Com. v. Edgin, M. ( 2022 )

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2022 PA Super 49COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MAXWELL DAVID EDGIN :
:
Appellant : No. 984 MDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 4, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
Criminal Division at No: CP-14-CR-0001599-2018
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED: MARCH 22, 2022
Appellant, Maxwell David Edgin, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County on June 4, 2020. On
appeal, Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress
evidence. For the reasons stated below, we vacate and remand.
Following a hearing on Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence, the trial
court made the following findings:
1. Joshua Maurer is a patrol officer with the State College
Department.
2. Officer Maurer has been with the State College Police
Department for 2 years, is experienced in administering
standard field sobriety tests, has made over a dozen driving
under the influence (DUI) arrests during his tenure, and has
dealt with instances of alcohol overdose amongst college
students.
3. On May 30, 2018, Officer Maurer was dispatched to a report
of an intoxicated driver in State College, Centre County,
Pennsylvania.
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4. Officer Maurer received information from dispatch that Nick
Bradley, a bouncer at Bar Bleu, called 911 at approximately
7:47 p.m. to report a male intoxicated driver.
5. There was conflicting testimony from Officer Maurer and
Officer Kenneth Shaffer regarding what was known on the
night of May 30, 2018 before the incident which led to the
current suppression motion versus what was learned after an
investigation was made, and after [Appellant] was in custody.
6. It is clear to the [trial court] that Mr. Bradley observed a male
recklessly driving a black F-150 truck northbound on Garner
Street towards College Avenue, an area known for its heavy
pedestrian traffic. Officer Shaffer testified that in his
experience, driving recklessly is often synonymous with
driving intoxicated.
7. Mr. Bradley gave the registration of the male driver, and
stated he observed damage on the taillights on the rear end
of the truck.
8. Raymond Raker also called 911 on May 30, 2018[,] at
approximately 8:04 p.m. to report an accident near Shellers
Bend. Mr. Raker did not witness the accident.
9. At approximately 7:57 p.m.[,] Julia Rater called to report
observing a black F-150 run a red light at Westerly Parkway
and Atherton Street, and almost striking another vehicle.
10. While on the phone with dispatch, Ms. Rater followed the
truck, and observed it swerving in and out the lane and being
driven erratically, in general.
11. Ms. Rater followed the vehicle to 110 Raleigh Avenue where
she observed a white male exit the truck wearing a greyish
white shirt and blue shorts.
12. Ms. Rater observed the male staggering and stumbling to the
garage door, enter a code in a keypad, and then enter the
residence through the garage door.
13. Officer Mauer was in a marked vehicle and in full uniform
when he arrived at 110 Raleigh Avenue at 8:01 p.m.
14. Upon arrival at the residence, Officer Maurer observed the
truck with the damage that had been described by the callers.
15. Officer Maurer also observed air actively leaking from the
right rear tire.
16. Officer Maurer’s colleague, Officer Stover, arrived at the
residence simultaneously to Officer Maurer’s arrival, and
Officer Shaffer arrived shortly thereafter, at approximately
8:07 p.m.
17. Just before Officer Shaffer arrived, he contacted Ms. Rater
regarding her call to 911. When Officer Shaffer arrived, he
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observed the F-150 truck to have damage on the right side
and the rear end. The truck also had dents, scrapes, the
mirror was off, and there was a large piece of bark or wood
shoved between the rim and the tire.
18. In an attempt to make contact with the male, Officer Maurer
and his colleagues announced themselves and pounded on
the front door and the rear sliding door multiple times with
no response.
19. The officers contacted their lieutenant, Lieutenant Angelotti,
who came to the residence.
20. The officers conveyed their concerns about the welfare of the
male to Lieutenant Angelotti and inquired about making an
entry into the house.
21. Officer Maurer was concerned the male may have had a
medical emergency or was injured based on the damage to
the vehicle.
22. Officer Shaffer testified Mr. Bradley, the bouncer, believed the
male was intoxicated. Officer Shaffer also had concerns the
male may have been diabetic, as Officer Shaffer had prior
experience with diabetic emergencies.
