Com. v. Haitos, A. ( 2023 )


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  • J-S12033-23
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    AUSTIN PATRICK HAITOS                      :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1291 MDA 2022
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 11, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-38-CR-0000526-2017
    BEFORE:      KUNSELMAN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                                FILED: JUNE 6, 2023
    Appellant, Austin Patrick Haitos, appeals from the order of the Court of
    Common Pleas of Lebanon County (trial court) that denied his first petition
    filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1     After careful review, we
    affirm.
    On February 28, 2018, Appellant was convicted by a jury of involuntary
    deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI), sexual assault, and two counts of indecent
    assault. These convictions arose out of an incident that occurred in the early
    morning of January 1, 2017, following a New Years’ Eve party, when Appellant
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1   42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546.
    J-S12033-23
    put his penis in the mouth of a woman (Victim) while she was sleeping. The
    evidence at trial showed the following:
    [O]n December 31, 2016, [Victim’s] family held a New Year’s Eve
    party at the family house…, to which [Victim] and her four siblings
    had invited approximately forty to fifty friends. There was alcohol
    at the party and the house had been accommodated for the
    attendees to sleep over. While some attendees arrived earlier,
    most began to arrive between 9 P.M. and 9:30 P.M. [Victim]
    admitted that she had been drinking on the night of the party as
    well. [Victim] testified that attendees began to go to sleep or leave
    the party around 2:30 A.M.
    [Victim] went to sleep in the lower basement on a couch with a
    friend laying behind her. [Victim] then woke up and felt a penis
    being thrusted into her mouth. [Victim] did not see the face of the
    person who had inserted his penis into her mouth while she was
    asleep, but she saw his legs and she saw the person pull his pants
    up, turn around and begin rapidly walking away. [Victim] was able
    to identify the individual as Appellant from the unique outfit he
    was wearing the night of the party and from his unique gait.
    [Victim] has known Appellant most of her life and Appellant lived
    within walking distance of the family home. As Appellant was
    walking away, [Victim] called out after him to stop and come back,
    but Appellant continued to walk [a]way.
    *            *           *
    [One of the partygoers] testified at trial that he and Appellant
    were going to watch a movie at about 4 a.m. As he was setting
    up the movie, Appellant mentioned to him that [Victim] “looked
    hot” that night. Shortly thereafter, [the partygoer] excused
    himself to go to the restroom, and when he returned, Appellant
    was gone. Ten to fifteen minutes later, [the partygoer] heard
    [Victim] screaming and crying as she moved throughout the
    house. Appellant reentered the living room from the rear of the
    house mumbling about his coat and exited through the front door.
    [The partygoer] observed [Victim] as she went to the front door
    and yelled at Appellant.
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    J-S12033-23
    Commonwealth v. Haitos, No. 1788 MDA 2018, slip op. at 1-3 (Pa. Super.
    filed July 25, 2019) (unpublished memorandum) (citations and brackets
    omitted).
    Victim’s mother took Victim to a hospital, where the police were notified
    and Victim’s mouth was swabbed for evidence. Haitos, No. 1788 MDA 2018,
    slip op. at 2. Later that day, Appellant’s clothing was collected, and swabs
    were taken of Appellant’s genitals. Id.; N.T. Trial, 2/27/18, at 157-59. DNA
    testing was performed on the swabs from Victim’s mouth and Appellant’s
    genitals and on a cutting of Appellant’s underpants. N.T. Trial, 2/27/18, at
    195-200; Commonwealth Ex. 4. The testing did not find sufficient DNA other
    than Victim’s DNA on Victim’s swab to identify any person other than Victim
    as a contributor and did not find sufficient DNA other than Appellant’s DNA on
    the swabs of Appellant’s genitals and his underpants to identify any other
    person as a contributor.       N.T. Trial, 2/27/18, at 197-200, 203-04;
    Commonwealth Ex. 4.
    On June 13, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 4 to 10 years’
    imprisonment for the IDSI conviction and the other convictions merged with
    the IDSI conviction for sentencing purposes. Sentencing Order. Appellant
    filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied. Appellant timely
    appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in admitting testimony of a
    female partygoer, S.B., concerning a sexual advance by Appellant earlier on
    the night of the party, and that the verdict was against the weight of the
    -3-
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    evidence.   On July 25, 2019, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of
    sentence.   Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which the
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied on January 7, 2020.
    Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition on January 5, 2021, and on June
    9, 2021, filed an amended PCRA petition asserting eight claims for PCRA relief,
    including all of the claims that are the subject of this appeal. The trial court
    held hearings on this PCRA petition on December 6, 2021 and February 1,
    2022 at which Appellant’s trial counsel and Appellant testified. On August 11,
    2022, the trial court entered an order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition. Trial
    Court Order and Opinion, 8/11/22, at 1. This timely appeal followed.
    Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
    1. Whether the PCRA court committed error when it ruled that
    Appellant’s Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of
    Counsel was not violated by his trial attorney’s failure, during trial,
    to take the necessary steps to discredit [Victim]?
    2. Whether the PCRA court committed error when it ruled that
    Appellant’s Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of
    Counsel was not violated by his trial attorney’s failure to request
    a limiting instruction following [S.B.’s] testimony?
    3. Whether the PCRA court committed error when it ruled that
    Appellant’s Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of
    Counsel was not violated by his trial attorney’s failure to object
    and move for a mistrial after the Commonwealth’s closing
    statement?
    4. Whether the PCRA court committed error when it rejected
    Appellant’s claim that his Sixth Amendment Right to Effective
    Assistance of Counsel was violated by the cumulative effect of the
    attorney errors alleged in his PCRA Petition?
    Appellant’s Brief at 4-5 (suggested answers omitted).
    -4-
    J-S12033-23
    Our review of an order denying a PCRA petition is limited to determining
    whether the record supports the PCRA court’s findings and whether its decision
    is free of legal error.   Commonwealth v. Mason, 
    130 A.3d 601
    , 617 (Pa.
    2015); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    236 A.3d 63
    , 68 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en
    banc); Commonwealth v. Smith, 
    181 A.3d 1168
    , 1174 (Pa. Super. 2018).
    We must view the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record in a
    light most favorable to the prevailing party.      Mason, 130 A.3d at 617;
    Commonwealth v. Mojica, 
    242 A.3d 949
    , 953 (Pa. Super. 2020); Johnson,
    236 A.3d at 68. The PCRA court’s credibility determinations, if supported by
    the record, are binding on this Court. Mason, 130 A.3d at 617; Mojica, 242
    A.3d at 953, 956; Commonwealth v. Orlando, 
    156 A.3d 1274
    , 1280 (Pa.
    Super. 2017).
    All of Appellant’s issues are claims that trial counsel was ineffective. To
    be entitled to relief under the PCRA on a claim of ineffective assistance of
    counsel, the defendant must prove: (1) that the underlying claim is of
    arguable merit; (2) that counsel’s action or inaction had no reasonable basis
    designed to effectuate her client’s interest; and (3) that he suffered prejudice
    as a result of counsel’s action or inaction.       Mason, 130 A.3d at 618;
    Commonwealth v. Selenski, 
    228 A.3d 8
    , 15 (Pa. Super. 2020);
    Commonwealth v. Ligon, 
    206 A.3d 515
    , 519 (Pa. Super. 2019).                  The
    defendant must satisfy all three prongs of this test to obtain relief under the
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    J-S12033-23
    PCRA. Mason, 130 A.3d at 618; Commonwealth v. Burno, 
    94 A.3d 956
    ,
    972 (Pa. 2014); Smith, 
    181 A.3d at 1175
    .
    In his first issue, Appellant argues that his trial counsel’s cross-
    examination of Victim was inadequate in two respects. First, Appellant asserts
    that trial counsel was ineffective for failure to question Victim on whether she
    told a friend that Appellant had lured her into another room before assaulting
    her, which would be inconsistent with her testimony that Appellant assaulted
    her while she was sleeping on the couch next to her friend. The other claimed
    deficiency is that trial counsel allegedly failed to sufficiently cross-examine
    Victim concerning her intoxication. These arguments fail because the trial
    court found that trial counsel had a reasonable basis for her actions, Trial
    Court Order and Opinion, 8/11/22, at 5-6, and those findings are supported
    by the record and legally correct.
    Trial counsel testified at the PCRA hearing that she cross-examined
    Victim concerning her drinking at the party in order to show that her
    perception may have been impaired. N.T. PCRA, 12/6/21, at 14-15, 21. Trial
    counsel testified that she did not cross-examine Victim further because she
    elicited sufficient evidence from Victim concerning her drinking and because
    she concluded from Victim’s composure on the stand and her responses that
    continuing to cross-examine Victim would not produce any beneficial answers
    and that “it would have been dangerous to press her further.” Id. at 21, 31-
    33.
