Cruz, J. v. Morales, M. ( 2023 )

J-S42017-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
JEREMY CRUZ : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
MADELINE SABLE MORALES AND : No. 583 WDA 2022
JOSE AGAPITO MORALES :
Appeal from the Order Entered April 12, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Civil Division at No(s): No.
10726 of 2021
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: May 5, 2023
Appellant, Jeremy Cruz, appeals pro se from the April 12, 2022 order
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County that sustained the
preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer filed by Madeline Sable
Morales and her father, Jose Agapito Morales, (collectively, “Morales”) and
dismissed Appellant’s second amended complaint with prejudice.1 We affirm.
We previously summarized the procedural history as follows:
On August 16, 2021, Appellant filed pro se a complaint against
Morales for, inter alia, two claims of breach of contract stemming
from Appellant's marriage to, and subsequent divorce from,
Madeline Morales. Appellant's Complaint for Breach of Contract,
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 In his notice of appeal, Appellant stated that he appealed from the “judgment
entered in this matter on [April 12, 2022.]” Notice of Appeal, 5/12/22. In
fact, Appellant appealed from the April 12, 2022 order sustaining the
preliminary objections and dismissing his second amended complaint.
J-S42017-22
8/16/21, at ¶66. On September 17, 2021, Morales filed
preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer to Appellant's
complaint, as well as a motion to dismiss the complaint with
prejudice. On September 30, 2021, Appellant filed a petition,
seeking leave of court to amend the complaint to include two
claims of breach of contract, as well as a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The trial court subsequently
denied Appellant's petition as moot, having found that Appellant
filed his petition, which the trial court deemed an amended
complaint, within twenty days of service of Morales’ preliminary
objections. Trial Court Order, 10/6/21; see also Pa.R.Civ.P.
1028(c)(1) (stating, “a party may file an amended pleading as of
course within twenty days after service of a copy of preliminary
objections”).
On October 15, 2021, Morales filed preliminary objections in the
nature of a demurrer to Appellant's amended complaint, as well
as a motion to dismiss the amended complaint with prejudice. On
November 8, 2021, Appellant filed a second amended
complaint.[FN1] On November 24, 2021, Morales filed preliminary
objections in the nature of a demurrer to Appellant's second
amended complaint, as well as a motion to dismiss the second
amended complaint with prejudice. Appellant filed a response to
the preliminary objections on December 10, 2021. On December
20, 2021, Morales filed a brief in support of the preliminary
objections, and Appellant filed a response to the brief on January
3, 2022.
[Footnote 1] Appellant, who was incarcerated in a state
correctional institution at the time, received service of
Morales’ preliminary objections on October 27, 2021. See
Appellant's Pro Se Correspondence, 11/4/21. Therefore,
Appellant's second amended complaint was timely filed on
November 8, 2021, pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(c)(1).
On January 21, 2022, Morales filed a supplement to the brief in
support of the preliminary objections. On February 7, 2022,
Appellant filed a petition to strike the supplement to Morales’ brief
in support of the preliminary objections and requested oral
argument on the matter pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 211. See
Pa.R.Civ.P. 211 (stating, “Any interested party may request oral
argument on a motion. The court may require oral argument,
whether or not requested by a party. The court may dispose of
any motion without oral argument.”). On April 12, 2022, the trial
court sustained Morales’ preliminary objections in the nature of a
-2-
J-S42017-22
demurrer to Appellant's second amended complaint and dismissed
Appellant's second amended complaint with prejudice.
On May 12, 2022, Appellant filed pro se a timely notice of appeal.
On May 25, 2022, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) no later than Tuesday, June 21, 2022. Trial Court Order,
5/25/22. The May 25, 2022 order provided Appellant the mailing
address to be used in serving a copy of his Rule 1925(b) statement
on the trial court and advised Appellant that “any issue not
properly included in his Rule 1925(b) statement, timely filed and
served pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), shall be deemed waived for
purpose of appeal.” Id. The May 25, 2022 order also contained
a notation that notice had been provided to Appellant on May 25,
2022, pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 236, and a review of the trial court
docket confirms that notice was provided on that date. Id.; see
also Trial Court Docket at 5/25/22 entry[;] Pa.R.Civ.P. 236(a)(2)
and (b) (requiring the prothonotary to note in the trial court
docket the date upon which notice of a trial court order is provided
to each party's attorney of record or, if unrepresented, to each
party). A copy of the May 25, 2022 order was mailed via “legal
mail” to Appellant using the legal address of the state correctional
institution where Appellant was incarcerated, as well as
Appellant's control identification number.
