Com. v. Thompson, D. ( 2017 )


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  • J. S67008/16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :          PENNSYLVANIA
    v.                  :
    :
    DERRICK THOMPSON,                       :          No. 151 EDA 2013
    :
    Appellant      :
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, October 26, 2012,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0004275-2011
    BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., RANSOM, J. AND STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.:                FILED AUGUST 31, 2017
    Derrick Thompson appeals the judgment of sentence in which the
    Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County sentenced him to serve a
    term of life in prison for first-degree murder.1    After careful review, we
    affirm.
    In September 2003, Craig Butler (“Butler”) was standing outside of a
    bar on York Street in the City of Philadelphia and overheard appellant tell
    Terrance Berry (“the victim”), “I don’t want you hustling around here
    no [sic] more.” (Notes of testimony, 10/22/12 at 91.) Butler explained that
    the term “hustling” meant “selling drugs.” (Id.)
    * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).
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    On September 20, 2003, Butler was walking on Arizona Street when
    he saw the victim standing outside a Ford Thunderbird with his hands resting
    on the hood. Appellant was in the car. Butler then heard a “boom.” Butler
    saw the victim fall back and saw appellant exit the vehicle. (Id. at 92-94.)
    Butler saw a portion of a double barrel shotgun hanging outside the driver’s
    side window of the car. Butler observed appellant exit the vehicle and get
    on a bicycle. (Id. at 95.) Butler went to appellant’s residence and arrived
    there approximately 15 minutes after the shooting.           Butler overheard
    appellant tell Kiomi Dell (“Dell”), the mother of appellant’s child, “to go
    head [sic] and get the gun from the car, take it in the house.” (Id. at 104.)
    The City of Philadelphia Police Department investigated the scene of
    the shooting.     The victim was pronounced dead at 8:35 p.m. on
    September 20, 2003.     (Notes of testimony, 10/18/12 at 63.)        The police
    recovered two live shotgun shells from the left side of the driver’s seat of the
    Ford Thunderbird.   (Id. at 142.)    Officer Robert Flade of the Crime Scene
    Unit observed wadding from the shotgun in the victim’s neck. (Id. at 144.)
    The police recovered appellant’s fingerprints from the Ford Thunderbird.
    (Notes of testimony, 10/22/12 at 185.)
    Sam Gulino, M.D. (“Dr. Gulino”), chief medical examiner for the City of
    Philadelphia, testified that the victim suffered a shotgun wound to the neck
    at close range which damaged the structures in the neck, including the
    voice box, larynx, blood vessels and nerves in the neck, the spine in the
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    neck, and severed his spinal cord. (Id. at 25-26.) Dr. Gulino testified that
    the victim died of a single shotgun wound to the neck, and the manner of
    death was homicide. (Id. at 41.)
    Orlando O’Neal testified that in mid-October of 2003, appellant told
    him that a person known as “Lemon” had a shotgun in his possession and he
    wanted money or else he would turn it in to the police.           (Id. at 55.)
    Appellant told O’Neal that the shotgun was passed off to a female friend,
    who passed it off to somebody else, and somehow Lemon got it.           (Id. at
    56.) Appellant told O’Neal that Lemon wanted money every week and that
    he should have gotten rid of the shotgun right after the shooting. (Id. at
    67.)
    Detective Kevin Judge of the Philadelphia Police Department testified
    that when he questioned appellant on November 11, 2003, regarding the
    shooting of the victim, appellant denied that he saw who shot the victim and
    claimed that Dell called the police to report the shooting. (Id. at 119-120.)
    Appellant did not testify.    Keith Harding, a long-time friend of
    appellant, testified that appellant told him that he shot the victim “on a [sic]
    accident.” (Notes of testimony, 10/23/12 at 77.)
    On October 26, 2012, the jury found appellant guilty of first-degree
    murder. The trial court sentenced appellant to life in prison. Appellant was
    also convicted of possession of an instrument of crime 2 but was sentenced to
    2
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(a).
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    no further penalty.      Appellant filed a post-sentence motion which the trial
    court denied on December 11, 2012.
    Appellant appealed to this court. On September 12, 2016, appellant’s
    counsel, Norman Scott, Esq. (“Attorney Scott”), applied to withdraw as
    counsel and asked this court to remand to the trial court for the appointment
    of new counsel because Attorney Scott had been suspended from the
    practice of law for six months on August 17, 2016.           On October 3, 2016,
    appellant moved to hold his appeal in abeyance pending the appointment of
    new counsel after Attorney Scott’s suspension. On December 5, 2016, this
    court granted Attorney Scott’s leave to withdraw and remanded for the
    appointment of new counsel for appellant.               This court also granted
    appellant’s motion to hold his appeal in abeyance pending action by the trial
    court.
    On January 30, 2017, the trial court appointed new counsel,
    David Scott Rudenstein, Esq. (“Attorney Rudenstein”).          On April 13, 2017,
    Attorney Rudenstein petitioned to vacate the previous brief filed on behalf of
    appellant.     On April 21, 2017, this court granted the motion to vacate.
    Subsequently, both parties filed briefs.
    Appellant raises the following issues for this court’s review:
    1.    Is [appellant] entitled to an Arrest of Judgment
    on the charge of Murder in the First Degree
    where the evidence was insufficient to
    establish that [appellant] was the perpetrator
    of the crime; and where, the evidence was
    insufficient to establish the crime of Murder in
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    the First Degree where the Commonwealth
    could not prove specific intent to kill or
    premeditation?
    2.     Is [appellant] entitled to a new trial on the
    charge of Murder in the First Degree where the
    greater weight of the evidence did not support
    the verdict?
    Appellant’s brief at 3.
