Com. v. Strickhouser, C. ( 2023 )

J-A09032-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
CORY MICHA STRICKHOUSER :
:
Appellant : No. 632 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 21, 2022,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County,
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-01-CR-0000631-2021.
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: MAY 8, 2023
Cory Strickhouser appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
following his convictions for two counts of driving under the influence (DUI).1
He challenges the denial of his suppression motion. We affirm.
Strickhouser was charged with DUI following a traffic stop on March 14,
2021. On August 9, 2021, Strickhouser moved to suppress the evidence
obtained during the stop. The suppression court heard the matter on
September 21, 2021. The parties prepared briefs. The court found the
following facts:
1. Trooper Nathan McHugh is employed with the Pennsylvania
State Police and had been a Pennsylvania State Police Trooper
for approximately 5 months when the vehicle stop occurred in
this case.
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1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1) and (c).
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2. Trooper McHugh graduated from the Pennsylvania State Police
Academy and received training concerning the Pennsylvania
Vehicle Code, including investigations involving loud mufflers
and modified exhaust systems.
3. On March 14, 2021 at approximately 12:30 a.m., Trooper
McHugh was travelling northbound in a marked Pennsylvania
State Police SUV patrol unit on Hanover Pike, Conewago
Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania. Trooper McHugh
observed a blue Ford Focus pass him travelling south on
Hanover Pike.
4. When the Ford Focus passed Trooper McHugh’s vehicle,
Trooper McHugh observed the Ford Focus to have an exhaust/
muffler that was “quite loud.” Trooper McHugh turned his
vehicle around and followed [the Ford Focus]. Trooper
McHugh verified that the Ford Focus had a very loud
exhaust system. The Ford Focus made a loud audible sound
as if the motor were amplified through the exhaust.
5. Trooper McHugh initiated a vehicle stop on the Ford Focus to
investigate the amplified loud sound from the exhaust system.
[Strickhouser] was identified as the operator of the Ford Focus.
6. Trooper McHugh advised [Strickhouser] why he stopped him,
and [Strickhouser] stated that the vehicle’s exhaust system
was modified.
7. Trooper McHugh observed that [Strickhouser’s] eyes were
bloodshot and glassy, [Strickhouser’s] pupils were dilated, and
there was a strong odor of alcoholic beverage on
[Strickhouser’s] breath. As a result of Trooper McHugh’s
observations, Trooper McHugh’s investigation changed, and he
initiated a DUI investigation.
8. Ultimately, Trooper McHugh placed [Strickhouser] under arrest
for suspected driving under the influence of alcohol.
Opinion, 10/19/21, at 1–2 (emphasis added). Based on these findings, the
court denied Strickhouser’s motion to suppress. The case proceeded to a non-
jury trial on March 10, 2022, where the court found Strickhouser guilty.
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Strickhouser was sentenced on April 21, 2022, to 84 months of
probation with restrictive conditions of 18 months of house arrest. He timely
appealed. Strickhouser and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925.
Strickhouser presents three issues for our review:
1. Did the lower court err in finding that the trooper verified that
the Ford Focus had a “very loud” exhaust system to the extent
that the court maintained that the trooper’s observation about
amplification is a verification of an exhaust loud enough to be
materially relevant or sufficient to establish cause for the stop,
where such finding was clearly erroneous and not supported by
the reviewable evidence?
2. Did the lower court err in denying Strickhouser’s motion to
suppress where, based on the evidence, there was not
reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop where the trooper
pulled Strickhouser over due to a loud exhaust/muffler,
described as not “normal” and “amplified,” which is not a
violation, but at a time when the trooper believed it was,
without any reasonable or articulable basis to suspect that such
condition violated a traffic or other law or to justify an
investigative detention?
3. Did the lower court err in denying Strickhouser’s motion to
suppress where, based on the evidence, there was not probable
cause for the traffic stop where the trooper pulled Strickhouser
over due to a loud exhaust/muffler, described as not “normal”
and “amplified,” which is not a violation, but at a time when
the trooper believed it was, without any sufficient cause to
believe that such condition violated a traffic or other law?
Strickhouser’s Brief at 4–5.
Strickhouser’s issues all challenge the denial of his motion to suppress.
We employ the following standard of review:
An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge
to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
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the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those
facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before
the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those
findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are
erroneous. Where the appeal of the determination of the
suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the
suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an
appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression
court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions
of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 164 A.3d 1255, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526–27 (Pa. Super. 2015))
(brackets and ellipsis omitted). The factual findings of a suppression court do
not bind this Court unless the record supports those findings.
