Leslie, A. v. Public Health Mngmt. Corp. ( 2023 )

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2023 PA Super 142ANTOINE H. LESLIE, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF : PENNSYLVANIA
RENEE D. GILYARD, DECEASED :
:
:
v. :
:
:
PUBLIC HEALTH MANAGEMENT : No. 2267 EDA 2021
CORPORATION D/B/A WORDSWORTH :
ACADEMY, TURNING POINTS FOR :
CHILDREN,TURNING POINTS CUA 3, :
LLC, THE TURNING POINTS FOR :
CHILDREN CHARITABLE :
FOUNDATION, TURNING POINTS CUA :
9, LLC, DEBORAH CROSTON AND :
JOHN AND JANE DOE 1-10 :
Appeal from the Order Entered October 21, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): 210501900
ANTOINE H. LESLIE, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE : PENNSYLVANIA
OF RENEE D. GILYARD, DECEASED :
:
:
v. :
:
:
PUBLIC HEALTH MANAGEMENT : No. 662 EDA 2022
CORPORATION D/B/A :
WORDSWORTH ACADEMY, TURNING :
POINTS FOR CHILDREN, TURNING :
POINTS CUA 3, LLC, THE TURNING :
POINTS FOR CHILDREN CHARITABLE :
FOUNDATION, TURNING POINTS CUA :
9, LLC, DEBORAH CROSTON, AND :
JOHN AND JANE DOE 1-10 :
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Appeal from the Order Entered January 31, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): 210501900
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 28, 2023
These consolidated interlocutory appeals1 are taken from two discovery
orders entered by different judges of the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia presiding over the present wrongful death and survival action
brought on behalf of the estate of Renee D. Gilyard, a foster care parent
murdered by her then 17-year-old foster child, Xavier Johnson. After careful
review, we vacate the orders at issue and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this decision.
The pertinent facts and procedural history are that on May 21, 2021,
Antoine Leslie (“Administrator”), the son of Ms. Gilyard and administrator of
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 The grant of jurisdiction to this Court is codified in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 742 and
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 762(a). An interlocutory appeal may be taken as of right when
the order appealed from "is an order separable from and collateral to the main
cause of action where the right involved is too important to be denied review
and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final
judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost." Pa.R.A.P. 313(b).
Herein, this Court has jurisdiction to decide the present appeals because an
order requiring disclosure of allegedly privileged material or confidential
medical information is an appealable collateral order under Rule 313(b).
Pasquini v. Fairmount Behavioral Health System, 230 A.3d 1190, 1194
(Pa. Super. 2020); Buckman v. Verazin, 54 A.3d 956, 959 (Pa. Super.
2012); V.B.T. v. Family Services of Western Pennsylvania, 705 A.2d
1325, 1329 n.6 (Pa. Super. 1998), aff'd, 728 A.2d 953 (Pa. 1999).
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her estate brought this action against Defendants/Appellants,2 alleging in the
Complaint that the Turning Points Defendants were a foster family care agency
under contract with the Philadelphia Department of Human Services.
Complaint ¶¶ 14, 24-26. The Complaint alleged that the Turning Points
Defendants and Deborah Croston (collectively, “Defendants/Appellants”) and
the Doe defendants placed 17-year-old foster child, Xavier Johnson, with
foster care parent Renee Gilyard and that Johnson murdered Gilyard within
days after he was placed in her home. Id. ¶¶ 26, 28, 36, 42. The Complaint
alleged further that Defendants/Appellants and the Doe defendants knew at
the time of the placement that Johnson had history of violence and, therefore,
are liable in negligence for her death because they failed to disclose that
history of violence to Gilyard. Id. ¶¶ 37-39, 41, 50-55, 60-63.
Appellants/Defendants in their answer denied these allegations. Answer and
New Matter ¶¶ 37-39, 41, 50-55, 60-63.
Pursuant to the Administrator’s discovery requests, the trial court’s
discovery orders directed Defendants/Appellants to produce both Johnson’s
foster care case record and additional information that Defendants/Appellants
contend are also part of Johnson’s foster care case record. Specifically,
Defendants/Appellants argued that they are prohibited by law from disclosing
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2 Most of Defendants/Appellants’ briefs in these appeals list the Philadelphia
Parking Authority as a defendant-appellant in the caption. That is an error.