    -6-
    J-S12033-23
    The record from the trial supports the trial court’s conclusion that the
    decision not to cross-examine Victim further concerning her alcohol
    consumption was reasonable.     The trial transcript shows that trial counsel
    cross-examined Victim concerning both the amount of alcohol she had
    consumed and the drinking games in which she participated at the party. N.T.
    Trial, 2/27/18, at 46-58. In this cross-examination, Victim admitted that she
    was drinking for five hours and consumed several beers and at least four
    glasses of champagne sangria that contained both champagne and red wine.
    Id. at 47-50.    In addition, trial counsel cross-examined other witnesses
    concerning Victim’s drinking and level of inebriation, some of whom testified
    that Victim was significantly intoxicated. Id. at 79-80, 91, 108-10, 118, 126-
    27.
    The record also supports the trial court’s conclusion that there was a
    reasonable basis for trial counsel’s actions concerning Victim’s alleged prior
    inconsistent statement. While trial counsel did not ask Victim whether she
    had told a friend that Appellant had lured her into another room before
    assaulting her, she did bring this inconsistent statement into evidence in her
    cross-examination of the friend and used this inconsistency in her closing
    argument. N.T. Trial, 2/27/18, at 114-16; N.T. Trial, 2/28/18, at 22. The
    decision to question the friend on this statement, rather than Victim, was
    reasonable, since the claim that Victim made the inconsistent statement was
    based on a statement that the friend made to an investigator and trial counsel
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    J-S12033-23
    used the statement to the investigator to cross-examine the friend on this
    subject. N.T. Trial, 2/27/18, at 115-16.
    Appellant’s second issue concerns trial counsel’s actions with respect to
    the testimony of witness S.B. Prior to trial, the Commonwealth had sought to
    introduce evidence from several witnesses, including S.B., concerning
    instances of prior nonconsensual sexual touching by Appellant. Haitos, No.
    1788 MDA 2018, slip op. at 3 n.1; Commonwealth Notice to Introduce
    Evidence of Prior Bad Acts at 3-5.      Appellant’s trial counsel opposed the
    Commonwealth’s attempt to introduce any of this bad act evidence, and the
    trial court permitted the Commonwealth to introduce only S.B.’s bad act
    testimony.    Haitos, No. 1788 MDA 2018, slip op. at 3 n.1; N.T. PCRA,
    12/6/21, at 21-22.     Appellant’s counsel in his direct appeal argued that
    admission of S.B.’s bad act testimony was reversible error, but this Court held
    that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the
    Commonwealth to introduce this evidence under Pa.R.Crim.P. 404(b) for the
    purpose of showing Appellant’s state of mind, to prove that Appellant’s contact
    with Victim was for sexual gratification. Haitos, No. 1788 MDA 2018, slip op.
    at 4-9.   In this appeal, Appellant’s only claim on this subject is that trial
    counsel was ineffective because she did not request that the jury be given a
    limiting instruction concerning its consideration of S.B.’s testimony.
    This claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails for the same reason
    as Appellant’s first issue. The trial court found that trial counsel had a
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    reasonable basis for not requesting a limiting instruction. Trial Court Order
    and Opinion, 8/11/22, at 6-7. That determination, like its ruling on Appellant’s
    first issue, is supported by the record and legally correct.
    Trial counsel testified at the PCRA hearing that she made a strategic
    decision not to request a limiting instruction because S.B.’s testimony was
    very brief and a limiting instruction would have both highlighted it and made
    the testimony, which was relatively minor, more damaging.           N.T. PCRA,
    12/6/21, at 22. That judgment was reasonable. S.B.’s only testimony on this
    subject was indeed brief, consisting of less than three pages of the trial
    transcript, and was that Appellant put his hand on her thigh and stroked her
    thigh under her dress without her consent when she was sitting next to him
    during the party, that she got up and walked away, and that she “just thought
    [Appellant] was being a dumb drunk kid.” N.T. Trial, 2/27/18, at 130-31, 133.
