Andrews, D. v. Barnes, T. and B. ( 2023 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
DELAINE ANDREWS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
BERNICE AND TIMOTHY BARNES : No. 1046 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered June 27, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Civil Division at No(s):
2019 CV 8624-DJ
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 08, 2023
Appellant, Delaine Andrews, appeals pro se from the trial court’s June
27, 2022 order that, inter alia, found that she did not qualify for in forma
pauperis (“IFP”) status, and dismissed her appeal from an arbitration award.
We affirm.
The trial court provided the following summary of this matter:
The instant case arises from a landlord[/]tenant dispute initially
filed before the Honorable Magisterial District Judge Paul T. Zozos,
MDJ 12-2-05. At Docket No. MJ-12205-CV-0000061-2019[,] Ms.
Andrews named [Appellees, Bernice and Timothy Barnes,] as
defendants.[1] At Docket No. MJ-12205-CV-0000083-2019,
[Appellees] named Ms. Andrews as a defendant. After hearing the
cases together, Judge Zozos entered judgment in favor of
[Appellees] and against Ms. Andrews in the amount of
$4,150.00[.]
Ms. Andrews appealed the magisterial district judgment to the trial
court. Ms. Andrews filed a Complaint[,] which alleged Breach of
Contract, Sewer and Trash Rents, Tenant Damages and
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1 By way of background, Ms. Andrews was Appellees’ landlord.
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Recoverable Litigation Costs Pursuant to the Terms of the Lease.
(Delaine Andrews v. Timothy Barnes and Bernice Barnes,
Docket No. 2019 CV 8624). She did not seek [IFP] status in
connection with [her] appeal from the magisterial district
judgment.
[Appellees] filed a Complaint against Ms. Andrews asserting
Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability, Breach of Lease,
Violation of the Landlord Tenant Act, and Violation of the
Consumer Protection Law…. (Bernice Barnes and Timothy
Barnes v. Delaine Andrews, Docket No. 2019 CV 8628 DJ).
The parties engaged in a complex series of cross-preliminary
objections.1
1 We refrain from reciting the history of the preliminary
objections because they are not controlling to the issue sub
judice.
On January 19, 2021, [Appellees] filed Motions to Consolidate
Dockets at Docket No. 2019 CV 8624 and 2019 CV 8628. Ms.
Andrews filed no opposition at either docket. Accordingly, on May
3, 2021, we ordered that the captions be consolidated at Docket
No. 2019 CV 8624 and that no further filings be docketed to
Docket No. 2019 CV 8628 DJ.
The cases proceeded to arbitration. By Report and Award of
Arbitrators dated September 8, 2021, filed September 10, 2021,
the arbitration panel found in favor of Ms. Andrew[s] in the
amount of $1,117.92[,] and in favor of [Appellees] in the amount
of $2,525.00, which constituted a new award to [Appellees] of
$1,407.08.
On September 30, 2021, Ms. Andrews filed a Petition to Proceed
[IFP], which she verified, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904 (Crime of
Unsworn Falsification to Authorities). In the attached affidavit in
support of her petition, Ms. Andrews stated that she was, because
of her financial condition, unable to pay the fees and costs
associated with this case and was unable to obtain funds from
anyone, including family and friends. The Affidavit further
represented that she was, at the time, unemployed and owned
real estate valued at $40,000. Based upon … Ms. Andrews[’s]
verified statements, the court granted Ms. Andrews [IFP] status
by Order filed September 30, 2021. On the same date, Ms.
Andrews filed a Notice of Appeal from [the] Award of Board of
Arbitrators which stated that application had been made to
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proceed IFP. (Notice of Appeal from Board of Arbitrators, Docket
No. 2019 CV 8624-DJ, September 30, 2021).[2]
On November 22, 2021, [Appellees] filed a Motion to Strike Appeal
in which they asserted that[,] although Ms. Andrews stated in her
Petition to Proceed [IFP] that she owned real estate valued at
$40,000, public records reflect that she owns seven properties
with a total value in excess of $40,000.[3, 4] [Appellees] asserted
that Ms. Andrews falsely reported the value of the real estate and
that without IFP status, she would have been required to pay $400
to appeal the Report and Award of Arbitrators as arbitrators’
compensation. [Appellees] asserted that Ms. Andrews’[s] appeal
was therefore invalid and should be stricken.
