In the Int. of: L.S.C.-P., Appeal of: H.C.-O. ( 2023 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: L.S.C.-P., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: H.C.-O., FATHER :
:
:
:
: No. 3135 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered November 22, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000074-2021
BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JUNE 15, 2023
Appellant, H.C.-O., (“Father”) appeals from the November 22, 2022
decree entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County that
terminated his parental rights to his dependent child, L.S.C.-P., a female child
born June 2019, (“the child”) pursuant to Section 2511 of the Adoption Act,
23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938. We affirm.
The record demonstrates that, on February 12, 2021, the Philadelphia
Department of Human Services - Children and Youth Division (“DHS”) filed a
petition for involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to
Sections 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b). DHS filed an amended
petition pursuant to the same provisions on March 23, 2022.1 Jason Ross
____________________________________________
1 Both the original and amended petitions requested termination of the
parental rights of R.D.P., the biological mother of the child, (“Mother”)
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Kleinman, Esquire (“Attorney Kleinman”) was appointed as guardian ad litem
to represent the legal and best interests of the child. Jay Steven Stillman,
Esquire (“Attorney Stillman”) was appointed to represent Father, and Michael
John Graves, Jr., Esquire (“Attorney Graves”) was appointed to represent
Mother. DHS was represented by Erin Maloney, Esquire (“Attorney Maloney”),
an attorney with the Philadelphia Solicitor’s Office. On August 9, 2022, and
November 22, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing on the termination
petition and the petition for goal change, in which the aforementioned counsel
participated.2 N.T., 11/22/22, at 5. Father attended both hearings.3
____________________________________________
pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b). On
November 22, 2022, in a separate decree, the trial court terminated Mother’s
parental rights to the child. Mother did not participate in the instant appeal.
2 An evidentiary hearing on the petition for involuntary termination of parental
rights was continued several times after the trial court determined that
continuances were “best suited to the protection and physical, mental[,] and
moral welfare of the child.” Trial Court Order, 5/11/21; see also Trial Court
Order, 8/11/21; Trial Court Order, 12/8/21; Trial Court Order 2/23/22.
A final continuance was granted on February 23, 2022, to afford DHS an
opportunity to file an amended petition for involuntary termination of parental
rights. The amended petition included averments that Mother’s and Father’s
last known addresses were the same residence, as well as a revised Exhibit A
(statement of facts). Compare Amended Petition for Involuntary Termination
of Parental Rights, 3/23/22, at ¶¶3-4, Exhibit A, with Petition for Involuntary
Termination of Parental Rights, 2/12/21, at ¶¶3-4, Exhibit A.
3 The record reveals that Mother joined the August 9, 2022 hearing after it
began, N.T., 8/9/22, at 30, and left the proceeding before it concluded, Id. at
89. Mother did not attend the November 22, 2022 hearing. N.T., 11/22/22,
at 3-5.
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On November 22, 2022, the trial court found that DHS met its burden
of proof under Sections 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b) of the
Adoption Act, and subsequently terminated Father’s parental rights to the
child. The trial court also granted DHS’s request to change the permanent
placement goal to one of adoption with regard to the child. This appeal
followed.4
Father raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred in terminating [Father’s]
parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§ ]2511(a)(1), the
evidence having been insufficient to establish [Father]
evidenced a settled purpose of [relinquishing his] parental
claim, or having refused or failed to perform parental
duties[?]
2. Whether the [] evidence was sufficient to establish that
[Father] refused or failed to perform parental duties, caused
[the child] to be without essential parental care, that
conditions having led to placement [] continued to exist, or
finally that any of above could not have been remedied
[]under [] 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§§ ]2511(a)(2), 2511(a)(5), and
2511(a)(8)[?]
3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
and welfare of the [child] under 23 Pa.C.S.[A. § ]2511(b)[?]
4. Moreover, under [S]ections 2511(a)(1), 2511(a)(2),
2511(a)(5), 2511(a)(8), and 2511(b), whether the
termination of [Father’s] parental rights pursuant to the
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4 Father filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant
to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a)(2)(i), along with his
notice of appeal on December 14, 2022. The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a)
opinion on January 11, 2023.
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aforemention[ed] is contrary to the [] weight of the
evidence[?]
Father’s Brief at 5 (extraneous capitalization and footnote omitted).
Father’s issues, in toto, challenge the trial court’s termination of his
parental rights pursuant to Section 2511 of the Adoption Act. In matters
involving termination of parental rights, our standard of review is well-settled.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa.
