Straw, J. v. Fair, K. v. Pittsburgh Lubes ( 2018 )

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J-A07013-17
2018 Pa. Super. 125
JENNIFER M. STRAW AND THOMAS P. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
STRAW, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CO- OF
ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
ELIJAH C. STRAW, DECEASED; AND
ROWAN J. STRAW, A MINOR, BY AND
THROUGH HIS PARENTS AND NATURAL
GUARDIANS, JENNIFER M. STRAW AND
THOMAS P. STRAW
v.
KIRK A. FAIR AND GOLON MASONRY
RESTORATION, INC.
v.
PITTSBURGH LUBES, INC. D/B/A JIFFY
LUBE, TOWER AUTO SALES & SERVICE,
NATIONAL AUTOMOTIVE PARTS
ASSOCIATION-NAPA AUTO PARTS
T/D/B/A NAPA
v.
THOMAS P. STRAW
APPEAL OF: GOLON MASONRY
RESTORATION, INC.
No. 742 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment Entered April 28, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Civil Division at: G.D. No. 2013-003294
JENNIFER M. STRAW AND THOMAS P. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
STRAW, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CO- OF
ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
ELIJAH C. STRAW, DECEASED; AND
ROWAN J. STRAW, A MINOR, BY AND
THROUGH HIS PARENTS AND NATURAL
J-A07012-17
GUARDIANS, JENNIFER M. STRAW AND
THOMAS P. STRAW
v.
KIRK A. FAIR AND GOLON MASONRY
RESTORATION, INC.
v.
PITTSBURGH LUBES, INC. D/B/A JIFFY
LUBE, TOWER AUTO SALES & SERVICE,
NATIONAL AUTOMOTIVE PARTS
ASSOCIATION-NAPA AUTO PARTS
T/D/B/A NAPA
v.
THOMAS P. STRAW
APPEAL OF: KIRK A. FAIR
No. 743 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment Entered April 28, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Civil Division at No.: G.D. 13-003294
BEFORE: OLSON, STABILE, and STRASSBURGER, JJ.*
DISSENTING OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED MAY 11, 2018
The Majority would vacate the judgment entered in favor of the Straws
and remand for a new trial based on its belief that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of Additional Defendants, including
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Straw.1 I believe the trial court correctly determined that Additional
Defendants, Jiffy Lube, Tower Auto, NAPA Auto Parts, and Thomas Straw
(collectively “Additional Defendants”), were entitled to summary judgment
because Fair’s conduct was a superseding cause of the accident, thus relieving
Additional Defendants from liability. Therefore, I dissent.
Eight months prior to this May 1, 2012 tragic motor vehicle accident,
Tower Auto performed a required annual state inspection on the Straw vehicle
and serviced the hood latch by spraying it with lubricant to achieve proper
functionality. Five months before the accident, Straw returned his vehicle to
Jiffy Lube, where the oil had been changed, to advise an employee the hood
of his car was not closing properly. The employee performed some work on
the hood to get it to close. In March 2012, three months before the accident,
while at a NAPA Auto Parts store, Straw requested that a store employee look
at his hood latch. The employee advised him that the hood latch was working
properly and the car was safe to drive. Three months and several hundred
miles later, this accident occurred after the hood on Straw’s vehicle opened
while he was driving. Straw bought his vehicle to a controlled stop in the
center northbound lane of Route 28 because he could not see the road.
Upon bringing his vehicle to a stop, Straw activated his hazard lights.
Thereafter, Defendant Fair, acting in an extraordinarily negligent manner as
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1 Like the Majority, I too am of the opinion that we have jurisdiction to
entertain this appeal.
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will be described infra, violently crashed into the rear of the Straw vehicle,
killing six-year-old Elijah Straw and severely injuring Thomas, Jennifer and
Rowan Straw. The question thus presented is whether Fair’s actions were a
superseding cause relieving the Additional Defendants of liability for any
antecedent negligence. For reasons more fully detailed below, I do not find it
necessary to examine the issues of duty and causation vis-à-vis the Additional
Defendants as the Majority so thoroughly has done, because I believe the
superseding negligence of Fair makes that analysis unnecessary.