Appellant subsequently filed his Rule 1925(b) statement. The
Rule 1925(b) statement was dated June 21, 2022, and Appellant
avers in the certificate of service that the document was duly
mailed on June 21, 2022. Appellant's Pro Se Rule 1925(b)
Statement. The Rule 1925(b) statement, however, was
time-stamped as having been received in the prothonotary's office
on June 27, 2022, and the envelope Appellant used for mailing the
Rule 1925(b) statement bears a postage meter time-stamp of
June 24, 2022.
Cruz v. Morales, 2023 WL 371665, at *1-*2 (Pa. Super. Jan. 24, 2023)
(unpublished memorandum) (original brackets and some footnotes omitted).
On January 24, 2023, this Court remanded the case to the trial court for
the purpose of determining the timeliness of Appellant’s Rule 1925(b)
statement. Id. at *2. On March 20, 2023, the trial court filed a supplemental
-3-
J-S42017-22
Rule 1925(a) opinion stating that, upon concluding an evidentiary hearing on
the matter, the trial court found Appellant’s testimony and the evidence
submitted at the hearing to be credible and that the Rule 1925(b) statement
was timely filed on June 20, 2022, or June 21, 2022, pursuant to the prisoner
mailbox rule.2 See Trial Court Opinion, 3/20/23, at 2 (stating, the trial court
“credits the testimony of [Appellant] that he deposited the filing with prison
officials either on [June 20, 2022, or June 21, 2022.] This is corroborated by
[Appellant’s exhibit 3,] a copy of a cash slip dated June 21, 202[2], with the
word ‘deadline’ handwritten on the document.”); see also Commonwealth
v. Jones, 700 A.2d 423, 426 (Pa. 1997) (explaining the well-established
principle, commonly referred to as the “prisoner mailbox rule,” under which a
document is deemed “filed” on the date an inmate deposits the mailing with
prison authorities or places it in the prison mailbox).
Upon review, we concur with the trial court, and the certified record
supports, that Appellant timely filed his Rule 1925(b) statement. On July 20,
2022, the trial court filed its initial Rule 1925(a) opinion, addressing
Appellant’s issues raised in his Rule 1925(b) statement. Therefore, we
proceed to address the merits of Appellant’s appeal.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
____________________________________________
2 The trial court also noted that Morales “did not meaningful[ly] refute the
evidence presented by [Appellant].” Trial Court Opinion, 3/20/23, at 2 n.1.;
see also N.T., 2/16/23, at 3.
-4-
J-S42017-22
[1.] Did the [trial] court erred by dismissing Appellant's
complaint without a trial by jury?
[2.] Did the [trial] court violate Appellant's [first] amendment
right [of freedom of religion granted by] the United States
Constitution?
[3.] Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion by dismissing
Appellant's complaint?
[4.] Did the [trial] court violate[ A]ppellant's United States
constitutional right[ of trial by jury]?
[5.] Did Appellant and [Madeline Morales] enter[] into a legally
binding[,] enforceable [oral contract]?
[6.] Was [] Appellant required to seek [] relief and/or bring an
action for support in the Domestic Relations Court?
[7.] Was [Madeline Morales’] promise to financially care for
Appellant whenever Appellant was in need [] far too vague
to constitute a legally enforceable promise?
Appellant’s Brief at 1 (extraneous capitalization omitted).3
In sum, Appellant challenges the trial court’s order sustaining Morales’
preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer to Appellant’s second
amended complaint. Id. at 2-13; see also Rule 1925(b) Statement, 6/21/22.
Appellant’s second amended complaint asserts claims for breach of contract
and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) against Madeline
Morales and a claim for IIED against Jose Morales. See generally, Second
Amended Complaint, 11/8/21.
Our standard of review of an order of the trial court overruling or
[sustaining] preliminary objections is to determine whether the
____________________________________________
3For ease of identification, we have assigned page numbers to Appellant’s
unpaginated brief.
