In the Interest of: C.D.M., Jr., a Minor ( 2017 )

J-S52011-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: C.D.M., JR., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.M.W. : No. 647 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered March 22, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-67-DP-0000022-2010
IN THE INTEREST OF: C.D.M.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.M.W. : No. 648 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered March 22, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-67-DP-0000020-2010
IN THE INTEREST OF: C.D.M.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.M.W. : No. 649 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered March 22, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-67-DP-0000021-2010
J-S52011-17
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: C.D.M., JR., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.M.W., MOTHER : No. 678 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Decree March 21, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): 2016-0163a
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: C.D.M.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.M.W., MOTHER : No. 679 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Decree March 21, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): 2016-0164
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: C.D.M.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.M.W., MOTHER : No. 680 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Decree March 21, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): 2016-0165a
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED OCTOBER 18, 2017
S.M.W. (“Mother”) appeals from the Decrees granting the Petitions,
filed by the York County Office of Children, Youth and Families (“CYF” or the
“Agency”), to involuntarily terminate her parental rights to her son, C.D.M.,
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Jr. (“Oldest Child”) (born in July 2004); her daughter, C.D.M.M. (“Middle
Child”) (born in September 2005); and her son, C.D.M.M.2 (“Youngest
Child”) (born in December 2007) (collectively, “the Children”),1 pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). 2 Mother also appeals the
related Orders that changed the Children’s permanency goals from
reunification to adoption, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351. We affirm.
The trial court set forth the factual background of this appeal in its
Adjudication and Order entered on March 21, 2017 (hereinafter “Trial Court
Opinion”). See Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/17, at 1-8. We incorporate the
trial court’s recitation as though fully set forth herein. See id.
At the hearing on CYF’s termination/goal change Petitions, held on
February 24, 2017, each of the Children testified. See N.T., 2/24/17, at 18-
70. Additionally, CYF presented four witnesses, including Chelsea Grove
(hereinafter “Caseworker”), a placement caseworker at CYF, who had been
the assigned Caseworker for the Children since June 2016. Id. at 117-18.
Mother testified on her own behalf. Id. at 208.
____________________________________________
1 The Children have another younger male half-sibling, Car.M., who resides
with his father. See N.T., 2/24/17, at 73, 91, 166, 224. Neither Car.M. nor
his father is a subject of the instant appeal.
2 In separate Decrees entered on March 21, 2017, the trial court terminated
the parental rights of the Children’s father, C.D.M., Sr. (“Father”), and any
unknown father to the Children. Neither Father nor any unknown father has
filed an appeal, nor is Father or any unknown father a party to the instant
appeal.
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On March 21, 2017, the trial court entered the Decrees terminating
Mother’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). On the following day, the court entered
the Orders changing the Children’s permanency goals to adoption. Mother
filed separate, timely Notices of Appeal, along with Concise Statements of
errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
In May 2017, this Court, sua sponte, consolidated the appeals.
Mother now presents the following issues for our review:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as a
matter of law in changing the [] Children’s permanency goals to
adoption[,] when [Mother] asserts such was not in the best
interest[s] of the Children?
II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as
a matter of law in changing the permanency goal to adoption[,]
and terminating the parental rights of [Mother,] when more time
may permit [Mother] to remedy the conditions that caused
removal and permit the Children and [Mother] to live once again
as an intact family?
III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as
a matter of law in terminating the parental rights of [Mother]
when such was not in the best interests of the Children[,] where
bonds do exist between [Mother] and the Children, the Children
and one another, and there is no plan to place the three Children
together?
IV. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as
a matter of law in terminating the parental rights of [Mother,] as
[] Caseworker testified beyond her knowledge and/or expertise?
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Mother’s Brief at 5 (issues renumbered for ease of disposition).3
In her first issue, Mother argues that the trial court abused its
discretion or erred as a matter of law in changing the Children’s permanency
goals to adoption. See id. at 10-12. Mother complains that the trial court
failed to inquire “what, if any, efforts were made to locate a home for all
three [] of the Children.” Id. at 11. She further contends that
the tentative “plan” for the Children is ultimately not in their best
interests and welfare due to: their age; their bonds with
[Mother]; their bonds with one another; and the fact that the
Children have ultimately been separated not only from their only
involved biological parent, but from one another as well.
Additionally, within the last six [] months, Mother had been in a
position to have the Children in her unsupervised care[,] and
[she] was working toward reunification.
Id. at 12.
[T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an
appellate court to accept findings of fact and credibility
determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the
record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the
lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. We review for
abuse of discretion[.]
In Interest of L.Z., 111 A.3d 1164, 1174 (Pa. 2015) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
Regarding the disposition of a dependent child, section 6351(e), (f),
(f.1), and (g) of the Juvenile Act provide the trial court with the criteria for
its permanency plan for the subject child. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351.
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3Mother stated her issues somewhat differently in her Concise Statements.
We, nevertheless, find them sufficiently preserved for our review.
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Pursuant to those subsections, the trial court is to determine the disposition
that is best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental and moral
welfare of the child. See id. § 6351(g).
When considering a petition for goal change for a dependent child, the
trial court must consider:
the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the
placement; the extent of compliance with the service plan
developed for the child; the extent of progress made towards
alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original
placement; the appropriateness and feasibility of the current
placement goal for the child; and, a likely date by which the goal
for the child might be achieved.
In re A.K., 936 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).
Additionally, section 6351(f.1) requires the trial court to make a
determination regarding the child’s placement goal:
(f.1) Additional determination.—Based upon the
determinations made under subsection (f) and all relevant
evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall
determine one of the following:
* * *
(2) If and when the child will be placed for adoption,
and the county agency will file for termination of
parental rights in cases where return to the child’s
parent, guardian or custodian is not best suited to the
safety, protection and physical, mental and moral
welfare of the child.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f.1)(2).
On the issue of a placement goal change, this Court has stated as
follows:
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When a child is adjudicated dependent, the child’s proper
placement turns on what is in the child’s best interest, not
on what the parent wants or which goals the parent has
achieved. See In re Sweeney, 393 Pa. Super. 437, 574
A.2d 690, 691 (1990) (noting that “[o]nce a child is
adjudicated dependent … the issues of custody and
continuation of foster care are determined by the child’s
best interests”). Moreover, although preserving the unity
of the family is a purpose of [the Juvenile Act], another
purpose is to “provide for the care, protection, safety, and
wholesome mental and physical development of children
coming within the provisions of this chapter.” 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 6301(b)(1.1). Indeed, “[t]he relationship of parent and
child is a status and not a property right, and one in which
the state has an interest to protect the best interest of the
child.” In re E.F.V., 315 Pa. Super. 246, 461 A.2d 1263,
1267 (1983) (citation omitted).