In every negligence action, a plaintiff must prove, inter alia, that a
defendant’s actions were both the proximate cause and cause in fact of the
plaintiff’s injury. Reilly v. Tiergarten Inc., 633 A.2d 208, 210 (Pa. Super.
1993). Proximate cause is a question of law to be determined by a judge and
must be established before the question of actual cause can be submitted to
a jury. Id. This question of proximate or legal causation essentially regards
whether the negligence, if any, was so remote that as a matter of law the
actor cannot be held legally responsible for the harm that occurred. Id. A
court must determine whether an ordinary person would foresee that an injury
would be a natural, probable outcome of the act complained of. Id. As the
Majority correctly recognizes, conduct is a proximate cause of a plaintiff’s
harm when the conduct is “a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.”
Majority Opinion at 52 (quoting Jones v. Montefiore Hosp., 431 A.2d 920,
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923 (Pa. 1981)).2 As this Court explained in Brown v. Philadelphia College
of Osteopathic Medicine, 760 A.2d 863 (Pa. Super. 2000):
Proximate cause “is primarily a problem of law” and “it is a
Pennsylvania court’s responsibility to evaluate the alleged facts
and refuse to find an actor’s conduct the legal cause of harm ‘when
it appears to the court highly extraordinary that [the actor’s
conduct] should have brought about the harm.’” [Bell v. Irace,
619 A.2d 365, 367 (Pa. Super. 1993)] (emphasis in original).
Thus, proximate cause must “be determined by the judge and it
must be established before the question of actual cause is put to
the jury.” Reilly [v. Tiergarten Inc., 633 A.2d 208, 210 (Pa.
Super. 1993)].
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2 The principle that conduct is a proximate cause of a plaintiff's harm when
the conduct is a "substantial factor" in bringing about the harm is well
entrenched in our jurisprudence. It is worth noting that section 13.20 of the
current version of the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Civil Jury Instructions
(“SSJI”) does not recommend instructing a jury on this component of a
negligence action, believing the term to be the epitome of vagueness. See
Comment to § 13.20. Instead, the recommended instruction suggests a jury
be instructed to determine whether a defendant's conduct was a “factual
cause” in bringing about the harm. The proposed instruction suggests the
jury be instructed that “to be a factual cause, the conduct must have been an
actual, real factor in causing the harm, even if the result is unusual or
unexpected. A factual cause cannot be an imaginary or fanciful factor having
no connection or only an insignificant connection with the harm." I would not
deem the use of the term “factual cause” in a jury instruction to be
inconsistent with “substantial factor.” See Ford v. Jeffries, 379 A.2d 111,
114 (Pa. 1977) (“the issue is whether the defendant's conduct was, on the
one hand, a ‘substantial factor’ or a ‘substantial cause’ or, on the other hand,
whether the defendant’s conduct was an ‘insignificant cause’ or a ‘negligible
cause.’”). See also Gorman v. Costello, 929 A.2d 1208, 1213 (Pa. Super.
2007) (SSJI provide guidance on how to fashion appropriate jury instructions
on the issue of factual cause). A trial judge has wide latitude in his choice of
language when charging a jury, provided always that the court fully and
adequately conveys the applicable law. See Hatwood v. Hospital of the
University of Pennsylvania, 55 A.3d 1229, 1235 (Pa. 2012).
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Id. at 868 (emphasis in original). “Liability is contingent upon the probability
or foreseeability of the resulting injury, not merely the possibility that it
could occur.” Reilly, 633 A.2d at 210 (quotation omitted) (emphasis
added).
A superseding cause breaks the chain of proximate causation between
a negligent act and a plaintiff’s injury. A superseding cause is an act of a third
person that, by its intervention, prevents an actor from being liable for harm
to another that his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing
about. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 440; Trude v. Martin, 660 A.2d
626, 632 (Pa. Super. 1995). “If in looking back from the harm and tracing
the sequence of events by which it was produced, it is found that a
superseding cause has operated, there is no need of determining whether the
actor’s antecedent conduct was or was not a substantial factor in bringing
about the harm.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 440, Comment b.