23. Officers Maurer, Stover, and Shaffer used the rear sliding
doors to make entry into the residence at 8:27 p.m. At his
time, it was still daylight.
24. The [o]fficers announced themselves loudly and searched the
house for the male.
25. The officers found the male asleep in a bedroom on the
second floor of the residence.
26. Officer Maurer smelled a strong odor of alcohol, and had to
shake the male several times to wake him up, and recognize
the officers.
27. After waking the male, Officer Maurer noticed the male’s
speech was very slurred, his eyes were bloodshot and watery,
and he stumbled getting out of bed.
28. The officers called for Emergency Medical Services (EMS) at
approximately 8:29 p.m. for overconsumption of alcohol.
29. The male was identified as [Appellant] via his driver’s license.
Ms. Rater also returned to the residence to identify
[Appellant] while he was in the back of an ambulance.
30. After awaking [Appellant] from sleep, Officer Stover put
[Appellant] in a wrist lock. Officer Maurer testified that
putting a suspect in a wrist lock is standard to protect the
officer.
31. Officer Maurer assisted [Appellant] downstairs and led him
outside.
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32. Once outside, Officer Maurer checked for injuries and
proceeded to recite to [Appellant] his Miranda[1] rights.
33. [Appellant] was then interrogated at the scene.
34. [Appellant] denied driving, and denied that his truck was ever
downtown.
35. EMS arrived at approximately 8:47 p.m.
36. When EMS arrived[,] [Appellant] was taken to the hospital.
37. [Appellant]’s consent to a blood draw is not at issue before
[the trial court] and testimony surrounding the procurement
of [Appellant]’s Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) was not
presented, nor was evidence stating [Appellant]’s BAC level
presented to [the trial court].
Trial Court Opinion and Order, 11/1/19, at 1-4.2 (italics added).
Relying on the factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Roland, 637 A.2d
269 (Pa. 1994), which we discuss in detail infra, the trial court reasoned:
When analyzed together, the factors determining whether a
warrantless intrusion was justified supports the Commonwealth’s
argument that exigent circumstances existed at the time law
enforcement entered [Appellant]’s home. The gravity of the
offense was quite high as there were multiple calls made to 911
regarding a black F-150 driving recklessly in a well-populated
area. 911 caller Julia Rater remained on the phone with dispatch
while describing the driver erratic driving, near-miss with another
driver on the road, his running of a red light, and, finally, his
staggering and stumbling demeanor as he exited his car and
walked into his home. Ms. Rater’s call coupled with Nick Bradley’s
call reporting a person recklessly driving a truck matching the
same description more than adequately expressed [Appellant]’s
disregard for the safety of others that evening.
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1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 Subsequently, Appellant was charged with seven counts under Title 75,
including: DUI – Section 3802(c) (Count 1); DUI – Section 3802(a) (Count 2);
traffic control signals – Section 3112(a)(3)(i) (Count 3); one-way roadways –
Section 3308 (Count 4); obedience to traffic control devices, Section 3111(a)
(Count 5); careless driving, Section 3714(a) (Count 6); and, accidents
involving damage to unattended vehicles or property, Section 3745(a) (Count
7).
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There was a probability [Appellant] was suffering a medical
emergency. Law enforcement arrived at [Appellant]’s residence
shortly after [Appellant] entered the home. There were at least
four marked police vehicles surrounding [Appellant]’s house.
Shortly after arriving, the officers announced themselves loudly
and pounded on the door. They received no response. Officer
Maurer had extensive experience with impaired individuals.
Officer Shaffer knew the dangers of over-consumption of alcohol,
but also concerned with the possibility that [Appellant] may be
having a diabetic emergency. Armed with their experience, Mr.
Bradley’s report that [Appellant] was highly intoxicated, the
information gleaned from the call with Ms. Rater, and the visible
damage to [Appellant]’s truck, the officers came to the conclusion
that the driver of the truck was either intoxicated or suffering from
a medical emergency or both. These details were enough to form
basis of probable cause to enter the home. [. . .]
In consideration of factor four, not only did Ms. Rater provide a
detailed account of [Appellant]’s actions as she witnessed them,
but she followed him home, witnessed him exit his truck, and
enter the residence law enforcement later entered. While Ms.
