Com. v. Corliss, J. ( 2021 )

J-S53038-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JUSTIN CORLISS :
:
Appellant : No. 1232 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered May 27, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-45-CR-0000743-1997
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: Filed: April 30, 2021
Justin Corliss appeals the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe
County (PCRA court)1 denying his petition for a writ of coram nobis. In 1998,
following a jury trial, Corliss was found guilty of several sexual offenses
against the victim, D.G., and he was sentenced to a prison term of four to ten
years. He now asserts that his convictions must be vacated because judges
and prosecutors have conspired to obscure evidence of his innocence.
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 We note that Corliss disputes that this appeal arises from a petition filed
pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
His position is that the PCRA does not apply and that the common law writ of
coram nobis is a viable means of correcting his asserted errors. As explained
below, the “PCRA” designation is apt.
J-S53038-20
However, because all of the factual and legal claims now advanced by Corliss
are procedurally barred, the order on review is affirmed.
I.
Corliss currently has appeals pending in three separate matters, each
involving similar allegations of sexual abuse against minors.2 The present
case concerns D.G., who was a 14-year-old co-worker of Corliss at a pet store
in 1997. After D.G. came forward about an ongoing sexual relationship with
Corliss, he was charged with statutory sexual assault, aggravated indecent
assault, indecent assault and corruption of minors. At the time, Corliss was
about 32 years old.
Samples were obtained from D.G.’s underwear for DNA testing a few
days after she divulged to the police that she and Corliss had been having
sexual interactions.3 Those samples were compared to the DNA profile
obtained from Corliss’ blood. The lab report detailing the DNA comparison,
however, was excluded from the evidence at trial because some of the tested
____________________________________________
2 The pending case at appellate docket number 1239 EDA 2020 began in 2013
when Corliss’ minor daughter, C.C., informed her mother that Corliss had
touched her inappropriately under her pants between 2009 and 2012. The
case at appellate docket number 1272 EDA 2020 also began in 2013 when the
minor daughter of Corliss’ former girlfriend, R.V., reported similar abuse
between 1995 and 1997. Both of those cases were tried together in 2016.
3 D.G. and her parents contacted the police on July 9, 1997, which was the
day of the final time she and Corliss had sexual intercourse. She was
interviewed by police two days later, and on July 13, 1997, a pair of her
underwear was taken to a crime lab for DNA testing.
-2-
J-S53038-20
specimens taken from D.G.’s underwear contained no DNA or were simply
“uninterpretable.” The prosecution described the report as “inconclusive” but
maintained that Corliss could not be excluded as a contributor of DNA on the
clothing. See Pre-trial Hearing Transcript, 6/16/98, at pp. 36-37.
Corliss then moved to compel the production of the lab test materials so
that he could hire his own expert to ascertain whether his DNA could be
excluded as a match. The trial court denied the motion, ruling in part that
even if Corliss could prove his DNA was absent from the underwear, it would
not be exculpatory because the alleged offenses took place on multiple dates
other than when D.G. wore that clothing. Id. In sum, this lack of relevance
precluded the defense from conducting its own DNA testing. See Trial
Transcript, 7/9/1998, at pp. 61-62.
Corliss was found guilty of the above charges in 1998. He filed
numerous appeals and petitions for post-conviction relief, none of which were
successful. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Corliss, 750 A.2d 366 (Pa. Super.
1999) (unpublished memorandum) (affirming judgment of sentence on direct
appeal); Commonwealth v. Corliss, 778 A.2d 732 (Pa. Super. 2001)
(unpublished memorandum) (affirming denial of first PCRA petition);
Commonwealth v. Corliss, 841 A.2d 571 (Pa. Super. 2003) (unpublished
memorandum) (affirming denial of second PCRA petition).
Corliss was not granted parole and he completed his full prison term in
2008. Upon his release, Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law required Corliss to
-3-
J-S53038-20
register as a sexual offender. After Corliss was charged with new sexual
offenses in 2013, it was discovered that he had violated those registration
requirements. He challenged the violation by contesting the underlying
convictions via a petition for a writ of coram nobis.
The filing was construed as an untimely PCRA petition and that finding
was upheld on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Corliss, 709 EDA 2014 (Pa.
Super. December 2014) (unpublished memorandum) (reiterating that the
PCRA subsumes all common law remedies, including coram nobis, making the
PCRA the sole means of obtaining post-conviction relief in Pennsylvania).
It was not until 2017 that Corliss hired an expert (Dr. Monte Miller) to
evaluate the DNA report that was disclosed to the defense but excluded from
trial in 1998. According to a report compiled by Dr. Miller dated March 1,
2017, the DNA samples taken from D.G.’s underwear did not match the DNA
of Corliss, excluding him as a possible contributor of the tested samples. Dr.
Miller stated in his report that while there was a possible semen stain on the
underwear, the DNA that was foreign to D.G. on the garment did not originate
from that stain. Dr. Miller speculated that no DNA was taken from the semen
stain at all.
