Com. v. Rivera-Gonzalez, E. ( 2017 )

J-S46019-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ERNIE RIVERA-GONZALEZ
Appellant No. 2020 MDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order November 17, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0005899-2014
BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON, JJ. and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 18, 2017
Appellant, Ernie Rivera-Gonzalez, appeals pro se from the order
entered on November 17, 2016, dismissing Appellant’s petition filed
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-
9546. We affirm.
The PCRA court has ably summarized the underlying facts and
procedural posture of this appeal. As the PCRA court explained:
On October 5, 2014, police were called in response to a
reported stabbing. When officers arrived at the scene, they
found the victim, Alexander Vazquez-Dones, lying on the
sidewalk, bleeding from a stab-wound to the chest. Mr.
Vazquez-Dones was transported by ambulance to the
hospital where emergency efforts were made to save his
life. Unfortunately, the efforts were unsuccessful, and Mr.
Vazquez-Dones died. . . .
While securing the scene, a police officer found a black,
leather wallet [lying] on the sidewalk across the street from
where Mr. Vazquez-Dones was found. Within the wallet, the
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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officer discovered [Appellant’s] state identification card.
The officer showed the ID card to two eye-witnesses, both
of whom confirmed [that] the person in the ID card photo
was who they saw stab Mr. Vazquez-Dones once in the
chest with a [pocketknife] before fleeing the scene on foot.
The witnesses were also familiar with [Appellant], as he had
frequented the neighborhood. One of the witnesses, Mr.
Vazquez-Dones’ brother, had known [Appellant] for about
[ten] years, and stated that [Appellant] had told him prior
to the stabbing that he was planning to fight Mr. Vazquez-
Dones. [Appellant] was ultimately caught [11] days later,
on October 16, 2014, by a police officer responding to a
disturbance call in Enfield, Connecticut.
[Appellant] was charged with criminal homicide[] and
extradited back to Pennsylvania. Once here, he was
appointed counsel, who filed an omnibus pre-trial motion on
his behalf. Ultimately, a suppression hearing was scheduled
for November 30, 2015, with a trial, if necessary, to begin
on December 7, 2015. . . .
While the . . . suppression [motion] was pending,
[Appellant’s counsel] was able to get the Commonwealth to
offer a reduction of the charge from first to third degree
murder[,] with an agreed upon sentence of 15-30 years’
incarceration. [Appellant’s] counsel then requested a status
conference due to [Appellant’s] desire to reject that
negotiated plea offer and proceed to trial. [The trial court]
granted that request, and a status conference was held on
November 5, 2015. At that conference, [the trial court] was
informed that while the Commonwealth had made such an
offer, [Appellant] still had some concerns and misgivings
about the negotiation process and was still considering
proceeding pro se. Accordingly, to give time for
[Appellant’s] concerns to be resolved, and to address any
continuing issues on the record, [the trial court] scheduled
another conference for November 19, 2015.
Prior to the November 19th conference, [Appellant’s] counsel
contacted [the trial court’s] chambers to request scheduling
a guilty plea hearing for the following Monday. Due to
[Appellant’s] prior assertions, however, [the trial court] still
held the scheduled status conference. At the conference,
[Appellant’s] counsel explained to [the trial court] that while
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[Appellant] had indicated the day before that he was ready
to accept the Commonwealth’s offer, at the time of the
conference, she was no longer sure how he wished to
proceed. After informing [Appellant] of the importance of
not revealing attorney-client confidences, [the trial court]
then proceeded to question him to ensure he understood
the proceedings, to avoid any further delay, and to
determine whether he wished to proceed pro se.
[Appellant] then stated that he did not want to sign the plea
agreement because, while he did not consider [his counsel]
incompetent, he did not trust her. [The trial court] then
confirmed with [Appellant] and the Commonwealth that the
offer was only open until the end of the week. [The
Commonwealth] then added that the offer was only
available to begin with because [Appellant’s counsel] had
advocated very strongly on [Appellant’s] behalf. The
[Commonwealth] also noted that their theory of the case
was first degree murder, and that is what they would
pursue should the case proceed to trial.