Rater did eventually leave [Appellant]’s residence, the officers
arrived approximately five minutes later. Officer Shaffer testified
that when he arrived at [Appellant]’s residence the truck’s engine
was still hot. It was more than reasonable for law enforcement to
believe [Appellant] was in the house.
Finally, the officers’ entry into the house was peaceable as the
sliding door they opened to enter the home was unlocked, and the
entry was done during daylight hours. [The trial court] concludes
there were exigent circumstances present to justify law
enforcement’s warrantless entry into [Appellant]’s home.
Trial Court Opinion, 11/1/19, at 6-7.
After denying Appellant’s motion for suppression of evidence, Appellant
proceeded to a non-jury trial on the two DUI counts. On June 4, 2020, the
trial court, after finding him guilty, sentenced Appellant, inter alia, to pay a
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fine in the amount of $1,000.00, and imposed no additional sentence on the
second DUI count.3 This appeal followed.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
Did the suppression [court] err in holding that the warrantless
entry and search of [Appellant]’s residence did not violate
[Appellant]’s constitutional rights, as set forth in Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, by finding that said search was
supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances[?]
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Our review of an order denying a motion to suppress is limited:
We may consider only the Commonwealth’s evidence
and so much of the evidence for the defense as
remains uncontradicted when read in the context of
the record as a whole. Where the record supports the
factual findings of the trial court, we are bound by
those facts and may reverse only if the legal
conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
Commonwealth v. Russo, 594 Pa. 119, 934 A.2d 1199, 1203
(2007) (citations omitted). As an appellate court, we are not
bound by the suppression court's conclusions of law; rather, when
reviewing questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and
our scope of review is plenary. Id.Commonwealth v. Wilmer, 194 A.3d 564, 567 (Pa. 2018).
With this background in mind, we now address the issue raised in the
instant appeal.
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3 On the same day, Appellant was sentenced on the remaining counts, after
pleading guilty to all of them.
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We discern some ambiguity regarding the grounds relied upon by the
officers in making the warrantless entry into Appellant’s residence, which is
also present in the Commonwealth’s argument before the trial court and us.
It appears the Commonwealth is arguing that the officers could enter
Appellant’s residence under exigent circumstances and/or for emergency aid
purposes.4 We consider these in turn.
In Wilmer, our Supreme Court stated:
Under the Fourth Amendment, “searches and seizures without a
warrant are presumptively unreasonable,” subject only to
specifically established exceptions. Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); Birchfield
v. North Dakota, ––– U.S. –––, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 2173, 195
L.Ed.2d 560 (2016); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327, 107
S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987); Commonwealth v. Roland,
535 Pa. 595, 637 A.2d 269, 270 (1994). These exceptions
include, inter alia, exigent circumstances, the “plain view”
exception, searches incident to arrest, consent searches, and
automobile searches. A police officer may also briefly detain a
person without a warrant or probable cause, so long as the officer
possesses a reasonable suspicion that the individual is or is about
to be engaged in criminal activity. United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
Wilmer, 194 A.3d at 567-68 (footnotes omitted).
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4 Likewise, the trial court found the entry to be legal on exigent circumstances
grounds, even though some of the reasons provided seem more consistent
with emergency aid grounds. In Commonwealth v. Coughlin, 199 A.3d
401, 406 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) this Court held that the Roland
factors are of limited utility in determining whether warrantless entry was
necessary for rendering medical aid.
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In Roland, the appellant was convicted of furnishing liquor or malt or
brewed beverages to minors, possession of a small amount of marijuana, and
possession of drug paraphernalia. Appellant's convictions rested on evidence
obtained when police entered his home, without a warrant, to investigate
underage drinking. The Roland Court identified seven factors to be
considered in applying the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement:
Absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, the entry of a
home without a warrant is prohibited under the Fourth
Amendment. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583–90, 100
S.Ct. 1371, 1378–82, 63 L.Ed.2d 639, 648–53 (1980). In
determining whether exigent circumstances exist, a number of
factors are to be considered. As stated in Commonwealth v.
