Com. v. Stokes, W. ( 2017 )

J-S29028-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
WARREN STOKES
Appellant No. 1861 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence dated April 29, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002680-2015
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., SOLANO, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY SOLANO, J.: FILED JULY 12, 2017
Appellant, Warren Stokes, appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed after a jury convicted him of first-degree murder, conspiracy,
carrying a firearm without a license, carrying a firearm in public in
Philadelphia, and possessing an instrument of crime (PIC).1 We affirm.
The trial court stated the facts as follows:
On August 5, 2009, Katora Wilson Bush travelled by bus to
the 5100 block of Chester Avenue in Southwest Philadelphia
from dinner with her daughter, Amirajh Wilson, and her
husband, Gerald Bush. Upon disembarking the bus, all three
observed an African-American teenager in a black hooded
sweatshirt, later identified as the co-defendant Marquise C.
Walker-Womack, following them as they walked southwest along
Chester Avenue.
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502, 903, 6106, 6108, and 907.
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As she travelled home with her family, Katora Wilson Bush
observed her son, the decedent Niam Wilson Atif, at the corner
near 5117 Chester Avenue talking to his neighbor Allen Bryant.
During Bryant and the decedent’s discussion about employment,
an unidentified individual walked past the pair shouting, “it’s
about to go down.” Seconds later, Bryant saw the African-
American teenager in the black hooded sweatshirt approach the
decedent from behind, draw a revolver, and shoot him three
times.
Katora Wilson Bush heard the gunfire from her home eight
doors away and saw her son lie bleeding on the corner of
Chester Avenue and Paxton Street. Gerald Bush and Amirajh
Wilson, from Katora Wilson Bush’s same vantage point, watched
as the teenager fled the scene along Chester Avenue.
At approximately 11:00 p.m., Philadelphia Police Officers
Alexander Montes and Clara Martinez arrived at the scene and
observed the decedent lying in a pool of blood emanating from a
large wound in the back-right side of his head. Officer Martinez
spoke to Amirajh Wilson, who described the assailant as a 5’8”
African-American male in his teens, wearing a black hood.
According to Philadelphia Deputy Medical Examiner Dr.
Albert Chu, an expert in forensic pathology, the decedent
sustained three fatal, penetrating gunshot wounds to the left
side of this head, the right side of his neck, and his center back,
respectively. Each bullet penetrated a vital organ, including the
brain, jugular vein, and the left lung. The medical examiner
recovered three projectiles from the body and submitted them to
the Firearms Identification Unit. The decedent’s body did not
exhibit strippling or any indication of close-range firing. Dr. Chu
concluded, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the
manner of death was homicide caused by multiple gunshot
wounds.
No more than one week after the murder, [Appellant]
bragged to Harlem Boys gang members Kareem Pittman and
Tayale Shelton that the co-defendant “put in some work” by
killing the decedent. [Appellant] and his co-defendant told both
Pittman and Shelton that [Appellant] provided the .38 Special
the co-defendant used to kill the decedent. As the co-defendant
described the shooting to Pittman, [Appellant] displayed the
firearm used to murder the decedent. The co-defendant further
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informed Shelton that he shot the decedent at [Appellant’s]
behest.
On October 7, 2009, Philadelphia police engaged in a foot
chase with Tyreek Artis, a member of the Harlem Boys gang.
Artis led police to an apartment complex at 5403 Harley Terrace
and attempted to conceal himself in unit 3A. Unit 3A served as
an epicenter for gang-related activity, housing several firearms
and approximately sixty drug packets prepared for distribution.
Inside, police discovered Artis, Pittman, and [Appellant], and
recovered a loaded .38 special revolver.
Officer Jesus Cruz, a ballistics expert with the Philadelphia
Firearms Investigation Unit, examined all three projectiles
recovered from the decedent’s body and determined that all
three bullets were fired from a single firearm. Each projectile
exhibited “six left twist” rifling markings, an identification
characteristic used to match a projectile to the weapon that fired
it. Officer Cruz concluded that the projectiles were consistent
with having been fired from the .38 Special recovered at 5403
Harley Terrace, as the firearm exhibited “six left twist”
characteristics.
On October 6, 2010, federal authorities indicted Pittman
and Shelton pursuant to the Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). Prior to trial, Pittman and
Shelton pled guilty and entered into separate cooperation
agreements. During an April 18, 2012 interview with
Philadelphia Homicide Detectives John McNamee and William
Kelhower, Pittman explained that [Appellant] oversaw a splinter
organization within the Harlem Boys, known as the Greenway
Gorillas, consisting primarily of adolescent members, and that
the co-defendant Walker-Womack, known in the organization as
“Littleman,” shot the decedent at [Appellant’s] behest. During a
May 18, 2012 interview, Shelton told Detectives McNamee and
Kelhower that the co-defendant confessed to shooting the
decedent on [Appellant’s] orders, as [Appellant] had been
“beefing” with the decedent for some time prior to the shooting.