The Philadelphia Parking Authority is not a party to this case and is not in the
caption of either appeal.
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any of the requested records and information and that some of the documents
sought are protected medical and mental health records.
The first appeal (under 2267 EDA 2021) concerns the Administrator’s
service for production of documents on Defendants/Appellants on May 24,
2021, that requested that they produce complete copies of any records that
were in their possession prior to and during Johnson’s placement with Gilyard
“that contain any information concerning Xavier Johnson’s medical history,
mental health diagnosis, general behaviors, relationships between him and his
parents, educational history, life experiences, and previous and/or prospective
circumstances.” Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents (Set I),
Requests Nos. 1-2.3
Defendants/Appellants filed objections to these document requests,
asserting that the documents sought are protected from discovery by 55 Pa.
Code § 3130.44, the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 medical privacy regulations (HIPAA), and the Pennsylvania Mental
Health Procedures Act (MHPA). Turning Points Defendants’ Response to
Request for Production of Documents (Set I), Response to Requests Nos. 1-2.
The Administrator filed a motion to compel production of these
documents and Defendants/Appellants, in addition to filing an opposition to
the Administrator’s motion, filed a motion for a protective order seeking a
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3 Plaintiff had previously unsuccessfully sought similar documents in pre-
complaint discovery in an earlier action against the Turning Points Defendants
commenced by summons and the discovery was denied in those actions
without opinion.
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ruling that the requested documents were protected from discovery unless an
authorization to release the records was given by Johnson.
Defendants/Appellants asserted, in both their opposition to the
Administrator’s motion and their motion for a protective order, that those
records contain details related to Johnson’s juvenile court proceedings,
medical history, mental and behavioral health history, and foster care and
placement history, that 55 Pa. Code § 3130.44 and the Juvenile Act, 42
Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6375, prohibit disclosure of such documents, and that HIPAA
and the MHPA, 50 P.S. §§ 7101-7503 prohibit production of the medical
records and mental health and behavioral health records.
Defendants/Appellants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion
to Compel at 31-38; Defendants’/Appellants’ Motion for Protective Order ¶¶
6, 19-27.
On September 1, 2021, Johnson moved to quash a subpoena that had
been issued seeking production of his criminal lawyer’s files asserting, inter
alia, that his foster care case record was protected from discovery and that he
did not consent to its disclosure. Johnson Motion to Quash Subpoena ¶¶ 5-8.
On October 21, 2021, the trial court judge (Judge Sean F. Kennedy) entered
both an order denying Defendants/Appellants’ motion for a protective order
and an accompanying order granting the Administrator’s motion to compel
and directing the Turning Points Defendants to produce all documents
requested in the Administrator’s first set of document requests without any
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limitation concerning the types of documents and without any confidentiality
order as to any of the documents to be produced. Trial Court Order, 10/21/21.
Defendants/Appellants appealed the order granting the Administrator’s
motion to compel on November 3, 2021, at 2267 EDA 2021.
The second appeal (under 662 EDA 2021) concerns the Administrator’s
second and third sets of interrogatories and document requests served upon
Defendants/Appellants on October 25, 2021, just four days after the October
21, 2021, order that is the subject of the 2267 EDA 2021 appeal. The second
set interrogatories sought information concerning insurance coverage for the
claims in the Administrator’s action and the second set document requests
sought documents concerning such insurance coverage. Plaintiff’s
Interrogatories (Set II) at 4-6; Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents
(Set II) at 3. The third set interrogatories sought identification of witnesses
and information concerning witness statements and investigations of the
claims in the Administrator’s action, reports concerning Johnson’s behavior
prior to his placement with Gilyard, Defendants/Appellants’ factual
contentions, and evidence that Defendants/Appellants intended to use at trial.
Plaintiff’s Interrogatories (Set III) at 3-8. The third set document requests
sought only documents identified in their response to the third set
interrogatories. Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents (Set III) at 3.
Defendants/Appellants did not file responses to this discovery.
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On December 14, 2021, while the 2267 EDA 2021 appeal was pending,
the Administrator moved to compel answers in its second and third set
interrogatories and production of the documents requested by the second and
third set document requests. Defendants/Appellants did not object to
providing responses to the second set insurance interrogatories and document
requests, Defendants’/Appellants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Second Motion to
Compel at 4 n.4, but they opposed providing any answers or documents in
response to the third set interrogatories and document requests.