On December 9, 2021, Ms. Andrews filed a Motion to
Strike/Dismiss with Prejudice [Appellees’] Motion to Strike Appeal.
On the same date, Ms. Andrews filed an Answer/Reply in
Opposition to Strike Appeal. [She also filed a Reply/Reply Brief in
Opposition to Motion to Strike Appeal.]
We conducted argument on February 22, 2022, on [Appellees’]
Motion to Strike Appeal. In support of their argument, counsel for
[Appellees] presented exhibits regarding seven properties which
[Appellees] asserted Ms. Andrews owned at the time she filed the
[petition for] IFP.[5] We granted [Appellees’] leave to file
documents following the argument which would reflect the status
of payment of property taxes on those properties. We denied Ms.
Andrews’[s] Motion to Strike/Dismiss with Prejudice [Appellees’]
Motion to Strike Appeal.
On February 25, 2022, [Appellees] filed of record Property Taxes
of Plaintiff Delaine Andrews for Dauphin County.
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2 Ms. Andrews only filed this appeal at Docket No. 2019 CV 8624-DJ.
3 Of the seven properties, Appellees asserted that Ms. Andrews owned four of
them outright. N.T., 2/22/22, at 3.
4 The docket reflects that no activity occurred between the court’s September
30, 2021 order granting Ms. Andrews leave to proceed IFP, and Appellees’
November 22, 2021 motion to strike.
5 The trial court also permitted Ms. Andrews to submit exhibits.
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On March 10, 2022, we ordered as follows:
The [c]ourt having reviewed the documents of [Appellees]
and of [Ms.] Andrews submitted at oral argument held [on]
February 22, 2022, on the respective parties’ motions, and
the supplemental exhibits regarding [Ms.] Andrews’[s]
property taxes submitted by [Appellees], the court finds
that inquiry into the issue of whether [Ms.] Andrews was
entitled to proceed [IFP] requires an evidentiary hearing.
See, e.g., Kovalev v. Step[ansky, 240 A.3d 955 (Pa.
Super. 2020) (unpublished memorandum)].
[Ms.] Andrews filed a Petition to Proceed [IFP] on
September 29, 2019[,] pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904
(Crime of Unsworn Falsification to Authorities). Accordingly,
inasmuch as [Ms.] Andrews will have the opportunity to
present testimony under oath regarding said Petition, [Ms.]
Andrews is hereby apprised of the right to seek
representation related to presentation of testimony during
such hearing, which will be held on April 29, 2022[,] at 9:15
… a.m., in Courtroom No. 1, Fifth Floor, Dauphin County
Courthouse.
[Ms.] Andrews shall bear the burden of proof as to whether
the September 29, 2019[] Petition to Proceed [IFP] was true
and correct[,] and whether she is a party without financial
resources to pay the costs of litigation pursuant to
Pa.R.C[iv].P. 240(b).
We convened for the April 29, 2022[] hearing. Counsel for
[Appellees] appeared. Ms. Andrews did not appear. [Appellees],
by their counsel, asserted that the February 25, 2022[] filing,
Property Taxes of Plaintiff Delaine Andrews, demonstrates that
Ms. Andrews owns seven properties having a total value of
$384,000. The documents further reflected that Ms. Andrews paid
property taxes in 2021[,] which totaled $3,112.07. We issued our
ruling in open court on [Appellees’] Motion to Strike Appeal and
stated the reasons therefore.
On June 27, 2022, we filed the following written [o]rder:
Upon hearings conducted February 22, 2022, and April 29,
2022, we found the testimony of [Appellees] to be credible.
We found non-credible the testimony of [Ms.] Andrews that
she had little income and qualified for [IFP] status. [Ms.]