In re K.C., 903 A.2d 12, 14-15 (Pa. Super. 2006).
In its Opinion, the trial court thoroughly addressed Mother’s issue,
discussed the section 6351 criteria and the applicable law, and determined
that changing the Children’s placement goal to adoption was appropriate and
in the Children’s best interests. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/17, at 9-15,
26; see also id. at 24-25 (wherein the trial court addressed the matter of
Middle Child’s placement in a pre-adoptive home different from the pre-
adoptive placement home of Oldest Child and Youngest Child, and the efforts
needed to continue sibling contact). The trial court’s findings are supported
by the record, and we agree with its determination, discerning no abuse of
discretion. See In Interest of L.Z., 111 A.3d at 1174. Accordingly, we
adopt the trial court’s recitation as though fully set forth herein, and affirm
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on this basis concerning Mother’s first issue. See Trial Court Opinion,
3/21/17, at 9-15, 26.
In her second issue, Mother argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in determining that termination of her parental rights to the
Children was warranted, when more time might permit Mother to remedy
the conditions that caused the Children’s removal from her care, and permit
the reunification of Mother and the Children. See Mother’s Brief at 22-23.
In reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental rights, we
adhere to the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard
when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for
termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our
standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if
they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., [] 9 A.3d 1179,
1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. Id.; [In re] R.I.S., 36 A.3d [567, 572
(Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)]. As has been often stated, an
abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing
court might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also
Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., [] 34 A.3d 1,
51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely, [] 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa.
2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of
discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.
As [the Supreme Court] discussed in R.J.T., there are
clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of
review in these cases. [The Court] observed that, unlike trial
courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-
specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges
are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often
presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and
parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the
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facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in
dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must
resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its
own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must
defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are
supported by the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not
the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re
Adoption of Atencio, [] 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012).
The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). “[T]he
standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so
clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to
a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in
issue.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
This Court may affirm a trial court’s decision regarding the termination
of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 2511(a),
along with a consideration of section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d
380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). In the instant case, we will focus on
sections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
***
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(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
***
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
Concerning incapacity sufficient for termination under subsection
2511(a)(2), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated as follows:
A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be made lightly
or without a sense of compassion for the parent, can seldom be
more difficult than when termination is based upon parental
incapacity. The legislature, however, in enacting the 1970
Adoption Act, concluded that a parent who is incapable of
performing parental duties is just as parentally unfit as one who
refuses to perform the duties.
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 827 (citation omitted).
Moreover,
[t]he biological relationship of parent and child does not vest in
the parents a property right to the custody of the child. Instead,
a parent-child relationship is a status, and one in which the state
has an interest to protect the best interest of the child.
Maintaining a parent-child relationship requires a continued
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interest in the child and a genuine effort to maintain
communication and association with the child.
A parent is required to exert a sincere and genuine effort
to maintain a parent-child relationship; the parent must use all
available resources to preserve the parental relationship and
must exercise “reasonable firmness” in resisting obstacles placed
in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. This
[C]ourt has repeatedly recognized that parental rights are not
preserved by waiting for a more suitable or convenient time to
perform one’s parental responsibilities while others provide the
child with his or her immediate physical and emotional needs.
In re Adoption of M.R.D., 128 A.3d 1249, 1261-62 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en
banc) (citations, quotation marks and ellipses omitted); see also In re
A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa. Super. 2002) (stating that a parent’s vow to
cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity
or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or
disingenuous).
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Mother’s second issue and
determined that CYF had established, by clear and convincing evidence, that
termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Children was appropriate
under subsection 2511(a)(2). See Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/17, at 20-21,
21-22. The trial court’s findings are supported by the record, and we agree
with its determination that (1) Mother lacks parental capacity; and (2) the
evidence showed that she will be unable to remedy that situation within a
reasonable period of time, if ever. Accordingly, we adopt the trial court’s
recitation as though fully set forth herein, see id., and affirm on this basis
as to Mother’s second issue, with the following addendum.
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Concerning Mother’s claim that she could remedy the conditions that
led to the Children’s placement if afforded more time, this Court has stated
that “we will not toll the well-being and permanency of [a child] indefinitely.”
In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1007 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc)
(citing In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 732 (Pa. Super. 2008) (noting that a
child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will
summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.”)). Moreover,
“a parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of … her
child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill … her parental duties, to the
child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential
in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847,
856 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
In her third issue, Mother challenges the trial court’s determination
that CYF had established, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination
of her parental rights was in the Children’s best interests under section
2511(b), particularly where (1) strong bonds exist between her and the
Children, and amongst the Children; and (2) there is no plan to place the
three Children together. See Mother’s Brief at 13-16.
This Court has stated that the focus in terminating parental rights
under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant to
section 2511(b). See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1008. In
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reviewing the evidence in support of termination under section 2511(b), our
Supreme Court has stated as follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a
court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child
have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as
love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781,
791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa.
1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child’s
“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional
bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost attention”
should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at
791.
In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
Here, the trial court thoroughly addressed its consideration of section
2511(b) in its Opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/17, at 22-25. As the
court’s analysis is sound and supported by the record, we adopt it herein by
reference. See id. We additionally note the following.
Our Supreme Court has stated that the mere existence of a bond or
attachment of a child to a parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a
termination petition, and that “[e]ven the most abused of children will often
harbor some positive emotion towards the abusive parent.” In re: T.S.M.,
71 A.3d at 267 (citation omitted). Additionally, “[t]he continued attachment
to the natural parents, despite serious parental rejection through abuse and
neglect, and failure to correct parenting and behavior disorders which are
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harming the children[,] cannot be misconstrued as bonding.” Id. (citation
omitted).
Moreover, the trial court appropriately considered the fact that Oldest
Child and Youngest Child would be living together in the same pre-adoptive
foster home after the hearing, with R.C. and K.C. as their foster parents.