Shelton further explained that the murder weapon was a
community firearm that multiple gang members had access to
and that [Appellant] provided it to the co-defendant.
At trial, both Pittman and Shelton described the co-
defendant as a member of the Greenway Gorillas, which
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[Appellant], as a member of the Harlem Boys, oversaw. Pittman
and Shelton both testified that Greenway Gorillas members
seeking to advance within the gang committed murder to
impress Harlem Boys associates. The co-defendant looked up to
[Appellant] in particular and sought to earn his respect and
approval.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/11/16, at 2-5 (citations to notes of testimony and
footnote omitted).
Appellant and Marquise Walker-Womack together were charged, tried,
and convicted of the aforementioned crimes. On April 29, 2016, the trial
court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate life sentence (comprised of
mandatory life without parole for first-degree murder, concurrent sentences
of six to twelve years for conspiracy and one to two years for carrying a
firearm without a license, and no further penalty on the remaining two
charges).2
On May 9, 2016, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion in
which he sought a new trial and arrest of judgment based on the sufficiency
and weight of the evidence presented at trial. The trial court denied the
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2
That same day, the trial court sentenced Marquise Walker-Womack to an
aggregate sentence of 35 years to life; Mr. Walker-Womack was not subject
to a mandatory life without parole sentence because he was 15 years old at
the time of the murder. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1 (providing that a person
who has been convicted after June 24, 2012 of murder of the first degree,
and who was under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of the
offense but was 15 years of age or older, shall be sentenced to a term of life
imprisonment without parole, or a term of imprisonment, the minimum of
which shall be at least 35 years to life). At this writing, Mr. Walker-Womack
has an appeal pending before this Court at No. 1809 EDA 2016.
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post-sentence motion on May 12, 2016. Appellant filed this appeal, in which
he again presents the two evidentiary issues:
[1.] Was the evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction of first-
degree murder?
[2.] Was the greater weight of the evidence against the
verdict?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
Appellant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
first-degree murder conviction because “it was so inherently unreliable.”
Appellant’s Brief at 13. Specifically, Appellant asserts that “the evidence,
consisting solely of the testimony of two informants facing stiff federal
sentences, was so incredible and lacking corroboration by way of physical
evidence that it failed to prove [A]ppellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. at 14.
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test,
we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for
the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and
circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in
applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and
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the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Hicks, 151 A.3d 216, 221–222 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(citation omitted).
Appellant argues that that the Commonwealth’s evidence was
insufficient because it “rested solely” on the testimony of Pittman and
Shelton, who “can be described as master criminals [and] violent drug
dealers [whose] world was shattered when federal authorities arrested them
and charged them with numerous crimes . . . that carried life sentences
and which exposed them to lengthy mandatory minimum sentences.”
Appellant’s Brief at 18-19. Appellant states:
In an effort to reduce their sentences both men entered
guilty plea agreements with authorities that required them to
provide information to authorities concerning their and others[’]
criminal activities. In relaying this information both men
implicated [A]ppellant in the murder of the victim herein.
Id. at 19. Appellant contends that the witnesses’ “incentive to lie was so
great that it rendered their testimony so unreliable that no verdict can
stand” and “the witnesses had no choice other than to lie because of the life
sentences they faced.” Id.
Appellant’s sufficiency argument actually is a challenge to the weight
of the evidence and therefore does not entitle him to relief. See
Commonwealth v. Bristow, 538 A.2d 1343, 1345-1346 (Pa. Super. 1988)
(sufficiency analysis does not permit an examination of credibility, reliability,
or weight of the evidence); Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 571 A.2d 1035
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1042 (Pa. 1990) (sufficiency claim must accept the credibility and reliability
of evidence that supports the verdict). Facing a similar argument, this Court
has explained:
A sufficiency of the evidence review . . . does not include an
assessment of the credibility of the testimony offered by the
Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Brown, 538 Pa. 410, 438,
648 A.2d 1177, 1191 (1994). Such a claim is more properly
characterized as a weight of the evidence challenge.
Commonwealth v. Bourgeon, 439 Pa.Super. 355, 654 A.2d
555 (1994). Therefore, we find the Appellant has blurred the
concepts of weight and sufficiency of the evidence. Based upon
our review, it appears Appellant is raising a weight of the
evidence claim.
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 825 A.2d 710, 713–14 (Pa. Super. 2003).
Because Appellant presents a challenge to the weight of the evidence, rather
than a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we find his sufficiency
claim without merit and proceed to his second issue, in which he expressly
assails the weight of the evidence presented at trial.
With respect to a weight-of-the-evidence claim, we have explained:
[T]he weight attributed to the evidence is a matter exclusively
for the fact finder, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses.
