Com. v. Terantino, E. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S44006-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    EDWARD TERANTINO,
    Appellant                     No. 44 EDA 2017
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 6, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0001848-2013
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                          FILED AUGUST 16, 2017
    Appellant, Edward Terantino, appeals nunc pro tunc from the August
    6, 2015 judgment of sentence of 48 to 96 months’ incarceration.
    Additionally, Appellant’s counsel, Hillary A. Madden, Esq., seeks to withdraw
    her representation of Appellant.          After careful review, we deny counsel’s
    petition to withdraw and remand with instructions.
    In March of 2014, Appellant was convicted, following a jury trial, of
    involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (of a person less than 16 years of
    age) (hereinafter, “IDSI”), statutory sexual assault, and aggravated indecent
    assault (of a person less than 16 years of age).1           The facts underlying
    Appellant’s convictions are unnecessary to our disposition of his appeal at
    ____________________________________________
    1
    18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3123(a)(7), 3122.1, and 3125(8), respectively.
    J-S44006-17
    this juncture. For these offenses, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate
    term of 9 to 18 years’ incarceration, which included a mandatory minimum
    sentence of 5 years’ incarceration, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718, for
    Appellant’s IDSI conviction.
    Appellant filed a timely direct appeal and, while this Court found
    meritless the sole issue he presented therein (a claim that the trial court
    erred by allowing certain expert testimony), we sua sponte vacated
    Appellant’s mandatory minimum sentence under section 9718, as that
    statute has been struck down as unconstitutional in the wake of Alleyne v.
    United States, 
    133 S.Ct. 2151
    , 2163 (2013) (holding that “facts that
    increase mandatory minimum sentences must be submitted to the jury” and
    found beyond a reasonable doubt).    See Commonwealth v. Terantino,
    No. 2311 EDA 2014, unpublished memorandum at 6-8 (Pa. Super. filed April
    14, 2015) (relying on Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 
    106 A.3d 800
     (Pa. Super.
    2014), aff’d by, 
    140 A.3d 651
     (Pa. 2016) (holding that 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718 is
    unconstitutional pursuant to Alleyne)). Accordingly, we vacated Appellant’s
    sentence and remanded for resentencing.    See Terantino, No. 2311 EDA
    2014, unpublished memorandum at 8.
    On remand, the trial court resentenced Appellant on August 6, 2015,
    to a term of 4 to 8 years’ incarceration for his IDSI conviction, and to a
    concurrent term of 2 to 4 years’ incarceration for his aggravated indecent
    assault offense.    His statutory sexual assault conviction merged for
    sentencing purposes.
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    J-S44006-17
    Appellant filed a timely motion for reconsideration of his sentence,
    which the court denied.    Appellant then filed a notice of appeal, but his
    counsel at that time did not file a brief with this Court, resulting in
    Appellant’s appeal being dismissed.          Thereafter, the court appointed
    Appellant new counsel, Attorney Madden, who filed a petition under the Post
    Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, seeking the
    restoration of Appellant’s right to appeal from his August 6, 2015
    resentencing. On October 28, 2016, the court granted Appellant’s petition
    and reinstated his right to file a direct appeal.    On November 23, 2016,
    Attorney Madden filed the nunc pro tunc notice of appeal that is presently
    before this Court.   Attorney Madden also timely complied with the trial
    court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, wherein she preserved
    the following three issues for our review:
    1. The trial court erred in denying [Appellant’s] Motion to
    Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction due to the expiration of the
    statute of limitations.
    2. The trial court erred in denying [Appellant’s] Motion to
    Dismiss due to staleness and pre-arrest delay in violation of
    [Appellant’s] constitutional rights to due process.
    3. The trial court abused its discretion in imposing an excessive
    sentence.
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 12/14/16, at 1.
    On March 6, 2017, Attorney Madden filed with this Court a petition to
    withdraw as counsel. Therein, Attorney Madden erroneously states that she
    is seeking to withdraw under Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
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    J-S44006-17
    (Pa. 1998), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
     (Pa. Super.
