Com. v. Colangelo, R. ( 2022 )

J-S38022-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ROBERT COLANGELO :
:
Appellant : No. 191 WDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 6, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-04-CR-0000268-2020
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: April 4, 2022
Appellant, Robert Colangelo, appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following his conviction of driving under the influence (“DUI”)—
highest rate of alcohol and public drunkenness.1 We affirm.
On November 22, 2019, Appellant was charged with the above-stated
offenses relating to an incident that occurred on November 15, 2019 in
Economy Borough. A non-jury trial took place on October 6, 2020. In its
opinion, the trial court summarized the evidence at trial as well as its
credibility findings:
[O]n November 15, 2019, at 1:40 p.m., [Appellant] drove his
yellow Ford Escape north on Route 65 in Beaver County, turned
right on Economy Way, and turned left onto Beaver Avenue. He
parked in front of Giant Eagle; at about 1:58 p.m., he left his car
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c); 18 Pa.C.S. § 5505.
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and walked to Giant Eagle. He walked out of Giant Eagle at 2:02
p.m., stepped past his car, and got back in his car.
[Appellant] then drove from Giant Eagle to Dollar Tree. Dollar
Tree is approximately 75 to 100 yards from Giant Eagle, in the
same parking lot.
At approximately 2:20 p.m., Officer Aschley [of the Economy
Borough Police Department] received a call to investigate a
possibly intoxicated male who had left Dollar Tree and was seated
in a yellow Ford Escape. Five to ten minutes later, Officers
Aschley, Amrhein, and Priolo arrived at the Dollar Tree parking lot
from the station. They saw [Appellant] in his car, which was not
running. Officer Amrhein told [Appellant] to get out of the car.
[Appellant] had a blank stare and did not make eye contact.
[Appellant] reached with his left hand for the door handle and
appeared to be reaching for something in his back right pocket.
Eventually, he opened the door and got out of the car. Officer
Aschley saw [Appellant] holding onto the vehicle’s door frame to
keep from falling over; [Appellant’s] eyes were red, and he was
swaying from side to side.
[Appellant] asked questions, including “What the fuck do you
want?” and “What did I do?”; his tone varied from very loud to
relaxed and subdued. He slurred his speech and was having
difficulty putting together words and sentences. Officer Amrhein
noticed that [Appellant] had a firearm[, which he was licensed to
carry,] in his back pocket, and officers secured the firearm.
Officer Aschley asked [Appellant] to take field sobriety tests, and
he replied, “l won’t take a tests.” [sic] Officer Amrhein handcuffed
[Appellant], who was arrested for suspicion of DUI and public
drunkenness. The time from when the officers arrived to when
they arrested [Appellant] was about 15 minutes.
Officer Aschley inspected [Appellant’s] car. [Appellant’s] cell
phone was in the center console, and the keys were on the
passenger seat. There was an empty half-gallon bottle of Vladimir
vodka in the backseat and five unopened cans of Keystone Ice in
the front passenger seat.
Officer Amrhein drove [Appellant] from the Dollar Tree parking lot
to the police station, and Officer Aschley followed. The drive to
the station took 10 minutes.
At the station, Officer Amrhein repeatedly asked [Appellant] to get
out of the car, and [Appellant] refused. Officer Hartsell asked
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[Appellant] to get out of the car, and [Appellant] refused. Officer
Hartsell pulled [Appellant] from the car by his jacket and walked
him to the booking and breathalyzing center. While Officer
Hartsell walked [Appellant] to the booking and breathalyzing
center, [Appellant] used profanities, including calling the officers
present a racial slur. Getting [Appellant] out of the car took about
30 to 60 seconds.
Officer Aschley asked [Appellant] to calm down, and he did.
[Appellant] was read the [Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation (“DOT”)] DL-26A form, signed the form, and
agreed to take a breath test. Officer Aschley, who was certified
to operate the DataMaster DMT, administered a breath test. []
[Appellant] gave breath samples at 3:22 p.m. and 3:25 p.m. The
low reading for [Appellant’s] breath test was a [blood alcohol
content (“BAC”)] of .356. Based on the high blood alcohol level,
the police requested medical personnel to check on the condition
of [Appellant]. Emergency medical services cleared [Appellant]
to leave, and he was released to another person.
At trial, [Appellant] testified on his own behalf. He acknowledged
that he drove from Route 65 to the Giant Eagle parking lot and
that he drove from there to the parking lot by Dollar Tree.
