East End Gun Club v. Kowalczyk, A. ( 2023 )


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  • J-S18044-22
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
    EAST END GUN CLUB OF                        :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    SCHUYLKILL HAVEN, PA                        :         PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    :
    v.                            :
    :
    :
    ANNE C. KOWALCZYK, SUSAN C.                 :
    STRANG, CYRUS PALMER DOLBIN,                :    No. 1624 MDA 2021
    ELLEN MARIE DOLBIN                          :
    :
    Appellants              :
    Appeal from the Judgment Entered March 9, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Civil Division at
    No(s): S-2019-2015
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                  FILED: AUGUST 7, 2023
    Anne C. Kowalczyk, Susan C. Strang, Cyrus Palmer Dolbin, and Ellen
    Marie Dolbin (Appellants) appeal from the order entered in the Court of
    Common Pleas of Schuylkill County, which granted quiet title to Appellee, East
    End Gun Club of Schuylkill Haven, Pennsylvania (East End) of a 150-acre
    property in Wayne Township, Pennsylvania, as made final by the entry of
    judgment on March 9, 2022. Appellants raise a myriad of claims on appeal,
    including, inter alia, trial court error in (1) failing to properly review the record;
    (2) failing to apply the principle of acquiescence; (3) accepting the testimony
    of a defense expert witness; and (4) improperly shifting the burden of proof
    to them. Based on the following, we affirm.
    J-S18044-22
    At the outset, the crux of this appeal concerns a dispute over a 50-acre
    tract of land (the Property) that is part of the East End Property, and has been
    contested since 2009.1 As will be discussed in detail below, Appellants claim
    ownership of the Property pursuant to a November 13, 2014, deed (the
    Kowalczyk-Strang-Dolbin Deed) from Cyrus Palmer Dolbin2 to them. East End
    also asserts ownership of the Property by a deed dated February 11, 1963
    (the 1963 Deed), from Anthony Wallace, Leon W. Naus, George D. Naus, and
    Maurice E. Umbenhaur, Trustees of and for the East End Gun Club (the
    Trustees of East End) to East End. See East End Gun Club, 1458 MDA 2019
    (unpub. memo. at 1-2).          The 1963 Deed described the total property as
    containing 150 acres and represented the acreage conveyed to the Trustees
    of East End from Charles V. and Susan E. Strause, husband and wife, by deed
    dated August 7, 1930 (the Strause Deed). Id. at 2. “However, the Strause
    [D]eed described the property as containing 100 acres of land, ‘more or less.’”
    See Trial Ct. Op., 1/31/22, at 1. It is those last three words — “more or less”
    ____________________________________________
    1 Indeed, this Court has addressed appeals concerning this land in some
    fashion three times before. See McGovern v. East End Gun Club of
    Schuylkill County, PA, 1954 MDA 2013 (unpub. memo.) (Pa. Super. Sept.
    25, 2014); Kowalczyk v. East End Gun Club of Schuylkill County, PA,
    1303 MDA 2016 (unpub. memo.) (Pa. Super. Jan. 30, 2018); East End Gun
    Club of Schuylkill County, PA v. Kowalczyk, 1458 MDA 2019 (unpub.
    memo.) (Pa. Super. Oct. 5, 2020).
    2 Cyrus Palmer Dolbin is a judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill
    County, which resulted in a full-bench recusal of that court. See Trial Ct. Op.,
    1/31/22, at 2 n.1.
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    J-S18044-22
    — that Appellants take issue with as they assert that the Strause Deed only
    provided East End with 100 acres, not 150 acres.
    A prior panel of this Court summarized some of the relevant facts and
    procedural history of this case as follows:
    In September 1950, the Honorable (then attorney) Donald
    Dolbin of the Schuylkill County Court of Common Pleas purchased
    a parcel of land from the Schuylkill County Tax Claim Bureau at
    an upset sale. The deed [(the 1950 Tax Claim Bureau Deed)]
    reflects the property was owned by Alvin Heim and sold for
    $90.00. Dolbin placed the title to the property in the names of
    Anne Palmer Dolbin and Jane Palmer Craig, his wife and sister
    (hereinafter “Sellers”).     The property is landlocked and
    unimproved.
    Dolbin paid real estate taxes on the property until his death
    in 2000. Thereafter, Dolbin’s son, the Honorable Cyrus Palmer
    Dolbin, as one of the co-executors, paid the real estate taxes until
    2008, when Sellers entered into an agreement of sale with [James
    P. and Shana L. McGovern, husband and wife (the McGoverns)].
    In 2010, the McGoverns divorced. Since then, James McGovern
    has paid the taxes.
    Pursuant to the terms of the agreement of sale, the
    McGoverns were responsible for securing a registered survey of
    the tract, securing an abstractor in order to establish the chain of
    title, and proceeding with the action to quiet title. The McGoverns
    acknowledged that the agreement of sale called for the sale of
    75.8 acres, indicated in the tax assessment records, in contrast to
    the 83-acre tract found in the [1950 Tax Claim Bureau Deed] to
    Dolbin. The McGoverns further acknowledged that the registered
    surveyor determined the tract was actually approximately 67
    acres.
    After signing the agreement of sale, the McGoverns walked
    around the boundaries of the property and observed warning signs
    posted by [East End]. Walter J. Manhart, the registered surveyor,
    secured all the adjacent deeds, assessment maps, zoning maps
    and surveys he could find. Using these instruments, Manhart
    developed a legal description1 of the property in question; he
    determined that the tract consisted of 67.904 acres. Additionally,
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    he determined that in 1963, while East End was conducting a
    survey of its land, it surveyed into its deed a 50-acre parcel of the
    Dolbin tract.
    __________________________
    1 A legal description is a formal description of real property,
    including a description of any part subject to an easement
    or reservation, complete enough that a particular piece of
    land can be located and identified. The description can be
    made by reference to a government survey, metes and
    bounds, or lot numbers of a recorded plat. Black’s Law
    Dictionary 746 (8th ed. 2005).
