Com. v. Desalvo, J. ( 2017 )


Menu:
  • J-S49040-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    v.
    JOSEPH DESALVO
    Appellant                    No. 199 WDA 2017
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 12, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0000123-2016
    BEFORE: DUBOW, SOLANO, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.:                         FILED AUGUST 28, 2017
    Appellant, Joseph DeSalvo, appeals from his judgment of sentence of
    three to six years’ imprisonment for, inter alia, persons not to possess
    firearms.1     Appellant’s sole argument is that the trial court abused its
    discretion in denying him a continuance and holding a jury trial in his
    absence when he was admitted to the hospital for a medical emergency. We
    affirm.
    The trial court accurately recounts the factual history as follows:
    On January 9, 2017, a jury trial before this [c]ourt was
    commenced at 2:45 p.m. with [Appellant] present with his
    counsel in the courtroom. The jury was empaneled and
    opening statements by the prosecutor and defense counsel
    were made. When the trial resumed at approximately
    9:10 a.m. the following morning, January 10, 2017,
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a). The trial court imposed no further penalty on the
    other charges for which the jury found Appellant guilty.
    J-S49040-17
    counsel informed the [c]ourt that [Appellant] was absent
    from the courtroom due to being hospitalized on account of
    overdosing after voluntarily ingesting unknown illegal
    substances. Defense counsel requested a continuance of
    the trial, which the [c]ourt denied, and the trial resumed
    without [Appellant] on charges of . . . Person Not To
    Possess Firearm, Theft By Unlawful Taking, and Firearm
    Not To Be Carried Without A License. After the conclusion
    of all testimony and closing arguments, [Appellant] was
    [convicted] on all charges.
    Trial Ct. Op., 3/6/17, at 1-2 (record citations omitted).            Following
    sentencing, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and both Appellant and
    the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Appellant raises one issue on appeal:
    Whether the [trial] court committed reversible error by not
    granting defense counsel’s request for continuance or
    mistrial and holding [Appellant’s] jury trial in his absence
    while he was admitted to Uniontown Hospital for a medical
    emergency?
    Appellant’s Brief at 7.
    The Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:
    The defendant shall be present at every stage of the trial
    including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the
    verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as
    otherwise provided by this rule. The defendant’s absence
    without cause at the time scheduled for the start of trial or
    during trial shall not preclude proceeding with the trial,
    including the return of the verdict and the imposition of
    sentence.
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 602(a).
    This Court has written:
    A defendant’s right to be present at trial is guaranteed
    by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
    -2-
    J-S49040-17
    by Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution;
    and by Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 602(a).
    See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 
    414 U.S. 17
    , 20, 
    94 S.Ct. 194
    , 
    38 L.Ed.2d 174
     (1973); Illinois v. Allen, 
    397 U.S. 337
    , 338, 
    90 S.Ct. 1057
    , 
    25 L.Ed.2d 353
     (1970);
    Commonwealth v. Tizer, [], 
    684 A.2d 597
    , 604 ([Pa.
    Super.] 1996). This Court has previously declined to
    interpret our state Constitution as requiring more
    protection for the accused with respect to trials in absentia
    than the United States Constitution. See Commonwealth
    v. Hill, 
    737 A.2d 255
    , 260 (Pa. Super. 1999).
    Furthermore, the right may be waived either impliedly, via
    the defendant’s actions, or expressly.           See, e.g.,
    Commonwealth v. Vega, [], 
    719 A.2d 227
    , 229–30
    ([Pa.] 1998); Commonwealth v. Sullens, [], 
    619 A.2d 1349
    , 1351 ([Pa.] 1992).
    *     *     *
    Furthermore, a defendant may be tried in absentia if he
    or she is absent without cause when the trial is scheduled
    to begin or if the defendant absconds without cause after
    the trial commences. Commonwealth v. Wilson, [] 
    712 A.2d 735
    , 737 ([Pa.] 1998); Sullens, 619 A.2d at 1352;
    see also Taylor, 
    414 U.S. at 20
    , 
    94 S.Ct. 194
     (concluding
    that the trial court had committed no error in proceeding
    with a trial even though the defendant had chosen not to
    return to the courtroom for the afternoon session, and
    quoting Allen, 
    397 U.S. at 349
    , 
    90 S.Ct. 1057
     (Brennan,
    J., concurring) for the proposition that “the governmental
    prerogative to proceed with a trial may not be defeated by
    conduct of the accused that prevents the trial from going
    forward”).
    Commonwealth v. Faulk, 
    928 A.2d 1061
    , 1065-66 (Pa. Super. 2007).
    Under these precepts, the trial court acted within its discretion by
    proceeding with trial in Appellant’s absence.    The record establishes that
    Appellant was present for the first day of trial but was found unresponsive at
    his home and transported by ambulance to the hospital. N.T., 1/10/17, at
    -3-
    J-S49040-17
    11-12.   Blood tests taken at the hospital show that he ingested illegal
    controlled substances between the first and second days of trial. Id. at 12.
    We agree with the trial court that this was a “voluntary” act. Id. Moreover,
    several witnesses missed work to attend the second day of trial, and a state
    trooper adjusted his schedule to be present as well.    Id.   The court aptly
    observed that “the inconvenience to those people outweigh the voluntary act
    on [Appellant’s] part.” Id.
    We hold that Appellant waived his right to be present during trial by
    voluntarily ingesting illegal substances that caused his hospitalization. See
    Faulk, 
    928 A.2d at 1065-66
    .     The trial court properly held that Appellant
    could be tried in absentia for being absent without cause after trial
    commenced.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judge Dubow joins.
    Judge Solano concurs in result.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/28/2017
    -4-