Superseding causes are intervening causes that operate after an actor’s
negligence has been committed.3
In determining whether an intervening force is a superseding cause of
harm, guidance is found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442, which
provides as follows:
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3 Not all intervening acts are superseding causes. Cf. Restatement (Second)
of Torts §§ 440 and 441.
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The following considerations are of importance in determining
whether an intervening force is a superseding cause of harm
to another:
(a) the fact that its intervention brings about harm
different in kind from that which would otherwise
have resulted from the actor’s negligence;
(b) the fact that its operation or the consequences
thereof appear after the event to be extraordinary
rather than normal in view of the circumstances
existing at the time of its operation;
(c) the fact that the intervening force is operating
independently of any situation created by the
actor's negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is
not a normal result of such a situation;
(d) the fact that the operation of the intervening force
is due to a third person’s act or to his failure to act;
(e) the fact that the intervening force is due to an act
of a third person which is wrongful toward the other
and as such subjects the third person to liability to
him;
(f) the degree of culpability of a wrongful act of a third
person which sets the intervening force in motion.
See also Trude, supra (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442).
Additional guidance is found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 447,
which defines when an intervening cause may not be a superseding cause of
harm. Our Supreme Court reaffirmed adoption of § 447 in Grainy v.
Campbell, 425 A.2d 379 (Pa. 1981), wherein the Court explained:
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 447 (1965) (hereinafter
cited as § 447) [] formulates a test of when intervening negligence
will relieve antecedent negligence. In § 447, the liability of the
first actor continues whenever: (a) the first actor “should have
realized” that the second actor “might so act”; (b) a reasonable
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man would not regard the second actor’s action as “highly
extraordinary”; or (c) the second actor’s conduct is a “normal
consequence of the situation created” by the first actor and “not
extraordinarily negligent.”
Id. at 381.4
From these formulations, I believe two related factors are most
appropriate for consideration here: whether Fair’s intervening negligence was
extraordinary and not normal under the circumstances, and whether Fair’s
conduct operated independently of any situation created by the Additional
Defendants. Under the circumstances of this accident, I conclude Fair’s
conduct was extraordinary, not normal,5 and a superseding cause of this
accident, thus relieving the Additional Defendants of any liability for the
Plaintiffs’ harm.
On May 1, 2012,6 at approximately 7:30 p.m., Straw was traveling in
the center northbound lane on State Route 28 in Allegheny County,
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4The Court in Grainy noted that § 447 of the Restatement was adopted as
Pennsylvania law in Estate of Flickinger v. Ritsky, 305 A.2d 40 (1973).
Grainy, 425 A.2d at 381.
5 The use of the word "normal" in §§ 442 and 447 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts is not used in the sense of what is usual, customary, foreseeable or
to be expected. Instead, it means when looking at a matter after an event
and knowing the situation that existed when a new force intervened, one
would not regard the intervening act as extraordinary, even though negligent.
See Comment (b) and Comment (c) to §§ 442 and 447 of the Restatement
(Second) Torts, respectively.
6 Like the Majority, I have recited facts herein taken from those considered by
the trial court in ruling upon the motions for summary judgment, including
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Pennsylvania, near the RDIC Drive exit. It was daylight, the sky was clear,
traffic was light, and the highway was posted with a 55 mph speed limit. While
driving north on Route 28, the hood latch on Straw’s Pontiac Vibe
malfunctioned, causing the hood to release and lift, blocking Straw’s view of
the road. Straw brought his vehicle to a stop in the center lane of the highway
and activated his hazard lights. Upon stopping, Straw looked in his rearview
mirror and saw no cars approaching. Straw also stated that when he looked
in his rearview mirror, he saw a truck on the horizon line. He thought to
himself it was a good thing the truck was far enough back for its driver to
react. He estimated that while it seemed like an eternity, it was probably at
least five to eight seconds before the truck crashed into his car. At no time
were there any cars between his car and the truck. In fact, he did not recall
any traffic in the area at the time of the crash.
