A.R.Z. v. C.M.B. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S22026-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    A.R.Z.                                            IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant
    v.
    C.M.B.
    Appellee                  No. 1887 MDA 2016
    Appeal from the Order Entered October 12, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
    Civil Division at No(s): 2016-4937 CIVIL
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., MOULTON, J., and PLATT, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.:                              FILED JULY 17, 2017
    A.R.Z. (“Mother”) appeals from the October 12, 2016 order entered in
    the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas denying Mother’s petition
    for a protection from abuse (“PFA”) order. We affirm.
    On September 1, 2016, Mother filed a petition for a PFA order on
    behalf of R.R., a minor, against C.M.B. (“Father”). That same day, the trial
    court entered a temporary PFA order and scheduled a hearing for September
    7, 2016. Following a series of continuances, the trial court held a hearing on
    October 11, 2016.        On October 12, 2016, the trial court denied Mother’s
    petition. On November 14, 2016, Mother timely filed a notice of appeal. 1
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    Although the order is dated October 12, 2016, notations on the order
    show that the Prothonotary entered the order on the docket and mailed
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    J-S22026-17
    The well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Jessica E. Brewbaker set
    forth the factual history underlying this appeal, which we adopt and
    incorporate herein. See Trial Ct. Op., 11/30/16, at 1-6 (“1925(a) Op.”).
    Mother raises two issues on appeal:
    1. Did the [trial c]ourt err in determining there was
    insufficient evidence to grant a PFA order?
    2. Did the [trial c]ourt err in not granting the PFA order
    considering     C.[M.]B.’s    inconsistent    or   false
    statements provided to the Guardian ad Litem and in
    testimony to the [trial c]ourt?
    Mother’s Br. at 6 (suggested answers omitted).
    Mother argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the evidence
    was insufficient to grant a PFA order. The PFA Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-22,
    is intended “to protect victims of domestic violence from those who
    perpetrate such abuse, with the primary goal of advance prevention of
    physical and sexual abuse.”          Buchhalter v. Buchhalter, 
    959 A.2d 1260
    ,
    1262 (Pa.Super. 2009) (quotation omitted).           PFA petitioners have the
    burden of proving the allegations of abuse by a preponderance of the
    evidence. Ferko-Fox v. Fox, 
    68 A.3d 917
    , 926-27 (Pa.Super. 2013). “The
    preponderance of the evidence is defined as the greater weight of the
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    copies of the order to the parties on October 14, 2016. Because the “day of
    entry [is] the day the clerk of the court or the office of government unit
    mails or delivers copies of the order to the parties,” Pa.R.A.P. 108(a)(1), the
    30-day appeal period began to run on October 14, 2016. Therefore,
    Mother’s appeal is timely.
    -2-
    J-S22026-17
    evidence, i.e., to tip a scale slightly is the criteria or requirement for
    preponderance of the evidence.”      
    Id. at 927
    (quotation omitted).      “Our
    standard of review for PFA orders is well settled. In the context of a PFA
    order, we review the trial court’s legal conclusions for an error of law or
    abuse of discretion.”   Boykai v. Young, 
    83 A.3d 1043
    , 1045 (Pa.Super.
    2014) (quotation omitted).
    In both of her issues, Mother challenges the trial court’s credibility
    determinations and asserts that the evidence she presented proved by a
    preponderance of the evidence that R.R. was entitled to a PFA order against
    Father. We disagree.
    In its opinion, the trial court applied the relevant law and properly
    determined that Mother failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
    that Father abused R.R.    See 1925(a) Op. at 6-11.      The trial court found
    that R.R.’s testimony lacked credibility, and the court carefully explained its
    reasons for so finding. See 
    id. at 7-9.
    In contrast, the trial court found that
    Father’s testimony, as well as the testimony of Father’s witnesses, was
    consistent, credible, and, in some cases, supported by photographic
    evidence that contradicted R.R.’s testimony.      “This Court defers to the
    credibility determinations of the trial court as to witnesses who appeared
    before it[,]” 
    Ferko-Fox, 68 A.3d at 927
    (quotation omitted), which are
    supported by the record. Further, the trial court considered and weighed the
    evidence, including testimony, photographs, the guardian ad litem’s report,
    prior PFA orders, and psychiatric reports. After reviewing the parties’ briefs,
    -3-
    J-S22026-17
    the record, and the relevant law, we conclude that the trial court neither
    erred nor abused its discretion.   We affirm based on the trial court’s
    reasoning. See 1925(a) Op. at 6-11.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 7/17/2017
    -4-
    Circulated 06/20/2017 08:51 AM
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A.R.Z. v. C.M.B. No. 1887 MDA 2016

Filed Date: 7/17/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024