Corliss filed a “Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis” on March 3, 2020,
which was over three years after he obtained Dr. Miller’s report. In the coram
nobis petition (his second), Corliss argued that the absence of his DNA on
D.G.’s underwear could have resulted in a different trial verdict. He also
-4-
J-S53038-20
claimed that Dr. Miller’s testimony proves that since the trial in 1998, the
prosecutors and judges assigned to his case have misrepresented the DNA
report as incriminating evidence. According to Corliss, Dr. Miller’s testimony
shows that the suspected semen stain on D.G.’s clothing was a result of her
sexual relations with someone other than himself.
The PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing on the coram nobis petition
on January 23, 2020, and Dr. Miller testified. See Hearing Transcript,
1/23/2020, at pp. 125-148. He discussed his review of the DNA report from
1998 and concluded that it was unlikely that the specimens taken from D.G.’s
underwear were actually semen: “I’m extremely doubtful that what they
found was a fresh semen stain, No. 1, because the way that they have written
it; but No. 2, because they didn’t get any DNA from it. That doesn’t rule it
out but I’m not really sure they found semen.” Id. at p. 135.
The PCRA court issued an opinion outlining the reasons for its denial of
Corliss’ petition for a writ of coram nobis. See PCRA Court Opinion,
5/27/2020. First, the PCRA court construed Corliss’ filing as an untimely PCRA
petition that does not satisfy the after-discovered evidence exception to the
PCRA’s time-bar. Id. at 2-8.
Next, the PCRA court ruled that even if the claim was timely, it would
afford Corliss no relief because the evidence he sought to rely upon would be
-5-
J-S53038-20
inadmissible at a new trial. The PCRA court found that the Rape Shield law4
would preclude evidence that D.G.’s underwear contained a seminal stain
caused by someone other than Corliss. Id. at 9-10.
Finally, the PCRA court found that Corliss’ claim fails because the lack
of his DNA on D.G.’s underwear in no way proved his actual innocence or
otherwise entitled him to any post-conviction remedies. Id. at 10-11. The
purported absence of his DNA did not undermine any of the evidence that was
presented to the jury at trial. For example, D.G. had testified that during the
last time they had intercourse, Corliss had only ejaculated on his own clothing,
which would be consistent with Dr. Miller’s opinion that none of Corliss’ semen
was on D.G.’s underwear.
Corliss moved the PCRA court to correct perceived errors in the opinion,
arguing that it had inaccurately described the relevant facts without adequate
citation to the record. The PCRA court issued a statement pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), wherein it clarified and enlarged upon the citations in the
opinion, albeit not to Corliss’ satisfaction. See PCRA Court 1925(a)
Statement, 6/24/2020.
____________________________________________
4 Pennsylvania’s Rape Shield statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3104, prohibits the
admission of evidence at trial regarding the victim’s past sexual conduct with
individuals other than the defendant.
-6-
J-S53038-20
Corliss timely appealed from the order denying his petition. In his brief,
he concedes that he cannot plead and prove a meritorious claim under the
PCRA. He insists, rather, that he is eligible for the common law writ of coram
nobis,5 which he believes is available where government obstruction has
thwarted an otherwise valid PCRA claim.
The four issues Corliss presents in his brief, which he filed pro se, are
as follows:
1. Did [the PCRA court] intend to obstruct the fair administration
of justice when his opinion is rife with ex parte claims, deliberate
misrepresentations, and fake citations, designed to mislead this
reviewing court, rendering it not entitled to the presumption of
correctness?
2. Did the [PCRA] court err in construing a coram nobis petition
as a “PCRA [petition]” for the purpose of delaying the relief due,
of vacating the conviction obtained, and to cover up twenty-two
(22) years of the Monroe County District Attorney’s Office
deliberately obstructing access to the remedies of a direct appeal
and the PCRA?
3. Did the [PCRA] court err in finding that incontrovertible physical
evidence of someone other than the accused had sexual
intercourse with the minor complainant, at the relevant time, as
not being relevant to her credibility and [Corliss’] constitutional
right to present a defense, when [D.G.] never admitted to who
she actually had sexual intercourse with, fraudulently claiming she
was otherwise a “virgin?”
4. Would the fact of the Monroe County District Attorney’s office
deliberately misrepresenting exculpatory DNA results as being
____________________________________________
5At common law, a writ of coram nobis could be used to “challenge the validity
of a judgment based on facts not before the court when the judgment was
entered.” Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 285 A.2d 465, 467 (Pa. 1971).
-7-
J-S53038-20
“inconclusive,” to obstruct the fair administration of justice, act to
bar retrial under the double jeopardy clause?
Appellant’s Brief, at 4-5.
In response, the Commonwealth argues both in its brief and its motion
to quash the appeal that Corliss’ claims are time-barred by the PCRA,
previously litigated or waived, and unavailable because Corliss has already
completed the full term of his sentence.
II.