Defendant Fair was driving north on Route 28 in a white F250 Ford truck.
Data obtained from Fair’s truck7 indicated he was driving approximately 71
mph for 19 seconds prior to impact and that Fair did not apply the brakes of
his truck until .6 seconds prior to impact. Fair admitted to taking his eyes off
the road to pick up some binders that fell on the floor of his truck. When he
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those facts admitted by Fair during his guilty plea colloquy and those from the
Pennsylvania State Police Accident Report.
7Data regarding the truck’s speed and brake application was obtained from a
download of the truck’s powertrain control and restraint modules.
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looked up, he noticed the Straw vehicle with its hazard lights on, but could
not avoid the collision. According to Pennsylvania State Police crash
reconstruction, Fair would have been able to see the Straw vehicle
approximately 2,058 feet prior to impact if he were looking at the road. At a
speed of 71 mph, it would have taken Fair approximately 19 seconds to travel
that distance.
Fair was criminally charged for his reckless conduct. He subsequently
pled guilty to homicide by vehicle, three counts of aggravated assault by
vehicle, four counts of recklessly endangering another person, exceeding 55
mph by 16 mph, and driving at a safe speed.8
There was no impediment to Fair’s view of the Straw vehicle, had he
been looking at the road, or his ability to take action to avoid a collision.
Nevertheless, Fair, who was traveling in excess of the speed limit, 71 mph in
a 55 mph zone, did not change lanes or take any evasive action despite an
abundance of time to do so. Tellingly, the truck brakes were not engaged
until .6 of a second before impact, when his truck was slightly less than 60
feet from Straw’s vehicle. This accident would not have happened but for
Fair’s failure to look at the road and see the Straw vehicle that was visible
from more than 2,000 feet away.
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8 A person is required to drive a vehicle at a speed no greater than is
reasonable and prudent under the circumstances. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3361. A
violation of this statute is a summary offense under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6502.
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Any “reasonable man” would certainly regard Fair’s action as “highly
extraordinary” under these circumstances. Every driver is taught the cardinal
rule that when driving your eyes must be upon the road at all times. Even
though violations of this rule occurs often and might be deemed “normal” in
the context of considering negligent actions, the extent of Fair’s reckless
conduct in this case cannot under any measure be considered “normal,” but
only as extraordinary.
The Majority recognizes ordinary human experience indicates drivers
may commonly violate posted speed limits, may occasionally be inattentive to
the road, may occasionally drive dangerously, and may occasionally be
intoxicated. Majority Opinion at 59. Although these actions cannot be
condoned, it cannot be said that these transgressions are extraordinary, as
they unfortunately have become common ills upon our highways. Instantly,
we are not presented with the all-too-common situation of negligent
inattention for a brief period of time, or the situation where a driver observes
a hazard but is unable to stop in time to avoid a collision because of speeding.
Instead, as stated, Fair had more than 2,000 feet of unobstructed sight on a
clear day before he crashed his truck into the Straw vehicle with its hazard
lights flashings. Fair tragically collided with the Straw vehicle because, for
reasons unrelated to the circumstances that placed the Straw vehicle upon
the highway, he took his eyes off the road while traveling 71 mph in a 55 mph
zone, applying his brakes only .6 of a second before he crashed into the Straw
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vehicle that was stopped on the highway with its hood raised. While the Straw
vehicle certainly presented a hazard on the highway, it cannot be said that it
was foreseeable that Fair would operate his vehicle in the extraordinary
manner he did. This is especially so where, as here, there were multiple
factors in this scenario that would have allowed Fair to avoid this collision.
Fair’s conduct also cannot be said to be a “normal consequence of [any]
situation created” by Additional Defendants. See Grainy, 425 A.2d at 381.
