Com. v. Capriotti, M. ( 2022 )


Menu:
  • J-S02039-22
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                       :
    :
    :
    MARK CAPRIOTTI                        :
    :
    Appellant           :   No. 929 EDA 2021
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 30, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-09-CR-0000872-2020
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                       :
    :
    :
    MARK CAPRIOTTI                        :
    :
    Appellant           :   No. 930 EDA 2021
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 30, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-09-CR-0002503-2020
    BEFORE: OLSON, J., KING, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                     FILED MARCH 18, 2022
    J-S02039-22
    In these consolidated appeals,1 Mark Capriotti (Appellant) appeals from
    the judgments of sentence2 imposed in the Bucks County Court of Common
    Pleas, following his open guilty plea on two separate dockets. At docket CP-
    09-CR-0000872-2020, Appellant pled guilty to one count each of stalking,
    terroristic threats, harassment, and recklessly endangering another person
    (REAP).3     At docket CP-09-CR-0002503-2020, Appellant pled guilty to one
    count of theft by unlawful taking4 for an unrelated incident. On appeal, he
    challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. For the below reasons,
    we affirm.
    We glean the following facts from Appellant’s December 9, 2020, guilty
    plea hearing. Regarding Appellant’s charges for stalking, terroristic threats,
    harassment, and REAP, the Commonwealth read the following recitation of
    facts into the record:
    ____________________________________________
    1 These appeals were consolidated by this Court sua sponte.        See Order,
    6/22/21.
    2 On May 10, 2021, Appellate Counsel filed two notices of appeal which both
    stated the appeal was from “the denial of post-sentence motions by Order
    without a hearing, entered on April 12, 2021[.]” Appellant’s Notices of Appeal,
    5/10/21. However, “[i]n a criminal action, appeal properly lies from the
    judgment of sentence made final by the denial of post[-]sentence motions.”
    Commonwealth v. Shamberger, 
    788 A.2d 408
    , 410 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2001)
    (en banc) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 
    800 A.2d 932
     (Pa. 2002). Thus,
    we have corrected the caption accordingly.
    3   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2709.1(a)(1), 2706(a)(1), 2709(a)(4), 2705.
    4   18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a).
    -2-
    J-S02039-22
    [The] Affiant is Officer Jason Mancuso from the Bristol
    Township Police Department.
    On November 3rd, 2019, [Officer Mancuso] was dispatched
    to [ ] Girard Avenue in Croydon, Bucks County[, Pennsylvania].
    On May 3rd, 2019, a temporary [Protection from Abuse
    (PFA) order] was obtained and was valid until November 15th,
    2019. The victim, Tara Walp [(Victim)], filed five police reports
    about violations on [October 23, 2019,] for a contempt of the PFA.
    On October 25th, 2019, [Victim] called 911 and reported
    that [Appellant] was following her from Bristol Borough to her
    home. [Appellant] was advised by [police] to abide by the PFA
    and to not have any contact with [V]ictim.
    On October 26th, 2019, [Appellant] was following [Victim]
    and became disorderly at a crowded football field.
    On November 3rd, 2019, [V]ictim began receiving texts
    from [Appellant] that stated, [“our minor children] will have no
    one before they don’t have me, what don’t you get, you’re pushing
    me off the edge and for no reason.[”]
    [Appellant] called [Victim] a pig and then texted, [“]death
    sentence is what you’re giving me, well, okay, I’ll take it on the
    chin, games are over[.”]
    [V]ictim took these text messages in a threatening
    [manner] and was concerned for her safety and the safety of her
    family.
    [Appellant] also texted her, [“]you made this all happen,
    you’re first[.”]
    Multiple texts starting at 10:45 in a threatening manner
    were observed by [Officer Mancuso], including, [“]we are at a
    point they will have no parents over having one, quote me on it.
    You know I’m done playing games and I’m done with court. I
    don’t give a fuck what they say or what you think, you won’t be
    here you keep playing with my kids[.”]
    [V]ictim was at Walmart at [10:50 a.m.] and received a
    text[: “Y]ou’re at Walmart as we speak. Don’t fucking play with
    me. You try and win a court case now, it’s a life case. I have
    nothing else but life to lose. I want my kids. I’ll give you to the
    end of the day. You are on a suicide mission[.”]
    -3-
    J-S02039-22
    [Victim] was in fear of this escalating behavior for her life
    and the lives of her children.
    On June 18th, 2020, [Victim] made a report at the Bristol
    Borough Police Department about being followed by [Appellant].
    Again, an active PFA was still in place protecting [Victim] and her
    three children.