The trial court also considered that Middle Child was in a separate foster
home, with K.S. and her husband, S.S., as the foster parents. Caseworker
testified that she had spoken with both foster families on numerous
occasions concerning the Children’s separation, and the foster parents had
assured Caseworker that they would ensure that the Children have visitation
and the ability to call each other. See N.T., 2/24/17, at 167. Similarly, the
Children’s Guardian Ad Litem (“the GAL”) questioned Caseworker about the
arrangements for the Children to visit with each other and Car.M. Id. at
169-71. The GAL opined that a meeting between both sets of pre-adoptive
foster parents would be appropriate to address the matter of continuing
sibling contact. Id. at 206. At the close of the hearing, the trial court
directed CYF and the GAL to meet with the foster parents and the father of
Car.M., in order to devise a plan to maintain sibling contact. Id. at 246.
The court ordered that the Children shall spend a minimum of two hours per
week together, and that CYF must attempt to involve Car.M. as well. Id. at
246-47. Further, the trial court ordered that the Children shall conduct at
least one conference phone call per week, in addition to the two-hour visit.
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Id. at 247. Accordingly, contrary to Mother’s claim, the trial court, in fact,
appropriately considered the bond between the Children and the importance
of maintaining that bond.
In her related fourth issue, Mother asserts that the testimony of
Caseworker was beyond her knowledge/expertise. See Mother’s Brief at 16-
22. According to Mother, “in considering and utilizing [] Caseworker’s
overall testimony, the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as a
matter of law in terminating [] Mother’s[] parental rights.” Id. at 21-22.
We disagree.
When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal
citations omitted). Although it is often wise to have a bonding evaluation
and make it part of the certified record, “[t]here are some instances …
where direct observation of the interaction between the parent and the child
is not necessary and may even be detrimental to the child.” In re K.Z.S.,
946 A.2d 753, 762 (Pa. Super. 2008). Moreover, it is appropriate to
consider a child’s bond with his or her foster parent(s). See In re T.S.M.,
71 A.3d at 268.
We discern no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in finding that the
requirements of section 2511(b) were met by clear and convincing evidence,
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and the record supports its findings and credibility determinations. See Trial
Court Opinion, 3/21/17, at 22-25; see also In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 763-
64 (affirming the involuntary termination of the mother’s parental rights,
despite the existence of some bond, where placement with the mother would
be contrary to the child’s best interests, and any bond with the mother
would be fairly attenuated when the child was separated from her, almost
constantly, for four years). Accordingly, Mother’s fourth issue does not
entitle her to relief.
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the Decrees terminating Mother’s
parental rights under section 2511(a)(1) and (b), and the Orders changing
the Children’s permanency goals to adoption.4
Decrees and Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/18/2017
____________________________________________
4 The parties are hereby directed to attach to this Memorandum a copy of
the Trial Court Opinion, in the event of further proceedings.
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Circulated 10/03/2017 04:02 PM
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF YORK
COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
In the Interest O.
C' 'D No.
Ct CP-67-DP22-2010
No. CP-67-DP-21-2010
Di ikib M No. CP-67-DP-20-2010
Minors Change of Goal
IN THE COURT F COMMON PLEAS OF YORK COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA
ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION
In re: Adoption o
C' Df ,in No. 2016-0163
C/ D 1 No. 2016-0164
C Dr No. 2016-0165
Termination of Parental Rights
Appearances:
MARTIN ILLER, Esquire
For York C unty Children, Youth and Families
CFIRISTOPI-MR MOORE, Esquire
Guardian Ad Litem for the Minors
HEATHER EYNOSA, Esquire
For Mother,
Pro Se-Did Not Appear
Father, C ' Sr.
ADJUDICATION
For the reasons outlined in the Finding of Facts and
Discussion below, the Court
GRANTS the Petitions filed by the York County Office of Children,
Youth and Families.
PROCEDURAL BISTORY
On December 12, 2016, the York County Office of
Children, Youth and. Families
(hereinafter "CYF" or "The Agency") filed a Petition to Change
the Court-Ordered Goal
from reunification with a parent to termination of parental
nights, and placement for
adoption, and a etition to Involuntarily Terminate The Parental
Rights of the parents of
the children, C M' Jr.; C M M and
--r ',collecti'vely referred to as the "Children").
1-% - A hearing
was held on Fehr wry 24, 2017.
FDIDINGS OF FACT
Before th Court are separate Petitions for each of three (3)
children for a total of
six (6) petitions fi ed by The Agency. One set of Petitions
asks the Court to change the
court -ordered go of reunification with the parents to termination of parental
rights and
placement for ado t on, and the other set requests the Court to
involuntarily terminate the
parental rights to above -captioned Children.
1. The Court corporates the prior findings of the Court from the orders
in the
juvenile re ords docketed at CP-67-DP-22-2010, CP-67-DP-21-2010,
and CP-67-
DP -20-201 into these findings.
2. The natural mother of the minor children is
``hereinafter
"Mother"), hose current address is West Maple Street, York, Pennsylvania
17401. Th. natural father of the minor children is a D M , Sr.
(hereinafter "Father"), whose current address is unknown. but whose
last address
was Harrisl g Comrnurity Corrections Center, 27 North Cameron
Street,
Harrisburg, ennsylvania 17101.
2
Jr. was born on July 2004. C
M. was born on December 2007. C M M - Alas born on
Septembe 200/
4. The Agen y has had extensive involvement
with the Children since 2010 when
the
children p eviously came into placement; however,
reunification was achieved with
juvenile c urt supervision terminated in June of 2012.
5. On May 3 , 2014, the agency filed an
Application for Emergency Protective
Custody, d upon a finding that continuation or return of
the Children to the home
of Mother d Father was not in the Children's best
interests, the Children were
placed in ft, ster care. Legal and physical custody of the
Children were awarded to
the Agenc
6. On June 5, 014, the Agency filed an Alleged
Dependent Children Petition that
alleged the ollowing:
a. Mat er was using illegal drugs;
b. Mo er did not have adequate homing for the Children;
c. The hildren were living with the maternal grandparents
at the time of the
refe al;
d. The hildren had issues with truancy;
e. Mo er had contacted the Agency and requested that the
Children be placed
info ter care because she was unable to maintain appropriate
housing; and
3
f. F4ther was not an available resource due to his incarceration at SCI
Coal
TO1vvnship.