After confirming with [Appellant] that he understood the
situation, [the trial court] asked [Appellant’s counsel] if she
would like to add anything. She then explained that she
had believed [Appellant] was truly ready to accept the plea
that afternoon, but that [Appellant] changed his mind only
after hearing the plea [hearing] had been rescheduled.
[Appellant’s counsel] then requested that the
Commonwealth keep their plea offer open, because she did
not want [Appellant’s] decision to be a “knee-jerk reaction”
because of her, and so that [Appellant] could confer with his
family or people he did trust before making a final decision.
[Appellant] then stated that he thought the agreement was
unfair, that it should have been for 14-28 years instead of
15-30, that he was rejecting the Commonwealth’s offer, and
that he wanted to proceed pro se. In response, [the trial
court] reminded [Appellant] that the right to counsel is an
important Constitutional right, and that [the trial court]
would need to ask him a series of questions before allowing
him to proceed pro se, to ensure that his decision to waive
that important right was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
Even though [Appellant] had never previously had any
difficulty understanding English, at this point he stated that
he required an interpreter. None being immediately
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available, [the trial court] terminated the proceeding until
the following Monday, November 23, 2015.
Prior to the November 23, 2015 hearing, an interpreter was
provided to [Appellant] to assist him with any language
issues or questions he had with the written waiver of
counsel colloquy. [Appellant’s counsel] then informed [the
trial court] that [Appellant] no longer wished to proceed pro
se, and instead wanted to accept a revised plea offered by
the Commonwealth. The interpreter thereafter assisted
[Appellant] with any language issues or questions he had
with the written guilty plea colloquy.
As a result of this change of heart, [the trial court]
proceeded with a guilty plea hearing. At the outset, [the
trial court] confirmed with [Appellant] that he had the
interpreter he had demanded, and that the interpreter’s
services were adequate. [The trial court] then had him
confirm his decision that instead of going to trial, he
intended to plead guilty to third degree murder. When
asked about mental health and medications, [Appellant]
responded that he had previously been treated for bipolar
disorder and depression, and that he was currently on
medication for anxiety, high blood pressure, and seizure[s].
[Appellant] confirmed, however, that there was nothing
about those conditions or medications that in any way
“would impair or limit [his] ability to understand” what was
happening at the proceeding. Indeed, [the trial court’s]
own observations throughout the colloquy left [the trial
court] with no doubt that [Appellant] fully understood the
meaning and gravity of his statements and decision.
[Appellant] also acknowledged that he had reviewed the
written guilty plea colloquy with his attorney and with the
assistance of the interpreter. [Appellant] stated that he
was able to understand all of the questions in the
document, and that, while he had had some questions,
those questions were answered satisfactorily by his attorney
before he signed the agreement[; Appellant confirmed that
he] fully underst[ood] the documents’ meaning and legal
effect. Likewise, [Appellant] signed a separate[] guilty plea
slip before the proceeding, and confirmed that the signature
on the slip was his own.
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[The trial court] then verbally explained the charge of third
degree murder during the colloquy, defining it as “a killing
with malice,” and explaining that malice occurs if the
“perpetrator’s actions show his or her wanton and willful
disregard of an unjustified and extremely high risk that his
or her conduct would result in death or serious bodily injury
to another.” After reading this definition to [Appellant], he
indicated that malice had previously been “explained
different[ly]” to him. After [Appellant] briefly conferred
with counsel, [the trial court] asked again if [Appellant]
understood the charge, and specifically malice, and
[Appellant] replied that he did. Then, to further ensure
there could be no doubt as to [Appellant’s] understanding of
the plea, [the trial court] defined malice a second time. At
[Appellant’s] request, [the trial court] then had the
interpreter define malice for him in Spanish, followed by
another explanation of third degree murder in English,
including another reading of the definition of malice. After
conversing again with counsel, [Appellant] responded again
that he admitted to the charge. Following this admission,
[the trial court] explained to [Appellant] that he faced a
maximum sentence of [40] years in prison and a fine of
$50,000[.00].
