Burkett, W. v. Parsons Towing and Recovery Service ( 2022 )

J-S10006-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
WAYNE PAUL BURKETT : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
PARSONS TOWING AND RECOVERY : No. 1245 MDA 2021
SERVICE :
Appeal from the Order Entered August 25, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County
Civil Division at 2020-00922
BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: MARCH 30, 2022
Wayne Paul Burkett (Appellant), pro se,1 appeals from the order
dismissing his complaint against Parsons Towing and Recovery Service
(Parsons). We vacate the order of the trial court and remand for further
proceedings.
On October 5, 2020, Appellant filed a civil complaint against Parsons,
which alleged that on October 26, 2016, at the request of the Lewistown Police
Department, Parsons towed Appellant’s Chevrolet Silverado from East Market
Street in Lewistown. Complaint, 10/5/20, ¶¶ 2-3. Parsons did not secure the
Silverado or inventory his personal property within the vehicle. Id. ¶¶ 4, 6,
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Appellant appeared pro se throughout the underlying proceedings.
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14. Appellant called Parsons on December 23, 2016, requesting access to the
vehicle to retrieve his personal property. Id. ¶¶ 9, 11. Parsons refused,
demanding towing and storage fees exceeding $600.00. Id. ¶¶ 10-11.
Parsons subsequently transferred the vehicle to Premier Finance Adjusters
(Premier) for $1,305.00. Id. ¶ 12. According to Appellant, Premier’s
inventory of the vehicle indicated it contained no personal property. Id. ¶ 14.
Consequently, Appellant asserted causes of action for negligence, conversion
of personal property, violation of privacy and violation of Pennsylvania’s Unfair
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law.2 See generally id. ¶¶ 15-33.
On November 5, 2020, Appellant served Parsons with notice of his intent
to enter a default judgment pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 237. See Notice of Intent,
11/19/20, Attachment (return receipt). The trial court explained:
On November 19, 2020, Appellant filed a Notice of Praecipe to
Enter Judgment of Default against [Parsons]. On the same day,
November 19, 2020, Appellant filed [a] Praecipe to Enter Default
Judgment. Again, on December 22, 2020, Appellant filed a second
Praecipe to Enter Default Judgment. However, per the Clerk of
Court, Appellant did not provide the requisite notice to the
Prothonotary, and no default judgment was entered. This
caused great confusion in this case, and [Parsons] proceeded to
file an Answer because while the Praecipe to Enter Default
[J]udgment was docketed, there was no judgment entered by the
Prothonotary….
Trial Court Opinion, 11/19/21, at 1-2 (emphasis added).
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2 See 73 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 201-1-2-1-9.3.
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On April 1, 2021, Parsons filed an answer to Appellant’s complaint.
Answer, 4/1/21. In response, Appellant filed a motion to strike the answer as
untimely filed. Motion to Strike, 4/14/21. The trial court conducted hearings
on April 1, 2021, and June 16, 2021. On August 25, 2021, the trial court
entered an order purporting to vacate the default judgment entered against
Parsons3 and dismissing Appellant’s complaint as barred by the statute of
limitations. Trial Court Opinion, 8/25/21, at 2. Appellant filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied by operation of law. Thereafter, Appellant
timely filed a notice of appeal. Appellant and the trial court have complied
with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant presents the following issues for review:
I. Whether the court erred when finding default judgment was
not entered in the record because Appellant did not provide[] the
requisite notice to the prothonotary to enter the default of
record[?]
II. Whether the court erred when improperly[] sua sponte raising
[the] statute of limitations, when the issue was not before the
court, and dismissing with prejudice Appellant’s claims, and
vacating [the] default judgment[?]
III. Whether the court erred in finding Appellant waived [his]
objection to the court raising [the] issue of [the] of statute of
limitations, when any such objection would have been premature,
as Appellant could not have reasonably anticipated the court
dismissing Appellant’s claims and vacating the judgment[?]
Appellant’s Brief at 4 (issues renumbered).
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3The trial court subsequently recognized “that vacating a judgment that did
not exist was in error.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/19/21, at 2.
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Appellant first challenges the trial court’s conclusion that no default
judgment exists. Id. at 22. Appellant asserts he filed a praecipe to enter
default judgment on November 19, 2020, and the praecipe was docketed. Id.
at 23. Appellant points out the prothonotary’s stamp indicating that notice
pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 236 was entered. Id. Appellant further claims he
served Parsons with the praecipe on December 8, 2020. Id.