7. On June z6, 2014, the Children were adjudicated dependent because
Mother lacked
adequate housing and resources for the Children and was using illegal
substances.
The Agency was awarded legal and physical custody of the Children.
The Children
were to remain in foster care. The goal initially established was return
to a parent
or guardi The Children have remained dependent and in placement since
June
16, 2014.
8. .A total of six family service plans were prepared. Mother and Father had
moderate
and minimal compliance with the July 3, 2014 Plan, respectively. The
Parents had
moderate compliance with the October 29, 2014 Plan. Mother and Father
had
substantial, to moderate and no compliance with the April 8, 2015 Plan,
respectivel . The Parents had no compliance with the September 11, 2015
Plan.
Mother and Father had substantial lid no compliance with the June 8, 2016
Plan,
respectively.
9. Unfortunately, since their placement in May 2014, the Children have
been in
multiple homes, and they have not always been placed together.
C. _D. M.1 -3r.
a. The placement for C , is as follows:
. On May 29, 2014, C vas placed in the foster home of 1.,;
and 'ski
4
ii. On June 11, 2015, C. was placed in emergency caregiver
placement with the maternal grandparents, j and D
w.
iii. On June 7, 2016, C was placed in the foster home of A
and 17
iv. On July 6, 2016, C was placed in the Youth Development
Center.
v. Finally, on July 21, 2016, C! was placed and has remained in the
foster home of Rt and K 'C
C
b. Thr placement for C'--
1:). . mks
's as follows:
a
On May 29, 2014, C was placed in the foster home of
and V zyM,
On June 19, 2015, Cf .vas placed in inpatient hospitalization at
Kidspeace Psychiatric Hospital.
Li On July 20, 2015, 0 was placed in the foster home of A
CL
On March 2, 2016, 0 was placed in the respite foster
of
.
home
On March 11, 2016, G as placed in the foster home
of
and
5
vi. On May 23, 2016, C was placed in the foster home of C
and M' B
i. On July 7, 2016, Cr.,- was placed in a Group Home at Hoffman
Homes.
Finally, on March 7, 2017, C 'was placed in the foster home of
and TK
c. Th placement for
ce D. fit\ . PA.
is as follows:
i. On May 29, 2014, C4 was placed in the foster home of L
and V -)M
1. On June 11, 2015, C was placed in emergency caregiver
placement with the maternal grandparents, D and Jr -
W
ii, On June 7, 2016, C.k xas placed in the foster home of Al.
and Ri
On July 12, 2016, C .was placed in kinship placement with the
maternal grandparents, D - and J
On August 23, 2016, C vas placed in the foster home of Pi
and &
Finally, on December 30, 2016, G was placed and has remained
in. the foster home of K. 9k
6
10. At the tine that the above-referenced petitions were filed, the
Children's
placements seem to have stabilized with a permanent placement
likely for all of the
Children.
11. Unfortunately, at the time of the hearing, all three of the Children were
in separate
placements. However, on March 7, 2017, C. was released to the foster home
C .b.
of Rt and R '1Ck , where C phad been and is currently residing.
12. While there have been some issues with sibling
visits, there is a plan in place for
those visit to occur on a regular basis.
13. On December 12, 2016, the Agency filed a Petition
to Change the Court-Ordered
Goal from reunification with a parent to termination of
parental rights and
placement for adoption, and a Petition to Involuntarily Terminate
The Parental
Rights of the parents of the Children.
14. Notice of tie Change of Goal/Involuntary Termination proceedings
were served
upon both S -(M. W and Ci, Dc__. tivl Sr. (collectively
referred to as "Parents") by personal service on Mother on February
14, 2017 and
by publicat on on Parents on December 27, 2016, January 3
and 10, 2017 in The
Patriot Ne s; on December 30, 2016, January 6, 13, and 20, 2017
in the Dauphin
County Re orter; and December 26 and 29, 2016, January 1, 2, 5, 9 and 12, 2017 in
the York Legal Record.
15. A hearing as held on February 24, 2017 to address the Petition to
Change the
Court-Orde ed Goal and the petition to Terminate the Parental Rights
to the
7
Children. Mother attended the hearing; Father did not. At
the time of the hearing,
the Chil en had been in Agency custody for more than
twenty-eight (28) months,
and sixty 60) months since the initial placement.
DISCUSSION
Fetid n to Change the Court-Ordered Goal
Before th Court can change the goal for any child in a
juvenile dependency action,
the Agency for C dldren, Youth, and Families ("CYF")
must prove by clear and
convincing evide ce that the change of goal would be in the child's
best interest. In re
Interest of MB., 6 4 A.2d 702 (Pa.Super. 1996). In addition to
the factors outlined in the
Juvenile Act, any d all other factors that bear upon the welfare of the
children must be
taken into conside ation. In re Davis, 465 A.2d 614, 620 (Pa.
1983).
The purpo e of the Juvenile Act is to preserve family
unity, or provide an
alternative family hen required, and to "provide for the care,
protection, safety and
Wholesome mental and physical development" of the child. 42
Pa.C.S. §§ 6301(b)(1) -
(1,1). the Juvenile Act was not intended to place children in a
more perfect home; instead,
the Act gives the urt the authority to "intervene to ensure that parents
meet certain
legislatively dote ed irreducible minimum standards in executing their
parental rights."
in re JW., 578 A.2 952, 958 (Pa.Super. 1990)(emphasis added).
Because th Juvenile Act addresses the concerns of both child and
paxent, the Act is
drawn broadly and ust therefore be construed liberally upon interpretation.
In the Matter
of TR., 665 A.2d 1 60, 1264 (Pa.Super. 1995)(reversed on other grounds).
8
Pursuant to the Juvenile Act, the Court must make a determination as
to each of the
following factors in reviewing the permanency plan. for the child:
a. the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the placement;
b. the appropriateness, feasibility and extent of compliance with the
permanency plan developed for the child;
c. the extent of the progress made toward alleviating the
circumstances which
necessitated the original placement;
d. the appropriateness and feasibility of the current placement
goal for the
child;
e. the likely date by which the goal for the child might be achieved;
f. whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize the permanency
plan in
effect; and
g. whether the child is safe.
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6351(f)(1)-(6).