On January 31, 2022, the trial court (Judge Dennis B. Cohen) entered
an order granting the Administrator’s motion to compel and ordering
Defendants/Appellants to provide full and complete responses to the
Administrator’s third set interrogatories other than Interrogatories 12 and 14,
and to produce the documents requested by the third set document requests.
Trial Court Order, 1/31/22. Defendants/Appellants appealed this order on
February 25, 2022, at 662 EDA 2022.
"Generally, on review of an order concerning discovery, an appellate
court applies an abuse of discretion standard." Berkeyheiser v. A- Plus
Investigations, Inc., 936 A.2d 1117, 1125 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations
omitted)." To the extent that the question involves a pure issue of law, [the
Court's] scope ... of review [is] plenary." Id. "Whether an order is appealable
under Rule 313 is a question of law." Commonwealth v. Williams, 86 A.3d
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771, 781 (Pa. 2014). As such, the standard of review as to that issue is
plenary. Id.In their first appeal, Defendants/Appellants ask this Court to determine
whether the foster care case record is protected from disclosure in its entirety.
They argue that their records of Johnson’s medical history, mental health
diagnosis, general behaviors, relationships between him and his parents,
educational history, life experiences, and previous and/or prospective
circumstances are contained in his foster care case record and that Section
3130.44 of Pennsylvania’s children and youth social service regulations, 55
Pa. Code § 3130.44, governing the confidentiality of foster care case records,
and Section 6307 of the Juvenile Act prohibit disclosure of those records.
Section 3130.44 provides in relevant part:
(a) Information that may be used to identify the child or the
parents by name or address, and information contained in the
case record, is confidential. A staff person may not disclose
or make use of information concerning the child or the
parents other than in the course of the performance of his
duties.
(b) Federal authorities, the Commonwealth and the Department
or respective authorized agents officially charged with
administrative supervision, review, evaluation or audit
responsibilities may have access to and the right to use
information ….
(c) Members of the administrative review panels, volunteers,
another county agency and other providers of services to
children and families who are accepted for service by the
county agency may have access to and the right to use
information identifying recipients of children and youth
services. The amount and type of information to be
released shall be determined by the county agency and
shall be limited to information needed by the service
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provider to carry out its responsibilities. The decision to
release information shall be based on the county agency’s
assessment of the individual case record and the responsibilities
of a service provider. Information released may include part or all
of the case record.
(d) Information contained in case records shall be released upon
request to:
(1) Parents and legal guardians.
(2) Children’s and parents’ attorneys.
(3) The court and court staff.
(4) County executive officers.
(5) The child, if 14 years of age or older. The county agency may
withhold information from a child which it has reason to believe it
will be harmful to the child. The basis for withholding information
from a child shall be recorded in the child’s case record.
(e) Information in case records may not be released to a
person or agency other than those specified in subsections
(b)-(d) without prior authorization of the court.
(f) Information from a case record may be made available
only if the information released does not contain material
which violates the right to privacy of another individual or is
protected or made confidential by law. This may not be
construed to protect the right to privacy of a county agency
employe.
55 Pa. Code § 3130.44 (emphasis added). These confidentiality restrictions
apply to foster family care agencies. V.B.T. v. Family Services of Western
Pennsylvania, 705 A.2d 1325, 1333-34 n.13 (Pa. Super. 1998), aff'd, 728
A.2d 953 (Pa. 1999).
The Administrator argued and the trial court held that this regulation
does not prohibit the disclosure of Johnson’s foster care case record that the
trial court ordered because Gilyard was entitled, as a foster parent, to the
information that the document requests seek and her estate succeeds to her
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rights under the Survival Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8302. Section 3700.38 of
Pennsylvania’s foster family care agency regulations, provides that a foster
parent has a right to otherwise confidential information from the foster care
case record. 55 Pa. Code § 3700.38(c). The documents governing Gilyard’s
relationship with the Turning Point Defendants provided that she had a right
to receive information regarding her foster child’s “medical history, mental
health diagnosis, general behaviors, relationships between [him] and [his]
parents, educational history, life experiences, and previous and/or prospective
circumstances.” Turning Points for Children Resource Parent Rights and
Responsibilities ¶5. In addition, Section 3130.44 expressly permits disclosure
of foster care case record information to providers of services to foster
children. 55 Pa. Code § 3130.44(c). Under these provisions, Gilyard thus had
a right to receive information from Johnson’s foster care case record while he
was under her care. V.B.T, 705 A.2d at 1333-34 n.13.
