Com. v. Rosas, W. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
WALDEMAR ROSAS :
:
: No. 1675 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered May 12, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0012668-2012
CP-51-CR-0012672-2012
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED OCTOBER 04, 2017
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the Order entered in
the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas on May 12, 2015, dismissing
felony and misdemeanor charges against Appellee, Waldemar Rosas,
following resolution in Appellee’s favor of summary traffic offenses. After
careful review, we reverse.
The record reflects that on September 30, 2012, Officer Timothy
Stephan of the Philadelphia Police Department observed Appellee disregard a
stop sign while operating a motor vehicle. Officer Stephan initiated a traffic
stop, and as he approached the car, he saw the car’s passenger make a
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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shoving motion toward his right side. Officer Stephan opened the passenger
door and saw marijuana inside the passenger-side door.
Officer Stephan placed Appellant into custody and performed a search
of Appellant’s vehicle. During the search, Officer Stephan’s partner
recovered a gun from the vehicle’s trunk—which was later discovered to
have been stolen—and a loaded magazine in the passenger cabin that
matched the gun found in the trunk. See N.T. Preliminary Hrg., 10/22/12,
at 4-6. Officer Stephan issued Appellant a citation for Disregarding a Stop
Sign and for Driving Without a License,1 both summary offenses.
Following this incident, on November 1, 2012, the Commonwealth also
charged Appellant with Receiving Stolen Property and Firearms Not to be
Carried Without a License,2 both felonies, and Intentional Possession of a
Controlled Substance, Carrying a Firearm in Public in Philadelphia, and
Possession of an Instrument of Crime,3 all misdemeanors.
1 75 Pa.C.S. § 3323(b) and 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(a), respectively.
2 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a) and 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1), respectively.
3 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108, and 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a),
respectively.
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On December 4, 2012, for reasons not set forth in the certified record
herein, the Philadelphia Traffic Court (“Traffic Court”)4 acquitted Appellant of
the summary driving offenses.
More than two years later and after numerous continuances of trial, on
May 5, 2015, Appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss the felony and misdemeanor
charges, pursuant to the Compulsory Joinder Rule, 18 Pa.C.S. § 110. The
trial court heard oral argument on Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss on May 12,
2015, and subsequently dismissed all of the pending criminal charges. The
trial court concluded that the felony and misdemeanor charges arose from
the same criminal episode as the traffic offenses so joinder was necessary.
Because the Commonwealth did not join the criminal charges with the
summary charges, and the Traffic Court had already acquitted Appellee, the
trial court concluded no further proceedings were permitted.
The Commonwealth timely appealed, raising the following issue: “Did
the lower court err when, in contravention of Supreme Court precedent, it
dismissed felony and misdemeanor charges pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 110
based upon the prior adjudication of summary traffic offenses?”
Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.
The Commonwealth challenges the trial court’s interpretation and
application of 18 Pa.C.S. § 110. Thus, “our standard of review is de novo,
4 It was not until 2013 that the legislature abolished Traffic Court and
assigned to Municipal Court jurisdiction to hear traffic offenses. See, infra
at 5.
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and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Fithian, 961 A.2d
66, 71 n.4 (Pa. 2008). Section 110 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
§ 110. When prosecution barred by former
prosecution for different offense
Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different
provision of the statutes than a former prosecution or is
based on different facts, it is barred by such former
prosecution under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or
in a conviction as defined in section 109 of this title
(relating to when prosecution barred by former
prosecution for the same offense) and the
subsequent prosecution is for:
(i) any offense of which the defendant could
have been convicted on the first prosecution;
(ii) any offense based on the same conduct or
arising from the same criminal episode, if such
offense was known to the appropriate
prosecuting officer at the time of the
commencement of the first trial and occurred
within the same judicial district as the former
prosecution unless the court ordered a separate
trial of the charge of such offense; or [ . . . ]
18 Pa.C.S. § 110(1)(i) and (ii).
As has been summarized by our Supreme Court, Section 110(1)(ii)
contains four requirements which, if met, preclude subsequent prosecution
due to a former prosecution for a different offense:
(1) the former prosecution must have resulted in an
acquittal or conviction;
(2) the current prosecution is based upon the same
criminal conduct or arose from the same criminal
episode as the former prosecution;
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(3) the prosecutor was aware of the instant charges
before the commencement of the trial on the
former charges; and
(4) the current offense occurred within the same
judicial district as the former prosecution.
