Com. v. King, D. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S35005-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    DEVIN KING
    Appellant                  No. 991 WDA 2016
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 25, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0007915-2015
    BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., RANSOM, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                          FILED AUGUST 11, 2017
    Devin King appeals from his judgment of sentence, entered in the
    Court of Common Pleas of Allegany County, following his conviction for
    aggravated assault – serious bodily injury1, unlawful restraint – serious
    bodily injury2, terroristic threats3, two counts of simple assault4, and false
    imprisonment.5 Upon review, we affirm.
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1).
    2
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2902(a)(1).
    3
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(1).
    4
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1).
    5
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2903(a).
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    Margaret Blow testified that on the morning of May 20, 2015, she
    approached King after seeing that he had messages from other women on
    his cell phone. At the time, Blow was living with King, although the lease
    was solely in King’s name. The two got into an argument, and eventually,
    King came into her bedroom from the living room and head-butted her in the
    mouth.   King then grabbed Blow by her hair, dragged her into the dining
    room, and stepped on her face. King put one hand around her throat, and
    when Blow started calling to her children for help, he placed one hand down
    her throat. King started repeatedly screaming at Blow, saying “I’m going to
    f-ing kill you and make you leave the house today.” N.T. Trial, 3/7/2016, at
    8. At this point, Blow tried to walk out of the dining room, but King brought
    her to the floor, wrapped his legs around her stomach, and choked her.
    When Blow got off of the floor, King threw her against the wall and she hit
    her head against the wall. Blow then picked up her phone and went to the
    bathroom, where she video-chatted with her sister-in-law, asking her to call
    a taxi. King came into the bathroom, keeping the door open but blocking it
    with his body, and continued screaming at Blow, saying that he was going to
    kill her. King would not let her leave the bathroom for several minutes, until
    her brother appeared on the voice chat, and yelled through the phone that
    he was going over to King’s house, causing King to leave the bathroom.
    Blow then left the house, and went to her sister-in-law’s house.         Blow
    testified that the entire incident took 10 or 15 minutes.
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    After stopping at her sister-in-law’s house, Blow went to the
    McKeesport Hospital to receive medical treatment. There, Blow received two
    sutures to her upper lip, and was told she might have a sprained wrist.
    Since Blow’s left eye was swollen to the point of being nearly shut, the staff
    also performed a CAT scan, but found no other damage. Shortly afterwards,
    Blow contacted the police about the incident.       Officer Smith testified that
    when he spoke to Blow, he noticed that her lip had stitches and that her left
    eye was swollen.
    On March 7, 2016, King was convicted on all counts at a non-jury trial,
    and on May 25, 2016, he was sentenced to two to five years’ incarceration.
    On June 2, 2016, King filed post-sentence motions challenging the weight of
    the sentence and a seeking reconsideration of his sentence. These motions
    were denied on June 9, 2016.      On July 16, 2016, King filed a notice of
    appeal, followed by a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors
    complained of on appeal on September 1, 2016. The trial court filed its Rule
    1925(a) opinion on October 19, 2016.
    King raises the following issues on review:
    1. Was the evidence insufficient to sustain the conviction for
    aggravated assault as no serious bodily injury occurred and
    Mr. King did not intent to cause such injury?
    2. Was the evidence insufficient to sustain the conviction for
    unlawful restraint as Mr. King did not expose Blow to risk of
    serious bodily injury?
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    3. Was the evidence insufficient to sustain the conviction for
    false imprisonment as Mr. King did not unlawfully restrain
    Blow so as to substantially interfere with her liberty?
    Brief of Appellant, at 4.
    King first claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his
    conviction for aggravated assault. Our standard of review of a challenge to
    the sufficiency of the evidence is well settled:
    The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
    evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
    the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
    evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
    crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test,
    we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for
    the fact-finder.     In addition, we note that the facts and
    circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
    preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
    defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
    evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
    probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
    circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
    proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
    by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.          Moreover, in
    applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
    all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
    trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and
    the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
    or none of the evidence.
    Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 
    782 A.2d 574
    , 582 (Pa. Super. 2001),
    quoting Commonwealth v. Hennigan, 
    753 A.2d 245
    , 253 (Pa. Super
    2000) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
    Aggravated assault is defined, in relevant part, as:
    (a) Offense defined. — A person is guilty of aggravated
    assault if he:
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    (1) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or
    causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly
    under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
    the value of human life;
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1) (bold and italics in original).        Additionally, the
    following terms are defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301:
    “Bodily injury.” —Impairment of physical condition or substantial
    pain.
    “Serious bodily injury.” —Bodily injury which creates a
    substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent
    disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function
    of any bodily member or organ.
    “For aggravated assault purposes, an ‘attempt’ is found where the accused,
    with the required specific intent, acts in a manner which constitutes a
    substantial step toward perpetrating a serious bodily injury upon another.”
    Commonwealth v. Gruff, 
    822 A.2d 773
    , 776 (Pa. Super. 2003). To find
    intent, we look at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a
    defendant   possessed    the   intent   to   inflict   serious     bodily   harm.