[Appellant] testified that he felt ill inside Dollar Tree, went to his
car, drank some vodka, and went to sleep. The Court found this
testimony to be not credible. Officer Aschley’s testimony
established that he had first observed [Appellant] with a blank
stare, which is inconsistent with [Appellant] being asleep. The
Court found [Appellant’s] statement about drinking vodka after
exiting Dollar Tree to be self-serving and not credible in view of
the empty half-gallon vodka bottle found in the car.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/17/21, at 2-4 (record citations and footnotes omitted).
At the conclusion of trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty of DUI—
highest rate of alcohol and public drunkenness. On January 6, 2021, the court
sentenced Appellant for the DUI offense to a six-month term of restrictive
probation with the first 72 hours on work release and a $1,000 fine; for the
public drunkenness offense, Appellant was sentenced to pay a fine of $50.
Appellant did not file a post-trial motion and instead filed this timely appeal.
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Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:
[1.] Whether the court erroneously admitted blood alcohol
evidence obtained through a breathalyzer as the Commonwealth
failed to introduce testimony, or lay the appropriate foundation,
to establish there was a 20-minute observation period where the
person being tested did not ingest alcohol or other fluids,
regurgitate, vomit[,] eat or smoke as required under [67] Pa.
Code § 77.24.
[2.] Whether the court erroneously admitted blood alcohol
evidence obtained through a breathalyzer when the
Commonwealth presented evidence that the person being tested
was incapable of providing consent for testing through a DL-26A
based upon an alleged blood alcohol level of .356.
[3.] Whether [Appellant’s] conviction for driving under the
influence at count 1 is properly supported by the factual testimony
and evidence submitted by the Commonwealth at trial as no
testimony was presented from any witness as to [Appellant] being
impaired (including relation back expert testimony) prior to the
arrival of law enforcement or at any time when he had operated,
driven, or had actual control of his motor vehicle.
[4.] Whether [Appellant’s] conviction for public [drunkenness] is
supported by the factual record as no testimony was presented
from any witness called by the Commonwealth to establish that
[Appellant] appeared in a public place manifestly under the
influence of alcohol to a degree that the individual endangered
himself or other persons or property or annoyed persons in the
vicinity.
Appellant’s Brief at 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Appellant’s first two issues relate to the trial court’s admission of the
Appellant’s breathalyzer test results, which showed that he had a BAC of .356
at the time of testing. In reviewing a trial court’s evidentiary rulings, we are
guided by the following standard:
The admissibility of evidence is a matter within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only where there
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is a clear abuse of discretion. Our standard of review of a
challenge to an evidentiary ruling is therefore limited. Abuse of
discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but rather where
the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not
applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of
partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 241 A.3d 1094, 1101 (Pa. Super. 2020)
(citation omitted).
Appellant first argues that the trial court erred by admitting the results
of his breath test because the court did not establish that he was not kept
under continuous observation by a police officer for at least 20 minutes prior
to the administration of his first breath test, as required by DOT regulations
(the “20-minute rule”). See 67 Pa. Code § 77.24(a). Appellant contends that,
while there may have been testimony at trial to show that he had been
observed for 20 minutes, “the Commonwealth failed to establish the second
element of the ‘observation’ requirement as there was no testimony
introduced as to whether [Appellant] ingested alcoholic beverages or other
fluids, regurgitated, vomited, [ate], or smoked in the 20 minutes prior to being
subjected to the breathalyzer.” Appellant’s Brief at 10.
Pursuant to the Vehicle Code, chemical breath tests are admissible in
DUI trials when performed by qualified operators and in accordance with
“procedures prescribed jointly by regulations of the Departments of Health
and Transportation.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(c)(1). Section 77.24(a) of the DOT
regulations sets forth the 20-minute rule at issue here:
(a) Observation. The person to be tested with breath test
equipment shall be kept under observation by a police officer or
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certified breath test operator for at least 20 consecutive minutes
immediately prior to administration of the first alcohol breath test
given to the person, during which time the person may not have
ingested alcoholic beverages or other fluids, regurgitated,
vomited, eaten or smoked. Custody of the person may be
transferred to another officer or certified breath test operator
during the 20 consecutive minutes or longer period as long as the
person to be tested is under observation for at least 20
consecutive minutes prior to initial administration of the alcohol
breath test.