Before going further, [the trial court] made sure that
[Appellant] admitted that he killed Alex Vasquez-Dones by
stabbing him in the chest with a pocketknife during an
argument. [Appellant] also admitted that before the
incident occurred, he had told the victim’s brother he was
planning to fight the victim. [Appellant] likewise admitted
that after stabbing the victim, [Appellant] fled from
Lancaster County to Connecticut, but was later identified as
the perpetrator by two eye-witnesses, and by his wallet,
which he left at the scene. [The trial court] then made sure
that [Appellant] knew he had an absolute right to have a
trial by jury where it would be the Commonwealth’s burden
to prove [Appellant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
[Appellant] also recognized that he was giving up most of
his rights to appeal, that he was pleading guilty of his own
free will, and that no one forced or threatened him to
induce the plea. While [Appellant] claimed that he was not
satisfied with counsel’s services, he stated that there was
nothing he would like to know that he [had not] been told
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up to that point, and that he had no questions he wanted to
ask his lawyer before entering the plea.
When given his right to make a statement, after asking
permission to address the victim’s family, [Appellant] stated
the following: “Forgive me. I know it’s difficult because
you lost a son, and you have the person in front of you, the
person who did it.”
Assured that the plea was knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent, [the trial court] accepted the plea agreement,
sentencing [Appellant] to the agreed upon guideline
sentence of 14 to 35 years [in prison] plus costs.
[Appellant] filed no direct appeal in this case, and almost
one year after sentencing, [Appellant] filed [a] pro se PCRA
petition.[1, 2] [Appellant] was appointed counsel, who, after
reviewing the case, filed a [no-merit letter and a request to
withdraw as counsel, pursuant to Commonwealth v.
Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v.
____________________________________________
1
Appellant raised the following claims in his pro se PCRA petition:
[1.] Was [Appellant] denied due process where his pre-
sentence self-defense claims were negated by [an]
incomplete colloquy on criminal homicide which should have
included an instruction on voluntary and involuntary
manslaughter from which [Appellant] could have faced a
lesser degree of homicide as opposed to the only alternative
plea of third degree murder?
[2.] Was counsel ineffective for not requesting a
competency hearing where [Appellant] clearly informed the
court of multiple occasions that he was bipolar, depressed,
arguably [schizophrenic], and on daily medications which
reasonably could have [affected] and clouded his judgment?
Appellant’s Pro Se PCRA Petition, 8/1/16, at 5 (some internal capitalization
omitted).
2
Appellant timely filed his PCRA petition on August 1, 2016.
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Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc)]. After
reviewing the [Turner/Finley letter], and an objection filed
by [Appellant], [the PCRA court entered an order notifying
Appellant that it intended to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA
petition in 20 days, without holding a hearing. See
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). Appellant] then filed a motion for
extension of time, asking to amend his petition[] and
“adequately respond” to the [Rule] 907 [notice; the PCRA
court granted this request]. Shortly after issuing that order,
[the PCRA court] received [Appellant’s] response to [the
Rule 907 notice.3] After reviewing it, [the PCRA court] still
found his petition to be meritless, dismissed it accordingly,
and granted counsel leave to withdraw. . . .
PCRA Court Opinion, 2/6/17, at 1-9 (internal citations, footnotes, and some
capitalization omitted).
Now on appeal, Appellant raises four claims to this Court:4
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3
Appellant’s response claimed that PCRA counsel’s no-merit letter was
insufficient because his claims had merit and because “PCRA counsel’s failure
to communicate with [Appellant] and his failure to explain any extra-record
investigation[] denied the very right entitled by our [C]onstitution.”