These provisions, however, limit the disclosure to the situation where
the foster parent can use the information in providing care for the foster child
at the time of the disclosure. 55 Pa. Code § 3700.38(c) (“Foster families shall
be provided information from the case record which is necessary to protect
the child’s health and safety and to assist in the child’s successful
accomplishment of necessary educational, developmental or remedial
tasks”) (emphasis added); Turning Points for Children Resource Parent Rights
and Responsibilities ¶5 (providing that foster parent has a right to such
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information “to facilitate the care of the child”); 55 Pa. Code § 3130.44(c)
(“The amount and type of information to be released … shall be limited to
information needed by the service provider to carry out its responsibilities”).4
Disclosure to the Administrator does not satisfy these limitations because
Gilyard at the time of disclosure was no longer providing care to Johnson. This
is not merely a result of her death, as it would be equally true if she were alive
and was no longer providing foster care for Johnson.
Even if Administrator is not a person authorized to receive information,
however, that not does not mean that Section 3130.44 immunizes the foster
care case record from all discovery. Section 3130.44(e) expressly permits
disclosure of foster care case record information pursuant to court order
without restricting the parties to whom a court may order disclosure. 55 Pa.
Code § 3130.44(e) (“Information in case records may not be released to a
person or agency other than those specified in subsections (b)-(d) without
prior authorization of the court”) (emphasis added). Thus, it appears that
Section 3130.44 only limits Defendants/Appellants’ ability to disclose foster
care records without court order and is not a prohibition of court-ordered
disclosure or a complete privilege or protection against court-ordered
disclosure to a plaintiff in a personal injury action.
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4 Plaintiff argues that the foster parent is entitled to receive information to
decide whether to accept the placement. It appears from the language of 55
Pa. Code § 3700.38(c) and the resource parent document that the purpose of
providing the information is to improve the care of the child, not to benefit the
foster parent in deciding whether to accept the placement.
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Two Pennsylvania cases and one federal district court case have
considered whether foster care records are protected from discovery in a
personal injury action. See V.B.T., S.M. v. Children and Youth Services
of Delaware County, 686 A.2d 872 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996), and L.W. v.
Lackawanna County, 2015 WL 1499865 (M.D. Pa. 2015). None of these
cases resolves either of the above issues.
In V.B.T., 728 A.2d 953 (Pa. 1999) the Supreme Court affirmed by Per
Curiam order based on this Court’s opinion that records of a foster child who
allegedly injured the plaintiff were protected from discovery in a personal
injury suit against the foster family agency and the foster parents of the
assailant. V.B.T., 705 A.2d at 1331-37. The Court ruled that the plaintiff’s
need for the documents and information did not overcome the statutory
privileges that applied in that case because the disclosure that was sought did
not further the aims of the statutes involved. Id. at 1334-37.
The Court, however, did not hold or suggest that Section 3130.44 bars
discovery of foster care records. Rather, the records sought concerned the
assailant’s history of being a victim of abuse, and the privileges that the Court
held barred discovery were the Sexual Assault Counselor Privilege, 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 5945.1, the Protection from Abuse Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6117, the
Juvenile Act, and the Child Protective Services Law, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6385,
none of which had provisions permitting court-ordered disclosure without
limitation on the parties who may receive such disclosure. 705 A.2d at 1329-
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34 & nn.7, 9, & 12. The only mention of Section 3130.44 in V.B.T. consisted
of a citation to Section 3130.44(c) as authority for the proposition that foster
care agencies are required to disclose protected information to foster parents.
705 A.2d 1325, 1333-34 n.13. Moreover, the Court in V.B.T. made no
determination as to the scope of the documents and information that were
protected from discovery by the statutory privileges that it addressed. Id. at
1329, 1330-33 nn. 8, 11, & 13.