    1988) (en banc). A Turner/Finley ‘no-merit’ letter is the appropriate filing
    when counsel seeks to withdraw on appeal from the denial of PCRA relief.
    See Commonwealth v. Widgins, 
    29 A.3d 816
    , 817 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2011).
    While Attorney Madden was initially representing Appellant during the post-
    conviction    proceedings   through   which    his   direct   appeal    rights   were
    reinstated, the present appeal is from Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
    Accordingly, to withdraw, Attorney Madden must satisfy the more stringent
    dictates     of   Anders    v.   California,   
    386 U.S. 738
          (1967),   and
    Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    978 A.2d 349
     (Pa. 2009).
    We recognize that this Court has accepted an Anders/Santiago brief
    in lieu of a Turner/Finley letter, reasoning that Anders/Santiago
    “provides greater protection to a defendant” than does Turner/Finley.
    Widgins, 
    29 A.3d at
    817 n.2. However, we are aware of no legal authority
    suggesting that this Court may accept a Turner/Finley ‘no-merit’ letter in
    lieu of an Anders brief.
    Moreover, while we acknowledge that Attorney Madden has filed a
    brief that seems to substantially comply with Anders/Santiago, the letter
    that she sent to Appellant informing him that she is seeking to withdraw is
    inadequate in one important regard. Specifically, Attorney Madden informed
    Appellant that he has “the right to proceed with [his] appeal pro se or, if [he
    is] financially able to do so, hire private counsel of [his] choosing.” Petition
    to Withdraw, 3/6/17, at Exhibit E (letter to Appellant dated March 1, 2017).
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    J-S44006-17
    Arguably,   Attorney    Madden’s   statement   to   Appellant   would   satisfy
    Turner/Finley, which requires counsel to, inter alia, “inform the PCRA
    petitioner that upon the filing of counsel’s petition to withdraw, the
    petitioner-appellant has the immediate right to proceed in the appeal pro se
    or through privately-retained counsel.”    Commonwealth v. Muzzy, 
    141 A.2d 509
    , 512 (Pa. Super. 2016) (emphasis omitted). However, to comply
    with Anders/Santiago, counsel must advise the appellant
    of his right to: “(1) retain new counsel to pursue the appeal; (2)
    proceed pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any points that the
    appellant deems worthy of the court[’]s attention in
    addition to the points raised by counsel in the Anders
    brief.” Commonwealth v. Nischan, 
    928 A.2d 349
    , 353 (Pa.
    Super. 2007), appeal denied, 
    594 Pa. 704
    , 
    936 A.2d 40
     (2007).
    Commonwealth v. Orellana, 
    86 A.3d 877
    , 880 (Pa. Super. 2014)
    (emphasis added).      Attorney Madden did not inform Appellant of the third
    right emphasized above.
    Accordingly, Attorney Madden has not satisfied the requirements of
    Anders/Santiago and we must deny her petition to withdraw and remand
    with the following instructions. See Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 
    931 A.2d 717
    , 721 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“If counsel does not fulfill the aforesaid
    technical requirements of Anders, this Court will deny the petition to
    withdraw as counsel and remand the case with appropriate instructions
    (e.g., directing counsel either to comply with Anders or file an advocate’s
    brief on [the] [a]ppellant’s behalf).”) (citation omitted).     We direct that
    Attorney Madden file - within 30 days of the date of this decision - either an
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    J-S44006-17
    advocate’s brief on Appellant’s behalf, or a petition to withdraw and brief
    that comply with Anders/Santiago. Counsel must include therein a copy
    of a letter to Appellant advising him of all three of the rights enumerated
    above. Thereafter, we will provide Appellant thirty days, from the date of
    Attorney Madden’s letter, within which to respond to counsel’s petition to
    withdraw.
    Petition to withdraw denied.     Case remanded with instructions.
    Jurisdiction retained.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/16/2017
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