“The interpretation and application of a Pennsylvania Rule of Civil
Procedure presents a question of law. Accordingly, to the extent that we are
required to interpret a rule of civil procedure, our standard of review is de
novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Keller v. Mey, 67 A.3d 1, 5 (Pa.
Super. 2013) (citation omitted).
“The object of all interpretation and construction of [the Rules of Civil
Procedure] is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of [our] Supreme
Court.” Pa.R.C.P. 127(a). In doing so, the Rules are to be “liberally construed
to secure the just, speedy[,] and inexpensive determination of every action
or proceeding to which they are applicable.” Pa.R.C.P. 126.
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 237.1 provides, in relevant part, as
follows:
(2) No judgment … by default for failure to plead shall be entered
by the prothonotary unless the praecipe for entry includes a
certification that a written notice of intention to file the
praecipe was mailed or delivered
…
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(ii) in the case of a judgment by default, after the failure to
plead to a complaint and at least ten days prior to the date
of the filing of the praecipe to the party against whom
judgment is to be entered and to the party's attorney of
record, if any.
…
(3) A copy of the notice shall be attached to the praecipe.
(4) The notice and certification required by this rule may
not be waived.
Pa.R.C.P. 237.1(2), (3), (4) (emphasis added). The 1994 Explanatory
Comment to Rule 237.1 provides, in relevant part:
The rule continues the practice of entering judgment by the filing
of a praecipe with the prothonotary. Two additional requirements
are imposed. First, the praecipe must contain a certification that
notice was given in accordance with the rule. Second, a copy of
the notice must be attached to the praecipe.
Id., Explanatory Cmt. (1994) (emphasis added).
Our review of the record discloses that Appellant initially filed a praecipe
to enter default judgment on November 19, 2020. Praecipe to Enter Default
Judgment, 11/19/20. Appellant did not attach the required Rule 237.1 notice
to his praecipe.4 The record reflects no entry of default judgment against
Parsons on that date.
Appellant filed a second praecipe to enter a default judgment on
December 22, 2020. Praecipe to Enter Default Judgment, 12/22/20. Our
review discloses Appellant again failed to attach the required Pa.R.C.P. 237.1
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4 It appears that Appellant filed the Notice separately.
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notice. Because Appellant failed to comply with Rule 237.1(3), we discern no
error in the prothonotary’s refusal to enter default judgment. See Pa.R.C.P.
237.1(3). Consequently, Appellant’s first issue lacks merit.
We address Appellant’s second and third issues together, as they are
related. In his second claim, Appellant argues the trial court erred by sua
sponte raising the statute of limitations and dismissing his complaint with
prejudice. Appellant’s Brief at 18. Appellant asserts Parsons never raised a
statute of limitations defense in its untimely answer. Id. Citing Pa.R.C.P.
1030(a) and 1032, Appellant claims Parsons waived the statute of limitations
defense by not pleading it in a new matter. Id. at 19. Appellant also claims
the trial court erred by raising the issue sua sponte and dismissing his
complaint on this basis. Id. at 21-22.
In his third claim, Appellant disputes the trial court’s finding that he
waived any objection to the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint based on
the statute of limitations. Id. at 25. Appellant asserts he “could not have
reasonably anticipated the court’s dismissing [his] claims on the basis of the
statute of limitations,” because the issue was not before the court. Id. Upon
careful review, we agree.
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1030(a) states, “all affirmative
defenses including but not limited to the defenses of … statute of limitations,
shall be pleaded in a responsive pleading under the heading ‘New Matter.’”
Pa.R.C.P. 1030(a) (emphasis added). In Dash v. Wilap Corp., 495 A.2d 950-6-
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(Pa. Super. 1985), we recognized a trial court “acted prematurely in ruling in
advance of the action sought to be taken that the statute of limitations would
preclude [the plaintiff’s] recovery[.]” Id. at 955. We reasoned that the
statute of limitations “does not divest the court of jurisdiction over either the
cause of action or the parties, but is merely a procedural bar to recovery which
may be waived by consent or conduct implying consent.” Id. (citation
omitted). This Court expressly stated, “it is not the responsibility of the trial
court to act as [the party’s] advocate and proffer a defense[.]” Id.Here, the trial court cited Wojciechowski v. Murray, 497 A.2d 1342(Pa. Super. 1985), to support its ruling on the statute of limitations issue,
stating:
[C]areful review of Wojciechowski affirms this [c]ourt’s
decision. The Court in Wojciechowski was reprimanded for
dismissing a case sua sponte under the Political Subdivision Tort
Claims Act. However, Wojciechowski was remanded to the trial
court “to allow the parties to argue their respective positions to
the trial court, in accordance with the accepted principles of
pleading.” Wojciechowski, 497 A.2d [at] 1345[.]