-5-
J-S42017-22
trial court committed an error of law. When considering the
appropriateness of a ruling on preliminary objections, the
appellate court must apply the same standard as the trial court.
Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer test the legal
sufficiency of the complaint. When considering preliminary
objections, all material facts set forth in the challenged pleadings
are admitted as true, as well as all inferences reasonably
deducible therefrom. Preliminary objections which seek the
dismissal of a cause of action should be sustained only in cases in
which it is clear and free from doubt that the pleader will be unable
to prove facts legally sufficient to establish the right to relief. If
any doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, it
should be resolved in favor of overruling the preliminary
objections.
Albert v. Erie Ins. Exch., 65 A.3d 923, 927-928 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
omitted); see also Am. Express Bank, FSB v. Martin, 200 A.3d 87, 93
(Pa. Super. 2018) (stating, this Court’s review of a trial court order sustaining
a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer is plenary).
“To successfully maintain a cause of action for breach of contract [a]
plaintiff must establish: (1) the existence of a contract, including its essential
terms, (2) a breach of a duty imposed by the contract, and (3) resultant
damages.” Albert, 65 A.3d at 928 (citation omitted). “While not every term
of a contract must be stated in complete detail, every element must be
specifically pleaded. Clarity is particularly important where an oral contract is
alleged.” Pennsy Supply, Inc. v. Am. Ash Recycling Corp. of
Pennsylvania, 895 A.2d 595, 600 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted),
appeal denied, 907 A.2d 1103 (Pa. 2006).
Where the existence of an informal contract is alleged, it is
essential to the enforcement of such an informal contract that the
minds of the parties should meet on all the terms[,] as well as the
-6-
J-S42017-22
subject matter. If anything is left open for future negotiation, the
informal paper cannot form the basis of a binding contract.
GMH Assocs., Inc. v. Prudential Realty Group, 752 A.2d 889, 900
(Pa. Super. 2000) (citation and quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 795
A.2d 976 (Pa. 2000).
To establish a claim for IIED, a plaintiff must sufficiently plead that (1)
the conduct of the defendant or defendants was extreme and outrageous, (2)
the conduct was intentional and reckless, (3) the conduct caused emotional
distress, and (4) the distress was severe. Jordan v. Pennsylvania State
Univ., 276 A.3d 751, 775 (Pa. Super. 2022).
For an IIED claim to survive a preliminary objection, a [trial] court
must determine, as a matter of law, whether there is sufficient
evidence for reasonable persons to find extreme or outrageous
conduct. The conduct must be so outrageous in character and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable
in a civilized community.
Id. (citations omitted).
In the case sub judice, the trial court, in sustaining Morales’ preliminary
objections, held that Appellant failed to plead an enforceable contract for
support based upon the exchange of marriage vows because, inter alia, the
exchange of wedding vows does not create an enforceable contract based
upon the representations expressed within the vows themselves. Trial Court
Opinion, 4/12/22, at 3-4. Moreover, in finding that Appellant failed to plead
an enforceable oral contract based upon the verbal exchange between
Appellant and Madeline Morales at the time Appellant signed an affidavit of
-7-
J-S42017-22
consent to the entry of a final divorce decree, the trial court stated, “[Madeline
Morales’] alleged promise to financially care for [Appellant] whenever he was
in need is far too vague to constitute a legally enforceable promise.” Id. at 5
(noting that, Appellant “characterizes the promise as one to support him
whenever he is ‘in a serious pickle,’ but it is not clear from the averments that
the parties actually contemplated such a ‘serious pickle’ term, nor is it clear
what circumstances would or would not qualify under this vague standard”).
The trial court further noted that, in his own pleadings, Appellant conceded
that no specifics about the terms of the oral contract were discussed at the
time Appellant executed the divorce document. Id. Finally, regarding the
IIED claims, the trial court explained,
[Appellant’s two-part claim] that [Madeline Morales] refused to
support him financially while [Appellant was] facing criminal
prosecution or otherwise, or that [Jose Morales] interfered with
his marriage, [which] caused him to lose faith in any future
fathers-in-law, and led him to take pain medications, [] fall[s]
woefully short of outrageous conduct [required to demonstrate a
claim for IIED.] Such allegations of negligence and carelessness
do not rise to the level of conduct premised upon standards such
as “atrocious” and “utterly intolerable” behavior.