Fithian, 961 A.2d at 72.
The Commonwealth argues on appeal that the prior adjudication of
Appellee’s summary traffic offenses in Traffic Court did not bar his later
prosecution on felony and misdemeanor charges; and, in fact, the
Pennsylvania Constitution precluded Appellee’s prosecution on summary
offenses simultaneously with misdemeanor and felony charges.
Commonwealth’s Brief at 9-12, 15-16. We agree.
Prior to 2013, the Traffic Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the
adjudication of traffic offenses committed in Philadelphia County, 5 and the
Municipal Court and Court of Common Pleas had exclusive jurisdiction over
the adjudication of misdemeanor and felony offenses.6,7 On June 19, 2013,
5“The traffic court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all summary offenses
under the motor vehicle laws.” Pa. Const. Sched. Art. V § 16(s); see also
42 Pa.C.S. § 1302(a.1)-(b) (1979).
6 “The municipal court shall have jurisdiction in . . . [a]ll summary offenses,
except those under the motor vehicle laws.” Pa. Const. Sched. Art. V §
16(r)(ii); see also Commonwealth v. Masterson, 418 A.2d 664, 666-67
(Pa. Super. 1980).
7 “The court of common pleas shall have unlimited original jurisdiction in all
cases except those cases assigned by this schedule to the municipal court
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Pennsylvania Governor Tom Corbett signed into law Act 17 of 2013,
abolishing the Traffic Court and transferring its responsibilities to the newly-
created Traffic Court Division of the Municipal Court of Philadelphia. 8
The criminal episode from which all charges arose, and the Traffic
Court proceeding in this case occurred in 2012, when the Traffic Court had
exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate only the summary traffic offenses with
which Appellee had been charged. The Pennsylvania Constitution, thus,
prohibited the Commonwealth from prosecuting Appellee’s summary traffic
charges in the Municipal Court or the Court of Common Pleas. See
Commonwealth v. Masterson, 418 A.2d 664, 666-69 (Pa. Super. 1980).9
Likewise, Appellee’s felony and misdemeanor criminal charges could not be
adjudicated in Traffic Court.
We conclude that, given the trifurcated judicial apparatus that existed
in Philadelphia County at the time of the criminal episode in this case, even
though the conduct giving rise to the criminal charges in the instant matter
“occurred within the same judicial district”—Philadelphia County—the
and to the traffic court.” Pa. Const. Sched. Art. V § 16(o); see also 42
Pa.C.S. § 931.
8 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 1123(a)(9)(i).
9 We acknowledge that this Court decided Masterson prior to the 2002
amendment to Section 110(1)(ii) that substituted the phrase “occurred
within the same judicial district as the former prosecution” for “was within
the jurisdiction of a single court.” However, we find its discussion of the
constitutional and statutory framework of the jurisdiction of the pre-2013
Philadelphia courts instructive.
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statutory and constitutional law prohibited the Commonwealth from
consolidating Appellee’s summary traffic offense trial with the trial on his
misdemeanor and felony offenses.10
Moreover, even if the offenses could have been tried together, we
disagree with the trial court that the charges in this case arose from the
same criminal episode.
In determining whether charges arose from the same criminal episode,
courts must look to the “temporal and logical relationship between the
charges to determine whether they arose from a single criminal episode.”
Commonwealth v. Reid, 77 A.3d 579, 582 (Pa. 2013) (quotation marks
omitted). “Generally, charges against a defendant are clearly related in time
and require little analysis to determine that a single criminal episode exists.”
Commonwealth v. Hude, 458 A.2d 177, 181 (Pa. 1983). With respect to
whether a logical relationship exists, however, the Supreme Court explained:
In ascertaining whether a number of statutory offenses are
logically related to one another, the court should initially
inquire as to whether there is a substantial duplication of
factual, and/or legal issues presented by the offenses. If
there is duplication, then the offenses are logically related
and must be prosecuted at one trial.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
10 We acknowledge that this Court recently considered this issue in
Commonwealth v. Perfetto, ___ A.3d ___, 2017 Pa. Super. 281 (Pa.
