Com. v. Franklin, C. ( 2023 )


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  • J-S36028-22
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee                :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    CURTIS FRANKLIN                            :
    :
    Appellant               :      No. 1261 WDA 2021
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 27, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0000044-2021
    BEFORE:      STABILE, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                             FILED: April 28, 2023
    Appellant, Curtis Franklin, appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury
    trial convictions for involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”), criminal
    solicitation, aggravated indecent assault of a child, two counts of criminal
    attempt-rape, indecent assault-person less than 13, endangering the welfare
    of children (“EWOC”), corruption of minors, and indecent exposure.1            We
    affirm.
    The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this
    case as follows:
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    118 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123(b); 902(a); 3125(b); 901(a); 3126(a)(7); 4304(a)(1);
    6301(a)(1)(ii); and 3127(a), respectively.
    J-S36028-22
    The convictions arose out of a series of incidents that took
    place over a period of approximately seven years, starting
    when J.C. [(“Victim”)] was 8 years old. Appellant is the
    paternal great uncle of [Victim]. [Victim] testified that
    during this seven year period, she and her family, which
    consisted of her mother, father and three brothers, moved
    three times. With each move, Appellant maintained a
    presence with the family, either through temporarily living
    with them or by helping to babysit and/or care for [Victim],
    and her siblings.    Through the collective testimony of
    [Victim]’s parents, Ms. Cannon and Mr. Walker, it was clear
    that Appellant was a constant presence in the family’s life.
    He benefited as a trusted member of the family as Ms.
    Cannon and Mr. Walker assisted him with housing, took him
    to medical appointments, helped with his care, and ran
    errands for him.
    The abuse began when Appellant lived with [Victim] and her
    family at a home located in McKees Rocks. During a time
    when [Victim]’s father was in the hospital, Appellant was
    watching her and her siblings. On a day when her mother
    was at the hospital visiting her father, [Victim] testified that
    Appellant touched her chest area and vagina beneath her
    clothing. Although [Victim] was unable to provide a specific
    date for this incident, her mother testified that the family
    lived at the McKees Rocks residence when [Victim] was
    between the ages of 6 and 12 years old and her father
    testified that he was hospitalized in 2014.
    The family then moved from McKees Rocks to a home on
    Clairhaven Street in Crafton. Although Appellant did not live
    with them at this home, he was a visitor and occasionally
    stayed overnight.      On one particular overnight stay,
    Appellant was allowed to sleep in [Victim’s] bedroom. It
    was during this night that [Victim] awoke to Appellant
    performing oral sex on her. She detailed that she was
    dressed in a shirt and pants, but that when she woke up
    both her pants and underwear were pulled down to her
    ankles. She detailed that Appellant stopped when he heard
    a noise and she fled into a bathroom and locked herself
    inside.
    When [Victim] was in the 6th grade her family moved to their
    current residence located on Lawson Avenue in Crafton.
    -2-
    J-S36028-22
    Although Appellant did not live with them, he remained a
    frequent visitor and stayed overnight. The abuse continued
    as he created opportunities to be alone with [Victim] to
    perpetrate the abuse by asking [Victim]’s parents to run
    errands for him. She testified to numerous incidents.
    Sometimes he would touch her buttock or her chest when
    he came into a room, but the abuse continued to escalate.
    One day [Victim] was alone in a bedroom when Appellant
    pulled down her pants and underwear and attempted to
    vaginally penetrate her with his penis. [Victim] testified that
    she shielded her vagina with her hand and could feel his
    penis push up against her hand. Although Appellant was
    unable to perform penile penetration on this day, Appellant
    did penetrate [Victim]’s vagina with his fingers, despite her
    physical efforts to get away. Appellant attempted vaginal
    intercourse with [Victim] a second time while her parents
    were out of state and he was in charge of supervising the
    children. On this day, [Victim] was laying on the living room
    couch watching television when Appellant laid on top of her.
    Appellant pulled down [Victim]’s pants and underwear and
    attempted vaginal intercourse, but again she was able to
    block him with her hand. Appellant’s abuse of [Victim] also
    included repeated requests for her to perform oral sex on
    him.
    The trauma from these years of sexual abuse led to [Victim]
    self-mutilating, by cutting her skin with razor blades. Her
    mother discovered this in November of 2020 and [Victim]
    then disclosed the abuse to her mother, which led to a
    criminal investigation and subsequent charges in this case.
    An expert in the field of child sexual abuse and disclosure,
    called by the Commonwealth, provided testimony about
    how and why children may delay disclosing abuse and that
    cutting or other forms of self-harm are ways sexual abuse
    victims act out on the pain.
    Appellant testified at trial that he moved from Chicago to
    Pittsburgh to have access to medical treatment for
    underlying health issues. He confirmed that he either lived
    with [Victim]’s family or was a frequent visitor who also
    supervised the children at times, but denied that he ever
    sexually abused [Victim].
    -3-
    J-S36028-22
    (Trial Court Opinion, filed 2/17/22, at 4-6).
    During a charging conference, Appellant’s counsel objected to the court
    instructing the jury with standard jury instruction 3.09—credibility of
    defendant as witness.2 The court overruled Appellant’s objection and gave
    the following instruction to the jury:
    Court: The defendant took the stand as a witness in this
    case. In considering the defendant’s testimony, you are to
    follow the general instructions I just gave you for judging
    the credibility of any witness. You should not disbelieve the
    defendant’s testimony merely because he is the defendant.
    In weighing his testimony, however, you may consider the