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Andrews failed to appear at the April 29, 2022[] hearing set
for the purpose of taking additional testimony regarding
[Ms.] Andrews’[s] evidence in support of her claim for [IFP]
status.
We find that she does not qualify for [IFP] status and did
not so qualify at the time she appealed the September 8,
2021[] arbitration award of $1,407.08 in favor of
[Appellees].
The September 8, 2021[] arbitration award of $1,407.08 in
favor of [Appellees] is AFFIRMED and [Ms.] Andrews’[s]
appeal of that award is DISMISSED.
Ms. Andrews filed the instant appeal.[6] On September 2, 2022,
Ms. Andrews filed a Motion to Correct (Material Omissions) (sic)
Lower Court Record[,] to which [Appellees] filed an Answer. By
our Order of October 3, 2022, we granted in part and denied in
part the Motion. We granted the Motion to the extent that we
supplemented the record with documents which Ms. Andrews
handed to the [c]ourt at the February 22, 2022[] proceeding. We
did not rely upon those documents as they lacked evidentiary
foundation.
Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 11/4/22, at 1-5 (some internal citations omitted;
emphasis and capitalization in original).
The trial court later issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion. In its opinion, it
referenced Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 240(j)(1), which states that,
[i]f, simultaneous with the commencement of an action or
proceeding or the taking of an appeal, a party has filed a petition
for leave to proceed [IFP], the court prior to acting upon the
petition may dismiss the action, proceeding or appeal if the
allegation of poverty is untrue or if it is satisfied that the action,
proceeding or appeal is frivolous.
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6 The trial court did not order Ms. Andrews to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and she did not do
so.
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Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(j)(1). The trial court went on to recognize that Rule 240(j)(1)
allows for dismissal for untrue statements before an action proceeds. TCO at
8. Nevertheless, it stated that it did not “read Rule 240(j)(1) to preclude us
from considering a claim of false representation raised during the pendency
of the action.” Id. It reasoned that ignoring such claims “would be
tantamount to knowingly allowing a case to proceed having been commenced
based upon false statements without sanction.” Id.
Presently, on appeal, Ms. Andrews raises eight questions for our review,
which we set forth verbatim:
1.Error of Law as a matter of law : Did the trial court Error
in its actions in the action detailed in theJune 27, 2022
court Order and who’s actions and decisions were a
misapplication of law and that were an error of law. More
specifically it was an error of law for the trial court judge
to “act” (to undermine) on an approved IFP (in forma
pauperis) application after it was approved by the courts.
2.Did the trial court have authority to “act on” the
September 30, 2022 IFP approval order after 30 days had
lapsed after the entry of the order?.
3.Did the trial court Erred as a matter of law : Once
Appellant Andrews petition for IFP had been approved did
the trial court have authorization under the law to hold a
IFP evidentiary hearing on the same identical IFP
application and subsequently determine that Appellant was
not entitled to IFP status when the court had approved
Appellant IFP status at the time of filing Appellant
Arbitration appeal
4.Did the court Error as a matter of law regarding the “denial
IFP” remedy provisions in 240 ( C) 1 (ii) If the Appellate Court
finds that the trial court had authorization under the law to
hold an IFP evidentiary hearing and subsequently
determine that Appellant was not entitled to IFP status. then
the trial court erred in their remedy in invalidating Andrews
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appeal and dismissing Appellant arbitration appeal and the
remedy was manifestly abusive and contrary to the law .
5.Did the court Error as a matter of law regarding the “denial
IFP” remedy provisions in 240( C) 1 (ii) If the Appellate Court
finds that the trial court had authorization under the law to
hold an IFP evidentiary hearing and subsequently
determine that Appellant was not entitled to IFP status. then
the trial court erred in their remedy in invalidating Andrews
appeal and dismissing Appellant arbitration appeal and the
remedy was manifestly abusive and contrary to the law .