It is “possible” that someone would drive a vehicle at approximately 71 miles
per hour without looking at the roadway for nearly twenty seconds and would
fail to observe a stopped vehicle with flashing hazard lights on an empty
highway during daylight hours. However, it clearly is not “probable” that these
actions could be deemed foreseeable. It cannot be said that Fair’s
recklessness was the type of foreseeable negligence that one might anticipate
as contributing to any harm caused by any antecedent negligence of other
parties. Fair’s reckless actions were extraordinary and cannot be considered
a normal consequence of any situation created by the Additional Defendants.
His conduct, therefore, was the superseding cause of this accident.
Similarly, I also would conclude that Fair’s conduct was a superseding
force operating independently of any situation created by the Additional
Defendants and, again, were not a normal result of any situation created by
them. The Plaintiffs’ harm was not caused by the actions of any of the
Additional Defendants who may have looked at or attempted to repair the
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hood latch on the Straw vehicle. Nor was the harm caused by Straw’s decision
to bring his vehicle to a stop in the center lane of the highway and engage his
hazard lights. Instead, this tragic accident was caused by Fair’s independent
decision to take his eyes off the road while rearranging binders on the floor of
his truck, all while significantly exceeding the posted speed limit. His decision
to do so was unrelated to, and not in response to, any antecedent negligence
that may have been created by the Additional Defendants. Nor was Fair’s
decision to take his eyes off the road a normal result of any antecedent
negligence that may have been committed by the Additional Defendants.
Fair’s actions were the superseding cause of Plaintiffs’ harm.
A review of Pennsylvania case law since the adoption of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 447 reveals that our courts have only infrequently
determined that conduct constituted a superseding cause warranting dismissal
of a case on preliminary objections or the grant of summary judgment. Even
with this paucity of cases, I find a number of them to be instructive to support
the result I would reach in this case.
In Jamison v. City of Philadelphia, 513 A.2d 479 (Pa. Super. 1986),
this Court sustained the grant of preliminary objections in the nature of a
demurrer, finding that the actions of a third party were a superseding cause
of the appellant’s injuries. In that case, the appellant was injured when a thief
negligently operated a stolen vehicle while attempting to elude police officers.
The stolen vehicle, a Mazda, was valet parked on the upper level of a garage
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operated by the defendant Blara Parking Corporation (“Blara”), located at
Eleventh and Clinton Streets in Philadelphia. Before midnight, the Mazda was
stolen by Reginald Lambert. When police observed the stolen car, they
pursued it. During the pursuit, the car was operated at a high rate of speed
and subsequently collided with a vehicle in which the plaintiff/appellant
Jamison was riding as a passenger. Jamison sustained serious injury.
This Court held that if Blara was careless in allowing the Mazda to be
stolen, it cannot be said to have been negligent toward the plaintiff/appellant,
whose injury was not a foreseeable consequence of the theft. The thief’s
careless operation of the stolen vehicle was a superseding cause of the
plaintiff’s/appellant’s injuries, for which Blara could not be held liable. In
reaching this conclusion, we observed that the case was not one where the
plaintiff’s complaint averred facts sufficient to permit a finding that Blara either
knew or should have known the vehicle was likely to be stolen by an
incompetent driver or that the thief would drive the vehicle in a negligent or
reckless manner. Had that been the case, the result might have been
different. We stated, “It is fundamental that one is not to be held liable for all
possible consequences, but only for the probable consequences.” Id. at 481
(citation omitted).
I find Jamison particularly instructive in examining superseding cause
because it demonstrates how the foreseeability of conduct—or conduct that is
expected as opposed to extraordinary—can affect causation in a case. In
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Jamison, it was not foreseeable or probable that the defendant Blara could
have expected the vehicle would be stolen by an incompetent driver and be
driven in a negligent or reckless manner. Likewise, the Additional Defendants
here could not have foreseen or anticipated that Fair would operate his truck
in the extraordinarily negligent manner he did when the Straw vehicle was
stopped upon the highway.
I note the Commonwealth Court has found superseding cause on at least
two occasions. “Although decisions by the Commonwealth Court are not
binding on this Court, they may be persuasive.” In re Barnes Foundation,
74 A.3d 129, 134 n. 2 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 80 A.3d 774 (Pa.
2013) (citation omitted).