    __________________________
    McGovern, 1954 MDA 2013 (unpub. memo. at 1-3) (record citation
    omitted).3
    On January 23, 2009, the McGoverns filed a complaint against East End
    in quiet title and ejectment.4 “The McGoverns also alleged that they held title
    by virtue of the deeds set forth in their chain of title, including the 1950 Tax
    Claim Bureau Deed, and that [East End] had no basis to claim title because
    the disputed land is not included in any deed by East End.” McGovern, 1954
    MDA 2013 (unpub. memo. at 3).
    In its answer, East End admitted that it acquired title by way of the
    recorded 1963 Deed. See McGovern, 1954 MDA 2013 (unpub. memo. at 3).
    ____________________________________________
    3 We will refer to this matter as “the 2014 McGovern decision.”
    4 The matter was docketed at No. S-172-2009.
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    J-S18044-22
    “In that deed, the Trustees of East End conveyed to themselves 50 more acres
    of land than was contained in the prior deed for the same land.” Id.
    The matter proceeded to a hearing in 2013, where the McGoverns’
    expert, Manhart, testified “that at no time did he specifically identify the 83
    acres referenced in the tax claim deed.” See McGovern, 1954 MDA 2013
    (unpub. memo. at 4).
    Devon Henne, the expert testifying for East End, did not
    perform a field survey but, instead, examined the legal description
    of the property in order to identify the properties involved and to
    try to come up with some kind of definition of the property. It
    became apparent to Henne that the instant dispute was more of
    a title dispute than a boundary dispute. Henne determined that
    the disputed area, which was described in the Manhart survey,
    was patented to James Everhart on November 19, 1841. Henne
    asserted that the lack of an ability to trace title forward to East
    End and the Dolbins creates, from Everhart, a cloud on the title
    for both parties in the disputed area.
    See McGovern, 1954 MDA 2013 (unpub. memo. at 4).
    On September 11, 2013, the trial court5 denied relief, stating:
    The [c]ourt is confronted with a claim and procedural history
    seeking to [q]uiet [t]itle that appears substantially flawed at the
    outset. . . . [W]e cannot find that [the McGoverns] sustained
    [their] burden of proof as to the disputed 50 plus acres . . . [and]
    we are not further persuaded that . . . East End has staked a
    superior claim to the disputed 50 acre parcel warranting a decree
    in its favor.
    Opinion, 9/11/13, at 18. Moreover, the court concluded “that the prayed for
    relief is denied and the status quo remain. Both parties should work toward
    ____________________________________________
    5 Senior Judge John C. Uhler was presiding at the time.
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    amicably untangling these complex title and boundary issues in a fashion
    designed to facilitate future land transfers.” Id. at 19.
    The McGoverns appealed, and a panel of this Court affirmed.           See
    McGovern, 1954 MDA 2013 (unpub. memo. at 1). The panel recognized that
    while tax claim deeds “can be evidence of ownership and title, it does not
    necessarily follow that all tax deeds qualify as prima facie evidence of good
    title.” Id. at 7. Furthermore, the panel stated:
    Here, the tax deed initially received by the Dolbins and then
    subsequently passed on to the McGoverns merely contains a
    description of the acreage of the property, a description of the
    condition of the land, and the township in which the property is
    located. The deed does not contain any other type of legal
    description that would allow for a survey to accurately define
    where the boundaries of the property exactly lie.
    Id. Lastly, the panel determined:
    The plaintiffs’ burden in an action in ejectment at law is
    clear: they must establish the right to immediate exclusive
    possession. Recovery can be had only on the strength of their
    own title, not the weakness of defendant’s title. The crux of an
    ejectment action, therefore, rests with the plaintiffs’ ability to
    identify, by a preponderance of the evidence, the boundaries of a
    parcel of land to which they are out of possession but for which
    they maintain paramount title.
    The McGoverns’ surveyor, Manhart, conceded during cross-
    examination that he had not specifically identified the 83 acres
    referenced in the tax claim deed. In this regard, plaintiff has the
    burden of presenting definite and certain evidence of the boundary
    of the property in controversy. Where the plaintiff is unable to
    establish his boundary line by adequate legal proof, his action
    must fail and he is not entitled to relief.
    The McGoverns, and to some extent Henne, the expert hired
    by East End, have cast doubt on the strength of the title held by
    East End. In their brief, the McGoverns relied on the perceived
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    relative weakness of, and cloud on, East End’s title to argue that
    the court should quiet title in their favor. However, unless and
    until the McGoverns have made a prima facie case by showing title
    sufficient upon which to base a right of recovery, the burden does
    not shift, and East End is not required to offer evidence of its title.
    If the McGoverns fail to establish proof of title with the required
    clarity, they cannot recover, no matter how defective East End’s
    title may be.
    For the reasons stated above, we are unable to conclude
    that the trial court erred. The trial court properly found that the
    McGoverns failed to meet the evidentiary standard that would
    allow the burden of proving superior title to shift to East End Gun
    Club. Because the McGoverns failed to make a prima facie
    showing of good title, the trial court was in no position to weigh
    the relative strength of the parties’ claims to the disputed area.
    Therefore, the remaining claims of error made by the McGoverns
    do not warrant further consideration.
    McGovern, 1954 MDA 2013 (unpub. memo. at 8-9) (citations omitted).
    Less than two months later, the Dolbins executed the Kowalczyk-
    Strang-Dolbin Deed to Appellants. “The legal description was the same one
    they used in the prior action, which [this] Court had found wanting.” Trial Ct.
    Op., 1/31/22 at 4.
    On March 11, 2015, Appellants filed with the Court of Common Pleas of
    Schuylkill County a quiet title and ejectment action in which they claimed
    superior title to East End over the Property. See East End Gun Club, 1458
    MDA 2019 (unpub. memo. at 4). “Several months later, East End received a
    Change in Assessment Notice from the Schuylkill County Tax Assessment
    Office informing it of a reduction in its assessment given the reduction in the
    acreage of East End’s property. East End deduced that Appellant[s’] quiet title
    and ejectment action triggered the assessment reduction, prompting East End
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    to contest the Board’s decision.” Id. The Board rejected East End’s challenge
    and East End filed an assessment appeal to the court of common pleas on
    October 7, 2015. See id. at 4-5.
