Com. v. Masood, S. ( 2023 )

J-S16025-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
SAAD MASOOD :
:
Appellant : No. 268 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 19, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at MC-51-MD-0000174-2019
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
SAAD MASOOD :
:
Appellant : No. 1276 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 4, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at MC-51-MD-0000175-2019
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED MAY 12, 2023
For the second time, Saad Masood (Appellant) appeals from the
judgments of sentence imposed after the trial court found him guilty of two
counts of contempt.1
____________________________________________
142 Pa.C.S.A. § 4132(3) (“misbehavior of any person in the presence of the
court, thereby obstructing the administration of justice.”).
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The trial court explained:
On August 20, 2019, Appellant Saad Masood was found
guilty of two counts of direct criminal contempt for screaming
obscenities at the prosecutor in the hall during a recess in his
criminal trial, and for making obscene gestures to the prosecutor
in the courtroom during another recess in the trial. 2 He was
sentenced to a flat thirty days of incarceration on the conviction
involving the screamed obscenities (MC-51-MD-000174-2019),
and no further penalty was imposed on the conviction involving
the obscene gesture (MC-51-MD-000175-2019).
Trial Court Opinion, 4/28/22, at 1 (footnote added).
Appellant appealed. He argued the trial court violated his right to due
process by compelling him to incriminate himself during the contempt trial,
and claimed the trial court imposed an illegal sentence. On May 28, 2021,
this Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions, but vacated the judgments of
sentence and remanded for resentencing because “the trial court imposed a
thirty-day aggregate prison sentence for two counts of direct criminal
____________________________________________
2 The Commonwealth explained:
During a break in [Appellant’s] jury trial … the prosecutor
was walking down the hallway to another courtroom, and
[Appellant], who was also in the hallway, screamed at her for the
duration of this walk. [Appellant] called her “a fucking bitch, a
fucking whore” and told her to “go fuck yourself.” Numerous other
people in the hallway stopped the prosecutor and asked her what
was going on. During another recess in the jury trial, the court
saw [Appellant] make a gesture toward the side of the room where
the prosecutor was sitting. The court was later informed by court
staff that the gesture [Appellant] was making was a “double
middle finger gesture.”
Commonwealth Brief at 2 (citations to notes of testimony omitted).
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contempt, but failed to provide a minimum term of incarceration.”
Commonwealth v. Masood, 255 A.3d 1284 (Pa. Super. 2021) (unpublished
memorandum at *4). We directed the trial court to impose new sentences
that included minimum and maximum terms. Id. Appellant unsuccessfully
petitioned for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Masood 269 A.3d
1229 (Pa. 2021).
On January 19, 2022, the trial court resentenced Appellant to 15 - 30
days for the contempt conviction at MC-51-MD-000174-2019, with credit for
time served. “No action was taken on MC-51-MD-000175-2019.” Trial Court
Opinion, 4/28/22, at 1. Appellant filed timely notices of appeal at both
dockets.
On February 22, 2022, the court entered an order directing
Appellant to file a statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) within
21 days thereof.
Counsel for Appellant attempted to file the Rule 1925(b)
statement on March 21, 2022, and served a copy on the court.
However, due to issues with the e-filing system, the filing was not
placed on the docket. After several requests from the court, the
statement was finally filed on April 19, 2022.
On March 4, 2022, the Superior Court quashed the appeal
at MC-51-MD-000175-2019 (269 EDA 2022), without prejudice,
concluding that since this court did not resentence Appellant on
that conviction - for which he originally received no further penalty
- there was no judgment of sentence from which to appeal. The
Superior Court directed the trial court to resentence Appellant
within 30 days of the date of that order. The order was not
docketed in the Court of Common Pleas until April 18, 2022.
Id. at 2.
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On May 4, 2022, the trial court imposed a sentence of “no further
penalty” at MC-51-MD-000175-2019. By correspondence to this Court dated
May 31, 2022, the trial court stated it had “reimpose[ed] a sentence of no
further penalty, on remand of this and companion case MC-51-MD-174-2019
for resentencing.” Trial Court Letter, 5/31/22. The trial court further “advised
that the court adopts the April 28, 2022 opinion.” Id. On June 2, 2022, this
Court granted Appellant’s application to consolidate the appeals.