In Beitler v. City of Philadelphia, 738 A.2d 37 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999),
appeal denied, 561 Pa. 679 (Pa. 2000), a Philadelphia police officer stopped
his vehicle with its roof lights activated in the left lane on the westbound side
of the Schuylkill Expressway while he went over the highway median to assist
Roldan, whose vehicle was disabled in the left lane on the eastbound side of
the divided highway. While the officer was assisting Roldan, Beitler drove her
vehicle into the rear of the police vehicle and was injured. Beitler brought an
action against, inter alia, the City and Roldan.
Rolden filed preliminary objections to Beitler’s complaint, contending
that the causal chain between his car losing power and stopping on the
eastbound side of the expressway and harm to Beitler on the westbound side
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was too remote. Roldan asserted that the conduct of the officer constituted a
superseding cause, because one could not reasonably be expected to foresee
that the officer would stop his vehicle in the roadway on the other side of the
highway in order to assist Roldan, rendering the officer's conduct highly
extraordinary.
Referring to Section 447 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Roldan
argued the issue was whether the actor (Roldan) should have realized that a
third party might act in a particular manner; whether a reasonable person
would regard the third-party act as highly extraordinary; and whether the
intervening act was a normal consequence of the situation created by the actor
and the manner in which the act was carried out was not extraordinarily
negligent. As such, Roldan maintained his negligence, if any, was too remote
a cause of Beitler’s injuries and the officer’s conduct was a superseding cause
of the accident. The trial court sustained the preliminary objections and the
Commonwealth Court affirmed, based on superseding cause.
In Chacko v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 611
A.2d 1346 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992), the plaintiffs were passengers in a car
operated by a diabetic who lost consciousness and control of the vehicle. The
vehicle left the roadway and struck a utility pole. The trial judge found that
the driver’s loss of consciousness was the superseding cause of the plaintiffs’
injuries and that the City of Philadelphia, which was alleged to have been
negligent in designing the road and permitting placement of the utility pole,
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was entitled to summary judgment. Id. at 1349-50 (citing Vattimo v. Lower
Bucks Hospital, Inc., 465 A.2d 1231 (Pa. 1983) and Restatement (Second)
of Torts §§ 440 and 442). The Commonwealth Court affirmed, finding the
trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in granting summary judgment
on the basis of superseding cause while noting that whether a force is a
superseding cause is generally a question for the fact finder. However, “in
cases where a jury may not reasonably differ, it is proper for the court to make
a determination of causation.” Id. at 1350 n. 2 (citing Vattimo, 465 A.2d at
1234).
As in Beitler and Chacko, I believe it was proper for the trial court here
to make a determination of causation. Further, I believe the trial court
correctly concluded that an ordinary person would not have foreseen that the
harm suffered by the Straws was a natural and probable outcome of the acts
complained of on the parts of the Additional Defendants, including Straw.
Therefore, I find the trial court properly concluded that Fair’s conduct was a
superseding cause of the accident.
Respectfully, I also take issue with other parts of the Majority’s analysis.
Citing Powell v. Drumheller, 653 A.2d 619 (Pa. 1995), the Majority
concludes that the determination of whether Fair’s actions were so
extraordinary and, thus, a superseding cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries, is one to
be made by a jury. Majority Opinion at 55, 59. This, however, is not always
the case, and I do not find it to be the case under the facts presented here.
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Powell speaks both to when a question of superseding cause is for the jury
and to when it may be decided as a matter of law by a court. While it is true
Powell held that a determination of whether an act is so extraordinary as to
constitute a superseding cause is normally one to be made by a jury, this
principle was stated in the context of when facts are in dispute, when room
exists for a difference of opinion as to whether certain conduct is superseding,
or where facts are such that reasonable minds could differ as to whether an
intervening act or cause constitutes a superseding act or cause. Powell, 653
A.2d at 624. However, Powell also held that when undisputed facts show
that conduct is so extraordinary as to constitute a superseding cause and only
one inference can be drawn, it is a question of law for the court to determine
whether there is a superseding cause preventing a defendant’s act from being
the proximate cause of an injury. Id.