67 Pa. Code § 77.24(a).
We have held that compliance with the 20-minute rule goes “go to the
trustworthiness of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Barlow, 776 A.2d 273,
275 (Pa. Super. 2001). “If that issue is raised, failure to comply does not
permit the results to be admitted[;] as substantive evidence with lessened
reliability[,] it precludes admission.” Id. (emphasis added). To satisfy the
rule, the Commonwealth must show by a preponderance of the evidence that
the “individual subjected to a breathalyzer test did not ingest anything for the
20 minutes prior to administration of the test, but [] ‘observation,’ as used in
[Section] 77.24(a), [does] not mean ‘eyes on [the individual’s] mouth 100%
of the time.’” Commonwealth v. Snell, 811 A.2d 581, 586 (Pa. Super. 2002)
(quoting Barlow, 776 A.2d at 275).
This Court has required that an objection to the admissibility of BAC
evidence based upon the 20-minute rule be raised in a pre-trial motion to
suppress.2 In Commonwealth v. Stoops, 723 A.2d 184 (Pa. Super. 1998),
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2 This Court has previously stated that a challenge to the admissibility of
evidence based upon the Commonwealth’s failure to follow DOT breath test
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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we rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that the defendant had waived his
argument premised on the 20-minute rule by not including it in his
suppression motion but only because the defendant raised the issue orally at
his suppression hearing and in a post-hearing brief and he was not provided
with discovery that alerted him to the issue until two days before the hearing.
Id. at 188. In Commonwealth v. Murray, No. 575 EDA 2019, 2019 WL
7290499 (Pa. Super. filed Dec. 30, 2019) (unpublished memorandum), we
held that the defendant’s 20-minute rule argument was waived as it was first
raised at trial and not included in the defendant’s pre-trial suppression motion.
Id. at *5.3
The necessity that a challenge to the admissibility of breath test results
be made prior to trial is particularly important with respect to a 20-minute
rule claim as DOT regulations expressly provide that the arrestee may be
observed by any officer over the course of the 20-minute period, not just the
____________________________________________
regulations should be raised in a motion in limine rather than in a suppression
motion as the latter is intended to address evidence obtained in violation of a
defendant’s rights. Commonwealth v. Hoopes, 722 A.2d 172, 174 n.1 (Pa.
Super. 1998); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(A) (providing that a suppression
motion may be filed “to suppress any evidence alleged to have been obtained
in violation of the defendant’s rights”). We need not decide here the precise
vehicle by which a defendant may raise a challenge to the Commonwealth’s
adherence to the 20-minute rule, but rather as illustrated herein, the crucial
factor in preserving such a challenge is that it is raised prior to trial to allow
the Commonwealth to meet its burden to show the reliability of the breath
test results.
3 Although Murray is an unreported memorandum decision, we cite to it for
its persuasive value. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (non-precedential Superior Court
decisions filed after May 1, 2019 may be cited for their persuasive value).
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officer who performs the breath test. 67 Pa. Code § 77.24(a). To the extent
a 20-minute rule challenge could be raised for the first time in the midst of
trial, the Commonwealth would not have been on notice that they would need
to call as a witness every officer who observed the defendant over the 20
minutes prior to the breath test, including officers who otherwise would not
offer relevant evidence probative of the defendant’s guilt. Cf. Pa.R.Crim.P.
581(E) (providing that a suppression hearing may be conducted prior to or at
trial but “shall afford the attorney for the Commonwealth a reasonable
opportunity for investigation” prior to the hearing).
In this case, Appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion, including a
motion to suppress, but he did not raise a challenge based upon the 20-minute
rule in that motion.4 Instead, Appellant first raised the issue when he objected
to the admission of Appellant’s BAC results during the testimony of Officer
Aschley, who performed the breath test. N.T., 10/6/20, at 55. Notably, at
the point that Appellant raised the 20-minute rule issue, one of the officers
who had observed Appellant after he had returned to the station, Lieutenant
Hartsell, had already finished testifying and been excused from trial. Id. at
10-39. In addition, there was testimony at trial that another officer had
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4 Appellant’s motion to suppress the results of his chemical test was based
upon the fact that the Commonwealth had not provided any discovery related
to the testing at the time the motion was filed. Appellant’s Omnibus Pre-Trial
Motion, 5/4/20. A hearing on the omnibus motion was scheduled for June 2,
2020 but then cancelled without prejudice. Order, 6/3/20. Appellant did not
seek to renew or amend his suppression motion prior to or at trial.