    fact that he has a vital interest in the outcome of this trial.
    You may take the defendant’s interest into account just as
    you would the interest of any other witness along with all of
    the other facts and circumstances bearing on credibility in
    ____________________________________________
    2 Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instruction 3.09 provides in
    relevant part:
    3.09 CREDIBILITY OF DEFENDANT AS WITNESS: INTEREST,
    PRIOR CONVICTION, REPUTATION
    1. The defendant took the stand as a witness.               In
    considering the defendant's testimony, you are to follow the
    general instructions I gave you for judging the credibility of
    any witness.
    2. You should not disbelieve the defendant's testimony
    merely because [he] [she] is the defendant. In weighing
    [his] [her] testimony, however, you may consider the fact
    that [he] [she] has a vital interest in the outcome of this
    trial. You may take the defendant's interest into account,
    just as you would the interest of any other witness, along
    with all other facts and circumstances bearing on credibility
    in making up your minds what weight [his] [her] testimony
    deserves.
    Pa. SSJI (Crim), §3.09 (1), (2).
    -4-
    J-S36028-22
    making up your minds what weight his testimony deserves.
    (N.T. Trial, 5/10/21, at 298).
    The jury found Appellant guilty of all charges on May 11, 2021. On July
    27, 2021, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate of 22 to 44 years of
    incarceration followed by a period of five years of probation. Appellant filed a
    timely post-sentence motion on August 6, 2021, which the court denied on
    September 22, 2021. On October 22, 2021, Appellant filed a timely notice of
    appeal.   The court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
    statement of errors complained of on appeal on October 28, 2021, and
    Appellant complied on December 2, 2021.
    Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
    Was Appellant denied his right to a fair trial and to due
    process of law when his jury was instructed that jurors could
    and should, “in weighing [Appellant’s] testimony, … consider
    the fact that he ha[d] a vital interest in the outcome of his
    trial[?]”
    (Appellant’s Brief at 2).
    Appellant argues that the trial court erred by reading the “credibility of
    defendant as witness” instruction to the jury because it improperly instructed
    the jury to scrutinize Appellant’s testimony based on Appellant’s vital interest
    in the outcome of the trial. Appellant claims this instruction was particularly
    improper in this case because Appellant was accused of a crime that is reviled
    and the outcome of the trial hinged entirely on credibility. Appellant avers
    that the instruction was also unnecessary because the court had already
    -5-
    J-S36028-22
    instructed the jury on credibility of witnesses generally twice before reading
    the “credibility of defendant as witness” instruction. Appellant concludes the
    court’s reading of this instruction was unnecessary, improper, and unduly
    prejudicial, and this Court should grant relief. We disagree.
    Our standard of review over a challenge to jury instructions is as follows:
    When a court instructs the jury, the objective is to explain
    to the jury how it should approach its task and the factors it
    should consider in reaching its verdict. In examining jury
    instructions, our standard of review is to determine whether
    the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion or an
    error of law controlling the outcome of the case….
    Moreover, in reviewing a challenge to a jury instruction the
    entire charge is considered, not merely discrete portions
    thereof. The trial court is free to use its own expressions as
    long as the concepts at issue are clearly and accurately
    presented to the jury.
    Commonwealth v. Bradley, 
    232 A.3d 747
    , 759 (Pa.Super. 2020) (internal
    citations and quotations omitted).
    A jury charge will be deemed erroneous only if the charge
    as a whole is inadequate, not clear or has a tendency to
    mislead or confuse, rather than clarify, a material issue. A
    charge is considered adequate unless the jury was palpably
    misled by what the trial judge said or there is an omission
    which is tantamount to fundamental error. Consequently,
    the trial court has wide discretion in fashioning jury
    instructions.
    Commonwealth v. Baker, 
    963 A.2d 495
    , 507 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal
    denied, 
    606 Pa. 644
    , 
    992 A.2d 885
     (2010) (internal citation omitted).
    Additionally, “[t]he Suggested Standard Jury Instructions themselves are not
    binding and do not alter the discretion afforded trial courts in crafting jury
    instructions; rather, as their title suggests, the instructions are guides only.”
    -6-
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    Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 
    631 Pa. 138
    , 178, 
    108 A.3d 821
    , 845 (2014).
    Instantly, the court’s instruction to the jury was nearly identical to
    standard jury instruction 3.09. There is nothing in the court’s phrasing of the
    instruction that implied Appellant provided false testimony. The instruction
    also did not suggest to the jury to evaluate Appellant’s credibility in a different
    way than any other witness because of his interest in the outcome. To the
    contrary, the court’s instruction cautioned the jury against assessing
    Appellant’s credibility solely based on his status as the defendant. It further
    instructed the jury to take Appellant’s interest in the outcome of the case into
    account in weighing credibility in the same manner that the jury would do so
    for any other witness. Consequently, the instruction served to reinforce to
    the jury that it should evaluate Appellant’s testimony based on the same
    factors of credibility as other witnesses.      As such, there is no merit to
    Appellant’s claim that the court’s instruction erroneously suggested to the jury
    to specially scrutinize Appellant’s testimony. Accordingly, we discern no error
    in the court’s instruction, and Appellant’s sole issue on appeal fails.       See
    Bradley, supra; Baker, 
    supra.
     Accordingly, we affirm.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    -7-
    J-S36028-22
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/28/2023
    -8-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1261 WDA 2021

Judges: King, J.

Filed Date: 4/28/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024