    On November 5, 2015, East End also commenced the present action,
    seeking to quiet title its 150 acres, that included the Property. Appellants filed
    an answer with new matter and counterclaim, alleging East End’s ownership
    interest derived solely from the Strause Deed, which conveyed to the Trustees
    100 acres “more or less.”     East End Gun Club, 1458 MDA 2019 (unpub.
    memo. at 5). “East End filed its Reply admitting that the Strause [D]eed is
    within the chain of title but denying the implication that it owns less than the
    land it has occupied since 1930.”      Id.   Several days later, the trial court
    granted a petition filed by East End to intervene and added East End as a
    defendant to Appellants’ quiet title action. See id. The court subsequently
    consolidated Appellants’ quiet title action, East End’s quiet title action, and
    East End’s assessment appeal. See id.
    On December 7, 2015, Appellants filed preliminary objections, arguing:
    (1) the 1963 deed, that was attached to East End’s complaint, incorporated
    by reference the Strause Deed that conveyed only 100 acres of land “more or
    less[;]” and (2) the language “more or less” could not include the additional
    50 acres. Kowalczyk, 1303 MDA 2016 (unpub. memo. at 2). The trial court
    denied Appellants’ preliminary objections, and they were granted permission
    to appeal. A panel of this Court affirmed the trial court’s denial on the basis
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    that the Strause Deed was not attached to East End’s complaint, or even
    Appellants’ preliminary objections, and therefore constituted a speaking
    demurrer. Id. at 4.
    Thereafter, Appellants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in
    May of 2018.    In the motion, they argued that “East End could not, by a
    conveyance to itself, acquire title to 150 acres of land when the previous deed
    conveyed only 100 acres, more or less.”       East End Gun Club, 1458 MDA
    2019 (unpub. memo. at 5). East End filed its own motion for judgment on
    the pleadings, arguing that Appellants’ claims were barred under the doctrines
    of collateral estoppel and res judicata. See id. at 6. Appellants did not file a
    response. See id. On July 30, 2019, the trial court treated East End’s motion
    as uncontested and granted it, while also quieting its title to the Property,
    granting its assessment appeal, and dismissing Appellants’ counterclaim and
    its separate action to quiet title. See id. Appellants appealed, and a panel of
    this Court vacated the trial court’s order on the basis that the court erred by
    finding that East End’s motion was uncontested where Appellant had filed its
    own, earlier, motion for judgment on the pleadings. Id. at 11-12. Moreover,
    the panel determined: (1) East End’s right to succeed on its claim was “not
    certain at the time” the court entered its order nor was Appellants’ position
    “so lacking as to allow a court to deem East End’s complaint admitted and to
    grant East End’s motion without findings as to the facts therein alleged[;]” (2)
    the record did “not reflect a judicial determination by the trial court that East
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    End established quiet title through its pleadings and exhibits[;]” and (3) the
    principle of res judicata did not apply because the prior decision did not make
    a determination “on whether East End had superior title to the McGovern[s’]
    title, now held by Appellants, but the decision acknowledged that both
    Appellants and East End’s own expert, Devon Henne, declared that East End’s
    title was clouded.” Id. at 12-13.
    Upon remand, the instant matter then proceeded to a non-jury trial,6
    which was held on September 13, 2021. “At the outset, [Appellants] stated
    they would rest upon the record in the previous action, . . . and not present
    any additional evidence.” Trial Ct. Op., 1/31/22, at 4.
    East End again presented the testimony of Henne, “who was received
    as an expert in title abstract and land surveying work.” Trial Ct. Op., 1/31/22,
    at 4.
    [Henne] testified he reviewed the chain of title for the disputed
    land, including an examination of various warrants, patents and
    deeds from as early as 1793, abstracts of title from the State
    Game Commission and surveys from as early as 1839, including
    a 2007 survey done by the Dolbins’ expert, Walter Manhart. He
    acknowledged the property was always contested.          He also
    conducted a “complete boundary survey” of the property in 2014,
    which was after Senior Judge Uhler’s 2013 decision in the prior
    action.    He rejected [Appellants’] contention that a deed
    conveying 100 acres cannot convey 150 acres. He explained
    property can be described by reference to monuments, adjoinders
    and courses and distances, and where, as here, a description may
    be inconsistent, priority is given first to monuments, such as
    ____________________________________________
    6 The matter was transferred to a visiting senior judge, the Honorable Arthur
    R. Tilson.
    - 10 -
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    natural objects, landmarks or artificial monuments on the land,
    then to adjoinders, such as adjoining property, and only then to
    inconsistent courses and distances or, least reliable, a simple
    recitation of acreage. Further, he criticized Manhart’s research
    because it relied completely on tax maps prepared ten years after
    the tax sale, which he said was not proper surveying protocol. He
    said Manhart should have taken the chain of title back to a legal
    description that could be plotted or conducted a title search in
    order to connect that chain of title to an underlying title. Henne
    concluded that to a reasonable degree of professional certainty
    the disputed 50-acre parcel belonged to East End.
    ________________________
    2 To the extent the legal description [did] not close, as
    [Appellants] contend[ed], Henne attributed it to a
    “typographical error” in that a course in distance was
    omitted.    He said it was, nonetheless, a “perfectly
    acceptable surveying practice when a survey is clearly
    referenced in a deed to refer to the survey itself in order to
    correct the mistake that was made in the deed.”
    Id. at 4-5 (record citations omitted).
    On November 18, 2021, the trial court entered an order and opinion,
    ultimately concluding that East End was entitled to an order quieting title to
    the 150 acres, which included the Property.         The court first noted that it
    adopted East End’s September 22, 2021, findings of act and conclusions of
    law. See Opinion and Order of Court, 11/18/21, at 1. It also adopted five
    additional conclusions, which are as follows:
    1. Even if not barred by res judicata and/or collateral estoppel,
    [Appellants’] claim to title is based entirely on the claim of the title
    from the tax sale deed of September 14, 1950 which, as noted by
    [the 2014 McGovern decision], contains no legal description.
    [The trial c]ourt finds the reasoning of [the 2014 McGovern
    decision] to be persuasive, namely that a deed that contains no
    legal description of the property being conveyed is of no force and
    effect.