6.Did the Trial Court Erred as a matter of law in that the
Evidence of Record does not reflect that in anyway was
Appellant Andrews untruthful on her IFP application The
trial court was manifestly unreasonable and abused
discretion because the evidence that the trial court relied
on wholly does not support that Andrews had the ability to
pay the Arbitration filing fee in September 2021 .
7 .Did the trial Court demonstrate bias, and ill will
prejudicing Appellant thus violating Constitutional rights?
8.Did the trial Court Error when they failed to grant
Appellant Andrews unopposed Motion to Strike Barnes
Motion to Strike causing prejudice in this case?
Ms. Andrews’s Brief at 2-3.7
First Issue
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7 Ms. Andrews’s brief fails to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). See Pa.R.A.P.
2119(a) (“The argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are
questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part—in distinctive
type or in type distinctively displayed—the particular point treated therein,
followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed
pertinent.”). Although she raises eight issues in her Statement of Questions
Involved, she does not divide the Argument section of brief into eight
corresponding parts. See Donaldson v. Davidson Bros., Inc., 144 A.3d 93,
99 n.9 (Pa. Super. 2016) (determining that the appellant failed to comply with
Rule 2119(a) where the appellant’s brief did not “present and develop eight
arguments in support of the eight questions raised”). While we admonish Ms.
Andrews for failing to follow Rule 2119(a), her noncompliance does not
prevent our review. We will therefore overlook her violation of Rule 2119(a)
and address the issues she raises in her Statement of Questions Involved.
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In Ms. Andrews’s first issue, she argues that the trial court erred in
acting on her IFP petition after it had already been approved by another judge.
She says “[n]either the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure or Pennsylvania
statutory law provide authorization for the Honorable Judge Cherry (another
trial court judge) to make a new finding on a previously granted IFP [petition]
dated September 30, 2021 by the Honorable Judge McNally (another trial
court judge)….” Ms. Andrews’s Brief at 7.
No relief is due. “Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
Problematically, Ms. Andrews does not indicate where she raised this claim
before the trial court. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e) (“Where under the applicable
law an issue is not reviewable on appeal unless raised or preserved below, the
argument must set forth, in immediate connection therewith or in a footnote
thereto, either a specific cross-reference to the page or pages of the statement
of the case which set forth the information relating thereto as required by
Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c), or substantially the same information.”); Commonwealth
v. Baker, 963 A.2d 495, 502 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“[I]t is not the
responsibility of this Court to scour the record to prove that an appellant has
raised an issue before the trial court, thereby preserving it for appellate
review.”) (citations omitted).
Further, our own review of the record does not indicate that Ms. Andrews
raised this issue below. To review, Appellees filed a motion to strike Ms.
Andrews’s appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 240. See
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Motion to Strike Appeal, 11/22/21, at 1 (specifically citing Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(b),
(j)(1)); id. at ¶ 14 (“Since [Ms.] Andrews falsely reported her value in real
estate in the IFP petition and she is able to pay the costs of litigation, this
appeal was granted pursuant to an invalid IFP.”). Ms. Andrews then filed a
Motion to Strike/Dismiss with Prejudice Appellees’ Motion to Strike Appeal.
Therein, she asserted that Appellees’ motion to strike appeal was procedurally
defective because they erroneously mailed the motion to the wrong P.O. Box.
In addition, she baldly claimed that Appellees untimely filed their motion to
strike, but she set forth no authority or legal analysis in support of that
assertion. Notably, she did not complain that the trial court could not act on
her IFP petition after another judge had already granted it.
In addition, Ms. Andrews filed an Answer/Reply in Opposition to Motion
to Strike Appeal. In that filing, she again did not raise that the trial court
could not act on her IFP petition after it had already been granted.
She also submitted a Reply/Reply Brief in Opposition to Motion to Strike
Appeal. In this reply, she reiterated her argument that the motion to strike
was procedurally defective because it had been sent to the wrong P.O. box,
and again claimed that Appellees’ motion to strike was untimely without
providing any authority or legal analysis in support. She additionally
maintained that she had insufficient funds at the time she filed her petition to
proceed IFP, and that her estimate of the value of her real estate took into
consideration the repairs the properties need. Finally, without any elaboration
or supporting legal authority, she claimed that striking her appeal is unduly
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prejudicial as it puts her out of court, and she stated that her appeal should
not be deemed invalid because she completed the petition to proceed IFP
truthfully, to the best of her ability, and in compliance with the relevant rule.