2012). “If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts
review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or
abused its discretion.” Id. “A decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill[-]will.” Id.The trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result. Id. at 827.
We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that
often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning
multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa.
2010)].
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (original brackets omitted). “[T]he
trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and
is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in
the evidence.” In re Q.R.D., 214 A.3d 233, 239 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation
omitted). “If competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will
affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result.” In re B.J.Z.,
207 A.3d 914, 921 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).
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The termination of parental rights is guided by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis of the grounds for
termination followed by an assessment of the needs and welfare of the child.
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the [trial]
court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating
parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent.
The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds
for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the [trial]
court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination
of his or her parental rights does the [trial] court engage in the
second part of the analysis pursuant to Section
2511(b)[ - ]determination of the needs and welfare of the child
under the standard of best interests of the child. One major
aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and
status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close
attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing
any such bond.
B.J.Z., 207 A.3d at 921 (citation omitted). We have defined clear and
convincing evidence as that which is “so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing
as to enable the trier[-]of[-]fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d
1108, 1116 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted). A child has a right to a
stable, safe, and healthy environment in which to grow, and the “child's life
simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the
ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 9
(Pa. Super. 2009).
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Here, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to the child
pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8). Section 2511(a)
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule. - The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least
six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition
either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform
parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect[,] or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control[,] or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect[,] or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
...
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency
for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led
to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist,
the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within
a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance
reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy
the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
child within a reasonable period of time[,] and termination
of the parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.
...
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of
removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
removal or placement of the child continue to exist[,] and
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termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
and welfare of the child.
23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5) and (a)(8).
Once the trial court determines that involuntary termination of parental
rights is warranted under Section 2511(a), the trial court is required to engage
in an analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b) to determine whether termination
is in the best interests of the child. Section 2511(b) states,
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
...
(b) Other considerations. - The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the
basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing[,] and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving
of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). The analysis under Section 2511(b)
focuses on whether termination of parental rights would best
serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
welfare of the child. As this Court has explained, [Section]
2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and the
term “bond” is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law,
however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any,
between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of
our analysis. While a parent's emotional bond with his or her child
is a major aspect of the [Section] 2511(b) best-interest analysis,
it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
[trial] court when determining what is in the best interest of the
child.
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In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally
emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also
consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security,
and stability the child might have with the foster parent.
Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court should
consider the importance of continuity of relationships and
whether any existing parent-child bond can be severed
without detrimental effects on the child.
In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 943-944 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation
and original brackets omitted), appeal denied, 183 A.3d 979 (Pa. 2018). A
trial court may rely on a caseworker or social worker to determine the status
of and nature of a parent-child bond. J.N.M., 177 A.3d at 944 (holding, a trial
court “is not required by statute or precedent to order a formal bonding
evaluation be performed by an expert” (citation omitted)); see also In re
C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005) (holding, a trial court must
“discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention
to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond” (citation
omitted)).
It is well-established that this Court need only agree with the trial court
as to any one section of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in order
to affirm an order or decree involuntarily terminating parental rights. C.D.R.,
111 A.3d at 1215, relying on In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380 (Pa. Super. 2004)
(en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Our review of the
certified record confirms that DHS introduced clear and convincing evidence
in support of termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b).
To terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1) the
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child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or more
from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to the
removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3)
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8). Section
2511(a)(8) sets a 12-month time frame for a parent to remedy
the conditions that led to the children's removal by the [trial]
court. Once the 12-month period has been established, the [trial]
court must next determine whether the conditions that led to the
child's removal continue to exist, despite the reasonable good
faith efforts of [DHS] supplied over a realistic time period.
Termination under Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the [trial]
court to evaluate a parent's current willingness or ability to
remedy the conditions that initially caused placement or the
availability or efficacy of [DHS] services.
In re C.B., 230 A.3d 341, 348 (Pa. Super. 2020) (case citations, quotation
marks and original brackets omitted), appeal denied, 234 A.3d 410 (Pa.
2020). “Under Section 2511(a)(8), in determining whether the conditions that
led to removal and placement continue to exist, the relevant inquiry in this
regard is whether the conditions that led to removal have been remedied
and[,] thus[,] whether reunification of parent and child is imminent at the
time of the hearing.” C.B., 230 A.3d at 348-349 (citation, original quotation
marks, and original brackets omitted).