    - 11 -
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    2. Th[e trial c]ourt held a trial on September 13, 2021 and
    [Appellants] offered no additional evidence in support of their
    claim to title. [Appellants] have therefore failed to prove their
    claim to title and their request to [q]uiet title set forth in their
    [c]ounterclaim is therefore denied.
    3. At the trial . . ., [East End] offered extensive evidence of grants
    of property over the course of centuries that coincide with the
    property claimed to be owned by it, with boundaries as described
    in the survey attached . . . to [East End]’s [c]omplaint.
    4. [Appellants] offered no contrary evidence, nor did they question
    [East End]’s evidence. [The trial c]ourt agrees that [Appellants’]
    sole argument as to defeat [East End]’s title is that the statement
    in the 1930 Strause deed “100 acres more or less” is inconsistent
    with the later survey showing 150 acres.
    5. In light of [East End]’s evidence and in light of no showing that
    the Strauses did not intend to convey 150 acres in the 1930
    Strause deed, [East End] is entitled to an [o]rder quieting title to
    the 150 acres in question.
    Opinion and Order of Court, 11/18/21, at 1-2.
    On March 9, 2022, judgment was entered in favor of East End and
    against Appellants in accordance with the trial court’s November 11, 2021,
    verdict.7 This timely appeal followed.
    Appellants raise the following issues on appeal:
    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to review
    the record from the previous trial of this matter. . ., which was
    incorporated into the instant record by agreement of the
    parties[?]
    ____________________________________________
    7 Prior to judgment being entered, the matter was reassigned to Senior Judge
    Edward D. Reibman by order of December 22, 2021, effective January 3,
    2022. See Trial Ct. Op., 1/31/22, at 6 n.3.
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    2. Whether the trial court erred in failing to recognize that [East
    End] received only 100 acres in its deed from [the Strauses] in
    1930[?]
    3. Whether the trial court erred in failing to apply the principle of
    acquiescence[?]
    4. Whether the trial court erred in holding that [Appellants]
    offered no evidence to contradict [East End]’s claim, when the trial
    record from [the previous matter] contains significant evidence in
    favor of [Appellants’] claim and contradictory to [East End]’s
    evidence[?]
    5. Whether the trial court erred in accepting the testimony of [East
    End]’s expert, Devon Henne[?]
    6. Whether the trial court erred in shifting the burden of proof to
    [Appellants] to prove that [East End]’s grantor did not intend to
    convey more than he did[?]
    7. Whether the trial court erred in failing to apply the principle of
    law that one cannot convey what one does not own[?]
    8. Whether the trial court erred in ignoring the fact that the Tax
    Claim Bureau of Schuylkill County acted pursuant to the Act of
    Assembly in conveying to [Appellants’] predecessors in title 83
    acres of which the disputed area was a part[?]
    9. Whether the trial court erred in failing to give weight to the fact
    that no challenge was ever made to the legitimacy of the Tax
    Claim Bureau’s sale[?]
    10. Whether the trial court erred in failing to find that [Appellants
    are] presumptively the legitimate owner[s] of the said 83 acres of
    which the disputed acreage is a part[?]
    11. Whether the trial court erred by misconstruing [the 2014
    McGovern decision], in holding that deeds not containing a full
    metes and bounds description cannot convey title to real estate[?]
    12. Whether the trial court erred in failing to recognize that the
    description in [East End]’s deed is ineffective to convey [150]
    acres of real estate because the description fails to close its
    borders[?]
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    13. Whether the trial court erred in failing to apply the principle of
    law that an owner of real estate cannot disavow or impugn his/her
    own deed[?]
    Appellants’ Brief at 3-4. Based on the nature of Appellants’ claims, we will
    address them as follows: (a) issues one and four will be addressed together;
    (b) issues two and seven will be addressed together; (c) issue three; (d) issue
    five; (e) issue six; (f) issues eight, nine, ten, eleven will be addressed
    together; (g) issue twelve; and (h) issue thirteen.
    On appeal from a non-jury trial, this Court's scope and standard of
    review are as follows:
    Our appellate role in cases arising from non-jury trial
    verdicts is to determine whether the findings of the trial court are
    supported by competent evidence and whether the trial court
    committed error in any application of the law. The findings of fact
    of the trial judge must be given the same weight and effect on
    appeal as the verdict of a jury. We consider the evidence in a light
    most favorable to the verdict winner. We will reverse the trial
    court only if its findings of fact are not supported by competent
    evidence in the record or if its findings are premised on an error
    of law. However, where the issue concerns a question of law, our
    scope of review is plenary.
    The trial court’s conclusions of law on appeal originating
    from a non-jury trial are not binding on an appellate court because
    it is the appellate court's duty to determine if the trial court
    correctly applied the law to the facts of the case.
    Bank of New York Mellon v. Bach, 
    159 A.3d 16
    , 19 (Pa. Super. 2017)
    (citation omitted).
    (a) Issues One and Four
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    In their first issue, Appellants contend that the trial court abused its
    discretion by failing to review the record from the previous trial, which was
    incorporated into the present record by the agreement of the parties. See
    Appellants’ Brief at 18.    They point to the following statement in the trial
    court’s November 18, 2021, opinion and order: “[Appellants] offered no
    contrary evidence, nor did they question [East End’s] evidence.” Opinion and
    Order of Court, 11/18/21, at 2. Appellants claim that the August 2013 trial
    transcript established that the McGoverns, via their predecessors in title, “paid
    the real estate taxes on the premises[,]” and the transcript included “the
    report of the title abstractor tracing the title back through a chain separate
    and distinct from that of” East End. Appellant’s Brief at 18. Moreover, they
    allege that their own expert’s testimony revealed that “he prepared a legal
    description of the 67.9 acre parcel which he stated correctly identified the
    property in question” and “he concluded that [the McGoverns’ predecessors]
    were the owners of the premises including the 50 acre disputed area.” 
    Id. at 19
    .   Appellants maintain: “For the trial court to state that there was no
    evidence contrary to, nor any question presented to [East End]’s evidence can
    only lead to the conclusion that the trial court failed to examine the
    incorporated record.”      
    Id.
       Lastly, Appellant contend that while it is the
    province of the fact-finder to decide the weight and credibility of evidence, the
    trial court’s conclusion “makes clear that [it] failed to do so[.]” 