Based on the evidence presented and the determinations made pursuant
to 42
§ 6351(f), the Court must then decide what disposition would be best
suited to
protect; he physical, mental, and moral welfare of the child. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(g). The
Court must determine:
a. if and when the child should be returned to the parents, guardian
or other
custodian; or
h. if and when the child will be placed for adoption and the county
agency will file
for termination of parental rights.
42 Pa.C.S. §6331(f)(1).
The present goal of the family service plan is reunification of the Children
with a
parent. CYF is seeking to change the current goal to termination of parental
rights and
placement for adoption pursuant to the Juvenile Act. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301 et seq.
A. ContitLL.iing Necessity for and Appropriateness of Placement
9
In this case, continued placement is necessary due to
continuing issues with both
Parents. Mother has an inability to obtain and maintain
appropriate housing, she continues
to have positive o missed drug tests, and she has
failed to maintain consistent contact or
visits. Father has failed to contact the children and/or
participate in any proceedings for a
few years.
This case actually has a 2010 docket number. With this
round of services, the
Children have been continuously in placement since May 30, 2014.
Numerous services
have been provided, especially to Mother, since the time the
children came into placement.
Mother had a Justice Works team from June 11, 2014 until
September 3, 2014. The team
closed unsuccessfully. (Joint Stipulation, 2/16/17, ¶27.) A
Pressley Ridge Team worked
with Mother from Dctober 3, 2014 until November 4 2015. That
team closed
unsuccessfully. (Joint Stipulation, 2/16/17, ¶28.) Mother has continued to
struggle with
issues related to stipstance abuse and housing. She was moving in
the right direction
during her time at Life's Beacon in the summer of 2016, but her
progress fell apart upon
her unsuccessful di charge from the program. Mother then exacerbated
her issues by
failing to keep the Agency informed with regard to her whereabouts or
maintaining
visitation with the Children. Despite the services, she is not yet in a position
to even have
any substantial period of unsupervised contact. Therefore,
placement continues to be
necessary. The Court has reached the point where further services are only
duplicative and
not likely to result in reunification.
10
With reg d to Father, his whereabouts are unknown. He has made no effort to
remain engaged any meaningful way. His last contact with the Agency was in 2015.
B. Al.ro,n. teness Feasibility, and Extent of Compliance with the Permanency Plan
When chi dren are placed in foster care, the parents have an affirmative duty to
make the changes in their lives that would allow them to become appropriate parents.
In re
Diaz, 669 A.2d 3 2, 377 (Pa.Super. 1995). A family service plan is created to help
give
the parents some "deline as to the various guideline as to the various areas that need
to
be improved. In e Interest of MB., 565 A.2d 804, 806 (Pa.Super. 1989). By assessing
the parents' complance and success with this family service plan, the Court can
determine
if the parents hay- fulfilled their affirmative duty. In re JEW, 651 A.2d 167, 170
(Pa.Super. 1994). When the parents fail to make efforts to comply with the family
service
plans, the Court is justified in changing the children's goals.
As for the urrent Plan, Mother's goals were to obtain and maintain stable
employment, hous g, and sobriety, and to work on her bond with the Children.
Father's
goals were to obt: and maintain stable employment and housing, arid to work on his
relationship with e Children. Each service team that was assigned to Mother has
closed
out unsuccessfully Mother has not complied with the goal of obtaining and maintaining
suitable housing, ployment, or sobriety. Father has not complied with the Plan at all.
'What is most cone -ruing for the Court recently is that Mother essentially dropped
out of
the picture. She i dicated that she was having substantial issues with depression
and that
she was riot really nteracting with anyone. The Court hopes that she is able to address
11
these issues and make progress, but the Children need a parent who is
actively working
toward permanency.
C. Extglgf12ssyji ess Toward Alleviating the Circumstances
which Necessitated
Original F lacemertt
The original placement was necessitated by a lack of adequate
housing and
resources, and Mother's use of illegal substances. It appears that Parents
have made no
progress regarding these problems. From November 2015 to February
2016, Mother tested
positive once for 71-IC and was unable to provide a sample on three other
occasions.
Mother is currently staying at a one -room efficiency at a boarding
house. Mother testified
that she intends to live with her boyfriend, who has a criminal history
of violent crimes,
and whose tax rettsn is expected to pay for the rent. Mother's choice to move in
with her
boyfriend puts her moving in the wrong direction in terms of appropriate
housing for the
Children. The Court cannot look favorably on the Children residing with
someone with a
history of violent crimes. Father stopped responding to the Agency's request
for contact
and his current wh-reabouts are unknown. Therefore, neither parent is
making any
progress toward alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original
placement.
D. Appropriateness and Feasibilit,..Lgthe Current Placement Goal
The current placement goal is reunification. Reunification does not
appear to be
feasible at this time. The Children have been in placement for more than twenty-eight
(28)
months. All three of the Children told the Court that they just want a normal life.
The
Children indicated that they would be alright with returning to live with Mother
only if she
12
stopped using drugs. Given the similarity of the Children's initials, the
Court will refer to
them as the oldest, middle, and youngest child, in order to avoid the use
of their names for
public record. Tl.e youngest child told the Court that he does not want to
live with Mother
because he is "afraid she is going to get back on drugs and stuff." The oldest
child told the
Court that he doe not want to live with Mother if she does not have
suitable housing. The
middle child indi ated that she was used to not seeing or not talking to
Mother. The
Children either vaguely remember or do not remember Father at all. The bond
between
Parents and Children has dissipated in the twenty-eight months that the
Children have been
in foster care. Part of their lack of affection may stem from the Children's
interactions
with their foster p ents, whom the Children clearly think of as parents. While
unfortunate, the Court is without the power to change what happened in the past.
Together, Parents ontinue to have difficulty in obtaining and maintaining appropriate
housing, employe ent, sobriety, and relationships with the Children after more than
five
years total of services. Because of these issues, it is unlikely that the Children
could be
successfully reuniiied with their Parents.
E. Likely Date by which the Goal Might be Achieved
Due to the issues listed above and the long history of unsuccessful services,
it is
unlikely that the goal will be achieved in the reasonably foreseeable future, if at
all.