With respect to the “needs and welfare” analysis pertinent to
Sections 2511(a)(8) and (b), we have observed:
Initially, the focus in terminating parental rights is on the
parent, under Section 2511(a), whereas the focus in Section
2511(b) is on the child. However, Section 2511(a)(8)
explicitly requires an evaluation of the “needs and welfare
of the child” prior to proceeding to Section 2511(b), which
focuses on the “developmental, physical[,] and emotional
needs and welfare of the child.” Thus, the analysis under
Section 2511(a)(8) accounts for the needs of the child in
addition to the behavior of the parent. Moreover, only if a
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[trial] court determines that the parent's conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights, pursuant to Section
2511(a), does a [trial] court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of
the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of
best interests of the child. Accordingly, while both Section
2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b) direct us to evaluate the
“needs and welfare of the child,” we are required to resolve
the analysis relative to Section 2511(a)(8), prior to
addressing the “needs and welfare” of the child, as
proscribed by Section 2511(b); as such, they are distinct in
that we must address Section 2511(a) before reaching
Section 2511(b).
Id. at 349 (citation, original brackets, and some quotation marks omitted).
In the case sub judice, the trial court explained its reasons for
terminating Father’s parental rights to the child pursuant to Sections
2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b) as follows:5
By way of background, [the child] has been in care for 40 months.
The termination petition in this case was filed in February []
202[1], and an amended [termination petition was filed] in March
[] 2022. . . .
With regards to [Section] 2511(a)(1), [i]n the six months
preceding the filing of [the termination] petition, the [trial] court
[found] that both [Mother and Father] failed to perform parental
duties. Prior to commencing Family School[6] in February [] 2022,
[Mother and Father] did not have in-person visits with the child,
did not make inquiries into the child’s well-being, did not meet any
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5 Although our decision to affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights
rests upon Section 2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b), we shall incorporate the
entirety of the trial court’s findings pertaining to all of the provisions in Section
2511(a) because of the substantial overlap between these statutory provisions
and the elements of Section 2511(a)(8).
6 “Family School” is a learning environment in which a parent is observed
interacting with his or her child while a coach is present to give instruction to
the parent on how to care for the child. N.T., 8/9/22, at 52-53.
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of the child’s daily needs, did not make any attempts to do so,
and[,] in fact, failed to perform parental duties, and that was
established by clear and convincing evidence by the witnesses
presented by [DHS.]
With regard to [Section] 2511(a)(2), [w]ith regard to [Mother,]
this case [arose] because of [Mother’s] drug and alcohol issues.
[Mother] has made no attempts throughout [] this case to avail
herself of the necessary measures to alleviate the drug and alcohol
concerns.
With regard to [Father], the [trial] court understands [Father’s]
arguments regarding the evidence. [Father’s] counsel[ is] correct
that [Exhibit] DHS 7 [is comprised of] still photo[graphs] of video.
Regardless of the dates of the video [and the still photographs
marked as Exhibit] DHS 7, there is no contradiction that [Mother]
is depicted in the photo[graphs,] which are taken this year, after
May [] 2022, and throughout the summer, showing [Mother] in
the vicinity of [Father’s] home.
Furthermore, there was clear and convincing testimony by
witnesses that, during two pop-up visits at [Father’s] home,
[Mother’s] coat and hat, which she has been [observed] wearing
in court – and it was a distinctive [style] of hat that she has
[worn] – were present in [Father’s] home.
On another occasion, it was believed that [Mother] may have been
in the bathroom of [Father’s] home [during a pop-up visit]. The
[trial] court did not find [Father’s] testimony credible as to the
explanation of the person [in the bathroom of his home] or the
objects [observed] in his home.
In addition, there was testimony that witnesses saw [Mother]
waiting outside the courthouse on dates of different hearings.
Father’s counsel questioned why on earth would he do this
because he has a daughter. It would not be shocking to the [trial]
court [if Father] still [harbored] feelings for [Mother.]
So, despite the creative arguments made by [Father’s] counsel,
the [trial] court finds that [Father] has not demonstrated an ability
to care for [the] child. Father has not progressed beyond Family
School.
In the document introduced by [Father’s] counsel as Father’s
Exhibit 8, it is indicated that [Father] has made some progress[.
Nevertheless,] it was reported by [Father’s Family School] teacher
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that [Father requires] prompting when it comes to managing
undesirable behaviors [of the child], using positive strategies
toward discipline, during the sessions.