In S.M., the Commonwealth Court held that Section 3130.44 did not
protect a foster care case record from discovery in an action brought by the
foster child and his legal guardian and natural parents for injuries allegedly
inflicted by a former foster parent when he was in her home. S.M., 686 A.2d
at 873-76. The court held that Section 3130.44 did not prohibit the disclosure
that the plaintiffs in that case sought because the plaintiffs were parties who
were entitled to receive information from the foster care case record on
request under Section 3130.44(d). Id. at 875-76. A foster parent is not listed
in Section 3130.44(d) as a party entitled to receive information from a foster
care case record, and the right to receive information under Section
3130.44(d) is different from the provisions that permit a foster parent to
receive information, as Section 3130.44(d) requesters are entitled to the
information without limitation as to the need for or use of the information.
The S.M. court did not address whether or under what circumstances a
court has a right to order disclosure under Section 3130.44(e). The S.M. court
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also held that Section 6339(b) of the Child Protective Services Law, which
governs the confidentiality of child abuse reports, did not prohibit the
disclosure because the Child Protective Services Law gave the abused child a
right to receive the documents upon written request. Id. at 875.
In L.W., as in S.M., the foster child brought the action seeking
discovery, and the federal court held that the documents in question were not
protected from discovery because the plaintiff was statutorily entitled to the
documents upon written request. 2015 WL 1499865 at *2-*4. In addition,
the only privilege considered in L.W. was Section 6339(b) of the Child
Protective Services Law, not a claim that Section 3130.44 protected
documents or information from discovery, and the court only referenced
Section 3130.44 in passing as one of the bases for the decision in S.M. 2015
WL 1499865 at *2-*3 & n.1.
One federal district decision, Dreibelbis v. Young, 2007 WL 9761596(M.D. Pa. 2007), has considered whether Section 3130.44(e) permits court-
ordered discovery of records that are otherwise protected as confidential by
Section 3130.44. In Dreibelbis, a suit alleging that the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights were violated in a state child custody action, the court
denied discovery of case records on the ground that they were protected from
disclosure by Section 3130.44. 2007 WL 9761596 at *2. The court noted
that Section 3130.44(e) permits authorization of disclosure by court order and
stated that it “appears to create an exception for disclosure authorized by
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courts handling custody cases.” Id. at *1 n.3. The court concluded that
Section 3130.44(e) did not provide grounds to order the disclosure because
the case over which it was presiding was an ancillary action and not the
custody action itself. Id. at *1-*2 nn.3 and 5.
The Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301 et seq., also bears on the present
issue. Section 6307(a) of the Juvenile Act provides:
(a) General rule.--All files and records of the court in a
proceeding under this chapter are open to inspection only
by:
(1) The judges, officers and professional staff of the court.
(2) The parties to the proceeding and their counsel and
representatives, but the persons in this category shall not be
permitted to see reports revealing the names of confidential
sources of information contained in social reports, except at the
discretion of the court.
(3) A public or private agency or institution providing supervision
or having custody of the child under order of the court.
(4) A court and its probation and other officials or professional
staff and the attorney for the defendant for use in preparing a
presentence report in a criminal case in which the defendant is
convicted and who prior thereto had been a party to a proceeding
under this chapter.
(4.1) A court in determining custody, as provided in 23 Pa.C.S. §§
5328 (relating to factors to consider when awarding custody) and
5329.1 (relating to consideration of child abuse and involvement
with protective services).
(5) A judge or issuing authority for use in determining bail,
provided that such inspection is limited to orders of delinquency
adjudications and dispositions and petitions relating thereto,
orders resulting from disposition review hearings and histories of
bench warrants and escapes.
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(6) The Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts.
(6.1) The judges, officers and professional staff of courts of other
jurisdictions when necessary for the discharge of their official
duties.
(6.2) Officials of the Department of Corrections or a State
Correctional Institution or other penal institution to which an
individual who was previously adjudicated delinquent in a
proceeding under this chapter has been committed, but the
persons in this category shall not be permitted to see reports
revealing the names of confidential sources of information
contained in social reports, except at the discretion of the court.
(6.3) A parole board, court or county probation official in
considering an individual’s parole or in exercising supervision over
any individual who was previously adjudicated delinquent in a
proceeding under this chapter, but the persons in this category
shall not be permitted to see reports revealing the names of
confidential sources of information contained in social reports,
except at the discretion of the court.
(6.4) The board for use in completing assessments.
(6.5) The Department of Human Services for use in determining
whether an individual named as the perpetrator of an indicated
report of child abuse should be expunged from the Statewide
database.