Appellant’s Response, 10/14/16, at 9.
4
On December 15, 2016, the PCRA court entered an order pursuant to
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b), instructing Appellant to
file and serve a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal within
21 days. PCRA Court Order, 12/15/16, at 1. As the PCRA court notes,
Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement arrived in an envelope stamped
“1/05/17.” See PCRA Court Opinion, 2/6/17, at 9; Envelope, postmarked
1/5/17, at 1. We note that, since Appellant is incarcerated and proceeding
pro se, Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement is timely. Commonwealth v.
Patterson, 931 A.2d 710, 714 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“[p]ursuant to the
prisoner mailbox rule, we deem a document filed on the day it is placed in
the hands of prison authorities for mailing”).
Within Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant listed the following
claims:
[1.] Appellant is [innocent] of third degree murder.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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[1.] Was counsel ineffective during the procession of plea
negotiations for compelling Appellant to accept the terms
without having advised Appellant of the facts of the case
against him as they related to the offense?
[2.] Was counsel ineffective for failing to inform Appellant of
the lesser elements of criminal homicide and include those
applicable to plea negotiations in light of Appellant’s claims
of self-defense?
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
[2.] PCRA court [erred] in denying [Appellant’s] self-defense
claim that denied him due process where his pre-sentence
self-defense claims were negated by an [incomplete]
colloquy on criminal homicide which should have include[d]
an instruction on voluntary and involuntary manslaughter
from which petitioner could have faced a lesser degree of
homicide as opposed to the only alternative plea of third
degree murder.
[3.] PCRA court [erred] in denying [Appellant’s] ineffective
[assistance of] counsel claim for not requesting a
competency hearing where Appellant clearly informed his
counsel of mental health problems since [juvenile] in and
out of mental health hospital[s], mental wards, also
Appellant informed the courts of multiple occasions that he
was bipolar, depressed, arguably schizophrenic, and PTSD,
and on daily medications which reasonably could have
[affected] and clouded his [judgment].
[4.] PCRA court [erred] in not addressing [Appellant’s] claim
of counsel ineffectiveness during the plea [bargaining]
process making [Appellant’s] plea unknowingly,
unintelligently and [involuntarily] accepted.
[5.] PCRA court [erred] in not addressing and/or finding
that PCRA counsel was ineffective for filing a no merit
[letter] without ever contacting Appellant.
Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 1/5/17, at 1.
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[3.] Was counsel ineffective for failing to request a
competency hearing after Appellant informed the court on
multiple occasions that he was bipolar, suffered from
chronic depression, that he was arguably schizophrenic, and
that he was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder?
[4.] Was PCRA counsel ineffective for filing a [no-merit]
letter without having contacted Appellant?
Appellant’s Brief at vii.5
As we have stated:
[t]his Court’s standard of review regarding an order
dismissing a petition under the PCRA is whether the
determination of the PCRA court is supported by evidence of
record and is free of legal error. In evaluating a PCRA
court’s decision, our scope of review is limited to the
findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record,
viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at
the trial level. We may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on
any grounds if it is supported by the record.
Commonwealth v. Rivera, 10 A.3d 1276, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal
citations omitted).
To be eligible for relief under the PCRA, the petitioner must plead and
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence
resulted from “one or more” of the seven, specifically enumerated
circumstances listed in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2). One of these statutorily
enumerated circumstances is the “[i]neffectiveness of counsel which, in the
circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining
____________________________________________
5
For ease of discussion, we have reorganized Appellant’s claims on appeal.
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process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken
place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).
Counsel is, however, presumed to be effective and “the burden of
demonstrating ineffectiveness rests on [A]ppellant.” Commonwealth v.
Rivera, 10 A.3d 1276, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010). To satisfy this burden,
Appellant must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the
particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not
have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his
interests; and, (3) but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, there is
a reasonable probability that the outcome of the challenged
proceedings would have been different.