    Where the testimony is brief and not extraordinarily harmful to the defendant,
    a decision to not request a limiting instruction to avoid calling additional
    attention to that testimony is a reasonable strategic choice that does not
    constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Commonwealth v. Solano, 
    129 A.3d 1156
    , 1178 (Pa. 2015); Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 
    811 A.2d 556
    ,
    561-62 (Pa. 2002). Moreover, the limited purpose for which S.B.’s testimony
    was admissible was to show that Appellant was acting for sexual gratification.
    Haitos, No. 1788 MDA 2018, slip op. at 8. Counsel could reasonably conclude
    that an instruction that focused the jury on viewing Appellant’s inappropriate
    -9-
    J-S12033-23
    touching of S.B. through the lens of sexual gratification could be more harmful
    than helpful to Appellant’s defense.
    Appellant’s   third   claim   of    error   concerns   statements   by   the
    Commonwealth in its closing argument about Appellant’s behavior when he
    was at the police station and the hospital on the day of the incident waiting
    for a swab of his genitals to be performed for DNA testing. At trial, the officer
    who was with Appellant testified that after he told Appellant that his genitals
    would be swabbed, Appellant repeatedly rubbed his genitals with his hand,
    both under and over the Tyvek suit he was wearing while awaiting the
    swabbing. N.T. Trial, 2/27/18, at 214-19. The officer testified that he asked
    Appellant what he was doing and that Appellant said that he “was adjusting
    himself” and that it was a nervous habit. Id. at 215, 217. The officer testified
    that he told Appellant to stop doing that because it made the officer
    uncomfortable, but that Appellant continued to periodically rub his genitals.
    Id. at 215-17. The Commonwealth in its closing argued that the jury could
    conclude from this evidence that Appellant was trying to destroy evidence by
    wiping Victim’s DNA off his genitals. N.T. Trial, 2/28/18, at 58-60. Appellant
    contends that trial counsel’s failure to object to these closing arguments
    constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We do not agree.
    It is proper for a prosecutor to summarize the admitted evidence, offer
    reasonable deductions and inferences from the evidence, provide fair rebuttal
    to defense arguments, and argue that the evidence establishes the
    - 10 -
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    defendant’s guilt. Burno, 94 A.3d at 974; Commonwealth v. Thomas, 
    54 A.3d 332
    , 338 (Pa. 2012); Commonwealth v. Riggle, 
    119 A.3d 1058
    , 1068
    (Pa. Super. 2015).       The Commonwealth’s argument here asserted a
    reasonable inference that the jury could draw from the evidence that Appellant
    repeatedly rubbed his genitals after he was told that they were going to be
    swabbed for DNA testing. In addition, this assertion was a fair response to
    Appellant’s counsel’s closing argument, as Appellant’s counsel asserted in her
    closing that the evidence of Appellant rubbing his genitals “has nothing to do
    with anything” and was brought out by the Commonwealth just to make
    Appellant look bad. N.T. Trial, 2/28/18, at 26. Because the Commonwealth’s
    closing argument was not improper, Appellant cannot satisfy the requirement
    that an objection to the closing argument would have had arguable merit, and
    trial counsel’s failure to object cannot constitute ineffective assistance of
    counsel.   Burno, 94 A.3d at 975-76; Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 
    165 A.3d 34
    , 42-44 (Pa. Super. 2017); Riggle, 
    119 A.3d at 1068
    .
    Appellant’s only remaining claim of error is that the cumulative effect of
    the above-described alleged deficiencies of trial counsel in her cross-
    examination of Victim, her failure to request a limiting instruction, and her
    failure to object to the Commonwealth’s closing argument deprived him of
    effective assistance of counsel. That is without merit. The cumulative effect
    of multiple actions or inactions of counsel may only be considered where those
    PCRA    claims   have   been   rejected   solely   due   to   lack   of   prejudice.
    - 11 -
    J-S12033-23
    Commonwealth v. Simpson, 
    112 A.3d 1194
    , 1205–06 (Pa. 2015);
    Commonwealth v. Koehler, 
    36 A.3d 121
    , 161 (Pa. 2012); Smith, 
    181 A.3d at 1187
    .    “[N]o number of failed ineffectiveness claims may collectively
    warrant relief if they fail to do so individually.” Simpson, 112 A.3d at 1205.
    Here, all of Appellant’s claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel failed for
    reasons other than lack of prejudice.
    For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court correctly held
    that Appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were without merit.
    Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s PCRA
    petition.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/06/2023
    - 12 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1291 MDA 2022

Judges: Colins, J.

Filed Date: 6/6/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024