F. Whether Reasonable Efforts were Made to Finalize the Permanency
Plan in Effect
At the hearing, Mother raised the issue of whether reasonable efforts were
made to
finalize the permat ency plan in effect. It does not appear that the Agency assisted
Mother
13
in having visits "th the Children during her incarceration. There also
appears to be an
issue as to wheth r the Children's foster parents were conducive
to reunification since the
children have ha several issues with regard to visits between and
contact with each other.
Father did receiv assistance from the Pressley Ridge in.-home
family reunification team
and drug screens orn Families United Network. Mother did receive
assistance from
Justice Works, Pr ssley Ridge, Life's Beacon recovery house, and
Colonial House, and
was unsuccessful' discharged from each program for failure
to comply with requirements.
The Agen y is not required to make perfect efforts or all efforts,
but is required to
make reasonable fforts. Inethis case,. more than reasonable
efforts were made. Mother
was unsuccessfull discharged from each program due to her
failure to comply with the
program's require ents. Mother did not raise the issue of prison visits
or that she needed
more services dur g any of the dependency proceedings regarding
her progress, or lack
thereof. In fact, th hearing at which her parental rights were considered
for termination
was the first time at Mother raised the issue of whether reasonable efforts
were made to
finalize the permar. ency plan in effect. There had been five other family
service plans in
effect prior to this eating. Mother did not use her best efforts to
comply with the services
that the Agency ha provided to her. The Court fords that the Agency
made reasonable
efforts to finalize t e permanency plans in effect; Mother did not.
G. Whether th Children are Safe
are safe where they are presently staying.
14
H. Analysis f Factors
The Chil IL en have been in placement for twenty-eight (28)
months. Based on the
above factors, es ecially the finding that reunification is unlikely
in the near future, if at
all, this Court bel eves that it is appropriate to change the
goal. Parents have still not
established that r. ey can successfully obtain and maintain appropriate
housing,
employment, sob ety, and relationships with the Children. Parents
cannot just drop in and
out of children's I ves. while Mother may have legitimate
mental health issues that are
hindering her abi to maintain contact, that does not change the fact that
she has been
unable to maint consistent contact. There was substantial testimony regarding
the
Children's welfar being negatively impacted by the lack of permanence.
The Children
could be innuedia ly placed for adoption because the Court will
also grant the Petition for
Involuntary Tern ation. of Parental Rights. Therefore, a change of goal is appropriate in
this case.
IL Petitio for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights
CYF argue that the parental rights to the Children should be
terminated pursuant
to 23 Pa.C.S. §251 (a)(1), (2), (5), and (8) of the Adoption Act.
Those subsections are
stated as follows:
(a) Genera Rule. - The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be
termina ed after a petition is filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least
six
mon ha immediately preceding the filing of the petition either
has
evid need a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to
a
chili or has refused or failed to perfoini parental duties.
15
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of
the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental
care, control or subsistence necessary for his
physical or mental
well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse,
neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by
the parent.
(5) The child has been removed from the care of
the parent by the
court or under a voluntary agreement with an
agency for a period
of lat least six months, the conditions which led to the
removal or
placement of the child continue to exist, the parent
cannot or will
not remedy those conditions within a reasonable
period of time, the
serVices of assistance reasonably available to' the
parent are not
liketly to remedy the conditions which led to
the removal or
placement of the child within a reasonable period of
time and
termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs
and
welfare of the child.
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the
court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12
months or
more have elapsed from the date of removal or
placement, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child
continue to exist and termination of parental rights
would best
serve the needs and welfare of the child.
CYF has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing
i
evidence that statutory
grounds exist to jue4ify the involuntary termination of parental rights.
In re Child M, 681
A.2d 793, 797 (1'a4uper. 1996). The clear and convincing
standard means that the
evidence presented by CYF is so "clear, direct, weighty, and
convincing that one can
come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the
precise facts in issue."
Matter of Sylvester, 555 A.2d 1202, 1202-04 (Pa. 1989).
16
CYF mus also present evidence proving that the termination of the parental
rights
will serve the chi dren's needs and welfare. In the Matter ofAdoption of Charles .E.D..M:
II, 708 A.2d 88, -93 (Pa. 1998). Subsection (b) of 23 Pa.C.S. §2511 provides:
(b) Other considerations.-The court in terminating the rights of a
parent
shall ve primary consideration to the developmental, physical
and
emoti s i al needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall
not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such
as
inadeq ate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if
found o be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any
petitio filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court
shall
not co i sides any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
descried therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of
notice )3F the filing of the petition.
CYF has p. oven by clear and convincing evidence that the parental rights
of
Parents should be nvoluntarily terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(a)(1),
(a)(5), and
(a)(8).
The most c 'deal part of the court's analysis is the six months immediately
preceding the filinL of the petition. In re D.JS., 737 A.2d 283, 286 (Pa.Super.
1999)
(citing In re A.P., i 92 A.2d 240 (Pa.Super. 1997)). However, the court "must
consider the
whole history of a iven case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory
provisions, but ins ad consider the individual circumstances of each case." Id.
(citations
omitted). Furthe,. ore, the Superior Court has stated:
To be lega ly significant, the [post-removal] contact must be steady
and
consistent ver a period of time, contribute to the psychological health of
the child, 7 id must demonstrate a serious intent on the part of the parent
to
recultivate a parent-child relationship and must also demonstrate a
willingness and capacity to undertake the parental role. The parent
wishing to reestablish his parental responsibilities bears the burden of
17
proof on his question. Id., ( quoting In re Hamilton, 549
A.2d 1291,
1295 (Pa Super. 1988)).
A. Anal sis with Respect to Father's Rig- ts
The Age cy contends that this Court should involuntarily
terminate parental rights
under subsection (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8). To satisfy this
statutory provision, the
Agency must pro e by clear and convincing evidence that a parent
by conduct continuing
for a period of at east six months immediately preceding the
filing of the petition either
has evidenced a s Wed purpose of relinquishing parental claim
to a child or has refused or
failed to perform arental duties. Additionally, the Agency must
prove by clear and
convincing evide ce that termination of parental rights must best serve the
needs and
welfare of the C dren. See In re: C.G., 791 A.2d 430, 43536 (Pa.Super. 2002).
In this cas , Father has not been in contact with the Agency since April
20, 2015.
Father's current ereabouts are unknown. The Court is satisfied that the Agency
has
proven that Fathe has refused or failed to perform parental duties with
regard to the
-Children. Father igned acknowledgements of paternity for each child.