Commonwealth v. Coughlin, 199 A.3d 401, 405 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citing
Commonwealth v. Champney, 161 A.3d 265, 271 (Pa. Super. 2017)). That
is, “appellate courts are not bound by findings wholly lacking in evidence.”
Commonwealth v. Hamlin, 469 A.2d 137, 139 (Pa. 1983) (citing
Commonwealth v. Hall, 380 A.2d 1238 (Pa. 1977)).
We first address Strickhouser’s argument that the record does not
support the suppression court’s finding that “Trooper McHugh verified that the
Ford Focus had a very loud exhaust system.” Opinion, 10/19/21, at 2
(emphasized in facts above). The evidence in support was as follows:
[By the Commonwealth:] . . . And when you noticed that vehicle,
what did you do?
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[Trooper McHugh:] I proceeded to turn my vehicle around and
proceeded to follow the vehicle.
Q And how long did you follow the vehicle for, approximately?
A Approximately -- I would say approximately 200 yards.
Q Okay. And did you then initiate a vehicle stop?
A Yes, I did.
Q When you initiated the vehicle stop, what was the reason?
A The reason was for the loud exhaust on the vehicle.
N.T., 9/21/21, at 6–7. On cross-examination, Trooper McHugh stated that
Strickhouser’s exhaust was “quite loud.” Id. at 11. He also described the
sound as “amplified” by the exhaust system. Id. at 25.
The suppression court’s finding is supported by the record. Trooper
McHugh described the exhaust system as “quite loud,” which the court took
to mean “very loud.” This is practically a synonym and at most an inference
supported by the testimony. Because the above finding is not “clearly
erroneous” or “wholly lacking in evidence,” it binds this Court. Hamlin,
supra; Coughlin, supra. Strickhouser’s first issue fails.
We thus turn to Strickhouser’s issues of law. By statute, police may
stop vehicles based on reasonable suspicion of Vehicle Code violations, which
our courts have limited to those violations that can be investigated further
after the stop. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b); Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d
108, 115–16 (Pa. 2008). Violations that require no further investigation
require probable cause. Commonwealth v. Tillery, 249 A.3d 278, 282–83
(Pa. Super. 2021) (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1105
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(Pa. 2013)). Reasonable suspicion is a lesser quantum than probable cause.
“[T]o establish reasonable suspicion, an officer must be able to point to
specific and articulable facts which led him to reasonably suspect a violation.”
Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89, 96 (Pa. 2011). Probable cause
turns on “whether the facts and circumstances which are within the knowledge
of the officer at the time of the arrest, and of which he has reasonably
trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution
in the belief that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime.”
Commonwealth v. Ibrahim, 127 A.3d 819, 824 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 585 A.2d 988, 990 (Pa. 1991)).
Section 4523 of the Vehicle Code, “Exhaust systems, mufflers and noise
control,” provides in part:
(a) Compliance with established sound levels.--Every motor
vehicle operated on a highway shall be constructed, equipped,
maintained and operated so as not to exceed the sound level for
the vehicle as prescribed in regulations promulgated by the
department. The test procedures and instrumentation to be
utilized shall also be established by regulation.
(b) Compliance with exhaust requirements.--In addition to
any requirements established under sections 4531 (relating to
emission control systems) and 4532 (relating to smoke control for
diesel-powered motor vehicles), every motor vehicle shall be
constructed, equipped, maintained and operated so as to prevent
engine exhaust gases from penetrating and collecting in any part
of the vehicle occupied by the driver or passengers.
(c) Mufflers and related equipment.--Every motor vehicle
shall be equipped with a muffler or other effective noise
suppressing system in good working order and in constant
operation and no muffler or exhaust system shall be equipped with
a cutout, bypass or similar device.
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(d) Unauthorized modification of equipment.--No person
shall modify the exhaust system of a motor vehicle in a manner
which will amplify or increase the noise emitted by the motor of
the vehicle above the maximum levels permitted under subsection
(a) or violate the provisions of subsection (b). Headers and side
exhausts are permitted provided the vehicle meets all the
requirements of this section.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4523(a)–(d).
The related regulations are found at 67 Pa. Code § 157.1 et seq.
Notably, the maximum permissible sound levels depend on the vehicle’s type,
speed, and location. 67 Pa. Code § 157.11(a). And although the regulations
authorize any police officer “to inspect, examine and test a motor vehicle,” an
officer needs specialized training to use the sound meters that are required to
determine a vehicle’s sound level. 67 Pa. Code §§ 157.21(a), (c), 157.31.