Amidst these arguments, she did not raise that the trial court could not now
act on her petition after it had already been granted.
Last, our review of the transcript from the February 22, 2022 oral
argument does not reveal that Ms. Andrews brought up this specific issue
there either. Further, she did not raise it at the April 29, 2022 hearing because
she did not attend that proceeding. As such, this issue is waived.
Second Issue
In Ms. Andrews’s second issue, she contends that the trial court did not
have the authority to act on the September 30, 2021 IFP approval order after
30 days had lapsed after the entry of the order. Ms. Andrews’s Brief at 8-9.
Citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505, she says that the trial court may only modify a
previous order within 30 days after its entry, and after that 30-day period, the
trial court’s jurisdiction is divested. Id.
Though Ms. Andrews did not raise this issue below, we will address it
since it ostensibly raises an issue of jurisdiction. See Borough of Media v.
County of Delaware, 82 A.3d 509, 512 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (“Section 5505
of the Judicial Code authorizes a court, upon notice to the parties, to modify
or rescind an order within 30 days of its issuance. This 30–day limitation is
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jurisdictional and cannot be waived by the parties.”) (cleaned up).8 Section
5505 provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided or prescribed by law, a
court upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order within 30
days after its entry, notwithstanding the prior termination of any term of court,
if no appeal from such order has been taken or allowed.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505.
Importantly, “Section 5505 applies only to final orders.” Manufacturers and
Traders Trust Co. v. Greenville Gastroenterology, SC, 108 A.3d 913, 917
n.3 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). Here, the trial court’s September
30, 2021 order granting Ms. Andrews IFP status was not a final order.
Therefore, the 30-day time limit of Section 5505 did not apply to it, and Ms.
Andrews’s argument fails.
Third Issue
In Ms. Andrews’s third issue, she argues that “[n]either the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure or Pennsylvania statutory law provide
authorization for a trial court judge to hold an evidentiary hearing on the same
identical IFP petition once the courts have approved an IFP application.” Ms.
Andrews’s Brief at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). Again, Ms. Andrews
does not point us to where she raised this claim below. See Pa.R.A.P.
2119(e), supra; Baker, supra. Further, our own review of the record does
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8“Although decisions by the Commonwealth Court are not binding on this
Court, they may be persuasive.” Cresci Const. Services, Inc. v. Martin,
64 A.3d 254, 256 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).
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not show that she presented it to the trial court. Accordingly, it is waived.
See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), supra.
Fourth and Fifth Issues
Ms. Andrews’s fourth and fifth issues duplicate each other and,
therefore, we address them together. Ms. Andrews complains that the trial
court should not have dismissed her appeal, but instead permitted her to pay
the filing fee. Ms. Andrews’s Brief at 2-3, 10. We deem this argument waived
on multiple grounds. First, she does not point us to where she specifically
raised this argument below. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e), supra; Baker, supra.Second, our own review of the record does not show that she specifically
raised it below. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), supra. Third, she sets forth no
developed argument that the trial court should have permitted her to pay the
filing fee rather than dismissing her action. See Commonwealth v. Hardy,
918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“This Court will not act as counsel and
will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant. Moreover, when defects
in a brief impede our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we may
dismiss the appeal entirely or find certain issues to be waived.”) (citations
omitted). Thus, for all these reasons, it is waived.