Father has not completed Family School successfully, and has not
demonstrated an ability to extend beyond the supervised Family
School setting. That does not mean that [the trial] court thinks
[Father] poses a specific safety threat to [the child].
But [Father] has not [demonstrated], through his counsel or by
any evidence, that he has the ability to care for [the child] and to
keep [the child] safe.
With regard to [Section] 2511(a)(5), [i]t has been 40 months.
Virtually the entire life of [the child], she has been in care.
[Mother and Father] have been afforded more than a reasonable
amount of time to demonstrate their ability to care for the child.
Again, this does not mean that [Father] does not love his child,
but this child has been in care for well more than six months. It
has been 40 months.
And despite the arguments by [Father’s] counsel, it is [the trial]
court’s job to do, at all times, what is in the best interest of the
child, and [the trial court hopes] that [Father] can realize that.
We need to prioritize what is best for [the child] – what would be
best for her to have permanency, and not to languish in the court
system, in a dependency proceeding.
40 months. [T]hat is more than three years. This is one of the
longest cases that [has remained] open with a child. [Mother and
Father] have been afforded every opportunity. [The trial court
does] not fault [Father] for [Mother’s] addictions, but [Father] has
not demonstrated an ability to care for [the child] independently.
If [Father] had availed himself sooner to take additional steps, we
might not be here, but for whatever reasons, that has not
happened and there were safety threats.
With regard to [Section] 2511(a)(8), [a]gain, it has been
40 months. [DHS] met its burden by clear and convincing
evidence as to this element as well, that more than 12
months [] elapsed since the removal of the child.
The conditions which led to the removal, which related to
[Mother’s] drug and alcohol usage, have not been
alleviated, and [Father] has not independently
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demonstrated an ability to care for this child, and has not
progressed beyond [] supervised Family School visits with
the child.
And termination would allow this child to be freed for
adoption and to have permanency in her life, which is in the
child’s best interest. Father’s counsel is correct that [DHS]
met its burden under [Section] 2511(a), as well as
[Section] 2511(b), and [DHS] has done so by clear and
convincing evidence.
[Section] 2511(b) relates to the parent-child bond. . . .
Father has a relationship with the child. The child knows
who her father is, but does not look to [this bond as a
parent-child] relationship. [The child] does not look to
[Father] to meet [] her daily needs or her emotional needs.
[The child] does not look to [Father] to [meet her] needs[,
as in a typical] parent-child relationship. Simply knowing
her father and enjoying time together does not establish
the existence of a parent-child bond. For these reasons,
[DHS] has met its burden of proof.
...
With regards to [DHS’s] request to change the goal, [DHS] met
its burden to show that it would be in the child’s best interest to
change the goal to adoption. This child has been in a loving home
since – virtually all of [her] life.
The child[ has] been provided with appropriate interactions in this
home, and with the love and care that a child looks to a parent to
meet for all of this child’s life, and the 40 months that the child
has been in care.
N.T., 11/22/22, at 110-117 (emphasis added; extraneous capitalization
omitted).
A review of the record demonstrates that the child was placed in the
care and custody of DHS upon her discharge from the hospital in July 2019
because the child tested positive for illegal substances at birth due to Mother’s
illegal drug use during pregnancy. N.T., 8/9/22, at 11. The child was not
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placed with Father because he still maintained contact with Mother and there
was a concern that Mother was still abusing drugs. Id. at 31. The child
continued to be in placement when DHS filed a petition for involuntary
termination of parental rights on February 12, 2021. Thus, at the time the
termination petition was filed, the child had been removed from Father’s
parental care for more than 12 months. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8); see also
C.B., 230 A.3d at 348.
In addition to concerns about Mother’s continued substance abuse and
Father’s continued contact with Mother, other factors which necessitated
placement included mental health issues, lack of parenting skills, and social
isolation and limited social and family support. See Exhibit DHS 3 (Initial CUA
Single Case Plan, 8/12/19, at 7). With a goal of reunification, Father’s single
case plan objectives included, inter alia, participating in supervised visits,
attending and completing Family School, providing proof of housing and
employment, and having no contact with Mother. Id. at 9; see also N.T.,
8/9/22, at 29. The trial court ordered DHS vis-à-vis its community umbrella
agency,7 to conduct weekly “pop-up” visits of Father’s residence to ensure
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7 A “community umbrella agency” (“CUA”) is described as:
community-based agencies that are responsible for the provision
of direct case management services to families in their designated
region. The CUAs ensure that local solutions and resources are
more accessible to children and families. They develop
connections to formal and informal neighborhood networks that
can strengthen and stabilize families. In addition, they are
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that Father is not in contact with Mother. Trial Court Order, 8/21/19; see
also Trial Court Order, 10/23/19; Trial Court Order, 8/11/19; Trial Court
Order, 12/8/21; Trial Court Order, 2/23/22; N.T., 8/9/22, at 31-33.