Commonwealth v. Fulton, 830 A.2d 567, 572 (Pa. 2003). “A failure to
satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness will require rejection of the
claim.” Id.First, Appellant claims that plea counsel was ineffective “during the
procession of plea negotiations for compelling Appellant to accept the terms
without having advised Appellant of the facts of the case against him as they
related to the offense.” Appellant’s Brief at 9. Appellant did not raise this
claim in his PCRA petition or in his Rule 1925(b) statement. 6 Therefore, the
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6
The PCRA court finally dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition on November
17, 2016. PCRA Court Order, 11/17/16, at 1. We note that, on November
30, 2016, Appellant filed a purported “Amended PCRA Petition,” where
Appellant attempted to raise a number of additional claims. See Appellant’s
Amended PCRA Petition, 11/30/16, at 1-12. Yet, given that the PCRA court
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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claim is waived. Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 727 A.2d 545, 547 (Pa. 1999)
(“issues [that] were not raised in [an] original PCRA petition, counsel’s
amended petition, or the oral amendments made to [a] petition before the
PCRA court . . . are waived”); Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“[i]ssues not
included in the [Rule 1925(b) s]tatement . . . are waived”);
Commonwealth v. Castillo, 888 A.2d 775, 780 (Pa. 2005) (“[a]ny issues
not raised in a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement will be waived”).
Second, Appellant claims that plea counsel was ineffective because she
“fail[ed] to inform Appellant of the lesser elements of criminal homicide and
include those applicable to plea negotiations in light of Appellant’s claims of
self-defense.” Appellant’s Brief at 1. Appellant did not raise this specific
claim either in his PCRA petition or in his Rule 1925(b) statement. Rather,
Appellant’s PCRA Petition and Rule 1925(b) statement only claimed that
Appellant was denied due process of the law because “his pre-sentence self-
defense claims were negated by an [incomplete] colloquy on criminal
homicide which should have include[d] an instruction on voluntary and
involuntary manslaughter.” Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 1/5/17, at
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
had already dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition, Appellant could not
“amend” the current petition. Moreover, Appellant cannot file a second
PCRA petition until “the resolution of review of the pending PCRA petition by
the highest state court in which review is sought, or upon the expiration of
the time for seeking such review.” Commonwealth v. Lark, 746 A.2d 585,
588 (Pa. 2000).
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1. Appellant’s claim that the trial court conducted an “incomplete colloquy
on criminal homicide” does not include any claim that plea counsel was
ineffective for failing to negotiate for, or inform Appellant of, a lesser charge.
Therefore, Appellant has waived his current claim on appeal. Jacobs, 727
A.2d at 547; Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).
Third, Appellant contends that plea counsel was ineffective for failing
to request a competency hearing. Appellant’s Brief at 6. This claim fails.
“A criminal defendant has the right to effective counsel during a plea
process as well as during trial.” Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d
136, 141 (Pa. Super. 2002). Yet, where the ineffectiveness of counsel is
claimed in connection with the entry of a guilty plea, a petitioner may only
obtain relief where “counsel’s deficient stewardship resulted in a manifest
injustice, for example, by facilitating [the] entry of an unknowing,
involuntary, or unintelligent plea.” Commonwealth v. Moser, 921 A.2d
526, 530 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en banc) (internal citations and quotations
omitted). As we have explained:
once a defendant has entered a plea of guilty, it is
presumed that he was aware of what he was doing, and the
burden of proving involuntariness is upon him. Therefore,
where the record clearly demonstrates that a guilty plea
colloquy was conducted, during which it became evident
that the defendant understood the nature of the charges
against him, the voluntariness of the plea is established.
Commonwealth v. Stork, 737 A.2d 789, 791 (Pa. Super. 1999) (internal
quotations, citations, and corrections omitted), quoting Commonwealth v.