    Id. at 20
    .
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    In their fourth claim, Appellants argue the trial court erred in finding
    that they offered no evidence to contradict East End’s claim. See Appellants’
    Brief at 33. Appellants reference their first argument and state they provided
    “abundant” evidence to support their claim:
    testimony regarding the acquisition of title initially by the
    [Sellers], then to the McGoverns, the payment of taxes on the
    assessed value of 83 acres of vacant land; documentary in the
    form of maps, drawings and title report; and expert testimony
    from a professional surveyor who walked the property and opined
    that title to what was described in the 1950 [Tax Claim Bureau
    Deed] as 83 acres (but which, when surveyed on the ground and
    aerially resulted in 67.9 acres) is in the [Sellers] and their
    successors and includes the 50 acre disputed area.
    
    Id. at 34
    .    They allege “there is no support for finding that [Appellants]
    presented no contrary evidence to [East End]’s and did not question [East
    End]’s evidence [; rather] the exact opposite is true if the trial court had
    reviewed the prior record.” 
    Id. at 34-35
    .
    In dismissing the allegation that it did not consider the prior record, the
    trial court stated, “The parties agreed to incorporate the record of the prior
    action [at No. S-172-2009] into the present action. There is no evidence the
    court failed to consider it.” Trial Ct. Op., 1/31/22, at 6.
    We agree with the trial court’s determination as the record is replete
    with evidence the trial court was aware of the prior record and took it into
    consideration.    At the beginning of September 2021 trial, counsel for
    Appellants informed the court that he would be relying on the record of the
    No. S-172-2009 action.      See N.T., 9/13/21, at 5.      The 2014 McGovern
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    decision was marked as an exhibit during East End’s case-in-chief. See 
    id. at 65
    . Moreover, the following exchange occurred between the court and the
    parties relating to the No. S-172-2009 action:
    THE COURT: And we know [Appellants have] rested. And I’m
    supposed to review previous testimony; am I correct? Is that one
    of the reasons you didn’t present -- produce any other evidence?
    [Appellants’ Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor. Our testimony is included
    in the record of [No. S-172-2009].
    THE COURT: Okay.
    [Appellants’ Counsel]: And the exhibits attached thereto.
    
    Id. at 87
    . Additionally, in its November 18, 2021, opinion and order, the court
    specifically references the reasoning of the 2014 McGovern decision as
    “persuasive[.]”     Opinion and Order of Court, 11/18/21, at 1.      As such,
    Appellants’ argument is not supported by the record.
    Moreover, to the extent that Appellants claim the court erred by
    specifically stating that they “offered no contrary evidence, nor did they
    question [East End’s] evidence[,]”8 we note their argument is misplaced. It
    is clear the court meant they presented no new evidence to challenge East
    End’s supplemental evidence. Unlike Appellants, East End did not rest on the
    evidence they presented in the No. S-172-2009 action. Their expert, Henne,
    referred to new evidence at the trial, including testimony concerning a
    ____________________________________________
    8 Opinion and Order of Court, 11/18/21, at 2.
    - 17 -
    J-S18044-22
    “complete boundary survey” of the property that was completed in 2014,9 an
    addendum report completed in February 2015,10 and a survey report
    completed in August of 2021.11 Appellants’ counsel did not question Henne
    about this supplemental evidence; rather, counsel mainly focused on the
    “more or less” language of the Strause Deed. See N.T., 9/13/21, at 73-87.
    Accordingly, the trial court’s comment, while slightly ambiguous, was directed
    at Appellants’ failure to challenge East End’s supplemental evidence — and did
    not imply that Appellants failed to question any of the evidence. Accordingly,
    Appellants’ first and fourth arguments fail.
    (b) Issues Two and Seven
    In their second argument, Appellants claim the court erred in failing to
    recognize that East End received only 100 acres in the Strause Deed. See
    Appellants’ Brief at 20. They state:
    The only theory on which [East End] can base an expansion
    of a grant of “100 acres, more or less” into 150 acres is reliance
    on the phrase “more or less” in the description contained in the
    [Strause D]eed, that the reference to “100 acres” is an
    approximation, and that the grant in fact consisted of 150 acres.
    
    Id. at 21
    . Appellants rely on Marino v. Moffa, 
    68 Pa. Super. 621
     (Pa. Super.
    1918), Pittsburgh Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Surowski, 
    64 A.2d 854
     (Pa.
    ____________________________________________
    9 See N.T., 9/13/21, at 16, 58-59.
    10 See id. at 60-62.
    11 See id. at 67.
    - 18 -
    J-S18044-22
    Super. 1949), Pencil v. Buchart, 
    551 A.2d 302
     (Pa. Super. 1988), for the
    notion that the words “more or less” are words of “safety and precaution
    intended to overcome some slight or unimportant accuracy.” Appellants’ Brief
    at 22 (citation omitted). Moreover, they point to Dawson v. Coulter, 
    106 A. 187
     (Pa. 1919), for the principle that “more or less has little weight as against
    specific boundaries and is in its nature an uncertain method of description and
    often a mere estimate.” Pencil, 551 A.2d at 307, quoting Dawson, 106 A.
    at 188. Appellants contend:
    The holdings in these cases bear directly on the legal sufficiency
    of [East End]’s claim in the instant case: the manifest intent of
    the grantor controls. [East End]’s grantor intended a grant of 100
    acres subject to minor variation, hence the disclaimer “more or
    less.” A landowner cannot extend a 280 feet call by an additional
    35 feet, a 15% differential, by relying on the phrase “more or less”
    as in Pittsburgh Outdoor Advertising; nor can the owner of a
    tract described as 31 acres, more or less, acquire title to 40.29
    acres, a 29% differential, on the basis of a survey as in Buchart
    vs. Pencil. A fortiori [East End] cannot, as a matter of law,
    increase its acreage from 100 to 150, a 50% differential, by
    relying on the words “more or less” in its description since the
    intent of [East End]’s grantor to convey 100 acres was clearly
    manifest in the [Strause D]eed.
    Appellants’ Brief at 26.