A CUA case manager testified that Father started Family School on
February 16, 2022, but as of the August 9, 2022 termination hearing, has not
completed Family School. N.T., 8/9/22, at 42. The case manager further
stated that, while Father’s home is appropriate for reunification, the child has
not been returned to Father because of continuing concerns Father still
maintains contact with Mother. Id. at 43. The case manager explained that
Father has not provided information regarding plans for the child’s care while
he would be at work, i.e. daycare, if reunification occurred, and the case
manager believes the child would be left with Mother while Father is at work.
Id. When asked how the case manager would “rate” Father’s compliance with
meeting the objectives of his single care plan, the case manager responded,
“substantial” but agreed that “the barrier to reunification would be [Father’s]
ongoing contact with [Mother.]” Id. at 44.
The case manager observed that, “[d]uring one pop-up visit [to Father’s
residence], there was a jacket and hat on [Father’s] couch, and someone
possibly hiding in a bathroom.” Id. at 37. During a subsequent visit with
____________________________________________
responsible for recruitment and retention of foster and adoptive
parents in the neighborhoods where children live.
https://bethanna.org/about/community-umbrella-agency/ (last visited
6/6/23).
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Mother, the case manager observed Mother “in the same hat that [the case
manager previously] saw on [Father’s] couch.” Id. During another pop-up
visit to Father’s residence, the case manager observed Mother and Father
enter Father’s house and when the case manager knocked on the door of
Father’s house immediately thereafter, no one answered the door. Id. The
notes contained in DHS’s supervisory conference logs,8 as well as several
photographs depicting, inter alia, Mother entering Father’s residence, confirm
that Father continues to maintain contact with Mother. See Supervisory
Conference Log, 9/25/19 (stating, “[o]n one pop-up visit[, Mother] was at
[Father’s] home but [Father] was not there”); see also Supervisory
Conference Log, 11/25/19 (noting that, “[r]eports have been made that [the
kinship parent observed Father] dropping [Mother off] to appointments”);
Supervisory Conference Log, 4/17/20 (stating, “[kinship parent reported
Mother and Father] are living together again along with [Mother’s] son, his
girlfriend, and their child”); Supervisory Conference Log, 7/16/20 (stating,
“[Mother’s son] has written a letter and sent pictures requesting that [the
child] not be able to return home to her [biological] parents. [Son] believes
the [biological] parents are not fit and will not be able to care for [the child]
if she were to go back home. Mother is now living with [Father] at his
home.”); Supervisory Conference Log, 11/20/20 (stating, “[t]here is a
____________________________________________
8The supervisory conference logs were admitted, collectively, as Exhibit DHS
4. N.T., 8/9/22, at 16.
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concern that [Mother] is still residing with [Father]”); Supervisory Conference
Log, 3/17/21 (stating, “Mother is still staying with [Father] at his home even
though both have denied it. Mother was recently seen at [Father’s] home and
said she recently just stopped by.”); Supervisory Conference Log, 8/24/21
(stating, “Mother is still believed to be staying with [Father] even though she
is not supposed to. [Father] still claims [Mother] does not live with him and
[that she] has no access [to his residence]. Father was told to change his
locks if [Mother] has a key.”); Exhibit DHS 7; N.T., 8/9/22, at 76-81.
Father testified that Mother’s son, the son’s girlfriend, and their child
lived with Father as recently as 18 months ago, which would be February
2021. N.T., 8/9/22, at 88-89. Father conceded that Mother came to visit the
son at Father’s residence and would sometimes stay overnight. Id. Father
stated that Mother’s son had a key to the residence but that Father ultimately
made the son, his girlfriend, and their child leave the residence. Id. at 92-93.
Father further conceded that Exhibit DHS 7 is comprised of several
photographs showing Mother entering Father’s residence, but Father states
that he was not home at the time, which suggests that Mother retained
independent access to Father’s residence. Id. at 96. The photographs which
comprise Exhibit DHS 7 were captured on July 7, 2022. See Exhibit DHS 7.