Id. at 8 (citation and some quotation marks omitted).
A review of Appellant’s second amended complaint demonstrates the
following pertinent averments in support of Appellant’s claims for breach of
contract and IIED.
24.) At the [pre-marriage meeting with the Reverend who was
to perform the marriage ceremony, the Reverend] spoke to
[Appellant] and [Madeline Morales. H]e explained what
marriage means and he also strictly explained to the couple
-8-
J-S42017-22
the basic fundamentals of marriage under God. [Appellant
and Madeline Morales] agreed and accepted the terms and
conditions of that bond which is also known as a “contractual
relationship”.
25.) [In October 2011, the Reverend] married [Appellant] and
[Madeline Morales.]
...
31.) [Jose Morales] would always seem to interrupt [Appellant’s
routine of picking up Madeline Morales’ children from school]
and the manner [in which Madeline Morales] and [Appellant]
would raise the children[. Jose Morales] would disregard
the rules that [Madeline Morales and Appellant] set as
parents. [Appellant] understands that [Jose Morales] is the
[children’s] grandfather and he wants to spoil the children,
but when [his actions go] against what the [parents put] in
place, it causes problem[s].
...
33.) [Jose Morales] seemed to always battle and challenge the
role that [Appellant] was given by [Madeline Morales.
Appellant] was “Papi”, which means “Dad” and [Jose
Morales] never respected that fact which caused [Madeline
Morales and Appellant] to argue.
...
36.) [Madeline Morales] filed for [] divorce.
37.) [Appellant] refused to sign the [divorce documents] and
[Madeline Morales] was his support and [Appellant] was left
out to dry.
38.) One day [Madeline Morales] asked [Appellant] if he could
meet her[. At the meeting, Madeline Morales] made a deal
(oral contract) with [Appellant. The deal was] that if
[Appellant] signed the divorce papers, that [Madeline
Morales] would financially take care [of Appellant whenever]
he was in need. No specifics [were] said about the deal,
only that if [Appellant] was in a struggle that she would be
there to assist him.
39.) [Appellant] eventually agreed and he signed the divorce
papers without reviewing the documents because [Madeline
-9-
J-S42017-22
Morales] advised [Appellant] of what was in the divorce
documents.
...
42.) [A] few years [later Appellant] reconnected with [Madeline
Morales,] and during that time, [Madeline Morales] bought
a [vehicle] for [Appellant] because [he needed a vehicle for
his employment.]
43.) [Appellant] was instructed to pay $200.00 a month for the
vehicle.
...
46.) [At some point, Appellant] ended up going to jail for [an
issue unrelated to the current controversary,] and
[Appellant] stayed in jail no more than 3 days [before
Madeline Morales paid the bail for his release.]
...
48.) [In August 2017, Appellant] was charged with some very
serious criminal charges and needed financial help to retain
an attorney to defend [Appellant].
51.) [Appellant] did his best to contact [Madeline Morales] and
he was being ignored. [Madeline Morales] had a contract
with [Appellant] which needed to be performed on her end.
52.) Due to [Madeline Morales] not performing her end of the
“deal”, [Appellant] had no choice but to go ahead with the
public defender that the [trial court] appointed and that
attorney did absolutely nothing for [Appellant. D]ue to the
attorney doing not a thing for [Appellant, Appellant] was
ultimately found guilty after a jury trial.
...
73.) [Appellant] avers that the only reason why he signed [the]
divorce document[] was [] because [Madeline Morales]
made a deal and a promise [] that when [Appellant] was in
need of financial help[] she would be there to help.
...
76.) [Appellant] avers that he did not file for alimony simply
because he had an agreement with [Madeline Morales] so
- 10 -
J-S42017-22
he was not worried about money. [Appellant] knew that if
he was seriously in a serious pickle, that he could count on
[Madeline Morales.]
...
80.) As for the [IIED claim, Madeline Morales] did cause that
[distress] because she did know that she had an
obligation[,] and in the community, everybody speaks, and
when [Appellant] was charged, everybody started to talk
about the problem that [Appellant] was in, and [Madeline
Morales] was told by a family member, and she did not aid
[Appellant] in his worst time of his life.
...