    Relatedly, in their seventh issue, Appellants allege the trial court erred
    in failing to apply the principle of law that one cannot convey what one does
    not own. See Appellants’ Brief at 40. They refer to their second argument
    and contend:
    [I]t is only commonsense that one may not convey, even to
    oneself, what one does not own. Title to real estate can be
    acquired in only three ways, by inheritance, by conveyance or by
    - 19 -
    J-S18044-22
    adverse possession. There is no claim that East End acquired its
    interest by inheritance or by adverse possession, so those issue[s]
    can be set aside. East End’s claim must rise or fall on a theory
    that it acquired title to 150 acres by conveyance, that is, through
    the 1930 [Strause Deed] to the trustees of the East End Gun Club
    which conveyed a tract of “100 acres, more or less.”
    The issue then presented is whether a survey can convert
    100 acres, more or less to 150 acres. A survey never conveys
    title. Nor can deeding property to oneself increase one’s holdings
    beyond what one acquired by conveyance.
    Id. at 40. They claim that East End should be left with what it bargained for
    — 100 acres. Id. at 41.
    We begin with our well-settled standard of review:
    When reviewing an equitable decision, like a quiet-title action,3
    our scope and standard of review are deferential. As this Court
    has explained:
    We will reverse only where the trial court was palpably
    erroneous, misapplied the law, or committed a manifest
    abuse of discretion.       Where there are any apparently
    reasonable grounds for the trial court’s decision, we must
    affirm it. Moreover, the function of this Court on an appeal
    from an adjudication in equity is not to substitute our view
    for that of the lower tribunal; [we are] to determine whether
    a judicial mind, on due consideration of all the evidence, as
    a whole, could reasonably have reached the conclusion of
    that tribunal . . . when reviewing the results of a non-jury
    trial, we are bound by the trial court’s findings of fact, unless
    those findings are not based on competent evidence.
    Nebesho v. Brown, 
    846 A.2d 721
    , 725-726 (Pa. Super. 2004)
    (citations and some punctuation omitted).
    _____________________
    3 Quiet title is a legislatively created action that the Supreme
    Court of Pennsylvania eventually incorporated into the Rules
    of Civil Procedure. See Pa.R.C.P. 1061-1067. Although of
    statutory origins, a suit to quiet title is actually an equitable
    proceeding “descended from two suits in chancery — the bill
    - 20 -
    J-S18044-22
    of peace and the bill to remove cloud.” Enhancing the
    Marketability of Title: The Suit to Quiet Title, 68 YALE L.J.
    1266 (1959).
    Calisto v. Rodgers, 
    271 A.3d 877
    , 881 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc).
    We repeat the law concerning quiet title (with which the parties are well
    acquainted): “An action to quiet title is designed to resolve a dispute over the
    title to real estate of which the plaintiff is in possession. The plaintiff bringing
    a quiet title action has the burden of proof and must recover on the strength
    of its own title.” Woodhouse Hunting Club, Inc. v. Hoyt, 
    183 A.3d 453
    ,
    457 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations omitted).
    As mentioned above, the crux of Appellants’ appeal is the effect of the
    “more or less” language as it relates to the Strause Deed. When interpreting
    a deed, this Court previously has explained:
    [A] court’s primary object must be to ascertain and effectuate
    what the parties themselves intended. The traditional rules of
    construction to determine that intention involve the following
    principles. First, the nature and quantity of the interest conveyed
    must be ascertained from the deed itself and cannot be orally
    shown in the absence of fraud, accident or mistake. We seek to
    ascertain not what the parties may have intended by the language
    but what is the meaning of the words they used. Effect must be
    given to all the language of the instrument, and no part shall be
    rejected if it can be given a meaning. If a doubt arises concerning
    the interpretation of the instrument, it will be resolved against the
    party who prepared it. . . . To ascertain the intention of the
    parties, the language of a deed should be interpreted in the light
    of the subject matter, the apparent object or purpose of the
    parties and the conditions existing when it was executed. . . .
    In the absence of fraud, accident or mistake, the nature and
    quantity of the real estate interest conveyed must be ascertained
    from the deed itself and cannot be shown by parol. When the
    language of the deed is clear and free from ambiguity, the intent
    - 21 -
    J-S18044-22
    of the parties must be determined from the language of the deed.
    With respect to unambiguous deeds, a court must ascertain what
    is the meaning of the words used, not what may have been
    intended by the parties as shown by parol.
    Wright v. Misty Mt. Farm, LLC, 
    125 A.3d 814
    , 818-19 (Pa. Super. 2015)
    (citations omitted).
    In rejecting Appellants’ arguments, the trial court found the following:
    Henne concluded East End’s chain of title was not limited to
    100 acres when that chain included the Strause [D]eed that
    conveyed 100 acres “more or less” and a prior will in the chain,
    the Bartolet will, referred to 100 acres “and so forth.” Henne
    determined the boundaries of East End’s property as determined
    by its chain of title and then measured it. It contained 150 acres.
    [Appellants] presented no evidence to contradict those
    references. See, Phillips v. Crist, 
    33 Pa. Super. 445
    , 450 (1907)
    (“Description of land by quantity does not amount to a covenant
    that the land shall equal the quantity measured in the deed. The
    grantee has a right to all the land within the boundaries”).
    Trial Ct. Op., 1/31/22, at 8.
    A review of the record supports the trial court’s conclusion.     At the
    September 2021 trial, East End’s expert, Henne, testified that East End’s title
    to the 150 acres, including the Property, was derived from the following, inter
    alia: (1) an 1875 will bequeath from Abraham Bartolet to his son, Benjamin
    Bartolet;12 (2) an 1888 sheriff’s sale and resulting deed that conveyed the
    property to Winfield Hendricks;13 (3) an 1889 conveyance from Winfield
    ____________________________________________
    12 N.T., 9/13/21, at 33.
    13 Id. at 33-34.
    - 22 -
    J-S18044-22
    Hendricks to Fietta Bartolet (the wife of Benjamin);14 (4) an 1924 transfer
    from the Estate of Fietta Bartolet to Mary J. Bartolet;15 (5) an 1925 transfer
    from Mary J. Bartolet to Charles Strause;16 and (6) an 1930 transfer from
    Charles Strause to the Trustees of East End.17          Henne confirmed that his
    research strategy was to “circumvent or go around the property that’s in
    question and see who owned all the other property and that if they could get
    the descriptions of all of those[,] he could figure out what the parameters of
    the disputed property are.” N.T., 9/13/21, at 46.