Sixth Issue
In Ms. Andrews’s sixth issue, she claims that the trial court erred and/or
abused its discretion in concluding that she was untruthful on her IFP
application. See Ms. Andrews’s Brief at 10. She asserts that she offered
evidence to substantiate her indebtedness and the poor condition of her
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properties. Id. at 11. She challenges the assertion that her seven properties
have a value of $384,000, which she says was nothing more than a ‘Zestimate’
from Zillow. See id. at 12. She also says that the fact that she paid property
taxes on the properties in March of 2021 does not mean that she could pay
the $400 filing fee to appeal the arbitration award six months later in
September of 2021. Id. at 12-13. Moreover, she claims that her self-
employment income only amounts to $500-800/month, as her income was
severely impacted by the Covid-19 crisis. Id. at 13.
We discern no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
determination that Ms. Andrews was untruthful on her IFP petition. Initially,
Ms. Andrews failed to appear at the April 29, 2022 hearing, which was
scheduled for the specific purpose of taking additional evidence regarding her
IFP status, including her testimony. TCO at 5, 7-8. To the extent Ms. Andrews
argues that she offered evidence at the February 22, 2022 proceeding of her
indebtedness and the conditions of her properties, the trial court reasonably
explained that it did not rely on such evidence as it lacked an evidentiary
foundation. Id. at 5. Instead, the trial court weighed the evidence presented
by Appellees, specifically that Ms. Andrews owned seven properties and was
in good standing on her tax bills for them, which led it to the conclusion that
Ms. Andrews provided false information on her IFP petition. Id. at 4-5, 7-8.
Given the record before it, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred or
abused its discretion in reaching this conclusion.
Seventh Issue
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In Ms. Andrews’s seventh issue, she argues that the trial court
demonstrated bias and ill-will toward her, thus violating her constitutional
rights. Most of her argument on this issue, however, rehashes the evidence
before the trial court and argues that it did not support that she could pay the
filing fee in September of 2021. See Ms. Andrews’s Brief at 11-13. Because
this argument fits better with her Sixth Issue, we incorporated her assertions
into our consideration of her Sixth Issue. Therefore, to the extent she argues
in her Seventh Issue that the evidence did not support that she could pay the
filing fee, we reject this argument for the reasons set forth in her Sixth Issue,
supra. Further, to the extent she argues that the trial court demonstrated
bias and ill-will toward her, violating her constitutional rights, we deem this
claim waived for lack of development. See Hardy, supra.Eighth Issue
Finally, in Ms. Andrews’s eighth issue, she advances that the trial court
erred when it failed to grant her unopposed Motion to Strike/Dismiss with
Prejudice Appellees’ Motion to Strike Appeal. She claims that the trial court
never ruled on this motion. Ms. Andrews’s Brief at 13.
The record belies this argument. At the February 22, 2022 proceeding,
the trial court denied her motion. N.T., 2/22/22, at 20 (“Based on the
evidence that was presented here[,] your motion is denied. … The reason for
my decision is there is a great amount of evidence which may call into question
whether or not such conduct was performed by [Ms. Andrews]. The [c]ourt
isn’t ready to render a verdict, but certainly there was not evidence presented
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by [Ms. Andrews] to show that this motion to strike should be denied and
stricken.”).
Further, we are unpersuaded that the trial court erred in denying the
motion. We reiterate that, in her Motion to Strike/Dismiss with Prejudice
Appellees’ Motion to Strike Appeal, Ms. Andrews presented two arguments.
First, she claimed that Appellees’ motion to strike her appeal was procedurally
defective because they erroneously mailed the motion to the wrong P.O. Box.
However, she admitted at the February 22, 2022 proceeding that she received
the motion in time for her to file a response. Id. at 21-22. Thus, we are
unconvinced by her argument that relief is due on this basis.
Second, Ms. Andrews baldly advanced that Appellees’ motion to strike
was untimely. However, she provided no authority or legal analysis to support
this claim. As such, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying her
motion on this basis either. Further, to the extent she raises a legal theory to
support her assertion of untimeliness on appeal, we deem such an argument
waived. See Estate of Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, 733 A.2d 623, 630 n.8 (Pa.
1999) (finding issue waived where the appellant raised a legal theory for the
first time on appeal to the Superior Court). Thus, all of Ms. Andrews’s issues
fail.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 08/08/2023
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