However, Father
has failed to info the Agency or anyone involved of his whereabouts and has
clearly
made no effort to omply with the numerous family service plans generated
in order to
achieve reunificati
With respe t to Father's rights, termination would serve the needs and
welfare of
the Children. The hildren need structure and finality to their familial
relationships.
They have clearly ost their bond of affection with Father. One of the
Children does not
18
even remember him, and the other two would like to see him, but have
no desire to be
reunified with . Father is clearly incapable of providing the stable environment
and
relationship that the Children need. Therefore, termination would serve the
needs and
welfare of the Children.
Under any analysis of any factor, a parent who has absented himself from
the
process and failed o make contact with the Agency or his children for a
period in excess
of a year should h ve his rights terminated. Being a parent is an affirmative
duty. The
Court had to approve notice by publication because Father's whereabouts
are unknown
despite the fact that he knows his children are in care. Under §2511(a)(1),
this evidences a
settled purpose of relinquishing his parental claim to the Children and
failing to perform
parental duties. In this case, Father has made no effort to perform his parental
duties.
Under §2511(a)(2) Father's refusal to maintain contact has caused the Children
to be
without essential parental care. Under §2511(a)(5) and (a)(8), these factors are
clearly
present as the Agency cannot remedy a situation when they do not even know
where
Father is, despite efforts to find him.
B. Analysis with Respect to Mother's Rights
The Agency contends that this Court should involuntarily terminate parental
rights
under subsection (0(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8). To satisfy this statutory provision,
the
Agency must prove by clear and convincing evidence that several conditions exist.
First,
the Children must have been removed from parental care by court order or agency
agreement for at least six months before the filing of the petition to terminate parental
19
rights. Second, t e conditions that led to the removal must continue to exist.
Third, the
parent must not e able or willing to remedy those conditions within a reasonable
period
of time. Fourth, e services or assistance reasonably available to the parent
must not be
likely to remedy he conditions that led to the removal within a reasonable
period of time.
Fifth, terminatio of parental rights must best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
See In re: C.G., 7 1 A.2d 430, 435-36 (Pa.Super. 2002).
The Agen y also contends that this Court should involuntarily terminate
parental
rights under subs ction (a)(8). Subsection (a)(8) allows the Court to terminate
parental
rights without an showing that the parents are likely to remedy the conditions
that led to
the placement, pr vided that the children at issue have been in placement for
twelve
months rather th six. See In re: A.R., 837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa.Super. 2003). Aside
from
those differences, .ubsection (a)(8) requires clear and convincing proof of the
same
conditions as subs ction (a)(5).
With regar to Mother, the Agency has proven its case with regard to
§2511(a)(2),
(a)(5), and (a)(8) follows. With regard to §2511(a)(2), the Children have been removed
from parental care for more than twenty-eight (28) months. The conditions that
led to
their removal still xist. Mother's employment, sobriety, and housing are still not
stable.
However, Mother as made more of an effort than Father to maintain contact and
remain
involved. The Co especially appreciates the progress she made while at Life's Beacon.
It appears that be g asked to leave that program was a serious blow to Mother.
She
struggled with ove coming that obstacle and returning to a path of recovery with her
20
mental health and substance abuse. Her =rent plan is to move in
with a boyfriend with a
history of violent crime. She appears to be moving in the wrong direction
with regard to
appropriate housing. While she has reasons for her repeated and continued
inability to
care for the children, the Court finds that she cannot or will not be
remedying them by her
plans for her current move or her current behavior.
With regard to §2511(a)(5) and (a)(8), despite the twenty-eight (28)
months that
the Children have been in placement, Mother still does not have appropriate
housing. She
has failed to work successfully with any team. She is still struggling
with her mental
health, according to her own testimony. Mother is. still struggling with
her substance
abuse issues. Over a period of several months, the only drug test Mother
was able to
provide a sample for resulted in a positive indication for THC. This is not a
stable
sobriety situation. Mother has made no progress on housing and sobriety issues,
which
were the issues that precipitated the Children being taken into custody. Sadly,
her middle
child, when offered any wish, stated that he "just hopes my parents can get
the help they
need." The Court shares this wish but is constrained to find that the Agency
has proven
that Mother has fai ed to remedy the conditions that led to the placement.
Mother appears to be willing to remedy some of these conditions now, but
it is too
little too late and comes across as grasping at straws. Mother apparently cocooned
herself
in her apartment rather than affirmatively seeking treatment for her depression.
Mother
did not know the names of the Children's doctors or teachers and was completely
unaware
that she would need to inform herself with respect to her Children's special
educational,
emotional, and developmental needs. Mother blamed the Agency for
not providing her
with more resour es, despite being unsuccessfully discharged from at
least four different
programs for her failure to follow the programs' instructions. As of
January 31, 2017,
Mother had made Zo progress toward compliance with the most recent family
service
plan. Two of the Children had made full progress toward
compliance with the most recent
family service plan, and the third child had made moderate progress
toward compliance
with the most recent family service plan. The Children appear to be
working to achieve
reunification and permanence, rather than Mother, Therefore, Mother is
either unable or
unwilling to remed the conditions which led to the placement.
The testim ny has shown that further services will not benefit Parents.
This time
around, Parents ha e had almost three years, multiple in -home teams,
counselors, and
other professionals to help them remedy the conditions. Being a parent
is an affirmative
obligation, and this Court cannot foresee that further services will lead to any
substantial
improvements in the conditions. Therefore, it is unlikely that the conditions will
be
remedied within a reasonable time.
C. '2511 Anal sis
1. Bond with Parents
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has specifically noted that the Adoption
Act
requires that the tri court examine the effect termination will have on the needs
and
welfare of the children involved. In re Adoption of Godzak, 719 A.2d 365, 368
(PaSuper.
1998) (citations omitted). Pennsylvania courts have recognized that emotional
bonds are
22
just as important o consider as the conditions necessitating removal.
See In re C.P., 901
A.2d 516 (Pa.Su er. 2006). The duty of being a parent "requires
continuing interest in the
child and a gen e effort to maintain communication and association
with the child." In
re S.S.W., 125 A. d 413, 416 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citations
omitted). When evaluating this
bond, courts are ot required to use experts. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108,
1121 (Pa.Super.