    [Victim] advised that she was in her vehicle in the area of
    Green Lane and Farragut Avenue in Bristol Township, Bucks
    County, when she approached a traffic light where she observed
    [Appellant], who began to yell at her from across the street. She
    could not tell what he was yelling in her direction, but she
    proceeded on Farragut Avenue in order to get away from [him].
    She noticed he entered a vehicle and sped up to follow her.
    [Victim] turned down several side roads to avoid [Appellant].
    However, he continued to follow her, and she feared for her safety
    and the safety of her children in the vehicle. At the intersection
    of Wilson Avenue and Garfield Street, [Appellant] came head-on
    at [V]ictim at a stop sign with his vehicle causing her to swerve
    almost off the roadway. He proceeded to block her vehicle in and
    she could not safely leave the area. She began to yell for about
    20 seconds before [Appellant] left the area.
    [Victim] was terrified and shaking, as were her children in
    the vehicle. . . .
    N.T., 12/9/20, at 21-25.
    The underlying facts of Appellant’s theft conviction are as follows:
    On October 28th, 2019, [Falls Township Police Officer Ryan
    Murphy] responded to [ ] Longview Drive in Bucks County for the
    report of a theft complaint. On location, [Officer Murphy] spoke
    with Rita and Anthony Saccavino. They advised that they had
    been hanging out with [Appellant] and he got into an argument
    with Rita.
    On October 28th, 2019, they woke up and found the door
    to their shed in the backyard open with the lock missing. An
    inventory of the shed found that a [w]eedwhacker, a leaf blower,
    and a chainsaw were all missing, all valued around $1,000.
    [Appellant] admitted to taking those belongings. . . .
    N.T., 12/9/20, at 25-26.
    -4-
    J-S02039-22
    After agreeing to the Commonwealth’s recitation of facts on both
    dockets, Appellant pled guilty to one count each of stalking, terroristic threats,
    harassment, REAP, and theft by unlawful taking.5        The trial court deferred
    Appellant’s sentencing until March 30, 2021, to give him the opportunity to
    complete the HOPE program, a resource for incarcerated persons suffering
    from substance abuse issues, while in custody.       Shortly after entering the
    HOPE program, Appellant was removed for alleged drug use.
    On March 30, 2021, the trial court imposed an aggravated range
    sentence – 12 to 48 months’ incarceration - for the offense of stalking.6 The
    trial court also sentenced Appellant to a term of five years’ probation for
    terroristic threats to run consecutive to the stalking sentence, and a
    concurrent term of five years’ probation for theft.      The trial court did not
    provide additional sentences for Appellant’s convictions of harassment and
    REAP.7 On April 6, 2021, Appellant, through his counsel John J. Fioravanti,
    ____________________________________________
    5At the same hearing, Appellant agreed he violated the terms of his parole in
    two separate matters. See N.T. 12/9/20, at 9-10.
    6 Based on the commentary regarding Appellant’s sentencing ranges for both
    terroristic threats and stalking, we deduce Appellant has a prior record score
    (PRS) of one. See N.T. 3/30/21, at 38-39. The sentencing matrix dictates
    that stalking under Subsection 2709.1(a)(1) has an offense gravity score
    (OGS) of four. With a PRS of one and an OGS of four, the standard guideline
    range is restorative sanctions to nine months incarceration. See N.T.
    3/30/21, at 38-39. Thus, Appellant’s minimum sentence of 12 months is
    within the aggravated range.
    7The trial court also sentenced Appellant to back time for the parole violations
    and a concurrent six months’ probation for contempt of a PFA order. See
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -5-
    J-S02039-22
    Jr., Esquire (Plea Counsel), filed a timely post-sentence motion for
    reconsideration of his sentence, wherein Appellant argued:
    [ ] The sentence on the stalking counts[8] was excessive in
    view of [Appellant’s] record, rehabilitative needs[,] and family
    support.
    [ ] The [trial c]ourt discounted [Appellant’s] guilty plea, and
    acknowledgement of guilt.
    [The trial c]ourt over-emphasized the nature of these
    crimes.
    Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence at 2. The trial court denied
    Appellant’s post-sentence motion on April 13, 2021.
    Plea Counsel motioned to withdraw as counsel and, on April 20, 2021,
    the trial court granted his request and appointed the Bucks County Public
    Defender’s Office (Appellate Counsel) to represent Appellant on appeal.
    Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on May 10, 2021. On May 11, 2021,
    the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of matters
    complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), no later than 21 days
    ____________________________________________
    N.T., 3/30/21, at 42, 45. However, the present appeal only concerns the new
    charges at docket numbers CP-09-CR-0000872-2020 and CP-09-CR-
    0002503-2020.