    Henne read the description of the Strause Deed into the record, which
    is recited in full, as follows:
    All that certain tract of farmland together with all of the buildings
    located thereon situate in the Township of Wayne, County of
    Schuylkill, and State of Pennsylvania and bordering along the road
    at the foot of the Blue Mountains in said township. Bounded and
    described as follows: On the north and west by land now or late
    of Milton Scholl, on the east by land of Augustus N. Brensinger,
    and on the south by the land or lands now or late of J. M. Kauffman
    and others containing in acreage, 100 acres more or less.
    ____________________________________________
    14 Id. at 35.
    15 Id.
    16 Id. at 35-36.
    17 Id. at 36-37.
    - 23 -
    J-S18044-22
    N.T., 9/13/21, at East End Exhibit 2 (Research Report Prepared for East End
    Gun Club of Schuylkill Haven, 10/4/10, at 19).18 See also id. at 35-37.
    Henne responded in the affirmative that it was his “opinion to a
    reasonable degree of professional certainty that the land that is referred to as
    the disputed parcel belong[ed] to East End[.]” N.T., 9/13/21, at 72. He noted,
    “Although [East End]’s title is not without flaws, [it] has an unbroken chain of
    ownership back to the Bartolet’s.” Id. at 82.
    On cross-examination, Henne testified to the proper surveying
    protocols, indicating that adjoiners or monumentation received the top
    priority, then dimensions, bearings and distances, and “finally acreage.” N.T.,
    9/13/21, at 73-74. He further stated, “Acreage is the last of the priorities that
    a surveyor needs to consider when establishing the boundaries of a piece of
    property.”    Id. at 74.     Additionally, when asked about the “more or less”
    language, Henne explained: “[W]hatever the definition would be based on the
    monumentation or the adjoiners calls in the description.        That acreage is
    nothing more than an estimate. Until the property is defined by a survey, you
    cannot have an accurate estimation of the acreage that’s in that.” Id. at 85.
    He stated that based on that survey, the amount of land “can increase
    dramatically” or “decrease dramatically.” Id. Henne also indicated that when
    ____________________________________________
    18 We note that the language of the deed was taken from the 1925 deed from
    Mary J. Bartolet to Charles Strause but no one disputes that the Strause deed
    uses essentially the same language.
    - 24 -
    J-S18044-22
    the Trustees of East End deeded the property to East End, that was the first
    time the land was surveyed “since it was devised in Abraham Bartolet’s will”
    and “this was simply a matter of surveying what they owned based on the
    interpretation of that will and the adjoining calls that were made throughout
    the history of the title. This was the first time anyone could come up with an
    accurate depiction of how many acres they had.” Id.
    Henne also discussed the Kowalczyk-Strang-Dolbin Deed, which was
    based on the 1950 Tax Claim Bureau Deed. N.T., 9/13/21, at 38. He testified
    that he discovered through his chain of title research that the property
    involved in that transaction “might” be “at an entirely different location.” Id.
    at 44-45. Henne stated the “configuration end[ed] up looking considerably
    different than disputed [parcel,]” otherwise known as the Property. Id. at 45.
    Henne then confirmed Appellants’ property was “entirely outside of the
    disputed parcel” and did not “encroach at all on any lands owned” by East
    End. Id.
    Upon review, we conclude that the trial court’s decision is supported by
    competent evidence in the record. See Calisto, 271 A.3d at 881. At trial,
    East End offered evidence of the Strause Deed, as well as its 1963 deed,
    indicating that its 150 acres included the Property. It also offered the expert
    testimony of Henne, whom the trial court found credible, who opined that the
    language of the Strause Deed required him to first examine the wording
    regarding monumentation, as well as the bearing and distances, and that this
    - 25 -
    J-S18044-22
    language was sufficiently specific so that it could determine the location of the
    disputed area. See Hoover v. Jackson, 
    524 A.2d 1367
    , 1371-72 (Pa. Super.
    1987) (“Evidence of the acreage of land, especially where, as in this case, the
    number of acres is followed by the words ‘more or less’ has little weight as
    against specific boundaries and is in its nature an uncertain method of
    description and often a mere estimate. Where, however, . . . a doubt exists
    as to the actual location of the boundary and the writing contains no words to
    definitely fix the line by either metes and bounds or monuments on the
    ground, evidence of acreage becomes a material factor in the determination
    of the intention of the parties . . . .”) (citation omitted). As such, evidence of
    the acreage was not a material factor.19
    Furthermore, as pointed out by the trial court, Appellants failed to
    present any evidence rebutting these presentations, and only focused on the
    “more or less” language. Therefore, we concluded the trial court did not err
    when it relied upon the deed description in preference to the amount of
    acreage, including the language “more or less,” recited in the Strause Deed.
    Accordingly, Appellants’ second and seventh arguments fail.
    (c) Issue Three
    ____________________________________________
    19 Accordingly, Appellants’ reliance on Marino and those other cases is
    misplaced because acreage did not become a material factor.
    - 26 -
    J-S18044-22
    In their third argument, Appellants complain that the trial court erred in
    failing to apply the principle of acquiescence. See Appellants’ Brief at 28.
    They assert that from the time East End acquired the 100 acres via the Strause
    Deed and then the 1963 Deed, “it took no action to correct any supposed
    defect in its description. It allowed [the Property] to remain part of or be
    absorbed into another party’s holdings[,]” which were ultimately sold to the
    Palmers via the 1950 Tax Claim Bureau Deed. Id. at 30. Moreover, they
    state that it was not until 2009 when East End initiated “the first formal legal
    action by which [it] gave notice that it was disavowing its acquiescence in
    holding 100 acres.” Id. at 31. Appellants suggest: “Courts should not be in
    the business of redrawing boundary lines of real estate and adding or
    subtracting acreage where time and the parties have demonstrated their
    settled agreement as to those dimensions.” Id. They state that pursuant to
    Adams Twp. v. Richland Twp., 
    154 A.3d 250
     (Pa. 2017), “where a factfinder
    cannot ascertain the boundary line after hearing and review of extensive
    evidence, resort to the doctrine of acquiescence may resolve the dispute and
    bring an end to the uncertainty.” Appellants’ Brief at 31-32 (citation omitted).