81.) [Jose Morales] did cause [IIED] to [Appellant] and also
physical pain as well. [Appellant] can’t sleep at times, and
he has to take pain pills to [alleviate] his head pain[.
Appellant] lost trust for any father[-]in-laws in the future,
and that is not right. [Jose Morales] did directly and
voluntarily cause problems to the marriage of [Madeline
Morales and Appellant.]
Second Amended Complaint, 11/8/21 (extraneous capitalization and
emphasis omitted).
We first examine the argument that the exchange of wedding vows
between Appellant and Madeline Morales created an oral contract under which
Madeline Morales was obligated to provide financial support to Appellant. We
disagree, as a matter of law, with the trial court’s conclusion that the exchange
of wedding vows does not “in and of [itself create] legally enforceable
obligations.” See Trial Court Opinion, 4/12/22, at 4. It is well-established
that marriage is a civil contract “entered into by words in the present tense”
and “does not require any particular form of solemnization before officers of
church or state.” Fiedler v. Nat. Tube Co., 53 A.2d 821, 822 (Pa. Super.
- 11 -
J-S42017-22
1947); see also In re Estate of Carter, 159 A.3d 970, 974 (Pa. Super.
2017) (stating that, marriage is “a civil contract made between [two] parties
with the capacity to so contract”). A ceremonial marriage, such as the one
Appellant avers occurred between he and Madeline Morales in the case sub
judice, “is a wedding or marriage performed by a religious or civil authority
with the usual or customary ceremony or formalities.” Carter, 159 A.3d at
974. Our Supreme Court has described a ceremonial wedding as typically
involving an exchange of vows between the individuals “to support one
another emotionally and financially[.]” Devlin v. City of Philadelphia, 862
A.2d 1234, 1243 (Pa. 2004); see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4321(1) (stating,
“[m]arried persons are liable for the support of each other according to their
respective abilities to provide support as provided by law”).
Nonetheless, just as a general contract can be terminated pursuant to
its terms or by agreement of the parties, it is well-established that a marriage
contract may be terminated by, inter alia, divorce. See Eisenberg v.
Eisenberg, 160 A. 228, 230 (Pa. Super. 1932) (stating, a marital contract “is
dissolved from the date of the entry of the [divorce] decree”); see also 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 3102 (stating that, the legislative intent behind the passage of the
Divorce Code, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3301-3904, was to enact a law “for [the] legal
dissolution of marriage”). In the case sub judice, Appellant and Madeline
Morales were divorced on August 8, 2013. Second Amended Complaint,
11/8/21, at ¶62. As such, any contractual obligations which arose out of their
marriage contract, i.e., mutual promises to financially support each other
- 12 -
J-S42017-22
during the marriage, ended upon entry of the divorce decree.4, 5 Eisenberg,
160 A. at 230.
Turning to Appellant’s argument that an oral contract arose from his
encounter with Madeline Morales pertaining to his signing of divorce
documents, we are ever-mindful that “[f]or a contract to be enforceable, the
nature and extent of the mutual obligations must be certain, and the parties
must have agreed on the material and necessary details of their bargain.”
____________________________________________
4 We concur with the trial court that any “financial obligation arising from the
marriage” that continues after divorce, “must be brought in the form of a
support action under [the] Domestic Relations Code.” Trial Court Opinion,
4/12/22, at 4; see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701 (pertaining to the award of
alimony as part of a divorce proceeding).
Moreover, aside from the general obligations to emotionally and financially
support each other that are inherent to a marriage contract, Appellant did not
allege any specific vows or promises in the second amended complaint that
were made during the wedding ceremony between Appellant and Madeline
Morales. Appellant simply alleged that the Reverend “explained what
marriage mean[t]” and Appellant and Madeline Morales “agreed and accepted
[] the terms and conditions of that bond.” Second Amended Complaint,
11/8/21, at ¶ 24.
5 To the extent that Appellant argues that the trial court violated his
constitutional right to freedom of religion by sustaining the preliminary
objections on the ground a marriage contract between the parties was not
enforceable, we find this argument to be without merit. As stated supra,
marriage is a civil contract that may be dissolved by divorce, and Pennsylvania
has the power to regulate marriage and divorce without encroaching upon the
ecclesiastical aspect of the marital bond and beliefs, as well as an individual’s
freedom of religion. Thus, while the state and courts no longer recognize
Appellant’s marital contract, it is still his constitutional prerogative to believe
that in the eyes of God, a marital bond still exists. See Pankoe v. Pankoe,
222 A.3d 443, 449-450 (Pa. Super. 2019), appeal denied, 237 A.3d 965 (Pa.
2020), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 1063 (2021).