Wagner, 486 Pa. 548, 557, 406 A.2d 1026, 1031 (1979),
Among the factors to be considered are: (1) the
gravity of the offense, (2) whether the suspect is
reasonably believed to be armed, (3) whether there is
above and beyond a clear showing of probable cause,
(4) whether there is strong reason to believe that the
suspect is within the premises being entered, (5)
whether there is a likelihood that the suspect will
escape if not swiftly apprehended, (6) whether the
entry was peaceable, and (7) the time of the entry,
i.e., whether it was made at night. These factors are
to be balanced against one another in determining
whether the warrantless intrusion was justified.
Accord Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293, 298–99, 396
A.2d 1177, 1179–80 (1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 912, 100
S.Ct. 1843, 64 L.Ed.2d 266 (1980). Other factors may also be
taken into account, such as whether there is hot pursuit of a
fleeing felon, a likelihood that evidence will be destroyed if police
take the time to obtain a warrant, or a danger to police or other
persons inside or outside the dwelling. See Minnesota v. Olson,
495 U.S. 91, 100, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 1690, 109 L.Ed.2d 85, 95
(1990). Nevertheless, “police bear a heavy burden when
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attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify
warrantless searches or arrests.” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S.
740, 749–50, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2097, 80 L.Ed.2d 732, 743 (1984).
Where an offense being investigated by police is a minor one, a
balancing of the foregoing factors should be weighted against
finding that exigent circumstances exist. Welsh v. Wisconsin,
466 U.S. at 750–53, 104 S.Ct. at 2098–99, 80 L.Ed.2d at 743–45
(1984). See also Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. at 298,
396 A.2d at 1179 (where no grave offense is involved, particularly
a crime of violence, the justification for proceeding without a
warrant is more likely absent).
As stated in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. at 750–53, 104 S.Ct.
at 2098–99, 80 L.Ed.2d at 743–45,
Before agents of the government may invade the
sanctity of the home, the burden is on the government
to demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome
the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to
all warrantless home entries.
....
[I]t is difficult to conceive of a warrantless home
arrest that would not be unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment when the underlying offense is
extremely minor.
... [A]n important factor to be considered when
determining whether any exigency exists is the
gravity of the underlying offense.... [A]pplication of
the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of
a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there
is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense,
such as the kind at issue in this case, has been
committed.
Roland, 637 A.2d at 270-71. Applying these considerations the Court held
entry by police into appellant's home was improper. The police were not in
hot pursuit of a fleeing felon. Nor was there a danger to police or other persons
that would have necessitated an immediate entry. There was no reason to
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believe that appellant or the minors were armed. Further, the entry occurred
at nighttime, a particularly suspect time for searches to be conducted. Thus,
given the minor nature of the offense that triggered the police entry, and the
lack of exigent circumstances supporting that entry, the Court held denial of
appellant's motion for suppression was erroneous.
As noted above, applying Roland to the facts at hand, the trial court
concluded that there were exigent circumstances present to justify law
enforcement’s warrantless entry into Appellant’s home. We disagree.
First, we consider the offense gravity. Appellant committed
misdemeanor DUI offenses in this case. In Lange v. California, 141 S. Ct.
2011, 2016 (2021), the United States Supreme Court held that a
misdemeanant’s successful flight into his or her home does not categorically
give rise to an exigency supporting warrantless police entry. The Lange Court
noted that “misdemeanors run the gamut of seriousness.” Id. at 2020. In
arriving at its holding, the Lange Court addressed Welsh, an older drunk
driving case not involving the suspect’s flight:
This Court has held that when a minor offense alone is
involved, police officers do not usually face the kind of emergency
that can justify a warrantless home entry. In Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984)], officers responded to a call
about a drunk driver only to discover he had abandoned his
vehicle and walked home. See 466 U.S., at 742–743, 104 S.Ct.
2091. So no police pursuit was necessary, hot or otherwise. The
officers just went to the driver’s house, entered without a warrant,
and arrested him for a “nonjailable” offense. Ibid. The State
contended that exigent circumstances supported the entry
because the driver’s “blood-alcohol level might have dissipated
while the police obtained a warrant.” Id., at 754, 104 S.Ct. 2091.
