Com. v. Isaac, R. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
RICHARD ISAAC, : No. 811 EDA 2015
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Order, March 12, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0012115-2014
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., STABILE AND STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 18, 2017
Richard Isaac appeals the order of the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County that denied his motion to dismiss. We affirm.
On July 31, 2014, at approximately 3:45 a.m., City of Philadelphia
Police Officer Amina Oliver (“Officer Oliver”) observed appellant driving a
vehicle northbound on the 5700 block of East Wister Street in the City of
Philadelphia. Officer Oliver stopped the vehicle. Appellant did not have any
identification and told Officer Oliver that his name was “Richard Isley.”
Officer Oliver ran the name “Richard Isley” through a Department of Motor
Vehicles check. The check provided no record or license. Officer Oliver
issued a traffic violation report to appellant for an unlicensed driver,
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1501(a). (Notes of testimony, 3/12/15 at 6-8.) Appellant
was arrested and charged with driving under the influence: controlled
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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substance or metabolite, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1), driving under the
influence: controlled substance -- impaired ability, 75 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 3802(d)(2), and driving while blood alcohol content .02 or greater while
license suspended, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b1.1). On October 2, 2014,
appellant was convicted in absentia in Philadelphia Municipal Court --
Traffic Division (“Traffic Division”) of driving without a license.
On December 3, 2014, appellant moved to dismiss the charge for
driving while his blood alcohol content was .02 or greater while his license
was suspended on double jeopardy grounds pursuant to the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. That same date, appellant
moved to dismiss the remaining charges on the basis of 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 110(a)(1)(ii) because the Commonwealth failed to prosecute these
charges at the same time as the summary traffic violations.
On March 12, 2015, the trial court heard the motions as well as the
testimony of Officer Oliver and denied the motions.
Appellant appealed to this court and raises the following issue for this
court’s review:
Did not the lower court err in denying appellant’s
motion to dismiss pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 110
in that: (i) Mr. Isaac was found guilty in the
Philadelphia Municipal Court’s Traffic Division on a
traffic citation; (ii) the Traffic Division prosecution
was based upon the same criminal conduct and/or
arose from the same criminal episode as the instant
criminal charges; (iii) the Commonwealth was aware
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of the instant charges before the commencement of
the trial on the former charge; and, (iv) these
instant charges occurred within the same judicial
district as the former prosecution in the Philadelphia
Municipal Court’s Traffic Division?
Appellant’s brief at 3.
This court is presented with pure questions of law. As a result, this
court’s standard of review is de novo, and its scope of review is plenary.
Commonwealth v. Barger, 956 A.2d 458, 461 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal
denied, 980 A.2d 109 (Pa. 2009).
The compulsory joinder statute, contained in the Crimes Code at
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110, provides in pertinent part:
§ 110. When prosecution barred by former
prosecution for different offense
Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different
provision of the statutes than a former prosecution
or is based on different facts, it is barred by such
former prosecution under the following
circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an
acquittal or in a conviction as defined in
section 109 of this title (relating to when
prosecution barred by former prosecution
for the same offense) and the
subsequent prosecution is for:
(i) any offense of which the
defendant could have been
convicted on the first
prosecution;
(ii) any offense based on the
same conduct or arising from
the same criminal episode, if
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such offense was known to
the appropriate prosecuting
officer at the time of the
commencement of the first
trial and was within the same
judicial district as the former
prosecution unless the court
ordered a separate trial of the
charge of such offense; or
(iii) the same conduct, unless:
(A) the offense of which
the defendant was
formerly convicted or
acquitted and the offense
for which he is
subsequently prosecuted
each requires proof of a
fact not required by the
other and the law defining
each of such offenses is
intended to prevent a
substantially different
harm or evil; or
(B) the second offense
was not consummated
when the former trial
began.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110.
Appellant contends that his situation falls under Section 110(1)(ii) for
the following reasons: First, he was convicted of driving without a license
in absentia in Traffic Division. Second, the prosecution in the trial court
was based upon the same criminal episode as the prosecution in
Traffic Division. Third, the prosecutor was aware of the charges in the trial
court before the commencement of the trial in Traffic Division because the
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Philadelphia District Attorney’s office handles the prosecutions for both the
trial court and Traffic Division. Fourth, appellant alleges that the alleged
violations all took place within the same judicial district as the former
prosecution in Traffic Division because Traffic Division and the Philadelphia
Municipal Court, where the present case began, are the same court.
The compulsory joinder rule bars a subsequent prosecution if each of
the following test prongs are met:
(1) the former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or
conviction; (2) the current prosecution was based on
the same criminal conduct or arose from the same
criminal episode; (3) the prosecutor in the
subsequent trial was aware of the charges before the
first trial; and (4) all charges [are] within the same
judicial district as the former prosecution.
Commonwealth v. Reid, 77 A.3d 579, 582 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted;
bracket in original).
Here, no dispute exists that appellant’s prosecution on the summary
traffic offense resulted in a conviction, that his DUI charges were based on
the same criminal conduct or arose from the same criminal episode, and that
the Commonwealth knew of the DUI charges before the summary trial. In
light of this court’s recent en banc decision in Commonwealth v.
Perfetto, A.3d , 2017 WL 3776631 (Pa.Super. 2017) (en banc),
however, appellant fails to satisfy the fourth Reid test prong.
In Perfetto, 2017 WL 3776631 at *11, this court held that where, as
here, a defendant’s summary traffic offense was to be heard solely in the
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Traffic Division pursuant to its jurisdiction in accordance with Pa.C.S.A.
§ 1302(a.1)(1)(i), a prior disposition of that summary traffic offense in
traffic court does not bar a later prosecution of other criminal charges that
arose in the same judicial district and at the same time as the summary
traffic offense because Section 1302 carves out an exception to compulsory
joinder and directs that the summary traffic offense is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Traffic Division. Consequently, appellant’s subsequent
prosecution on the DUI charges was not barred by compulsory joinder.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/18/2017
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