(7) With leave of court, any other person or agency or
institution having a legitimate interest in the proceedings
or in the work of the unified judicial system.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6307(a) (emphasis added).
The only category of persons to which disclosure is permitted under
Section 6307(a) that arguably could encompass a plaintiff in a personal injury
suit is Subsection (a)(7), supra. This Court held in V.B.T. that Subsection
(a)(7) permits disclosure only to a person who has direct involvement in the
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juvenile court proceeding or dependency proceedings as to which disclosure
is sought and that a plaintiff in a personal injury case is not such a party and
is barred by the Juvenile Act from discovery of juvenile court and dependency
proceeding records. 705 A.2d at 1331.5 The trial court’s conclusion that foster
parents—and therefore Gilyard—are persons “having a legitimate interest in
the proceedings,” Trial Court Opinion, 10/13/22, at 9, is therefore error.
This does not, however, protect the entire foster care case record from
discovery. The Juvenile Act’s restriction on disclosure applies only to “files
and records of the court” in delinquency proceedings, dependency
proceedings, related proceedings involving other states, transfers from
criminal proceedings, and summary offense proceedings against a juvenile
relating to delinquency proceedings. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6303(a), 6307(a), (b).
Plaintiff’s request for documents concerning “medical history, mental health
diagnosis, general behaviors, relationships between [Johnson] and his
parents, educational history, life experiences, and previous and/or prospective
circumstances,” Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents (Set I),
Requests Nos. 1-2, plainly encompasses at least some documents in
Appellants’ possession that are not court files or court records. Indeed,
Appellants concede that the placement of a child in a foster home is not a
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5 Section 6307 of the Juvenile Act has been amended multiple times since
V.B.T. was decided. None of those amendments, however, changed the
language of Subsection (a)(7), see 705 A.2d at 1331 n.9, and none of the
additional categories of persons entitled to disclosure that have been added,
Subsections 4.1 and 6.1-6.5, have any possible applicability to Plaintiff.
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proceeding under the Juvenile Act and the Juvenile Act does not apply to all
the documents that Plaintiff sought. Appellants’ Brief at 39-40.
In addition, Section 6307(b) of the Juvenile Act, which was added by
amendment after V.B.T. in 2006, permits public disclosure of limited
information if the juvenile has been adjudicated delinquent for certain violent
criminal conduct committed when he was 14 or older. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6307(b).
If Johnson had any juvenile adjudications satisfying Section 6307(b)’s
requirements, the Juvenile Act would not bar disclosure of the “offenses
charged and the disposition of the case” and Johnson’s age at the time. 42
Pa.C.S. § 6307(b)(2).
To the extent, therefore, that the trial court ruled that Johnson’s entire
foster care case record is not protected from discovery, we agree. It remains
for us to examine, however, whether the trial court erred in ordering
production of all the requested documents and ordering such production
without any confidentiality order.
Defendants/Appellants argue that the trial court’s order is overbroad
because it required production of all documents and some of the documents
are protected from disclosure even if the foster care case record is not entirely
protected from discovery. Specifically, they maintain that even if the
Administrator has a right to information from the case record based on
Gilyard’s status as a foster parent and regardless of whether the court has the
power to order disclosure in a personal injury action under Section
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3130.44(e), Section 3130.44(f) permits disclosure “only if the information
released does not contain material which … is protected or made confidential
by law.” 55 Pa. Code § 3130.44(f). Production therefore cannot be ordered
as to documents that are protected by other privileges. As discussed above,
any court files or court records from delinquency or dependency proceedings
that are in Defendants/Appellants’ possession are protected from discovery
except to the limited extent of disclosures permitted by Section 6307(b) of
the Juvenile Act. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6307(a), (b); V.B.T, 705 A.2d at 1331.
Defendants/Appellants also argue that the foster care case record
contains documents protected by HIPAA and the MHPA.
Defendants/Appellants’ contention that HIPAA bars the trial court from
ordering production of medical information concerning Johnson is without
merit. The HIPAA provision on which Defendants/Appellants rely, 45 C.F.R. §
164.508(a), applies only to health plans, health care clearinghouses, and
health care providers. 45 C.F.R. § 164.103, 164.500(a). In addition, HIPAA
permits disclosure of medical information in litigation in response to a
subpoena or discovery request where notice has been given to the patient, as
long as a protective order is in place that prohibits the parties from using or
disclosing the health information for any purpose other than the litigation and
requires the return or destruction of all copies of the health information at the
end of the litigation. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(ii)-(v).