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We rejected that argument on the ground that the driver had been
charged with only a minor offense. “[T]he gravity of the
underlying offense,” we reasoned, is “an important factor to be
considered when determining whether any exigency exists.” Id.,
at 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091. “[W]hen only a minor offense has been
committed” (again, without any flight), there is reason to question
whether a compelling law enforcement need is present; so it is
“particularly appropriate” to “hesitat[e] in finding exigent
circumstances.” Id., at 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091. And we concluded:
“[A]pplication of the exigent-circumstances exception in the
context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there
is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense” is involved.
Id. In summary, drunk driving can be considered a minor offense.5 And
where there is no hot pursuit or flight involved, warrantless entry into a home
under the exigent circumstances doctrine is rarely permissible. Id.In Commonwealth v. Fickes, 969 A.2d 1251, (Pa. Super. 2009),
however, this Court wrote that DUI, while a misdemeanor, is ”one of the few,
if not only misdemeanors, that results in over 500 deaths per year in our
Commonwealth.” Id. at 1258. Thus, the Fickes Court therefore concluded
the gravity of the offense before it was high. Id. Reading Fickes in light of
Lange and Welsh, however, we do not believe a categorial approach is
appropriate. Rather, we must examine the issue case by case. The instant
case, like Welsh, did not involve flight from police in hot pursuit. And while
we do not wish to diminish the seriousness of Appellant’s reckless, drunken
driving through a well-populated area—conduct that easily could have turned
deadly, as the Fickes Court explained—we conclude for purposes of the
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5 The defendant in Welsh had his license revoked; he did not face criminal
charges. We nonetheless find Welsh, and the Lange Court’s treatment of
Welsh, instructive.
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exigent circumstances analysis that police were not investigating a high-
gravity offense in this case. Thankfully there were no reported injuries
resulting from Appellant’s offenses; when police arrived at Appellant’s home,
they were investigating reports of his erratic driving after being turned away
from a bar because of his apparent intoxication. We therefore do not weigh
this factor in favor of exigency.
Regarding the second Roland factor, there is no indication in the record
that would support the officers’ reasonable belief that Appellant was armed.
Commonwealth’s Brief at 23. “This consideration bears materially on the
justification for a warrantless entry.” Williams, 396 A.2d at 1179. This factor
weighs against warrantless entry.
Third, we must consider whether the Commonwealth showed that “there
exists not merely the minimum of probable cause, that is requisite even when
a warrant has been issued, but beyond that a clear showing of probable cause,
including ‘reasonably trustworthy information,’ to believe that the suspect
committed the crime involved.” Williams, 396 A.2d at 1180. In Fickes,
police received a report of a hit and run automobile collision. Fickes, 969
A.2d at 1252. Following a trial of skid marks, a stop sign apparently bent over
from a collision, and muddy tire tracks from a vehicle that had run off the
road, police found the defendant asleep at the wheel of his vehicle in his open
garage. Id. at 1253-54. The garage appeared to be arranged as a “makeshift
social imbibing area,” and the vehicle apparently collided with a couch upon
entry to the garage. Id. at 1258. One open bottle of vodka was on the
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passenger seat. Id. On these facts, the Fickes Court held that probable
cause existed in support of the warrantless entry into the defendant’s garage.
Id.Instantly, police received information that Appellant drove away from a
bar after being denied entry based on his intoxication, and that he drove
erratically through a crowded area and eventually staggered from his vehicle
into his garage. Appellant acknowledges that police had strong reason to
believe he was intoxicated; he disputes whether evidence supported
warrantless entry for a medical emergency. We address the latter below. For
purposes of Roland, we conclude police had sufficient probable cause to
believe Appellant was intoxicated.
Fourth, there is no dispute Appellant was in the premises being entered.
Fifth, there is no indication that Appellant would have escaped if not
swiftly apprehended. Commonwealth’s Brief at 27. Several officers
surrounded the premises; as such, escape was not an option to Appellant,
particularly in his condition. This factor weighs against warrantless entry.
