Com. v. Price, R. ( 2023 )


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  • J-S18019-23
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    RICHARD A. PRICE                           :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 495 EDA 2022
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 3, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0008805-2018
    BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                                  FILED JUNE 30, 2023
    Appellant, Richard A. Price, appeals from the February 3, 2022 Order
    dismissing his first Petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
    (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46, as meritless. Appellant claims that his plea
    counsel provided ineffective assistance and, as a result, Appellant entered his
    guilty plea involuntarily and unknowingly. After careful review, we reverse and
    remand for further proceedings.
    The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. On December
    4, 2018, the Commonwealth filed a Criminal Complaint against Appellant
    charging him with 17 counts related to his sexual assault of a minor. Due to
    several factors, including delays in processing DNA evidence and the victim’s
    ____________________________________________
    *   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S18019-23
    failure to appear in court, there were numerous continuances granted for the
    trial. Once the DNA evidence was processed, there was insufficient data to
    determine if DNA material found in the victim’s underwear originated from
    Appellant, but he was not excluded as a contributor.
    On October 21, 2019, Appellant entered a guilty plea to one count of
    Indecent Assault of a Person Less than 16 Years Old and one count of Unlawful
    Contact with a Minor1 in exchange for which the Commonwealth nolle prossed
    the other charges. On the same day, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an
    aggregate term of 11½ to 23 months of imprisonment, followed by 3 years of
    probation. Appellant was immediately paroled, having already served 11½
    months. Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion or an appeal from his
    Judgment of Sentence.
    On March 5, 2020, the Commonwealth arrested Appellant for a
    probation violation. On March 13, 2020, the court (“VOP court”) held a hearing
    after which it found that Appellant had violated the term of his probation
    requiring that he attend drug treatment. The VOP court imposed a sentence
    of 11½ to 23 months of imprisonment, followed by 5 years of probation.
    On June 23, 2020, Appellant timely filed the instant PCRA petition pro
    se, claiming that his guilty plea was unlawfully induced because he was not
    informed of DNA evidence results that may have exonerated him. Petition,
    ____________________________________________
    1   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3126(a)(8), 6318(a)(1), respectively.
    -2-
    J-S18019-23
    6/23/20, at 2-3. The PCRA court appointed counsel who filed an Amended
    PCRA Petition developing Appellant’s argument that plea counsel had provided
    ineffective assistance that caused Appellant to enter an involuntary and
    unknowing plea. Amended Petition, 4/6/21, at 6. In particular, Appellant
    asserted that plea counsel failed to disclose the results of the DNA analysis
    and erroneously advised Appellant to opt for the plea and resulting immediate
    release rather than risk facing a “hanging judge.” Id. at 10.
    On November 1, 2021, the PCRA court provided notice of its intent to
    dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.2 Appellant did
    not respond. On January 12, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s
    petition without a hearing.
    This appeal followed. Both Appellant and the PCRA court have complied
    with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:
    1. Whether the [PCRA] court erred in not granting relief on the PCRA
    petition alleging counsel was ineffective[?]
    2. Whether [t]rial [c]ounsel’s assistance was ineffective for causing the
    Appellant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea[?]
    Appellant’s Br. at 7.
    ____________________________________________
    2 The lower court opined that the PCRA Petition was untimely filed before
    addressing the merits of the claims raised. See Notice of Intent to Dismiss
    pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, 1/12/2020, at 2. Our review indicates, however,
    that Appellant’s PCRA petition was timely filed on June 23, 2020, within one
    year of the date the judgment became final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).
    -3-
    J-S18019-23
    We review a PCRA court’s decision to deny a request for an evidentiary
    hearing for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Mason, 
    130 A.3d 601
    ,
    617 (Pa. 2015). Where a PCRA Petition raises “material disputes regarding the
    reasonableness of counsel’s actions, a hearing is required.” Commonwealth
    v. Reid, 
    99 A.3d 470
    , 501 n.26 (Pa. 2014); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 908(A)(2)
    (requiring a PCRA hearing “when the petition for post-conviction relief . . .
    raises material issues of fact”). Additionally, our Supreme Court has expressed
    a preference for an evidentiary hearing on counsel’s action or inaction where
    a petitioner has raised “a colorable claim” of ineffectiveness. Commonwealth
    v. Cousar, 
    154 A.3d 287
    , 299 (Pa. 2017).
    To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant
    must demonstrate that (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2)
    counsel’s performance lacked a reasonable basis; and (3) the ineffectiveness
    of counsel caused the appellant prejudice. Commonwealth v. Wah, 
    42 A.3d 335
    , 338 (Pa. Super. 2012). “[A]llegations of ineffectiveness in connection
    with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the
    ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing
    plea.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted). “Where the defendant enters his plea on the
    advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s
    advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
    cases.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    Appellant argues that plea counsel was ineffective because plea counsel
    failed to disclose DNA reports which could have exonerated Appellant.
    -4-
    J-S18019-23
    Appellant’s Br. at 13. Appellant claims that “had he been aware of the [DNA]
    reports, he never would have pled guilty.” Id. at 14. Additionally, Appellant
    asserts that plea counsel urged Appellant to take the plea so that Appellant
    could be immediately released, rather than face a “hanging judge,” further jail
    time, and additional continuances of the trial. Id. at 13-14.
    The PCRA court reasoned that Appellant’s ineffective assistance of
    counsel claim lacked merit because Appellant “stated at his guilty plea that he
    was very satisfied with his counsel” and indicated no deficiencies in either his
    written guilty plea colloquy or the oral colloquy. PCRA Ct. Op., 8/4/22, at 5-
    6. Further, the court reiterated that in exchange for Appellant’s guilty plea,
    the Commonwealth nolle prossed all remaining charges and Appellant was
    immediately paroled, indicating that plea counsel’s advice had a reasonable
    basis. Id. at 6. The PCRA court concluded that Appellant had not shown that
    “counsel’s advice was unreasonable or that he entered the plea unknowingly.”
    Id.
    After reviewing the record and case law, we conclude that Appellant
    presents a colorable claim of ineffectiveness and a material dispute regarding
    plea counsel’s actions. While it may be true that the actions of plea counsel
    resulted in immediate release from custody, Appellant indicates that he only
    opted for immediate release due to the uncertainty caused by the multiple
    continuances granted due to victim’s failure to appear in court and the delays
    in DNA processing. Id. at 13. Appellant “had been in jail for eleven months[,]
    . . . was sick due to his diabetes,” and took the plea on the advice of plea
    -5-
    J-S18019-23
    counsel to avoid further continuances. Id. Additionally, Appellant claims that
    while trial counsel informed Appellant that DNA reports were not available at
    the time of the guilty plea, the reports had in fact been completed months
    earlier. Id. at 14.
    Under these circumstances, the certified record and Appellant’s petition
    indicate an outstanding question of fact as to when Appellant and plea counsel
    learned of the DNA evidence and whether ineffective assistance of counsel
    prejudiced Appellant. To resolve these questions, the PCRA court must make
    a credibility determination weighing the evidence set forth in Appellant’s
    petition and related testimony, as well as plea counsel’s recollection of events.
    Since neither this Court nor the PCRA court could resolve these factual
    questions based on the information in the certified record alone, a hearing is
    necessary. We, therefore, reverse the PCRA court’s order dismissing
    Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of plea counsel, and remand to the
    PCRA court to hold an evidentiary hearing.
    Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/30/2023
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 495 EDA 2022

Judges: Dubow, J.

Filed Date: 6/30/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024