- 13 -
J-S42017-22
Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 30 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that, “[a]n
enforceable contract requires, among other things, that the terms of the
bargain be set forth with sufficient clarity”); see also United Envtl. Group,
Inc. v. GKK McKnight LP, 176 A.3d 946, 963 (Pa. Super. 2017) (stating,
“the essential terms of that agreement [must be] certain enough to provide
the basis for providing an appropriate remedy”). “If the essential terms of the
agreement are so uncertain that there is no basis for determining whether the
agreement has been kept or broken, there is not an enforceable contract.”
United Envtl. Group, 176 A.3d at 963.
Here, as the trial court stated, and the record supports,
it is impossible to tell whether [Appellant’s] desire for a private
defense attorney to be funded by [Madeline Morales] was
contemplated under the alleged agreement or not. [Appellant]
characterizes the promise as one to support him whenever he is
“in a serious pickle,” but it is not clear from the averments that
the parties [subjectively defined between themselves what was
contemplated by the term “serious pickle”], nor is it [objectively]
clear what circumstances would or would not qualify under this
vague standard.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/12/22, at 5. In his second amended complaint,
Appellant averred “no specifics” were discussed as part of the oral contract
that Appellant contends was formed when Madeline Morales agreed to
financially support Appellant “[whenever] he was in need” in exchange for his
consent to the entry of the final divorce decree. Second Amended Complaint,
11/2/21, at ¶38. As such, accepting the material facts in the pleadings as
true, while Madeline Morales may have made such a promise to Appellant in
- 14 -
J-S42017-22
exchange for his signature on the relevant consent forms, we concur with the
trial court that the essential terms of that agreement, namely the conditions
under which Madeline Morales was obligated to financially support Appellant
(in other words, what constitutes a “serious pickle”), are too vague and
uncertain as to permit the enforcement of such a contract.
Finally, we consider Appellant’s IIED claims. Based upon the allegations
contained in Appellant’s second amended complaint (together with any
reasonable inferences deducible therefrom), we concur with the trial court that
Appellant has not come forward with averments that support his IIED claims
by demonstrating extreme or outrageous conduct on the part of either
Madeline Morales or Jose Morales. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/12/22, at 8.
Put differently, we are without doubt that Appellant will be unable to prove
facts legally sufficient to establish his right to relief on his second theory of
recovery. In sum, Appellant avers that Madeline Morales failed to support him
financially so he could retain a private defense attorney in his then-pending
criminal charges and that Jose Morales interfered with his marriage and family.
See Second Amended Complaint, 11/8/21, at ¶¶80-81. This conduct by
Madeline Morales, who was under no obligation to support Appellant, or by
Jose Morales, is not the type of conduct which is so extreme or outrageous to
be regarded as “atrocious[] and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”
Jordan, 276 A.3d at 735 (stating that recovery for IIED is allowed in only
“very egregious cases”).
- 15 -
J-S42017-22
For these reasons, we discern no error of law by the trial court in
sustaining Morales’ preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer and
dismissing Appellant’s second amended complaint with prejudice.6
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/5/2023
____________________________________________
6 Moreover, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion by the trial court
in sustaining Morales’ preliminary objections and dismissing Appellant’s
second amended complaint without first convening an evidentiary hearing. It
is well-established that “[p]reliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer
require the [trial] court to resolve the issues solely on the basis of the
pleadings[. N]o testimony or other evidence outside of the complaint may be
considered to dispose of the legal issues presented by the demurrer.” Hess
v. Fox Rothschild, LLP, 925 A.2d 798, 805 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal
denied, 945 A.2d 171 (Pa. 2008). Because the trial court’s decision to sustain
Morales’ preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer must be based
upon a review of Appellant’s second amended complaint and all inferences
reasonably deducible therefrom, it was without error or abuse of discretion
that the trial court sustained the preliminary objections without first convening
an evidentiary hearing.
- 16 -