    8 In his motion for reconsideration Appellant states he has “[two] counts of
    stalking[.]” Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence, 4/6/21, at 1
    (unpaginated). We note that Appellant pled guilty to one count of harassment
    under 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(4) and one count of stalking under 18 Pa.C.S. §
    2709.1(a)(1). At sentencing, the trial court sentenced him on “[c]ount
    [n]umber 1, stalking, [to] imprisonment in the state correctional institution
    for a period of” 12 to 48 months. N.T., 3/30/21, at 42. The trial court did not
    impose an additional sentence for harassment.
    -6-
    J-S02039-22
    after entry of the order. Appellant failed to file a timely concise statement
    and the trial court issued an opinion stating all of Appellant’s claims were
    waived. See Trial Ct. Op., 6/7/21, at 2-4.
    Appellant then filed in this Court a “Motion to Vacate Briefing Schedule
    and Remand Case for Filing a Concise Statement of Matters Complained of On
    Appeal Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925,” which cited his failure to timely file his
    statement as an “administrative error” of Appellate Counsel.            Appellant’s
    Motion to Vacate Briefing Schedule and Remand Case for Filing a Concise
    Statement of Matters Complained of On Appeal Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925,
    7/9/21, at 2 (unpaginated). On July 26, 2021, this Court entered a per curiam
    order remanding the appeal to the trial court for Appellant to file a timely
    concise statement.       Order, 7/26/21.       Appellant complied, and filed a Rule
    1925(b) statement on August 13, 2021. 9
    Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:
    Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant by
    imposing manifestly excessive sentences, failing to consider all
    relevant factors, and failing to adequately state the reasons relied
    upon for imposing said sentence?
    Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    This Court has stated:
    ____________________________________________
    9 We note Appellant raises additional claims in his 1925(b) statement
    challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence. However, he makes no
    specific argument regarding these issues and raises only one claim in his brief.
    See Appellant’s Statement of Matters Complained of On Appeal, 8/13/21, at
    1-2 (unpaginated).
    -7-
    J-S02039-22
    Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
    sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
    absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
    of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
    the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
    sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
    judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
    arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
    Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 
    107 A.3d 127
    , 132 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
    omitted).
    Appellant’s claim challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
    It is well established that such a challenge does not entitle an appellant to
    “review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 
    117 A.3d 763
    , 768 (Pa.
    Super. 2015) (en banc). Rather,
    [b]efore this Court can address such a discretionary challenge, an
    appellant must comply with the following requirements:
    An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his
    sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying
    a four-part test: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely
    notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether
    the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a
    motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P.
    [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect,
    Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial
    question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate
    under the Sentencing Code.
    
    Id.
     (citation omitted). “A substantial question exists only when the appellant
    advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were
    either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or
    (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing
    process.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    -8-
    J-S02039-22
    In the present case, Appellant filed both a timely notice of appeal and a
    timely post-sentence motion.      In addition, his brief includes the requisite
    concise statement of reasons relied upon for appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
    2119(f).   Thus, we must determine whether he has raised a substantial
    question justifying our review.    “We cannot look beyond the statement of
    questions presented and the prefatory Rule 2119(f) statement to determine
    whether a substantial question exists.” Commonwealth v. Crawford, 
    257 A.3d 75
    , 78-79 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).
    In Appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement, he contends the trial court
    abused its discretion when it “failed to consider all relevant factors such as
    Appellant’s family history, age, or rehabilitative needs[,]” “did not adequately
    set forth its reasons on the record for imposing said sentence[,]” and “imposed
    [a] manifestly excessive and unreasonable” sentence. Appellant’s Brief at 12.
    Preliminarily, we note the Commonwealth insists Appellant waived any claims
    pertaining to the sentences imposed for terroristic threats or theft.
    Commonwealth Brief at 17. We agree. Appellant only challenged his sentence
    pertaining to stalking in his post-sentence motion. See Appellant’s Motion for
    Reconsideration of Sentence at 2; see Caldwell, 117 A.3d at 768 (claims
    must be “properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
    modify sentence”).
    Further, the Commonwealth argues Appellant did not preserve his claim
    that the trial court failed to set forth on the record the reasons for imposing
    an aggravated range sentence. Again, we agree. Appellant did not allege the
    -9-
    J-S02039-22
    trial court failed to state any reasons for sentencing him in the aggravated
    range in his post-sentence motion. Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration of
    Sentence at 2; Commonwealth v. Tejada, 
    107 A.3d 788
    , 799 (Pa. Super
    2015) (citation omitted) (when an appellant fails to preserve “arguments in
    support of his discretionary aspects of sentencing claim at sentencing or in his
    post[-]sentence motion, they are not subject to [this Court’s] review.”). This
    claim is also waived for our review.