In the case at hand, with no default judgment being entered
by the Prothonotary, an Answer had just been filed. Pursuant to
Pa.R.C.P. 1033, courts should liberally allow amendments to
pleadings. Although the Answer filed by [Parsons] failed to
address the statute of limitations, given the principles of Pa.R.C.P.
1033, [Parsons] would be allowed to amend his Answer to include
a statute of limitations defense. Absent that defense being
pled, this [c]ourt cannot ignore a facially untimely pleading.
Noticing that this incident occurred such a long time ago, this
[c]ourt directly asked about the issue of the statute of limitations
to Appellant on the record at the time of the hearing. This [c]ourt
further notes that at no time did Appellant object to this [c]ourt’s
inquiry about the statute of limitations….
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Trial Court Opinion, 11/19/21, at 2-3 (emphasis added).
Critically, the trial court ignores our admonishment in Wojciechowski:
In particular, we are compelled to note our disapproval of the trial
court’s sua sponte reference to and use of the Political Subdivision
Tort Claims Act “as a basis for the present cause of action to be
dismissed.” Especially is this so in the absence of [defendant]
Lackawanna County’s reliance upon such an immunity statute to
skirt liability. The reasons against endorsing such a gratuitous act
were cogently stated in Dash …, wherein the trial court’s denial
to the plaintiffs of the opportunity to retain an additional
defendant in a personal injury case, because it felt that any verdict
brought in by the jury in favor of the plaintiffs would have been
time-barred, was held to be “presumptive”. Additionally, we
observed that the statute of limitations was a defense which
should not be addressed by a trial court sua sponte.
Rather, the defense had to be pleaded. Also, as is germane
herein, we went on to write:
Instantly, it is undisputed that [the additional defendant] has
neither entered an appearance nor has he, as a result, raised
any objections or defenses to his inclusion in the suit.
Therefore, since [this party] has failed to act, it is not the
responsibility of the trial court to act as his advocate
and proffer a defense to the plaintiffs’ request to seek an
amendment to their complaint.
Wojciechowski, 497 A.2d at 1344 (emphasis added) (quoting Dash, 495
A.2d at 955-56) (emphasis added)). Although the defendant in
Wojciechowski, in Lackawanna County, had asked this Court to rule on the
Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act issue, we declined. We explained:
We do not find persuasive the argument of counsel for
Lackawanna County that if a remand takes place, it assuredly will
raise the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act as a defense. …
Lackawanna County requests this Court to overlook the procedural
irregularity and, in the interest of judicial economy, sustain the
actions of the trial court.
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We decline Lackawanna County’s invitation to give tacit approval
to a practice hereinbefore criticized.
Id. at 1344-45 (citations omitted).
As in Wojciechowski, we will not in this instance give tacit approval to
the trial court’s anticipatory application of the statute of limitations. Contrary
to Dash and Wojciechowski, the trial court asserted the defense, sua
sponte, on Parsons’s behalf. This was error. See Wojciechowski, 497 A.2d
at 1344 (admonishing trial court “for raising a [statute of limitations] defense
on behalf of the appellee … and, in essence, acting as its advocate.”); see
also Yount v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 966 A.2d 1115, 1119 (Pa. 2009) (in the
context of summary judgment, concluding “[f]or a trial court to raise an
argument in favor of summary judgment sua sponte and grant summary
judgment thereon risks depriving the court the benefit of advocacy on the
issue, and depriving the parties the opportunity to be heard.”).
Furthermore, Appellant preserved his objection to the statute of
limitations defense at the June 16, 2021, hearing. Appellant specifically
argued, “as far as any affirmative defenses, the statute of limitations were
[sic] waived in the Answer. It wasn’t pled.” N.T., 6/16/21, at 5 (emphasis
added). Thus, Appellant preserved the issue for review.
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Because the trial court erred in sua sponte asserting the statute of
limitations defense, we vacate the order dismissing the complaint and remand
for further proceedings.5
Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this Memorandum. Superior Court jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 03/30/2022
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5We make no determination regarding the viability of a statute of limitations
defense if properly pled.
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