This Court addressed Section 4523 and the corresponding regulations in
Commonwealth v. Bailey, 947 A.2d 808 (Pa. Super. 2008). As here, Bailey
involved a traffic stop for a car with a loud exhaust system that led to an arrest
for DUI. There, we recognized that while officers need special training and
sound meters to prove sound violations beyond a reasonable doubt, they do
not need this training and equipment to initiate a traffic stop. Id. at 814.
Instead, officers may develop reasonable suspicion of sound violations based
on their experience and observations. Id. This reasonable suspicion justifies
a traffic stop for Section 4523. Id. at 812, 814 (citing 75 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 6308(b)); accord Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A.3d 987, 993 (Pa.
Super. 2015) (citing Bailey). We thus held that observations that a car’s
exhaust system was “extremely” or “unusually loud” and louder than other
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cars of the same make provided reasonable suspicion to stop for two Section
4523 violations. Bailey, 947 A.2d at 814–15 (citing 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4523(a)
(exceeding established sound levels) and (c) (muffler not in good working
order)).
Strickhouser invites us to recast Bailey. He urges that the real factual
basis to stop Bailey’s car was that the muffler was missing, not just loud. See
id. at 817–18 (Tamilia, J., dissenting) (reviewing the evidence to reason that
“the suspected noise violation [was] an ad hoc rationalization contrived to
justify an otherwise unwarranted traffic stop”). Furthermore, Strickhouser
challenges the holding that reasonable suspicion is a constitutionally sufficient
basis to stop to investigate a suspected offense for which the officer does not
have the training2 or equipment required to issue a citation. See
Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa. 2008) (allowing traffic
stops based on reasonable suspicion only for “investigatable” offenses).
We decline to diverge from Bailey. Importantly, this panel cannot
overrule another panel of the Superior Court. Commonwealth v. Beck, 78
A.3d 656, 659 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing Commonwealth v. Taylor, 649 A.2d
453, 455 (Pa. Super. 1994)). We are therefore bound by our holdings that
reasonable suspicion will support a traffic stop for a suspected violation of
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2 Trooper McHugh testified that he was trained to use a sound meter to
measure the sound level from an exhaust system. N.T., 9/21/21, at 11.
However, he did not know at the suppression hearing what the applicable
sound limit was, nor did he state that he had a sound meter. Id.-8-
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Section 4523, and that observations that exhaust is “extremely” or “unusually
loud” provide such reasonable suspicion.3
Our inquiry, then, is whether Trooper McHugh possessed reasonable
suspicion to stop Strickhouser for violating Section 4523. Strickhouser is
correct in asserting that not all amplification violates the Vehicle Code.
However, this illustrates why the traffic stop required reasonable suspicion—
further investigation would be needed to determine whether this amplification
exceeded the prescribed sound limits or otherwise made the exhaust system
not be in good working order. Bailey, 947 A.2d at 814–15. Here, Trooper
McHugh was trained about loud mufflers and modified exhaust systems. He
heard that Strickhouser’s exhaust system was “quite loud,” like the motor was
amplified through the exhaust. We conclude that these specific, articulable
facts led Trooper McHugh to reasonably suspect that Strickhouser was
violating Section 4523. This authorized Trooper McHugh to stop Strickhouser
and investigate further. Because Trooper McHugh had reasonable suspicion
to stop Strickhouser, Strickhouser’s second issue fails. Based on our
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3 Bailey was decided several months before Chase. Although Chase clarified
that some traffic stops require probable cause, we do not read it as an
intervening decision that allows us to revisit Bailey. We observe that the
regulations that require specialized training to use sound meters nonetheless
authorize “[a]ny police officer” to inspect and examine vehicles, which does
not require sound meters. 67 Pa. Code § 157.21(a). Therefore, an untrained
officer could still obtain useful information in an investigative detention. Cf.
Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 121 (Pa. 2008) (Saylor, J., concurring) (recognizing
that a driver might provide an inculpatory statement). Here, Trooper McHugh
could reasonably expect to elicit that the muffler was not in good working
order, which would not require further testing. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4523(c).
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resolution of this issue, and our precedent in Bailey, we need not decide
whether Trooper McHugh had probable cause to stop Strickhouser.
Consequently, his third issue also fails. Therefore, the suppression court
properly denied Strickhouser’s motion to suppress.
Affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/8/2023
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