Sixth, the entry was peaceable, through an unlocked, sliding door in the
back of the house at 8:27 pm. Testimony indicates that it was still daylight
at that time. N.T. Suppression, 3/11/19, at 52. We observe that the
Commonwealth, in its brief described the entry as occurring in the “evening”.
Commonwealth’s Brief at 22, 23. These factors neither help nor hurt the case
for exigent circumstances.
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Next, we consider the Commonwealth’s argument that the dissipation
of Appellant’s BAC justified the warrantless entry. Commonwealth’s Brief at
32-33. Quoting from Commonwealth v. Dommel, 885 A.2d 998, 1004 (Pa.
Super. 2005), the Commonwealth argues that “perhaps, [the] most important
[factor] [is] the likelihood that [Blood Alcohol Content] evidence crucial to a
DUI charge permitting warrantless arrest in the first place would be lost in the
time it would take the officer to secure a warrant.” Commonwealth’s Brief at
32-33 (alterations in original). Id.In considering this argument, we must take account of developments in
the law after Dommel. In Commonwealth v. Trahey, 228 A.3d 520 (Pa.
2020), our Supreme Court noted:
Both breath tests and blood tests constitute “searches” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, conducting such
a search without a warrant is reasonable only if it falls within a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement. One such
exception . . . applies where the exigencies of the situation make
the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless
search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Although an exigency may present itself in a variety of contexts,
its defining trait is a compelling need for official action and no time
to secure a warrant. Such a need may arise, for instance, to
prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.
Id. at 530 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
The Commonwealth’s argument assumes that the difficulty in obtaining
and executing a search warrant prior to the expiration of the two-hour window
set forth in the DUI statute gives rise to an urgent need for warrantless
testing. Under this reasoning, given the mechanics of the statute and the
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operation of intoxication, essentially all DUI cases qualify as an exigent
circumstance. However, such an argument is inconsistent with Missouri v.
McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013). In McNeely, “the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected the government’s argument that the natural dissipation of alcohol in
a DUI suspect’s bloodstream constitutes a “per se exigency” that categorically
justifies warrantless BAC testing.” Trahey, 228 A.2d at 531 (citing McNeely,
569 U.S. at 147).
Relatedly, “a warrantless home arrest cannot be upheld simply because
evidence of the petitioner’s blood-alcohol level might have dissipated while
police obtained a warrant.” Welsh, 466 U.S.at 754. Similarly, in Roland,
relying on Welsh, our Supreme Court held that even if the evidence of the
crime might have been removed from appellant’s residence before a warrant
could have been obtained, “this alone would not have supported a warrantless
entry to investigate [a summary offense].” Roland, 637 A.2d at 272.6 Thus,
while destruction of the evidence is certainly a factor to be considered, it is
not, as suggested by the Commonwealth, the most important.
Considering all the foregoing, we do not believe the Roland factors
weigh in favor of an exigency here. Police were investigating a suspected
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6 We are aware that Welsh involved a noncriminal civil forfeiture offense (a
driver’s license revocation), Roland involved a summary offense, and that at
issue here is a misdemeanor. Despite the differences, for the reasons
explained infra, we believe Welsh and Roland support our conclusion that
destruction of the evidence was not a factor supporting the lawfulness of the
entry in the instant matter.
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drunk driver and nothing more. DUI is a misdemeanor, and there were no
reported injuries, no reported property damage other than to the vehicle itself,
and therefore nothing to support a finding of a high gravity offense here.
There is no indication Appellant was armed, and no indication he would have
could have attempted to escape. The Roland factors are not meant to support
warrantless entry any time police have strong reason to suspect drunk driving.
Moreover, the need to obtain BAC evidence is not sufficient, pursuant to
McNeely, to create an exigency. We therefore cannot uphold the trial court’s
denial of his suppression motion on this basis.
We now consider whether police were justified in entering Appellant’s
home to render emergency medical aid.
“[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment,” we have
often said, “is ‘reasonableness.’” [Brigham City v. Stuart, 547
U.S. 398, 403 (2006)]. Therefore, although “searches and
seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable,” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559, 124 S.Ct.