Super. filed August 30, 2017) (en banc). We find, however, that the
analysis in Perfetto is inapplicable herein as the instant matter pre-dates
abolition of Philadelphia Traffic Court.
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Substantial duplication of issues of law and fact is a prerequisite, as de
minimis duplication is insufficient to establish a logical relationship between
offenses. Commonwealth v. Bracalielly, 658 A.2d 755, 761 (Pa. 1995).
Where different evidence is required to establish the defendant’s
involvement in criminal activity, substantial duplication is not demonstrated.
See id. at 761-62. “When determining if there is a duplication of legal
issues, a court should not limit its analysis to a mere comparison of the
charges, but should also consider whether, despite the variation in the form
of the criminal charges, there is a commonality of legal issues within the two
prosecutions.” Reid, 77 A.3d at 585-86 (citations and quotation marks
omitted). “Two separate offenses may constitute the same criminal episode
if one offense is a necessary step in the accomplishment of a given criminal
objective or if additional offenses occur because of an attempt to secure the
benefit of a previous offense or conceal its commission.” Commonwealth
v. Lane, 658 A.2d 1353, 1355 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citation omitted).
Furthermore, in considering the temporal and logical relationship
between criminal acts, we are guided by the policy considerations that the
legislature designed Section 110 to serve:
(1) to protect a person accused of crimes from
governmental harassment of being forced to undergo
successive trials for offenses stemming from the same
criminal episode; and (2) as a matter of judicial
administration and economy, to assure finality without
unduly burdening the judicial process by repetitious
litigation.
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Commonwealth v. Anthony, 717 A.2d 1015, 1019 (Pa. 1998) (citation
omitted). However, Section 110 “must not be interpreted to sanction
volume discounting, procedural maneuvering, or to label an ‘enterprise’ an
‘episode.’” Reid, 77 A.3d at 586 (citation, brackets, and ellipsis omitted).
In the instant matter, the trial court summarily determined that this
case easily satisfied all but one of the four Fithian prongs; thus, the court
analyzed only whether the instant prosecution on the felony and
misdemeanor offenses is based upon the same criminal conduct or arose out
of the same criminal episode as the former Traffic Court prosecution. Trial
Ct. Op., 12/9/15, at 3-4. The court, relying on the holding in Hude,
concluded that the Commonwealth should have consolidated the charges
against Appellee for purposes of trial because “[t]he Commonwealth’s case
for both sets of offenses rests solely on the testimony of the single officer
who effectuated the traffic stop.” Id. at 4. Because “both prosecutions
present a substantial duplication of facts and issues [ ] they constitute the
same criminal episode under Section 110.” Id.
Following our review, however, we conclude that, contrary to the trial
court’s assessment, the logical relationship between all of the charged
crimes is insubstantial, and, thus, the conclusion that they comprised a
single criminal episode is error. The Traffic Court acquitted Appellant of
Disregarding a Stop Sign and Driving Without a License. Conviction of those
offenses would have required the Commonwealth to present evidence that
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Appellee failed to stop at a stop sign and that Appellee operated the vehicle
at a time when his operating privilege had been suspended or revoked. The
prosecution for Receiving Stolen Property, Possession of a Controlled
Substance, and firearms violations is materially different from disregarding a
stop sign and driving without a valid license, and proof of those crimes
requires substantially different evidence and witnesses.
Moreover, aside from a de minimis explanation of the traffic stop,
there is no need for the Commonwealth to present evidence pertaining to
the traffic offenses in the subsequent prosecution. Although one might
operate a vehicle without a license or disregard a stop sign during the
commission of another crime, commission of the traffic offenses is not a
necessary step in the accomplishment of the criminal objectives of the
misdemeanor and felony crimes with which the Commonwealth charged
Appellee. Hence, there is no logical relationship between the former and
latter prosecutions.
Because the charged crimes did not constitute a single criminal
episode for Section 110 purposes, on this alternative basis, we also conclude
that the trial court erred by dismissing the misdemeanor and felony charges
against Appellee.
Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/4/2017
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