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observed Appellant after his return to the station outside the presence of
Officer Aschley. Id. at 16-17, 77-78. In light of Appellant’s failure to raise
his challenge based upon the 20-minute rule prior to trial, we conclude that
Appellant has waived his first issue. See Stoops, 723 A.2d at 188; Murray,
2019 WL 7290499, at *5.
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in admitting Appellant’s
breath test results on the basis that the evidence at trial showed that Appellant
had a high degree of impairment, yet the Commonwealth did not show that
Appellant was able to voluntarily consent to a breath test. Appellant contends
that the Pennsylvania implied consent law does not automatically provide
consent to chemical testing of blood or breath and that instead the consent
must be freely given to the chemical test before the results of the test can be
used against a defendant in a criminal proceeding. Appellant asserts that,
viewing the totality of the circumstances, he could not have consented to the
test based upon the fact that he was already in custody at the time the request
was made, he was not able or willing to follow police commands, and police
had already used force during his arrest and transport to the station.
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a
breath test following a DUI arrest is considered a search incident to arrest that
may be conducted without a warrant. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S.Ct.
2160, 2184-85 (2016); Commonwealth v. Trahey, 228 A.3d 520, 533 (Pa.
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2020).5 Unless the motorist challenges the legality of the arrest itself, a
warrantless breath test will be deemed valid under the Fourth Amendment,
and the motorist has “no [constitutional] right to refuse it.” Trahey, 228 A.3d
at 536 (quoting Birchfield, 136 S.Ct. at 1286).
However, the Pennsylvania implied consent law provides a motorist
arrested on suspicion of DUI with the choice “either (a) to comply with the
test or (b) to refuse and accept the consequences that accompany refusal,”
including a suspension of the driver’s operating privileges. Commonwealth
v. Bell, 211 A.3d 761, 773 (Pa. 2019); see also 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(a), (b)(1).
Thus, under the implied consent statute, a motorist has “an absolute right to
refuse all chemical testing.” Bell, 211 A.3d at 774 n.12. The implied consent
law and our appellate case law require that the motorist be apprised of her
rights, which are contained in the DOT’s DL-26 form, at the time of the request
for chemical testing. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(2); see also Commonwealth v.
Venable, 200 A.3d 490, 495-96 & n.3 (Pa. Super. 2018); Commonwealth
v. Johnson, 188 A.3d 486, 488 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2018).
There is no dispute in this matter that, after Appellant was transported
back to the station, Officer Aschley read the DL-26 form to Appellant,
Appellant signed the DL-26 indicating that he agreed to the breath test, and
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5Unlike a breath test, a chemical test of blood is inadmissible absent a warrant
or a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, such as the motorist’s
voluntary consent to the test. Birchfield, 136 S.Ct. at 2185-86; Trahey, 228
A.3d at 530, 533; Commonwealth v. Krenzel, 209 A.3d 1024, 1028 (Pa.
Super. 2019).
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Appellant performed the test. N.T., 10/6/20, at 49-52. Appellant raises no
argument that the warnings contained on the DL-26 form contained an
inaccurate or incomplete recitation of his rights with respect to the testing he
was asked to perform. Cf. Commonwealth v. Krenzel, 209 A.3d 1024,
1031-32 (Pa. Super. 2019) (consent to submit to blood test was not valid
where officer failed to read DL-26 form to defendant or inform defendant of
his right to refuse testing).6
Furthermore, Appellant did not raise the issue of the voluntariness of his
consent in his pre-trial suppression motion; instead, the issue was first
brought to the trial court’s attention during closing arguments. N.T., 10/6/20,
at 110-11. This Court has traditionally resolved the issue of whether a
motorist voluntarily consented to chemical testing in DUI cases through the
suppression motion process. See, e.g., Krenzel, 209 A.3d at 1027;
Venable, 200 A.3d at 494; Johnson, 188 A.3d at 488. While Appellant
appears to argue that the Commonwealth was required to affirmatively prove
in its case in chief that his consent to chemical testing was the product of a
free and voluntary choice, he cites no decision for this proposition, and we are
aware of no case law that would impose this burden upon the Commonwealth
in the absence of a suppression motion. Therefore, we are constrained to find
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6 Indeed, Appellant alleges no ground for this Court to vitiate his consent to
testing aside from factors that are characteristic of a large number of DUI
cases, namely that he was highly intoxicated, he had already been placed
under arrest, and that he had been confrontational with the officers who
detained him.