    Regarding whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence
    to sustain a conviction, appellant contends simply that the Commonwealth
    did not prove its case because Butler turns up everywhere. He was present
    when appellant allegedly threatened the victim, he was present when
    appellant allegedly shot the victim, and he was present at appellant’s home
    when there was talk of a gun. Appellant characterizes Butler’s testimony as
    “simply outrageously unbelievable.” (Appellant’s brief at 9.)
    A claim challenging the sufficiency of the
    evidence is a question of law. Commonwealth v.
    Widmer, 
    560 Pa. 308
    , 319, 
    744 A.2d 745
    , 751
    (2000). In that case, our Supreme Court set forth
    the sufficiency of the evidence standard:
    Evidence will be deemed sufficient to
    support the verdict when it establishes
    each material element of the crime
    charged and the commission thereof by
    the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Commonwealth v. Karkaria, 
    533 Pa. 412
    , 
    625 A.2d 1167
     (1993). Where the
    evidence offered to support the verdict is
    in contradiction to the physical facts, in
    contravention to human experience and
    the laws of nature, then the evidence is
    insufficient as a matter of law.
    Commonwealth v. Santana, 460 Pa.
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    482, 
    333 A.2d 876
     (1975).           When
    reviewing a sufficiency claim the court is
    required to view the evidence in the light
    most favorable to the verdict winner
    giving the prosecution the benefit of all
    reasonable inferences to be drawn from
    the evidence.       Commonwealth v.
    Chambers, 
    528 Pa. 558
    , 
    599 A.2d 630
    (1991).
    Id. at 319, 
    744 A.2d at 751
    .
    Commonwealth v. Morgan, 
    913 A.2d 906
    , 910 (Pa.Super. 2006).
    We begin by reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence for appellant’s
    first-degree murder conviction. “To obtain a first-degree murder conviction,
    the Commonwealth must demonstrate that a human being was unlawfully
    killed, the defendant perpetrated the killing, and the defendant acted with
    malice and a specific intent to kill.”   Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 
    986 A.2d 84
    , 92 (Pa. 2009), citing Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 
    959 A.2d 916
    ,
    920 (Pa. 2008); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).          Specific intent to kill can be
    established through circumstantial evidence, such as the use of a deadly
    weapon on a vital part of the victim’s body. Commonwealth v. Rega, 
    933 A.2d 997
    , 1009 (Pa. 2007).
    Although appellant acknowledges that credibility is normally left to the
    jury, appellant argues that Butler’s testimony is incredible.    He challenges
    Butler’s testimony as not having a “ring of truth to it.”
    The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained that there is an
    “exception to the general rule that the jury is the sole arbiter of the facts
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    where the testimony is so inherently unreliable that a verdict based upon it
    could amount to no more than surmise or conjecture.” Commonwealth v.
    Karkaria, 
    625 A.2d 1167
    , 1170 (Pa. 1993), quoting, Commonwealth v.
    Smith, 
    467 A.2d 1120
    , 1122 (Pa. 1983).
    Here, the physical evidence and appellant’s own statements supported
    Butler’s testimony such that this verdict was not based on mere surmise or
    conjecture.
    Appellant also asserts that he is entitled to an arrest of judgment on
    the first degree murder conviction because the Commonwealth failed to
    make out the elements of the crime. Specifically, appellant argues that the
    Commonwealth failed to establish that appellant killed the victim in an
    intentional, deliberate, and premeditated manner.
    Here, the evidence supports that the victim was killed and that
    appellant perpetrated the killing.   With respect to whether appellant acted
    with malice and a specific intent to kill, the Commonwealth presented
    evidence that Butler heard appellant tell the victim to stop selling drugs in
    his area a few days before Butler saw appellant talking to the victim. Butler
    then heard a “bang,” saw the victim fall to the ground, saw appellant exit
    the vehicle, and saw a shotgun in the vehicle.           (Notes of testimony,
    10/22/12 at 92-95.)     Medical evidence and ballistics evidence established
    that the victim was shot at close range in the neck which severed the spinal
    cord which is certainly a vital part of the victim’s body. It could certainly be
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    inferred from Butler’s testimony that appellant intended to kill the victim.
    The Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to establish that appellant
    committed first-degree murder.
    Appellant next contends that the verdict was against the weight of the
    evidence.
    [T]he weight of the evidence is exclusively for
    the finder of fact who is free to believe all, part, or
    none of the evidence and to determine the credibility
    of the witnesses.          An appellate court cannot
    substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact
    . . . thus, we may only reverse the lower court’s
    verdict if it is so contrary to the evidence as to shock
    one’s sense of justice. Moreover, where the trial
    court has ruled on the weight claim below, an
    appellate court’s role is not to consider the
    underlying question of whether the verdict is against
    the weight of the evidence, . . . rather, appellate
    review is limited to whether the trial court palpably
    abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.
    Commonwealth v. Kim, 
    888 A.2d 847
    , 851
    (Pa.Super. 2005) (citations and quotations omitted).
    A motion for a new trial based on a challenge to the
    weight of the evidence concedes the evidence was
    sufficient to support the verdict. Commonwealth v.
    Davis, 
    799 A.2d 860
    , 865 (Pa.Super. 2002).
    Commonwealth v. Jarowecki, 
    923 A.2d 425
    , 433 (Pa.Super. 2007).
    Appellant argues that the greater weight of the evidence does not
    support the verdict.     Specifically, appellant argues the evidence only
    supports that he had a gun and that the gun was discharged.             While
    Keith Harding testified that appellant told him that the shooting was an
    accident, the jury did not credit this testimony and credited the testimony of
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    Butler. Once again, appellant attacks the credibility of Butler whom the jury
    obviously credited. Based on the evidence presented, the guilty verdict was
    not so contrary to the evidence to shock one’s sense of justice.    The trial
    court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s post-trial
    motion.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/31/2017
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