    Commonwealth v. Matthews, 
    909 A.2d 1254
    , 1256 (Pa. 2006).                     We
    examine the defendant’s words and conduct to determine whether the
    requisite intent exists. 
    Gruff, 822 A.2d at 779
    .
    In Commonwealth v. Burton, 
    2 A.3d 598
    (Pa. Super. 2010), our
    Court upheld a conviction of aggravated assault when the defendant, Darryl
    Burton, caused serious bodily injury to the victim, William Price, Jr., with a
    single punch.    In that case, we were able to determine that Burton
    possessed the requisite intent because Burton was significantly larger and
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    stronger than Price, and Burton aggressively initiated a confrontation with
    Price by demanding that Price pay the money he owes. 
    Id. at 603.
    We also
    found that, despite an initial aggressive confrontation, the fact that Burton
    suddenly struck Price while Price was unprepared for an attack was an
    indicator of Burton’s intent to inflict serious bodily harm. 
    Id. Additionally, we
    found that Burton’s conduct of smiling and saying, “I got you” while
    watching Price bleeding on the ground after the attack, was evidence of
    Burton’s intent. 
    Id. Upon review
    of the record and viewing all evidence in a light most
    favorable to the Commonwealth, 
    DiStefano, supra
    , we find that, regardless
    of whether Blow’s injuries constitutes serious bodily harm, King possessed
    the intent to inflict serious bodily harm to Blow, and attempted to do so by
    continuously attacking her.   Blow described King as being taller than her.
    N.T. Trial 3/7/2016, at 16. Additionally, King entered her room following an
    argument, and started yelling at her and then head-butted her.         This is
    comparable to 
    Burton, supra
    , as both cases involved a larger attacker
    suddenly initiating a physical attack. While attacking Blow, King repeatedly
    yelled that he was going to “f-ing kill her,” and continued to yell similar
    language while Blow was in the bathroom.       Like the statements made by
    Burton, King showed his intention to inflict serious bodily injury with his
    words and actions. 
    Id. at 603;
    see also Commonwealth v. Hall, 
    830 A.2d 537
    , 542 (Pa. 2003) (stating intent can be found where one verbalizes
    reasons for his actions). We find the attempt element of aggravated assault
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    also satisfied by King’s unrelenting physical assaults.    Commonwealth v.
    Rodriguez, 
    673 A.2d 962
    , 966-67 (Pa. Super. 1996).          While King argues
    that the lack of a weapon during the attack, despite the opportunity to get
    one, was evidence that he had no intent to inflict serious bodily injury, we
    have never held that a weapon is necessary to find intent to inflect serious
    bodily injury.   Therefore, we find that there was sufficient evidence to
    support the conviction of aggravated assault.
    King next claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his
    conviction for unlawful restraint. Unlawful restraint is defined as:
    (a)     Offense defined. — Except as provided under
    subsection (b) or (c), a person commits a misdemeanor of the
    first degree if he knowingly:
    (1) restrains   another     unlawfully    in   circumstances
    exposing him to risk of serious bodily injury;
    18 Pa.C.S.A § 2902(a)(1) (bold and italics in original).
    King’s challenge to his unlawful restraint conviction relies on the
    theory that he did not place the defendant in a situation where she was at
    risk of serious bodily harm. As we have discussed above, King’s continuous
    attacks on Blow did indeed expose her to the risk of serious bodily harm.
    Since King prevented Blow from leaving the house at various times during
    the attack, we find that the evidence supports the conviction of unlawful
    restraint.
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    Finally, King claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his
    conviction of false imprisonment. False imprisonment is defined as:
    (a) Offense defined. — Except as provided under subsection
    (b) or (c), a person commits a misdemeanor of the second
    degree if he knowingly restrains another unlawfully so as to
    interfere substantially with his liberty.
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2903.      In determining whether the restraint at issue
    “substantially” interfered with a person’s liberty, we must give the word
    substantially its plain meaning. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903 (words in statute
    construed according to common and approved usage);         In re M.G., 
    916 A.2d 1179
    , 1182 (Pa. Super. 2007).
    Upon review of the record and viewing all evidence in a light most
    favorable to the Commonwealth, 
    DiStefano, supra
    , we must determine
    whether King significantly or considerably deprived Blow of her liberty when
    he prevented her from leaving the house. We conclude that he did. King
    argues that he never deprived Blow of her liberty because Blow was never
    trapped in any room of the home. King additionally claims Blow went into
    the bathroom of her own volition, and the door to the bathroom was left
    open during the incident. However, Blow’s testimony clearly indicates that
    King did not allow Blow to leave the bathroom by inserting himself between
    Blow and the door. Blow testified that she was trapped in the bathroom with
    King for more than a minute. It was not until Blow’s brother communicated
    to her via video chat that he was coming over that King left the bathroom,
    enabling Blow to escape.       We have previously found a substantial
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    interference of a victim’s liberty when the victim was unable to leave her
    room for over a minute due to the defendant standing between the victim
    and her closed door. 
    M.G., 916 A.2d at 1182
    . Given the similarity between
    this holding and the facts of this case, we find that King substantially
    deprived Blow of her liberty.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/11/2017
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