Appellant presents one question for review:
Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to protect [Appellant’s]
rights where the contempt proceedings violated due process?
Appellant’s Brief at 6.
Appellant argues his trial counsel “should have objected, requested a
judgment of acquittal, and filed a post-sentence motion after the judge
sentenced [Appellant] for the second count of criminal contempt.” Id. at 10.
Appellant claims “there was no admissible evidence” that he “made an
inappropriate hand gesture in the prosecutor’s direction.” Id. Appellant also
claims trial counsel “should have objected and moved for a mistrial after the
judge improperly questioned [Appellant], twice violating [Appellant’s] right
not to incriminate himself. Lastly, counsel should have objected and
requested a mistrial after [Appellant] was not arraigned and given notice
about the charges.” Id.
The Commonwealth argues that Appellant’s ineffectiveness issue is
“waived because he did not preserve it before the lower court, unreviewable
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because ineffective assistance claims are barred on direct appeal, and
meritless because [Appellant] cannot establish prejudice.” Commonwealth
Brief at 1. We agree.
As this Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions in his prior appeal, he may
only raise issues regarding his resentencing. Commonwealth v. McKeever,
947 A.2d 782, 786 (Pa. Super. 2008) (stating that the appellant’s “underlying
claims of trial error regarding his non-vacated convictions could not be
addressed on direct appeal from re-sentencing”).
In addition, issues not raised in the lower court cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Specifically, issues raised for the first
time in a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement are waived. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Chittester, 256 A.3d 43 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citations
omitted), appeal granted, order vacated on other grounds, 284 A.3d 450(Pa. 2022); cf. Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381, 405 (Pa. 2021)
(holding PCRA petitioner may raise claims of ineffective PCRA counsel at the
first opportunity, even if on appeal). Here, Appellant did not raise trial
counsel’s ineffectiveness until he filed his Rule 1925(b) statement in this
second appeal.
We also recognize that in general, ineffectiveness claims are deferred to
collateral review. See Commonwealth v. Delgros, 183 A.3d 352, 360 (Pa.
2018) (recognizing two exceptions to the general rule in 1) “extraordinary
circumstances where a discrete claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness is
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apparent from the record and meritorious to the extent that immediate
consideration best serves the interests of justice”; and 2) “on post-sentence
motions and direct appeal if there is good cause shown and the defendant
knowingly and expressly waives his entitlement to seek subsequent PCRA
review of his conviction and sentence.”). Neither exception applies to
Appellant’s claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.
As the trial court observed:
[Appellant’s] first mention of these allegations of ineffectiveness
came in the Rule 1925(b) statement.
Here, there were no post-sentence motions or other efforts
to raise claims of ineffectiveness or make a record as to the
claims, the claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel are not
apparent from the record nor readily identifiable as meritorious,
nor has there been an offer of a waiver of PCRA relief. Simply put,
there is no record upon which we could decide Appellant’s newly
raised claims of ineffectiveness.
The court is, of course, aware that the failure to review the
ineffectiveness claims at this stage will leave Appellant without a
means to have those claims reviewed, since he has completed his
sentence (NT, 1/19/22, 5), and therefore is ineligible for PCRA
relief. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(1)(i). However, the original sentence
was imposed nearly three years ago. At no time while that
sentence was on appeal, prior to sentencing on remand, or by
post-sentence motions after resentencing, did Appellant raise the
ineffectiveness claims, even though nothing was preventing him
from doing so. It also bears noting that Appellant was for this
entire time represented by counsel other than he whose
ineffectiveness Appellant now belatedly raises.
Accordingly, to the extent Appellant is left without a remedy,
it is due to his failure to raise his claims in a timely fashion.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/28/22, at 2-4.
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For the above reasons, we are precluded from further reviewing
Appellant’s challenge to the effectiveness of trial counsel.
Judgments of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/12/2023
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