    Nevertheless, Appellant preserved his claims that the trial court abused
    its discretion when it imposed a “manifestly excessive” sentence for his
    stalking conviction because the trial court failed to consider “all relevant
    factors” in fashioning his sentence. Appellant’s Brief at 13. The factors to
    which Appellant refers are his “family history, age, [and] rehabilitative needs.”
    Id. at 12.   While a challenge to mitigating factors alone does not raise a
    substantial question, we note that an allegation that the trial court failed to
    consider rehabilitative needs and imposed an excessive sentence, absent
    consideration of mitigating factors, does meet the criteria for our review. See
    Commonwealth v. Akhmedov, 
    216 A.3d 307
    , 328 (Pa. Super. 2019) (“[A]n
    excessive sentence claim — in conjunction with an assertion that the court
    failed to consider mitigating factors — raises a substantial question.”) (citation
    omitted); see Commonwealth v. Baker, 
    72 A.3d 652
    , 662 (Pa. Super.
    2013) (concluding a challenge that the trial court did not consider
    rehabilitative needs raises a substantial question).
    - 10 -
    J-S02039-22
    Though Appellant has raised a substantial question, still we conclude he
    is not entitled to relief.   Our review of the trial court’s comments at the
    sentencing hearing reveals the court explicitly considered Appellant’s
    rehabilitative needs and other mitigating factors prior to imposing an
    aggravated range sentence:
    [Appellant], your behavior, to say the least, was atrocious.
    You have no regard for authority or the rule of law. What I mean
    by that is, you’re on supervision, absconding, leaving the state,
    you’re out of approved residence, you have multiple PFA’s and you
    commit crimes, all while on supervision.
    Then you’re brought in [and the court] issued a No Contact
    Order and the very next day you’re trying to contact that you were
    directed not to contact.
    You stalked this woman and put your own children at risk
    with your behavior. What I heard from [Victim] is, you’re going
    to do whatever you want and you don’t really care what a judge
    says or what anybody else says. Now, I know that you’re going
    to tell me and you have told me that you’re very apologetic and
    remorseful but your conduct bears out what she told me.
    Your guidelines, fortunately for you, are quite low. They
    recommend a sentence of probation and [six] months for
    terroristic threats and probation and [nine] months for the
    stalking. But your background – and I’ve read [the mental health
    evaluation]. Your background is, perhaps, in addition to your
    criminal history, that suggests you have . . . some violent
    tendencies based upon the facts of this case[.]
    [The mental health evaluator] has diagnosed you as being
    bipolar and having substance abuse [issues]. And, of course, we
    know that you have been unsuccessful in the [HOPE] Program. [I]
    attended a seminar on substance abuse [and] heard from the
    physician that relapse is quite common. It’s actually part of the
    process, so that we can expect that to take place.
    However, I say that only because you knew that you were
    probably in a position where you could not afford to make any
    - 11 -
    J-S02039-22
    mistakes and what I heard was you had drugs in the [HOPE]
    Program as a violation while you’re in the institution.[10]
    *       *    *
    I will also note from [Dana] Snyder[, Appellant’s childhood
    friend,] that there’s a different side of you. I have some other
    information from you as well that you can be friendly, caring, that
    you need a little bit of structure and guidance from your
    relationships, but that’s what probation and parole tried to do.
    [ ] I don’t know what else to say to you other than your
    behavior is just completely unacceptable. The day after you’re
    told by [the court] to stay away from [Victim], you’re contacting
    her, you’re threatening people, you’re engaged in criminal
    conduct. I would think that you would understand you can’t
    behave that way.
    So . . . I have a great deal of information about your
    background and about your conduct while on supervision and
    while in the institution and I have a great deal of information that
    presents a counter argument which I’ve listened to from you and
    [Plea Counsel].
    *       *    *
    We know that you’re in desperate need of treatment for
    mental health, substance abuse, and [the mental health
    evaluator] even points out a psychiatric evaluation is required.
    N.T., 3/30/21, at 37-42.
    Our review reveals the trial court considered the relevant factors raised
    by Appellant before fashioning its sentence, including his rehabilitative needs.
    The trial court’s determination that an aggravated range minimum sentence
    was warranted was not an abuse of discretion and this Court cannot reconsider
    ____________________________________________
    10 Appellant contested that he was in possession of drugs, stating “My
    misconduct reading was I was intoxicated. I was not found to have drugs in
    my possession.” N.T., 3/30/21, at 40.
    - 12 -
    J-S02039-22
    the above factors to fashion a sentence more favorable to Appellant.   See
    Zirkle, 107 A.3d at 132. No relief is due.
    Judgments of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/18/2022
    - 13 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 929 EDA 2021

Judges: McCaffery, J.

Filed Date: 3/18/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024