The preliminary issue is whether the grounds asserted in Corliss’ coram
nobis petition were subject to the PCRA’s filing deadlines.6 Importantly,
Corliss concedes that he cannot prevail unless it is determined that the alleged
judicial and prosecutorial fraud renders the PCRA inapplicable. He correctly
recognizes that he does not qualify for PCRA remedies because many years
have passed since his judgment of sentence became final, he has completed
the full term of his sentence, and he has exhausted his PCRA and appellate
remedies. The gist of his argument is that he should not be bound by the
PCRA because judges and prosecutors intentionally misrepresented a DNA
report as “inconclusive,” preventing him from demonstrating that the report
is, in fact, exculpatory.
____________________________________________
6“[T]he standard of review is whether the PCRA court’s findings are supported
by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d
875, 878 (Pa. 2009).
-8-
J-S53038-20
Contrary to Corliss’ interpretation of the law, the PCRA clearly does
encompass exactly the types of claims that he now asserts. As we stated in
a decision in 2013 affirming the denial of an earlier coram nobis petition filed
by Corliss, “[t]he PCRA subsumes common law remedies where the relief
sought is available under the PCRA[.]” Corliss, 709 EDA 2014, at 2-4
(footnote omitted).7 The PCRA encompasses all common law post-conviction
remedies, including coram nobis. See Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136
A.3d 493, 503 (Pa. 2016).
Section 9545(b)(1)(i) makes “government interference” an exception to
the one-year filing deadline running from the date that a judgment of sentence
____________________________________________
7 The PCRA provides in relevant part:
This [PCRA] provides for an action by which persons convicted of
crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences
may obtain collateral relief. The action established in this
subchapter shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral
relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory
remedies for the same purpose that exist when this
subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus and
coram nobis. This subchapter is not intended to limit the
availability of remedies in the trial court or on direct appeal from
the judgment of sentence, to provide a means for raising issues
waived in prior proceedings or to provide relief from collateral
consequences of a criminal conviction. Except as specifically
provided otherwise, all provisions of this subchapter shall apply to
capital and noncapital cases.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9542 (emphasis added).
-9-
J-S53038-20
becomes final.8 To satisfy this particular exception, a petitioner must show
that “the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by
government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the
Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the
United States[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i). Under the applicable version of
Section 9545(b)(2), such a claim had to be raised within 60 days from the
date that it could have been presented.9
Since 1998, when the DNA report was excluded from trial, Corliss has
disputed that it is “inconclusive” and inadmissible. He has also maintained
that the report exonerates him. All the while, Corliss could have hired his own
expert to review the report and assess its conclusions, methodology and
terminology. Yet he did not do so until 2017, by which time he had already
____________________________________________
8 It is well established that the PCRA encompass asserted violations of Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the seminal case compelling the
government’s disclosure of exculpatory evidence. Where a PCRA petitioner
alleges that a delay in making a claim for post-conviction relief arose from a
Brady violation, Section 9545(b)(2) of the PCRA applies. See generally
Commonwealth v. Natividad, 200 A.3d 11 (Pa. 2019). In Corliss’ direct
appeal as to cases 1749-CR-2013 and 2173-CR-2013, we explained that when
a Brady claim is alleged, there is still a duty on the part of the defense to
perform due diligence and conduct reasonable investigation. See
Commonwealth v. Corliss, 108 EDA 2017, at 20-25 (Pa. Super. Dec. 8,
2017).
9 Section 9545(b)(2) was amended on October 24, 2018, extending the time
for filing from 60 days from the date the claim could have been presented to
one year. This amendment applies to claims arising on or after December 24,
2017. See Act 2018, Oct. 24, P.L. 894, No. 146, § 3. Corliss’ claim arose
long before that effective date.
- 10 -
J-S53038-20
exhausted his direct appeal and post-conviction remedies under the PCRA and
served the full term of his sentence.
Another three years passed before he filed the present coram nobis
petition. Corliss has offered no logical explanation for why he could not have
acted sooner to establish that the report exonerates him. As the claims of
government obstruction/fraud are within the ambit of the PCRA, and Corliss
concedes he cannot satisfy any recognized exception to the PCRA’s filing
deadline, the PCRA court properly found that his petition is barred.
Having disposed of the case in that manner, it is unnecessary for us to
reach the merits of his remaining legal claims or address the litany of factual
disputes littered throughout his brief. To the extent we have not specifically
addressed these other points, we adopt the reasoning of the PCRA court, as
outlined in its opinions and clarifying statement.10
Because we are affirming the PCRA court’s denial of relief for the
timeliness reasons set forth in its opinion, the Commonwealth’s motion to
quash the appeal is denied as moot. See Commonwealth v. Corliss, 2468
EDA 2016 (Pa. Super. May 9, 2017) (unpublished memorandum) (affirming
____________________________________________
10Regardless of whether Corliss agrees with how prosecutors and judges have
construed the facts and evidence in this case, “this Court may affirm a PCRA
court’s decision on any grounds if the record supports it.” Commonwealth
v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2010). The indisputable
procedural history of this case, the relevant transcripts, and Corliss’
longstanding possession of the DNA report, all support the PCRA court’s
decision to dismiss Corliss’ petition as untimely filed.
- 11 -
J-S53038-20
denial of PCRA petition on timeliness grounds and denying motion to quash
appeal as moot).
Motion to quash denied. Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/30/21
- 12 -