Com. v. Cooper, J. ( 2017 )

J-S18037-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
JALIL COOPER
No. 566 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered January 15, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division
at No(s): CP-51-CR-0014102-2011
BEFORE: PANELLA, SOLANO and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 21, 2017
The Commonwealth appeals from the order entered in the Philadelphia
County Court of Common Pleas (“CCP”), which granted Appellee Jalil
Cooper’s motion to dismiss his misdemeanor charges of recklessly
endangering another person (“REAP”) and felony charge of fleeing or
attempting to elude an officer pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 110. The
Commonwealth argues it is not required to bring all summary,
misdemeanor, and felony charges in a single court proceeding. Pursuant to
this Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Perfetto, ___ A.3d ___,
2017 Pa. Super. 281, 2017 WL _____ (Aug. 30, 2017) (en banc), we reverse
the CCP’s order and remand for further proceedings.
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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The CCP summarizes the relevant facts and procedural history of this
case as follows:
On November 28, 2011, Philadelphia police observed
[Appellee] failing to stop and signal before a right turn.
[Appellee] also drove his car through red lights, failed to
stop at stop signs and acted recklessly toward an unknown
male passenger. Police arrested [Appellee] and charged
him [via criminal complaint] with a felony count of Fleeing
or Attempting to Elude Police and two misdemeanor counts
of [REAP]. Police also issued three summary traffic
citations: reckless driving, driving with a suspended
license, and disregarding a steady red signal.
On December 22, 2011, the Commonwealth filed bills of
information charging [Appellee] with a felony count of
Fleeing or Attempting to Elude Police and two
misdemeanor counts of [REAP] that arose out of the same
conduct on November 28, 2011. The Commonwealth
never filed a joinder motion to join the three summary
offenses pending in Philadelphia Traffic Court with the one
felony and two misdemeanor charges pending in the
[CCP].
On February 23, 2012, [Appellee] was found guilty in
Philadelphia Traffic Court of the summary offense of
disregarding a steady red signal and not guilty of driving
with a suspended license; the reckless driving charge was
dismissed.
Following the February 23, 2012 proceeding in
Philadelphia Traffic Court, [Appellee] filed a motion to
dismiss the one felony and two misdemeanor charges
pursuant to Section 110. The [CCP] granted [Appellee’s]
motion and dismissed those charges with prejudice.
Trial Ct. Op., 7/20/16, at 1-2. The Commonwealth timely appealed and filed
a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement.
On appeal, the Commonwealth raises the following issue: “Did the
[CCP] err when, in contravention of Supreme Court precedent, it dismissed
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felony and misdemeanor charges pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 based on the
prior adjudication of summary traffic offenses?” Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.
Pennsylvania’s compulsory joinder statute states, in relevant part:
§ 110. When prosecution barred by former
prosecution for different offense
Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different
provision of the statutes than a former prosecution or is
based on different facts, it is barred by such former
prosecution under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in
a conviction as defined in section 109 of this title (relating
to when prosecution barred by former prosecution for the
same offense) and the subsequent prosecution is for:
* * *
(ii) any offense based on the same conduct or
arising from the same criminal episode, if such
offense was known to the appropriate prosecuting
officer at the time of the commencement of the first
trial and occurred within the same judicial
district as the former prosecution unless the
court ordered a separate trial of the charge of such
offense[.]
18 Pa.C.S. § 110(1)(ii) (emphasis added).
In Perfetto, this Court determined that 42 Pa.C.S. § 1302, which
governs the jurisdiction of traffic courts, creates an exception to the
compulsory joinder rule. Perfetto at *13. The Perfetto Court reasoned
that under Section 1302 traffic courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
summary traffic violations. Id.; see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 1302(b) (“[t]he
jurisdiction of a traffic court under this section shall be exclusive of the
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courts of common pleas . . . .”) We concluded, “[W]here a defendant is
charged with a summary traffic violation, a misdemeanor, and a felony, in
judicial districts with a traffic court, the Title 75 summary offense may be
disposed of in a prior proceeding in the traffic court, which has exclusive
jurisdiction to hear it, without violating the compulsory joinder rule.”
Perfetto at *14.
Here, an earlier prosecution in the former Philadelphia Traffic Court1
resulted in a conviction of the summary traffic violation of disregarding a
steady red signal, the fleeing/eluding and REAP offenses arose from the
same criminal episode as the summary offense, and the prosecutor during
the traffic court proceeding would have known of the offenses, as they were
charged at the same time as the summary offenses. See 18 Pa.C.S. §
110(1)(ii). Furthermore, all of Appellee’s offenses occurred within the single
judicial district of Philadelphia. See id. Nevertheless, Philadelphia has a
designated traffic court that had exclusive jurisdiction to hear Appellee’s
summary traffic violations. See Perfetto at *13-14; see also 42 Pa.C.S. §
1302(b). Accordingly, Perfetto applies in this case and dictates that a
subsequent prosecution for fleeing/eluding and REAP in the CCP is
permissible under the compulsory joinder rule. See Perfetto at *13-14.
1
At the time of Appellee’s offenses, Philadelphia had a separate traffic court
that adjudicated his summary traffic violation. However, as of June 19,
2013, Philadelphia restructured the Municipal Court into two sections, the
General Division and the Traffic Division, which absorbed the former Traffic
Court.
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Therefore, we conclude that the CCP erred in granting Appellee’s petition to
dismiss the fleeing/eluding and REAP charges under Section 110, and we
reverse the order and remand for further proceedings.
Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/21/2017
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