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It is possible that some of the documents ordered produced are
protected by the MHPA. The MHPA protects mental health treatment records
from disclosure and is not limited to patient communications. 50 P.S. §
7111(a); M.M. v. L.M., 55 A.3d 1167, 1174 (Pa. Super. 2012). The MPHA,
however, applies only to involuntary treatment and voluntary inpatient
treatment. 50 P.S. § 7103; M.M., 55 A.3d at 1174. There is nothing in the
record from which it can be determined whether Defendants/Appellants’ files
concerning Johnson contain records from involuntary mental health treatment
and voluntary inpatient mental health treatment.
In addition to requiring disclosure without regard to whether some
portions of Appellants’ documents are protected from disclosure by privileges
other than 55 Pa. Code § 3130.44, the trial court did not impose any
confidentiality order or restriction on the Administrator’s use of the
documents. While it does not appear that Defendants/Appellants specifically
requested a confidentiality order, the bases on which the discovery order can
be permissible under Section 3130.44 require that the production be subject
to a confidentiality order.
Gilyard was not a person entitled to information from the foster care
case record under Section 3130.44(d) regardless of the purpose for which it
was to be used, and her right to obtain case record information as a foster
parent was subject to an obligation of confidentiality. V.B.T, 705 A.2d at1333-34 n.13. Moreover, the overriding purpose of Section 3130.44 is to
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require that information from the foster care case record be treated as
confidential. 55 Pa. Code § 3130.44(a). The court’s authority under Section
3130.44(e) to order disclosure, therefore, should be construed in light of this
overriding confidentiality purpose and permit an order to produce documents
or information from the foster care case record only under an order keeping
those documents confidential.
Accordingly, in the first appeal (under 2267 EDA 2021), we vacate and
remand to the trial court, which shall exclude Johnson’s juvenile court records
of delinquency and dependency proceedings, except for limited public
disclosure permitted by Section 6307(b) of the Juvenile Act, exclude Johnson’s
involuntary mental health treatment and voluntary inpatient mental health
treatment records, and require entry of a confidentiality order prior to
disclosure.
In the second appeal (under 662 EDA 2022), the only claim of error that
Defendants/Appellants raise is that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter
its January 31, 2022, order requiring Defendants/Appellants to provide full
and complete responses to the Administrator’s third set interrogatories other
than Interrogatories 12 and 14 and to produce the documents requested by
the third set document requests.
Rule 1701 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:
(a) General rule.--Except as otherwise prescribed by these
rules, after an appeal is taken or review of a quasijudicial order
is sought, the trial court or other government unit may no
longer proceed further in the matter.
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* * *
(c) Limited to matters in dispute.--Where only a particular
item, claim, or assessment adjudged in the matter is
involved in an appeal, or in a petition for review proceeding
relating to a quasijudicial order, the appeal or petition for review
proceeding shall operate to prevent the trial court or other
government unit from proceeding further with only such
item, claim, or assessment, unless otherwise ordered by
the trial court or other government unit or by the appellate
court or a judge thereof as necessary to preserve the rights
of the appellant.
Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a), (c) (emphasis added). Accordingly, a collateral order
appeal divests the lower court of jurisdiction only as to the issue on appeal
and matters related to or intertwined with that issue. Commonwealth v.
McClure, 172 A.3d 668, 685, 698-99 (Pa. Super. 2017).
As discussed, the first appeal was a collateral order appeal involving
only the trial court’s October 21, 2021, order that Defendants/Appellants
produce documents “that contain any information concerning Xavier Johnson’s
medical history, mental health diagnosis, general behaviors, relationships
between him and his parents, educational history, life experiences, and
previous and/or prospective circumstances.” Trial Court Order, 10/21/21;
Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents (Set I), Requests Nos. 1-2.
The trial court did not enter any order staying the action.