Here, the undisputed facts surrounding the manner in which this
accident occurred and in which Fair operated his truck lead to only one
inference: that Fair’s conduct was extraordinary. The record does not reveal
any other facts from which an inference can be drawn to suggest that Fair’s
actions were done other than in the reckless manner stated. Therefore, I
believe the question of superseding cause in this case was one of law for the
court.
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On the merits as to whether Fair’s conduct constituted a superseding
cause relieving the Additional Defendants of any antecedent negligence, I
believe the Majority’s analysis falls short of a proper examination of the facts
and unnecessarily defers to Sections 442B and/or 449 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. The Majority summarily dismisses the trial court’s
conclusion that Fair’s conduct, as a matter of law, was a superseding cause of
the Plaintiffs’ harm by simply noting that it is not enough to establish
superseding cause by alleging that an actor engaged in criminal conduct.
While the Majority earlier acknowledges Section 442 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which addresses considerations for determining
superseding cause, it engages in no factual analysis to determine if the
undisputed facts establish Fair’s conduct as a superseding cause as a matter
of law. Instead, the Majority reasons only that ordinary human experience
tells us that drivers sometimes act criminally on our roads and concludes
therefore, that a jury must determine whether Fair’s criminal conduct in
speeding, inattentive driving, and (alleged) intoxication were so extraordinary
as not to be reasonably foreseeable. Like the trial court, I too would conclude,
as a matter of law, Fair’s conduct was extraordinarily negligent, thus relieving
the Additional Defendants of any antecedent negligence. In coming to the
conclusion that Fair’s conduct was a superseding cause of Plaintiffs harm, I
would emphasize that it matters not whether the Additional Defendants’
conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the Plaintiffs’ harm, because
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a superseding cause relieves an actor from liability regardless of whether the
actor’s antecedent negligence was or was not a substantial factor in bringing
about harm. See Comment (b) to 440 (definition of superseding cause). The
antecedent negligence, if any, of the Additional Defendants is relieved here
due to the extraordinary conduct of Fair.
I also find the Majority’s reliance upon Sections 442B and 449 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts to be misplaced on the issue of superseding
cause. Section 442B is of limited or special application. See Comment (a) to
442B. This provision does not examine the conduct of an intervening actor
like Fair. Its focus is upon the negligent conduct of an initial actor, the
Additional Defendants here, who increase a risk of harm that is a substantial
factor in causing harm. It merely recognizes that antecedent conduct that
increases the risk of harm does not relieve an actor of liability when the
subsequent acts of a third person bring about the harm; that is, unless the
third person intentionally causes the harm and that harm is not within the
scope of the risk created by the antecedent actor’s conduct. Section 442B
however, does not address the effect of a superseding cause on antecedent
negligence. Likewise, Section 449 addresses only the negligent conduct of an
original actor. Section 449 recognizes that if a person acts in a negligent
manner and those acts make it likely that a third person may act innocently,
negligently, intentionally, or criminally in response to that conduct, the
original actor may still be liable for the harm caused by their conduct. Like
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J-A07012-17
Section 442B, Section 449 does not address the effect of a superseding cause
on antecedent negligence that makes it likely that a third party may act as
stated.
In summary, I do not believe it is necessary for this Court to examine
whether the conduct of the Additional Defendants was a proximate cause of
Plaintiffs’ harm, since I would conclude that Fair’s conduct was a superseding
cause of the harm. Fair’s extraordinary conduct was not a reasonably
foreseeable or normal result of the combined actions of the Additional
Defendants. His conduct was extraordinary in the degree of its recklessness
that could not have been foreseen by Additional Defendants, thus relieving
them of liability for any antecedent negligence. I therefore would conclude
the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the Additional
Defendants was free of legal error and not an abuse of discretion. I, therefore,
respectfully dissent.
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