Com. v. Marshall, R. ( 2023 )

J-S11026-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RODNEY MARSHALL :
:
Appellant : No. 915 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 21, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0000057-2019
BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED AUGUST 2, 2023
Rodney Marshall appeals his judgment of sentence following his
convictions for attempted murder, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm
prohibited, firearms not to be carried without a license, carrying firearms in
public in Philadelphia, simple assault, and recklessly endangering another
person.1 He challenges the admission of certain evidence. We affirm.
The facts giving rise to Marshall’s convictions are as follows. On June
19, 2018, Marshall shot the victim, Irvin Logue, multiple times in the back and
arm. Logue initially did not cooperate with the police in the investigation of
his shooter but later identified Marshall as the perpetrator, resulting in
Marshall being arrested and charged. At Marshall’s bench trial, the
Commonwealth presented testimony from Logue, the investigating police
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 2502, 2702(a), 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), 6108,
2701(a), and 2705, respectively.
J-S11026-23
officers and detectives, and from Logue’s wife and son. Marshall testified in
his defense.
During Logue’s testimony, he admitted that he dealt drugs and had been
doing so for 30 years. He further admitted that he previously had a car stolen
and did not report that $22,000 and narcotics had been in the car at the time.
Further, he testified that Marshall obtained statements he, his wife, and his
son had given to the police, and that Marshall disseminated them to neighbors,
which resulted in the Commonwealth relocating Logue for his safety.
The court found Marshall guilty of the above crimes and sentenced him
to an aggregate term of seven to 14 years’ imprisonment followed by three
years’ reporting probation. This timely appeal followed.
Marshall raises the following issues:
[1.] Did the trial court err, abuse its discretion, and/or make
a mistake of law in refusing to allow Mr. Logue to testify,
over objection, to drugs and money contained in his car.
2. Did the trial court err, abuse its discretion, and/or make
a mistake of law in refusing to allow Mr. Logue to testify,
over objection, to a prior shooting he was involved in and
gave testimony about.
[3.] Did the trial court err, abuse its discretion, and/or make
a mistake of law in allowing Mr. Logue to testify over
objection to an alleged written statement made by
[Marshall] when that statement was not produced at trial.
-2-
J-S11026-23
See Marshall’s Br. at 6 (answers of court and suggested answers omitted;
questions reordered).2
Marshall maintains that the court limited the introduction of
impeachment evidence during cross-examination. This impeachment evidence
included Logue’s testimony regarding his car being stolen and the drugs and
money in it, and testimony about whether Logue had been convicted of a
crimen falsi crime. He argues that this evidence was relevant to attack Logue’s
credibility.
To the extent that Marshall raises an issue with the court limiting
testimony regarding Logue’s alleged convictions for crimen falsi crimes, we do
not consider it because Marshall did not set this issue forth in his Statement
of Questions Involved or in his Rule 1925(b) Statement. See Pa.R.A.P.
2116(a) (“No question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement
of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby”); Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b)(4)(vii) (stating issues not included in Rule 1925(b) statement are
waived).
____________________________________________
2 We rearranged the order of Marshall’s issues because the argument section
of his brief is not “divided into as many parts as there are questions to be
argued.” See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Rather, Marshall presents three issues in his
Statement of Questions Involved, while his argument is divided into only two
sections bearing headings that do not match his Statement of Questions. One
argument section is listed as, “The Trial Court Should Have Allowed
Impeachment Testimony Into Evidence” and the second section is captioned,
“Improper Admission of Double Hearsay at Trial.” Marshall’s Br. at 13, 15.
Because Marshall’s error does not hamper our appellate review, we decline to
quash this appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101 (providing that if defects in the
appellant’s brief are substantial, the appeal or other matter may be quashed
or dismissed).
-3-
J-S11026-23
Marshall challenges the admission of evidence, which we review for an
abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Saez, 225 A.3d 169, 177
(Pa.Super. 2019). An abuse of discretion exists where the court’s ruling
resulted in “manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.” Id. at 178 (citation
omitted). Evidence is admissible when it is relevant. See Pa.R.E. 402.
Evidence is relevant where “it logically tends to establish a material fact in the
case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable or supports a
reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact.”
Commonwealth v. Drumheller, 808 A.2d 893, 904 (Pa. 2002) (citation
omitted). A court may exclude relevant evidence if its “probative value is
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Pa.R.E. 403.
Marshall cites the following exchange in which the trial court sustained
an objection to a question asking the type of drugs that were in the stolen
car:
Q [Defense Counsel]: Who did you report the car stolen to?
A [Logue]: To the police.
Q: Did they give you a DC number?
A: Yes, they did.
Q: Okay. Do you have that?