Upon review, we concur with the trial court, and the record supports,
that the conditions which led to the removal and placement of the child
continued to exist despite the reasonable good faith efforts by DHS. 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8); see also C.B., 230 A.3d at 348. Father was required
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to attend and complete Family School in order to develop parenting skills. As
the trial court noted, as of the November 22, 2022 termination hearing, Father
still attended Family School and had not progressed beyond supervised visits
with the child. N.T., 11/22/22, at 116. Moreover, as part of Father’s
reunification objectives, he was ordered to have no further contact with
Mother. Despite this requirement, Father permitted Mother’s son, and his
family, to reside at Father’s residence, which, in turn, involved Mother having
continued contact with Father. Photographs depict Mother in the vicinity of
Father’s residence or demonstrate that Mother retained access to Father’s
residence when Father is at work, even after her son no longer resided at
Father’s residence and as recently as the summer of 2022. N.T., 11/22/22,
at 112. Finally, as the trial court noted, during pop-up visits to Father’s
residence, Mother’s personal items were found in the residence and Mother
was observed entering the residence. Id.
We also concur with the trial court, and the record supports, that
termination of Father’s parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare
of the child, as analyzed under Section 2511(a)(8). The child, as noted by the
trial court, is in need of parental care and a safe environment in which to grow.
Father has not completed Family School and has not independently
demonstrated the ability to provide parental care to the child. Moreover,
Father’s continuing contact with Mother demonstrates Father’s inability to
provide a safe environment for the child. A child’s life, and the need for love,
comfort, security, and stability, should not be held in abeyance while a parent
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summons the abilities and desire to overcome the obstacles which prevent
reunification. See I.J., 972 A.2d at 9.
In examining the effects termination of Father’s parental rights would
have on the child, as well as the best interest of the child pursuant to Section
2511(b), the trial court considered the safety needs of the child, including a
drug-free home, as well as the child’s needs for permanency and parental
care, including love, security, discipline, and comfort. N.T., 11/22/22, at
110-117. Furthermore, the trial court considered the bond between Father
and the child, noting that the child knew Father and enjoyed spending time
with him, but the child did not look upon Father as a parent in a parent-child
relationship and did not look to Father to meet her daily or emotional needs.
Id. at 116-117. Upon review, we concur with the trial court, and the record
supports, that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interest of
the child pursuant to Section 2511(b). The CUA case manager testified that,
in her opinion, a parent-child relationship did not exist between the child and
Father. N.T., 8/9/22, at 45. The child, the case manager stated, did not look
to Father to fulfill her daily needs, and the case manager did not believe Father
would be able to provide for the child’s medical needs, including her asthmatic
condition, due to his work schedule and lack of plans for daycare. Id. at 45,
48. The case manager also explained that the child did not ask to see Father,
and Father did not financially support the child or send her cards, letters, or
gifts. Id. at 45. A teacher at the Family School stated that a relationship
existed between the child and Father in that the child recognizes Father as
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someone she knows and is familiar with, but that relationship did not equate
to a parent-child relationship, which the teacher described as one in which the
child is comfortable with the person and feels nurtured by the person.9 N.T.,
11/22/22, at 57-58. The teacher agreed that it would take several months
for a parent-child relationship to develop between Father and the child. Id.
at 56-57. When asked if the child would suffer if Father’s parental rights were
terminated, the teacher responded that she did not think the child would suffer
because the child, at this time, does not understand what Father’s relationship
is with her and, if that relationship ended, the child would not “feel a void right
now.” Id. at 62-63. The teacher expressed that the kinship parents have a
stronger relationship with the child and that, in her opinion, the kinship
parents would be able to better redirect the child’s behavior and provide better
structure for the child. Id. at 60.
For these reasons, we concur with the trial court, and the record
supports, that DHS has proven by clear and convincing evidence that grounds
for termination of Father’s parental rights exist under Section 2511(a)(8) and
(b). Consequently, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in the
decree terminating Father’s parental rights to the child.
____________________________________________
9 The teacher testified that, in her opinion, Father appears “very nurturing
with [the child]” and that he is “trying to develop a relationship with [the
child.]” N.T., 11/22/22, at 56. A “best interests of the child” analysis under
Section 2511(b), however, focuses on the needs and welfare of the child from
the child’s perspective, and does not take into account the behavior of the
parent. C.B., 230 A.3d at 349.
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Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/15/2023
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