2010) (citation o II) tted). As such, "social workers and caseworkers
can offer evaluations
as well. Addition ily, §2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation." Id.
(internal citation mitted).
Blare,. the aseworker testified that.the Children's bonds with
Parents have
weakened over e. This is not surprising, as the parents have been
inconsistent in their
ability to maintain contact with the children. The Agency has been involved
with these
Children for almo t half of the youngest child's life. The middle child indicated
that she
does not even rem mber Father. None of the children seemed to have any
significant bond
with Father. AM o the children did have a bond with Mother.. The Court, however,
questions whether his bond has a positive or negative effect on the Children's
needs and
welfare. It is a par nt's job to worry about children. It is not a child's job to worry
about a
parent. All of the hildren are worried about Mother, and that is not their job.
If a bond is
only an anchor pul ing Children repeatedly down, then it is perhaps a bond best
broken.
The Childr n repeatedly stressed that their sources of anxiety stem mainly
from the
ever-present in.stab lity in their lives with regard to where they will be living in a
few
months and wheth they will have a nounal life with Parents ever again. At this
point in
23
the dependency uncture, this is a fantasy. The Children have
been in foster care for more
than twenty-eight (28) months. They have clearly lost their
bonds of affection with Father
and their bonds of affection with Mother have diminished.
The Children feel unsafe in
Mother's care unless and until she could ensure her sobriety.
Parents have been incapable
of remedying the conditions which necessitated the removal.
Parents cannot provide the
stable environment that the Children need. Mother has
not used her best efforts to
overcome the obEtacles barring her from a continuing relationship
with the Children, and
thus, she has continually failed to perform her parental
duties. See In re &S. W., supra.
These Children want, need, and deserve a permanent, loving
home with positive,
appropriate role models. The Children need some structure and
finality to their familial
relationships. This need for permanency outweighs the emotional
bonds the Children
have left with Mother. Therefore, termination would serve the
needs and welfare of the
Children.
2. d with. Other Siblings
The Court was particularly troubled by the foster parents' failure to
facilitate visits
between the siblings. After termination, the siblings will only have
each other left from
their former life. It appears that the Agency has located pre -adoptive
homes for all of the
Children, but the middle child will not be in the same home as her
brothers. The Court
should not have to decide between permanency for the Children and
their ability to
maintain their connection and bond with one another. The only
reservation for the Court is
the inability to ensure sibling contact following termination. The
Court was quite clear
24
with the participants in the hearing that better efforts
needed to be made in this regard and
that a plan for cortinuing sibling contact should be in
place prior to any adoption
proceeding.
While the Court hopes that sibling contact will continue,
because of the Court's
lack of control following termination, the Court for this
purpose will assume the worst case
scenario, which would be a lack of regular contact between
the boys and their sister. In
that case, the Cott must weigh the importance of the
bond against the need for
permanence. Even in that case, given the numerous placements
and circumstances that
these Children haVe faced in their young lives, the need
for permanence wins out The
Court still stresses that there is no reason that this contact
should not continue and
specifically finds that it would be in the Children's best interests for
them to have both
permanence and continued sibling relationships.
.1
3. Other Factors
The Court noted in its Finding of Fact the placement history
of each of the children.
The Court notes specifically that the youngest child has
struggled in his ability to maintain
his behavior in his various placement settings. The failure to
identify appropriate pre.
adoptive homes has been a factor in the delay in filing the petitions.
The termination
appears to be appropriate at this time as the current foster parents
seem committed to
creating permanent homes for all of the Children. While the situation is
not ideal in that all
the Children are notan the same home, they are geographically
close together with the two
boys in the same hone. Therefore, terminating the rights of
Parents at this point so that the
25
Children can be adopted into their current homes would best
serve their developmental,
physical, and em tional needs and welfare.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Th- current placement of the Children continues to be
necessary and
appropriate. 42 P .C.S. §6351(f)(1).
2. P nts have not complied with the family service
plans. 42 Pa.C.S.
§6351(f)(2).
3. Th circumstances that necessitated the Children's
original placement
continue to exist. 2 Pa.C.S. §6351(f)(3).
4. The current placement goal of reunification of the
Children with Parents is
no longer appropri te and feasible. 42 Pa.C.S.
§6351(f)(4).
5. The Agency has made reasonable efforts to finalize the
permanency plan
that was in effect d' .g the Children's placement. 42 Pa.C.S. §6351(f)(5.1).
6. The hildren are safe in their current placement settings.
42 Pa.C.S.
§6351(f)(6).
7, The A
gency has proven by clear and convincing evidence that
Father by
conduct continuing or a period of at least six (6) months
immediately preceding the filing
of the petition eithe has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a
child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties. 23
Pa.C.S. §251I(a)(1).
8. The gency has proven by clear and convincing evidence that
the repeated
and continued incap city, abuse, neglect, or refusal of
Parents has caused the Children to
26
be without essenial parental care, control, or
subsistence necessary for their physical
or
mental well-being and the conditions and causes
of the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied by Parents.
23 Pa.C.S. §2511(a)(2).
9. The Agency has proven by clear and
convincing evidence that the Children
have been removed from the care of the Parents
by the court or under a voluntary
agreement with an agency for a period of at least six
months, the conditions that led to
the
removal or placement of the Children continue to
exist, the Parents cannot or will
not
remedy those conditions within a reasonable period
of time, the services or assistance
reasonably available to the parents are not likely to
remedy the conditions that led to
the
removal or placement of the Children within a
reasonable period of time, and
termination
of the parental rights would best serve the needs
and welfare of the Children. 23
Pa.C.S.
§2511(a)(5).
10. The Agency has proven by clear and convincing
evidence that the Children
have been removed from the care of the Parents by
the court or under a voluntary
agreement with an agency, twelve months or more have
elapsed from the date of removal
or placement, the conditions that led to the removal
or placement of the Children
continue
to exist, and termination of the parental rights of
the natural parents would best
serve the
needs and welfare of.the children. 23 Pa.C.S.
§2511(a)(8).
11. Ternination of all parental rights of the Parents to the
Children would best
serve their development, physical, and emotional
needs and welfare. 23 Pa.C.S.
§2511(b).
27
The following Decree and Order shall issue.
BY THE COURT:
March 20, 2017
KAM:LEE J.PRENDERGIST,
JUDGE
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