Commonwealth v. Forbes, 867 A.2d 1268, 1272–1273 (Pa.
Super. 2005). The grant of a new trial is not warranted because
of “a mere conflict in the testimony” and must have a stronger
foundation than a reassessment of the credibility of witnesses.
Commonwealth v. Bruce, 207 Pa.Super. 4, 916 A.2d 657, 665
(2007). Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that,
notwithstanding all of the facts, certain facts are so clearly of
greater weight, that to ignore them or to give them equal weight
with all of the facts is to deny justice. Id.
An appellate court’s purview:
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is extremely limited and is confined to whether the trial
court abused its discretion in finding that the jury verdict
did not shock its conscience. Thus, appellate review of a
weight claim consists of a review of the trial court's
exercise of discretion, not a review of the underlying
question of whether the verdict is against the weight of
the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 A.3d 732, 738 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(internal citations omitted). An appellate court may not reverse
a verdict unless it is so contrary to the evidence as to shock
one’s sense of justice. Forbes, 867 A.2d at 1273. “[T]he trial
court’s denial of a motion for a new trial based on a weight of
the evidence claim is the least assailable of its rulings.”
Commonwealth v. Diggs, 597 Pa. 28, 949 A.2d 873, 879–880
(2008).
Hicks, 151 A.3d at 223.
In challenging the weight of the evidence, Appellant admittedly
recycles his sufficiency argument. See Appellant’s Brief at 23 (“[i]n support
of this argument [A]ppellant relies upon the arguments set forth in support
of the first issue herein”). Appellant reiterates his contention that “the
testimony of the Commonwealth’s primary witnesses was not believable
because both witnesses had great reason to lie and falsely accuse
[A]ppellant of being involved in the murder herein given that they faced life
sentences and testified against [A]ppellant in order to reduce their
sentences.” Appellant’s Brief at 22. Appellant further contends that the
testimony of Pittman and Shelton – that Mr. Walker-Womack was the
shooter acting on instructions from Appellant – was contradicted by the
testimony of another Commonwealth witness, a jailed informant, Michael
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Williams, who stated that Appellant, not Mr. Walker-Womack, was the
shooter.3
Significantly, although Appellant repeatedly insists that Pittman and
Shelton were not credible, he fails to explain how the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his weight claim. The trial court succinctly but ably
stated:
[Appellant] pursues a similar tactic in his weight of the
evidence claim as he does in his sufficiency challenge: he
argues that the main witnesses against him, Pittman and
Shelton, provided incredible testimony, and that no eyewitness
or physical evidence linked [Appellant] to the decedent’s murder.
Pittman and Shelton provided ample evidence that [Appellant]
solicited his co-defendant to murder the decedent and provided
the co-defendant with the pistol used to complete the act. N.T.,
2/3/2016 at 56-62, 210-214. Ballistic examination of the
projectiles recovered from the decedent’s body suggested that
the projectiles were fired from a weapon discovered at 5403
Harley Terrace. N.T., 2/4/2016 at 129-138. Officer Keith
corroborated Pittman and Shelton’s testimony that [Appellant]
had access to the gun, as [Appellant] was present at 5403
Harley Terrace when the weapon was recovered. N.T., 2/2/2016
at 123-135. The jury was well aware of Pittman and Shelton’s
cooperation agreements with the federal government and
considered them when choosing to believe their testimony. N.T.,
2/3/2016 at 151-165, 268-280. The jury’s verdict does not
shock this Court’s sense of justice.
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3
The Commonwealth called Michael Williams to testify on the third day of
the five day trial. On direct, Mr. Williams repudiated an earlier sworn
statement that Appellant had told him that he “did that shit” – meaning that
Appellant shot the victim because Appellant “had to get some money.” N.T.,
2/3/16, at 353. Mr. Williams maintained throughout his testimony that he
was induced to lie and incriminate Appellant based on the Commonwealth’s
unfulfilled promise to reduce his sentence. See, e.g., id. at 339 (stating
“y’all lied to me and told me that y’all going to give me a three-to-six if I
cooperated with this and I got 17 to 34 years. . . I’m not lying for y’all no
more on somebody I don’t even know if he did this”).
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Trial Court Opinion, 8/11/16, at 9.
The trial court correctly viewed the weight issue as one of credibility
that the jury resolved against Appellant. Our review of the record supports
this conclusion. See Commonwealth v. Diggs, 949 A.2d 873, 879 (Pa.
2008) (appellate review is limited to whether the trial judge’s discretion was
properly exercised and relief will be granted only where the facts and
inferences of record disclose a palpable abuse of discretion). The jury was
free to believe the version of events related by Pittman and Shelton and not
to believe the testimony of Michael Williams. Accordingly, we find no merit
to Appellant’s weight claim and affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/12/2017
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