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Myers, 642 A.2d 1103, 1105 (Pa. Super. 1994). “To prove prejudice, [an]
appellant must prove he would not have [pleaded] guilty and would have
achieved a better outcome at trial.” Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d
795 (Pa. 2014) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Moreover,
With regard to the voluntariness of a plea, a guilty plea
colloquy must “affirmatively demonstrate the defendant
understood what the plea connoted and its consequences.”
Commonwealth v. Lewis, 708 A.2d 497, 501 (Pa. Super.
1998). Once the defendant has entered a guilty plea, “it is
presumed that he was aware of what he was doing, and the
burden of proving involuntariness is upon him.”
Commonwealth v. Bedell, 954 A.2d 1209, 1212 (Pa.
Super. 2008). Competence to plead guilty requires a
finding that the defendant comprehends the crime for which
he stands accused, is able to cooperate with his counsel in
forming a rational defense, and has a rational and factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.
Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876 (Pa. Super.
2007).
Commonwealth v. Willis, 68 A.3d 997, 1002 (Pa. Super. 2013). “A
defendant is bound by the statements which he makes during his plea
colloquy.” Commonwealth v. Lewis, 708 A.2d 497, 502 (Pa. Super. 1998)
(internal citation omitted). “A defendant may not assert grounds for
withdrawing the plea that contradict statements made when he pled guilty.”
Id.Within Appellant’s PCRA petition and brief to this Court, Appellant
notes that, during the plea colloquy, Appellant “repeatedly indicated” that he
could not understand the element of “malice” in the third-degree murder
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charge. See Appellant’s Brief at 6. However, as both Appellant and the
PCRA court note, after Appellant indicated that he could not understand the
charge during the plea colloquy, the PCRA court took its time and repeatedly
explained to Appellant the elements of third-degree murder and, specifically,
the element of malice. Id. As the PCRA court declared:
[The trial court] verbally explained the charge of third
degree murder during the colloquy, defining it as “a killing
with malice,” and explaining that malice occurs if the
“perpetrator’s actions show his or her wanton and willful
disregard of an unjustified and extremely high risk that his
or her conduct would result in death or serious bodily injury
to another.” After reading this definition to [Appellant], he
indicated that malice had previously been “explained
different[ly]” to him. After [Appellant] briefly conferred
with counsel, [the trial court] asked again if [Appellant]
understood the charge, and specifically malice, and
[Appellant] replied that he did. Then, to further ensure
there could be no doubt as to [Appellant’s] understanding of
the plea, [the trial court] defined malice a second time. At
[Appellant’s] request, [the trial court] then had the
interpreter define malice for him in Spanish, followed by
another explanation of third degree murder in English,
including another reading of the definition of malice. After
conversing again with counsel, [Appellant] responded again
that he admitted to the charge.
PCRA Court Opinion, 2/6/17, at 6-7 (internal citations omitted).
Neither in Appellant’s PCRA petition nor in his brief to this Court does
Appellant ever claim that he failed to understand the element of malice
after the PCRA court fully explained the element to him. See Appellant’s
Brief at 6-8. Moreover, Appellant has never claimed that any of his alleged
illnesses or possible medications actually prevented him from understanding
the element of malice. Id. Therefore, “even if counsel had no reasonable
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basis to decline to pursue a competency evaluation, Appellant fails to
articulate how he was prejudiced because he cannot establish that had
counsel requested an evaluation and hearing, the outcome of” the
proceedings would have changed. Commonwealth v. Rainey, 928 A.2d
215, 236-237 (Pa. 2007). Appellant’s claim on appeal fails.
Finally, Appellant claims that PCRA counsel was ineffective “for filing a
[no-]merit letter without having contacted Appellant.” Appellant’s Brief at
11. Even if Appellant raised this claim in his response to the Rule 907
notice, the claim fails because Appellant has completely “fail[ed] to articulate
how he was prejudiced” by PCRA counsel’s actions. See Rainey, 928 A.2d
at 236. Thus, Appellant’s final claim on appeal fails.
Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/18/2017
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