The third set interrogatories and document requests that are the subject
of the trial court’s January 31, 2022, order do not request information or
documents concerning Johnson’s medical history, mental health diagnosis,
behaviors, relationships with parents, educational history, life experiences, or
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prospective circumstances. Rather, the interrogatories seek identification of
witnesses (Interrogatories 1-5), interviews and statements obtained
concerning the action (Interrogatories 6-7), information concerning
investigations conducted by Defendants/Appellants or others concerning
Johnson’s placement with Gilyard and Gilyard’s murder (Interrogatories 8-11),
information concerning statements of witnesses and parties (Interrogatory
13) and identification of admissions of a party and documents that
Defendants/Appellants intend to use at trial (Interrogatories 15 and 16).
Plaintiff’s Interrogatories (Set III) at 3-8. The document requests are limited
to the scope of these interrogatories, as they seek only documents that
Defendants/Appellants identify in their third set interrogatory answers.
Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents (Set III) at 3.
Defendants/Appellants argue that the discovery sought in the second
motion to compel involves the same privilege issues that are the subject of
the first appeal. Discovery that requests different information or documents
is closely intertwined with an appeal from a prior discovery order if it is subject
to the same privilege objection that is at issue in the pending appeal and the
issues as to the applicability of the privilege are the same. McClure, 172 A.3d
at 685. A court therefore lacks jurisdiction during the pendency of the appeal
to order further discovery that is subject to a privilege objection that is at
issue in a pending appeal if the issues as to the applicability of the privilege
are the same as in the appeal. Id.- 23 -
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Here, although the privilege that Defendants/Appellants asserted was
the same, whether it applied to the third set discovery involved additional,
different issues. In the first appeal, the discovery sought documents from
Defendants/Appellants’ foster care case record and the issue is whether
documents and information in the foster care case record are protected from
discovery. On the Administrator’s second motion to compel, the issues were
whether the third set discovery sought information and documents in the
foster care case record and, as to information and documents that are both in
the case record and available outside the case record, whether, assuming that
the case record is protected from discovery, the requested discovery was
within the scope of that protection. The trial court ordered the discovery, not
based on the privilege ruling that was on appeal, but on the ground that the
discovery did not seek information from the foster care case record. Trial
Court Opinion, 6/22/22, at 6.
That conclusion is largely correct with respect to Interrogatories 6-11
and 13, as they appear to primarily seek information created after Gilyard was
murdered and Johnson was no longer in the foster care system, and
Interrogatories 15 and 16, which seek information concerning admissions of
the Administrator and books and magazines that Appellants intend to
introduce at trial. Plaintiff’s Interrogatories (Set III) at 5-8. It is possible,
however, that some information that those interrogatories seek could pre-date
the murder and be in or from the case record. Interrogatories 1-5, concerning
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identification of witnesses, appear to encompass information that could be
obtained both from the case record and from other sources and the
information and documents sought by Interrogatories 2(c), and 3-5 are likely
to include confidential case record information, some of which may not be
available from sources outside the case record.
The mere fact that information available from non-privileged sources is
also in a file that is protected from discovery does not shield it from discovery.
Pasquini v. Fairmount Behavioral Health System, 230 A.3d 1190, 1197-
99 (Pa. Super. 2020) (MHPA did not apply to request for admission concerning
defendant’s knowledge of patient’s sex offender status even if that information
was in patient’s privileged file because that information was publicly available
information). But because the order required full responses, and some of the
interrogatories could include information that is only in the case record, the
order did compel discovery that involves the same issue as in the first appeal.
Although this problem could have been avoided by limiting the required
responses to information and documents not obtained from the case record,
and it appears that the Administrator and the trial court at the hearing may
have intended to so limit the order, N.T., 1/26/22, at 6, 11-12, 25, other than
excluding two interrogatories that clearly sought information from the foster
care case record, Interrogatories 12 and 14, the order that the trial court
entered had no such limitation. Trial Court Order, 1/31/22. On this record,
we determine that the trial court had jurisdiction to order some of this
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discovery, but the overlap between the discovery order and the issue in the
first appeal creates a jurisdictional issue.
Accordingly, in the second appeal (under 662 EDA) we vacate the order
and remand for further discovery proceedings to be conducted consistent with
this decision and without prejudice to Defendants/Appellants to raise
objections of admissibility. In this regard, Defendants/Appellants shall file
with the trial court a detailed list of what documents and information it
possesses and which among that list it considers privileged. At the conclusion
of such proceedings, the trial court shall enter an order permitting the
Administrator to obtain the information and documents to which he is entitled.
Orders vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this decision. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/28/2023
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