Com. v. Nawn, R. ( 2023 )

J-S10033-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RYAN DAVID NAWN :
:
Appellant : No. 1414 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 11, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Criminal Division at No: CP-09-CR-0005518-2020
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and STABILE, J.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JULY 27, 2023
Appellant, Ryan David Nawn appeals from the May 11, 2022 judgment
of sentence imposing an aggregate four to eight years of incarceration for
possession of a firearm by a prohibited person and possession of a firearm
without a license (18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105 and 6106). We affirm.
The trial court recited the pertinent facts in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
opinion:
On July 13, 2020, at approximately 6:45 a.m., Officer Bryan
Hearn (“Hearn”) of the Bensalem Township Police Department,
was dispatched to 3325 Street Road, Bensalem Township, Bucks
County, for a well-being check of a person passed out on a
motorcycle under an awning in the drive thru lane of the Police
and Fire Federal Credit Union (“PFFCU”). Upon arrival, Hearn
noticed the motorcycle did not have a license plate affixed to it.
Hearn made contact with the person on the motorcycle by waking
him and asking if he was okay. In the meantime, fellow Bensalem
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Township Police officer Pettine (“Pettine”)[1] arrived on the scene.
The person on the motorcycle indicated he had been at Parx
Casino and went under the awning to avoid heavy rain. Hearn
asked the person for identification, and was provided the driver’s
license of [Appellant]. Hearn ran [Appellant’s] name through
police dispatch, which determined he had an active warrant for his
arrest. As a result, Hearn and Pettine approached [Appellant]
from both sides of his motorcycle to arrest him. [Appellant]
attempted to start his motorcycle and flee the scene, but the
officers thwarted his attempt. [Appellant] then ran from the
officers. After a short foot chase, Hearn tackled [Appellant] and
arrested him. [Appellant] advised police he had a firearm in his
pocket which was then seized.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/29/22, at 1-2.
Appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence of the firearm,
arguing that he had been subjected to an unlawful detention prior to Hearns’
discovery of the outstanding arrest warrant. The trial court conducted a
hearing on April 18, 2022 and denied the motion. The parties proceeded to a
May 11, 2022 bench trial, at the conclusion of which the trial court found
Appellant guilty of the aforementioned charges. This timely appeal followed.
The only issue before us is whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s
motion to suppress the handgun seized incident to his arrest.
[O]ur standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial
court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
whether the factual findings are supported by the record and
whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.
We are bound by the suppression court’s factual findings so long
as they are supported by the record; our standard of review on
questions of law is de novo. Where, as here, the defendant is
appealing the ruling of the suppression court, we may consider
____________________________________________
1 Officer Pettine did not testify in this matter, and his first name is not of
record.
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only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the
evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted. Our scope
of review of suppression rulings includes only the suppression
hearing record and excludes evidence elicited at trial.
Commonwealth v. Singleton, 169 A.3d 79, 82 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 181 A.3d 1080 (Pa.
2018). The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect citizens against unreasonable
searches and seizures by law enforcement. U.S. CONST. amend IV; PA CONST.
art. I, § 8. A warrantless search and seizure is permissible in limited
circumstances. One of these is an investigative detention supported by
reasonable suspicion that the detainee is involved in criminal activity.
Commonwealth v. Adams, 205 A.3d 1195, 1199-1200 (Pa. 2019), cert.
denied, 140 S.Ct. 2703 (2020).
[A] brief investigatory detention is permissible only if the
police officer ‘observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot.’ In such circumstances, he or she may
briefly stop the suspicious person and make ‘reasonable inquiries’
aimed at confirming or dispelling his suspicions.
Id. at 1203 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 329 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)).
Appellant argues that he was subjected to an unlawful investigative
detention when he asked Hearn to return his driver’s license to him and Hearn
refused. Appellant argues Hearn had no reasonable suspicion in support of
detaining Appellant at that time. Appellant relies on Commonwealth v.
DeWitt, 608 A.2d 1030 (Pa. 1992), in which our Supreme Court affirmed the
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trial court’s suppression order (reversing this Court) where police investigated
a car, parked along a street in the opposite direction of traffic, with its interior
lights on but its exterior lights off. The defendant was arrested for illegal
drugs in plain view in the car. Our Supreme Court reasoned that the car could
have arrived at its location from an adjacent parking lot, rather than by
traveling opposite oncoming traffic. The officer’s belief that the vehicle might
have been disabled was not supported by the evidence. Because there was
no probable cause to suspect a vehicle code violation, police had no valid
reason for the vehicle stop. Id. at 1032-34.
Appellant also relies on Adams, wherein police were investigating a car
parked behind a closed business. The officer received no specific information
about the car and articulated only general concerns about the location of the
vehicle and the time of day. Adams, 205 A.3d at 1206. Citing DeWitt, our
Supreme Court explained that reasonable suspicion did not arise merely from
the location of the car and the time of night when the officer observed it. Id.
at 1206-07.
Appellant’s reliance on Adams and DeWitt is misplaced. Assuming for
purposes of argument that Appellant was not free to leave while Hearn had
Appellant’s driver’s license (the parties dispute this point), the encounter was
a lawful investigative detention supported by reasonable suspicion. The
Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code provides as follows:
(b) Authority of police officer. — Whenever a police officer
is engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers
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or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is occurring
or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal,
for the purpose of checking the vehicle’s registration, proof of
financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine
number or the driver’s license, or to secure such other information
as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce
the provisions of this title.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b). Where a vehicle stop allows the officer to gather
information relevant to a possible Motor Vehicle Code violation, the stop is
permissible under Terry and § 6308(b). Commonwealth v. Chase, 960A.2d 108 (Pa. 2008).
In this case, unlike DeWitt and Adams, Hearn had reason to
investigate a possible vehicle code violation because Hearn observed that
Appellant’s motorcycle had no visible registration plate attached to it. The
Motor Vehicle Code provides that “[e]very registration plate shall, at all
times, be securely fastened to the vehicle to which it is assigned or on which
its use is authorized in accordance with regulations promulgated by the
department.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1332(a) (emphasis added). Hearn testified
during the suppression hearing that he noticed the absence of a registration
plate as he first approached the motorcycle, before waking Appellant. N.T.
4/18/22, at 13, 25, 41. After waking Appellant, Hearn asked him for
identification and asked him if he had a registration plate for the motorcycle.
Id. at 15. At first, Appellant provided only his driver’s license. Id. Hearn
forwarded that information to the dispatcher and learned of Appellant’s
outstanding arrest warrant. Id. Hearn then approached Appellant again, at
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which point Appellant “handed” Hearn the motorcycle’s registration plate,
which had been stored somewhere on the bike but not affixed to it. Id. at 16.
Hearn placed the registration plate on the ground and asked Appellant to step
off the motorcycle. Id.
Because Hearn observed that Appellant did not have his registration
plate affixed to his motorcycle, as required by § 1332(a), Hearn had
reasonable suspicion to investigate under § 6308(b). And by the time
Appellant produced the missing license plate, Hearn was aware of the
outstanding arrest warrant. The encounter therefore proceeded from a lawful
investigative detention to a lawful arrest. The trial court did not err in denying
Appellant’s motion to suppress the handgun seized from Appellant’s pocket
pursuant to a lawful arrest.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/27/2023
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