Com. v. Lovasz, S. ( 2023 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
STEVE ROBERT LOVASZ :
:
Appellant : No. 1467 WDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 18, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0000169-1987
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED: AUGUST 7, 2023
Steve Robert Lovasz appeals pro se from the order dismissing his fifth
petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). See
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9545. We affirm.
On January 26, 1987, Lovasz, acting in concert with his brother, stabbed
and fatally wounded Phillip Morris. Lovasz then stole Morris’s wallet and placed
his body into the trunk of a vehicle. Eventually, the police arrested Lovasz and
the Commonwealth charged him with numerous crimes. Ultimately, a jury
convicted Lovasz of first-degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy. The trial
court imposed an aggregate sentence of life in prison. This Court affirmed the
judgment of sentence, and on March 27, 1990, our Supreme Court denied
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Lovasz, 564 A.2d 260 (Pa.
Super. 1989) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 575 A.2d 110 (Pa.
1990). Lovasz previously filed four PCRA petitions, all of which were denied or
dismissed.
On July 11, 2022, Lovasz filed the instant PCRA petition, raising claims
substantially similar to the claims raised in his fourth PCRA petition.
Specifically, Lovasz argued that the Commonwealth committed a Brady1
violation by failing to inform him that his prior counsel in this matter, Mark
Morrison, was imprisoned in 2011, which evidenced a “dirty deal.” Lovasz also
raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The PCRA court issued a
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice. Thereafter, the PCRA court dismissed the petition
without a hearing. This timely appeal followed.
This Court’s standard of review regarding a PCRA court’s dismissal of a
PCRA petition is whether the PCRA court’s decision is supported by the
evidence of record and is free of legal error. See Commonwealth v. Garcia,
23 A.3d 1059, 1061 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Under the PCRA, any PCRA petition “shall be filed within one year of the
date the judgment [of sentence] becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).
A judgment of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review,
including discretionary review in … the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at
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1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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the expiration of time for seeking the review.” Id. § 9545(b)(3). The PCRA’s
timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature, and a court may not
address the merits of the issues raised if the PCRA petition was not timely
filed. See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).
Here, Lovasz’s judgment of sentence became final in 1990, after the
time to seek review with the United States Supreme Court expired. See
Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 995 (Pa. Super. 2022).
Accordingly, Lovasz’s PCRA petition, filed on July 11, 2022, was patently
untimely under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).
However, Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition
where the petitioner can explicitly plead and prove one of three exceptions:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution
or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws
of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
provided in this section and has been held by that court
to apply retroactively.
Id.
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Here, Lovasz did not plead or prove any of the above timeliness
exceptions.2 To the extent Lovasz raises a substantive ineffective assistance
of counsel claim, it does not implicate any of the exceptions to the PCRA time-
bar. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 139 A.3d 178, 186 (Pa. 2016)
(observing there is no statutory exception to PCRA time-bar applicable to
ineffective assistance of counsel claims). As we are without jurisdiction to
address the merits of Lovasz’s PCRA petition, the PCRA court properly
dismissed the petition as untimely.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/7/2023
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2 We note that Lovasz baldly pleaded the three exceptions to the time-bar in
his pro se PCRA petition. See PCRA Petition, 7/11/22, at 3. However, Lovasz’s
appellate brief does not present any argument in favor of these exceptions on
appeal; accordingly, they are waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a);
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 517 A.2d 1248, 1250 n.4 (Pa. 1986) (stating
issues raised in PCRA petition and not presented on appeal are deemed
abandoned).
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