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that Appellant has waived any challenge based upon the voluntariness of his
consent to testing. Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(B). Appellant’s second issue thus merits
no relief.
In Appellant’s last two appellate issues, he challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence to support his convictions of DUI—highest rate of alcohol and
public drunkenness. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presents a
question of law and is subject to plenary review under a de novo standard.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 234 A.3d 576, 581 (Pa. 2020). When reviewing
the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the evidence
admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, were sufficient to prove every
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. “[T]he facts and
circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence.” Commonwealth v. Bowens, 265 A.3d 730, 740
(Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc) (citation omitted). “The Commonwealth may
sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.” Id. (citation omitted).
Finally, we note that the trier of fact has the authority to determine the weight
of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses and is free to believe all, part,
or none of the evidence. Id. at 741.
In his third issue, Appellant argues that, in the absence of evidence that
he had a BAC of .356 within two hours of driving, the Commonwealth did not
establish that he was guilty of the DUI offense. Appellant recognizes in his
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brief that this appellate issue is entirely dependent on him prevailing on his
challenge to the trial court’s admission of the breath test results. Appellant’s
Brief at 21. However, as we have determined that the trial court properly
admitted Appellant’s test results, see supra, Appellant is not entitled to relief
on this claim.
Finally, Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support
his conviction of the summary offense of public drunkenness. Appellant
argues that there was no evidence submitted at trial that he had interactions
in public with anyone other than the police officers who arrested him, and
there was no testimony from the officers who made contact with him that they
felt threatened or annoyed by Appellant’s behavior.
The public drunkenness statute provides that “[a] person is guilty of a
summary offense if he appears in any public place manifestly under the
influence of alcohol [] to the degree that he may endanger himself or other
persons or property, or annoy persons in his vicinity.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5505.
The public drunkenness statute does not apply to individuals who are taken to
a public place by police officers; however, locations that are on private
property but are frequented by members of the public are considered public
places under the statute. Commonwealth v. Whritenour, 751 A.2d 687,
688 (Pa. Super. 2000) (road in private community that was open to residents,
guests, and employees of community was a public place for purpose of public
drunkenness statute); Commonwealth v. Meyer, 431 A.2d 287, 290-91 (Pa.
Super. 1981) (reversing conviction where defendant was detained after
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causing disturbance in private club and then involuntarily brought outside of
the club by officers). Furthermore, the “manifestly under the influence of
alcohol” element of the public drunkenness offense requires “some aberrant
behavior” that could harm or annoy another. Meyer, 431 A.2d at 290-91(citation omitted) (finding alternate grounds for reversal where testimony
revealed that defendant, after being taken to a public place by officers, was
only observed staggering and having the odor of alcohol ).
In finding that there was sufficient evidence to support the public
drunkenness conviction, the trial court reasoned as follows:
In this case, the parking lot outside the Dollar [T]ree was a public
place because it was a premise open to the public. Whritenour,
751 A.2d at 688. [Appellant’s] intoxication was shown by his
blank stare, difficulty locating and opening the door handle, and
physical instability in holding the car door frame for support and
swaying from side to side. [Appellant’s] speech was slurred, his
eyes were red, and he had a hard time putting together words and
sentences. Further, [Appellant’s] impairment is reflected in
judgment to ask officers “What the fuck do you want” and his
continued use of profanity and racial slurs at the police station.
The high degree of alcohol in [Appellant’s] blood supports a
conclusion that he endangered himself. Finally, [Appellant’s]
reaching for his back right pocket, where his legally carried firearm
was, when confronted by police[,] demonstrates that he was
intoxicated to a degree that endangered other persons.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/17/21, at 14-15 (some internal citations omitted).
We discern no error in the trial court’s analysis of Appellant’s sufficiency
claim. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
Appellant was found in a place frequented by members of the general public—
the parking lot for the Dollar Tree—and there was abundant evidence of his
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high degree of intoxication from alcohol. While there is no evidence that
Appellant had interactions with members of the public aside from the officers,
his confrontational attitude towards the officers as well as the act of reaching
for his firearm in his rear pocket while highly inebriated was sufficient to prove
he that he “endanger[ed] [] other persons [] in his vicinity.” 18 Pa.C.S. §
5505.
Finding no merit to Appellant’s appellate issues, we affirm his judgment
of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/4/2022
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