A: I don't have it on me personally, but it's a record that
you guys can --
-4-
J-S11026-23
Q: Well, I can’t get it. They gave you the number. I have no
idea the number they gave you.
A: I no longer have -
Q: Oh, you no longer have it. What else did you say that’s
not included in this statement?
A: What was in the vehicle.
Q: The 22,000 and drugs. What kind of drugs?
MR. KLEIN [Commonwealth]: Objection to relevance.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. JARRETT [Defense Counsel]: He said it. He opened the
door by saying it.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. JARRETT: So I can’t ask him what kind of drugs he had
in the car?
THE COURT: Right, you can’t.
N.T. Trial, 12/21/21, at 93-94.3
Marshall claims that the court erred by limiting this testimony because
Logue’s failure to tell the Commonwealth that his vehicle had been stolen and
that it had $20,000 and drugs was “extremely relevant to the believability of
his belated report to police relating to the identity of the shooter.” Marshall’s
Br. at 14.
The trial court determined that it did not limit counsel’s cross-
examination until he “sought to delve deeper into the specific type of drugs in
the car[.]” Opinion, filed 8/4/22, at 16 (emphasis in original). As such, it
____________________________________________
3 Marshall’s citation begins at page 92 but a review of the record shows that
the quoted text begins on page 93. See Marshall’s Br. at 13-14.
-5-
J-S11026-23
concluded that it “exercised its discretion in drawing a boundary of relevance.”
Id. at 17.
The court did not abuse its discretion. The court permitted Marshall to
elicit that there had been drugs and money in the car, disallowing only
testimony regarding the specific type of drugs. The specific type of drugs
would not have further impeached Logue’s credibility. The point of the cross-
examination was that Logue was not believable because he had omitted
damaging information when he reported his car stolen. The type of drugs was
not relevant to that point. Nor would it have established a material fact in the
case, tended to make it more or less probable that Marshall shot Logue, or
supported a reasonable inference or presumption that Marshall did not shoot
him. See Drumheller, 808 A.2d at 904. The court did not abuse its discretion
in limiting counsel’s line of questioning.
Marshall also claims that the court erred by preventing him from cross-
examining Logue about his involvement in a prior shooting. This claim is
waived. In his Statement of the Case,4 Marshall details the exchange between
defense counsel and Logue before the court sustained a relevance objection
by the Commonwealth, and asserts that the trial court improperly sustained
the objection. See Marshall’s Br. at 9-10. However, Marshall fails to present
a developed argument – in the Argument section of his brief, the Statement
of the Case, or anywhere else in his brief – with citations to authorities and
____________________________________________
4 Marshall’s Statement of the Case is improperly argumentative. See Pa.R.A.P.
2117(b).
-6-
J-S11026-23
an analysis explaining his contention that the trial court should not have
sustained the objection. See id. at 13-17 (presenting argument regarding first
and third appellate claims); Commonwealth v. Freeman, 128 A.3d 1231,
1249 (Pa.Super. 2015) (stating waiver may result where appellant fails to
develop argument).
Marshall’s final issue challenges the court’s admission of what Marshall
claims to be double hearsay. See Marshall’s Br. at 15. He directs us to the
following testimony:
Q [Commonwealth]: Can you tell us why you requested that
relocation?
A [Logue]: Okay. Mr. Marshall had sent out a statement in
regards to --
MR. JARRETT [Defense Counsel]: Objection to the hearsay
unless it’s a physical statement that he has a copy of or that
he had a copy of.
MR. KLEIN [Commonwealth]: It’s a statement by the
defendant.
THE COURT: It’s a statement by the defendant. Overruled.
THE WITNESS [Logue]: He sent a copy of the statement that
was given by myself, my wife, and my son and, you know,
the neighborhood was just like threatening my son -
N.T. Trial, 12/21/21, at 34.5
Marshall argues that the initial hearsay statements were the written
statements of the victim, the victim’s wife, and their son. The second hearsay
statement “appears to be a statement ‘sent out by’ [Marshall][.]” Marshall’s
____________________________________________
5 Marshall’s citation begins at page 33 but a review of the record shows that
the quoted text is limited to page 34. See Marshall’s Br. at 16.
-7-
J-S11026-23
Br. at 16. He maintains that the court should have required the
Commonwealth to show how each of these statements was covered within a
hearsay exception.
Marshall’s claim is meritless because the Commonwealth did not offer
an out of court statement from Logue, his wife, or his son. Instead, Logue
testified that Marshall had obtained the written statements Logue, Logue’s
wife, and Logue’s son had provided to the police, and mailed them out. N.T.
Trial, at 33-34, 101-102. Logue said that this resulted in the neighborhood
threatening Logue’s son and prompted Logue to ask for relocation. Id. at 33-
34. At no point in the challenged testimony did Logue say anything about the
contents of the statements. We affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/02/2023
-8-