1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004) (internal quotation marks
omitted), that presumption can be overcome. For example, “the
exigencies of the situation [may] make the needs of law
enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is
objectively reasonable.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393–
394, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978).
Brigham City identified one such exigency: “the need to assist
persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.”
547 U.S., at 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943. Thus, law enforcement officers
“may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency
assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from
imminent injury.” Ibid. This “emergency aid exception” does not
depend on the officers' subjective intent or the seriousness of any
crime they are investigating when the emergency arises. Id., at
404–405, 126 S.Ct. 1943. It requires only “an objectively
reasonable basis for believing,” id., at 406, 126 S.Ct. 1943, that
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“a person within [the house] is in need of immediate aid,” Mincey,
supra, at 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408.
Brigham City illustrates the application of this standard. There,
police officers responded to a noise complaint in the early hours
of the morning. “As they approached the house, they could hear
from within an altercation occurring, some kind of fight.” 547 U.S.,
at 406, 126 S.Ct. 1943 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Following the tumult to the back of the house whence it came, the
officers saw juveniles drinking beer in the backyard and a fight
unfolding in the kitchen. They watched through the window as a
juvenile broke free from the adults restraining him and punched
another adult in the face, who recoiled to the sink, spitting blood.
Ibid. Under these circumstances, we found it “plainly reasonable”
for the officers to enter the house and quell the violence, for they
had “an objectively reasonable basis for believing both that the
injured adult might need help and that the violence in the kitchen
was just beginning.” Ibid.Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47-48 (2009).
While our courts have repeatedly recognized that the Fourth
Amendment does not prevent police officers from conducting a warrantless
entry and search when they reasonably believe that a person is in need of
immediate aid,7 the intrusion “must be commiserated with, and limited to, the
perceived need to provide immediate assistance,” Wilmer, 194 A.3d at 571,
or, as the U.S. Supreme Court stated, “strictly circumscribed the exigencies
which justify its initiation.” Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26
(1968)).
Our Supreme Court clarified the meaning of the phrase “strictly
circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation” stating:
____________________________________________
7 See, e.g., Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S.Ct. 1596 (2021).
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[T]he right of entry into the private dwelling by law enforcement
officers terminates when either the necessary emergency
assistance has been provided or it has been confirmed that no one
inside needs emergency assistance. At that point, law
enforcement officers must leave the residence unless some other
exception to the warrant requirement permits their continued
presence.
Wilmer, 194 A.3d at 572.
Instantly, the record reflects that Appellant was able to drive himself
home and enter his home by using the keypad on his garage door. This is far
removed from the emergencies that have been held to justify warrantless
intrusions; Coughlin, 199 A.3d at 408-11 (credible report of shots fired from
an assault rifle in a residential neighborhood noted for gun violence);
Commonwealth v. Ford, 175 A.3d 985, 990 (Pa. Super. 2017) (reports of
someone screaming and someone with a gun); appeal denied, 190 A.3d 580(Pa. 2018). Thus, there is no evidence of anything more than intoxication,
and there is no support in the law for holding that intoxication by itself creates
a medical emergency. The Commonwealth’s arguments and the trial court’s
findings to the contrary—that a high degree of intoxication can itself create a
medical emergency or that Appellant may have been suffering a diabetic
emergency—find no support in the record. There is no evidence specific to
Appellant indicating that a medical emergency existed here. We therefore
conclude that the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement did not
support entry into Appellant’s house in this case.
Furthermore, even if we assume that the officers had an objectively
reasonable basis for believing that Appellant needed immediate assistance,
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once they ascertained his conditions and acted upon it (by calling the EMS),
their authority for a warrantless entry into the residence ceased. At that point,
the officers were required to leave the premises. See Wilmer, 194 A.3d at
573. Instead, after removing Appellant from his residence, the officers
proceeded to detain, mirandize, and interrogate Appellant. In doing so,
however, they exceeded their authority. Id.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying
Appellant’s motion to suppress all evidence of wrongdoing procured by the
unlawful entry into his home. We therefore vacate the judgment of sentence
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judge Musmanno did not participate in the consideration or decision of
this case.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/22/2022
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