    They claim the testimony “establishes that clear boundary lines cannot be
    ascertained” and that we “should apply the doctrine and hold that [East End]
    owns 100 acres and [Appellants] own[ ] 67.9 acres according to the
    boundaries the parties and their predecessors have observed and in which
    they have acquiesced for decades.” Id. at 32.
    - 27 -
    J-S18044-22
    The establishment of a boundary line by acquiescence for
    the statutory period of [21] years has long been recognized in
    Pennsylvania.
    Two elements are prerequisites: 1) each party must have claimed
    and occupied the land on his side of the line as his own; and 2)
    such occupation must have continued for the statutory period of
    [21] years. As recognized by the Superior Court and the common
    pleas court, the doctrine functions as a rule of repose to quiet title
    and discourage vexatious litigation.
    Zeglin v. Gahagen, 
    812 A.2d 558
    , 561 (Pa. 2002) (footnote & citations
    omitted; paragraph break added).
    Notably, a review of the record reveals that Appellants never raised this
    claim in their answer and new matter, nor did they raise it at the September
    2021 trial.     See Answer of Appellants, 3/26/18 at 5-6 (unpaginated).
    Moreover, in their brief, Appellants fail to point to whether they reserved this
    claim with the trial court.   See Appellants’ Brief at 28-33.      See Pa.R.A.P.
    302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised
    for the first time on appeal.”); see also Pa.R.C.P. 1032(a) (a party generally
    waives all defenses and objections which are not presented either by
    preliminary objection, answer or reply).
    Nevertheless, as East End points out, “the doctrine of acquiescence is
    employed where a fact finder cannot determine the location of a boundary”
    line. See East End’s Brief at 33. The underlying dispute here does not concern
    the location of a boundary; rather, it involves competing quiet title claims to
    the Property.    It merits mention that when East End’s counsel questioned
    Henne as to why his 2010 report, which was completed for the No. S-172-
    - 28 -
    J-S18044-22
    2009 action, did not focus on title issues or include a survey, Henne described
    the difference between quiet title and boundary disputes, stating:
    There’s a fine line between a title dispute and a boundary dispute.
    A boundary dispute involves a clear situation where two parties
    are actually arguing over a line.
    And in this case, the research indicated that we had two parties
    arguing over an entire piece of property. And in my mind, the
    research indicated that this was more of a title dispute than a
    boundary dispute. We weren’t arguing over measurements. We
    were arguing over ownership.
    N.T., 9/13/21, at 20. As such, even if Appellants had properly preserved the
    claim, it would not have been applicable because the matter did not implicate
    quiet title for boundary lines, which is necessary for a doctrine of acquiescence
    defense argument, but quiet title for acreage of land.20             Accordingly,
    Appellants’ third claim is unavailing.
    (d) Issue Five
    In their fifth claim, Appellants contend the trial court erred in accepting
    Henne’s expert testimony. See Appellants’ Brief at 35. They argue:
    Over objection the [trial c]ourt allowed [East End]’s expert,
    Henne, to testify as to his “opinion” as to what land was to be
    conveyed in the [Strause] deed [to the Trustees of East End]. It
    is submitted that this testimony should not have been admitted
    and must not be relied upon in determining the intentions of a
    ____________________________________________
    20 Moreover, as the trial court found: “The record indicates East End utilized
    the [Property] for hunting and also paid taxes on the property, thereby
    indicating it did not acquiesce in limiting its holding to 100 acres, and it rose
    to defend its claim when challenged by [Appellants].” Trial Ct. Op., 1/31/22,
    at 8.
    - 29 -
    J-S18044-22
    grantor in conveying land. Opinion testimony has long been held
    to be unreliable. . . .
    Expert testimony has value only when facts upon which it
    relies have been proven. The intent of [East End]’s grantor has
    not been proven, and indeed cannot be proven, as it was
    expressed in a deed created by the grantor more than 91 years
    ago. [East End]’s expert opinion is spun out of thin air in order to
    hypothesize what the parties should have done, or could have
    done 91 years ago, if they had had the benefit of the expert’s
    advice.
    It is submitted that the only objective evidence of [East
    End]’s grantor’s intent is the [Strause D]eed itself. The expert
    opined that [East End]’s grantor really meant to convey what the
    expert would have done.         This is rank speculation and is
    impossible to contradict except by saying that it is absurd and
    ridiculous. Obviously, Henne was not present when the Strause
    [D]eed was executed in 1930 so he can have no personal
    knowledge of the grantor, Strause’s, intent yet he opines that
    Strause’s intent was to grant 150 acres when his deed provides
    only 100 acres; nor is his opinion uncontradicted as it is
    contradicted by the deed itself; nor are there such assumed facts
    in the record to proffer such an opinion.
    Id.   at   36-37.     They   maintain    Henne’s    testimony    amounted    to
    “hypothecations” and the court erred by allowing “such speculation and
    whimsical testimony.” Id. at 37-38.
    “Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence lie within the sound
    discretion of the trial court[.]” Parr v. Ford Motor Co., 
    109 A.3d 682
    , 690
    (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (citation omitted). “[E]xpert testimony must be
    based on more than mere personal belief, and must be supported by reference
    to facts, testimony or empirical data.” Snizavich v. Rohm & Haas Co., 
    83 A.3d 191
    , 195 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations & quotation marks omitted). The
    - 30 -
    J-S18044-22
    standard for admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Pennsylvania
    Rule of Evidence 702, which provides as follows:
    A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
    experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
    opinion or otherwise if:
    (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
    knowledge is beyond that possessed by the average layperson;
    (b) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
    knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
    to determine a fact in issue; and
    (c) the expert’s methodology is generally accepted in the relevant
    field.
    Pa.R.E. 702(a)-(c).
    Notably, Appellants’ argument does not attack the three requirements
    set forth in Rule 702.     Moreover, East End emphasizes that Appellants
    requested the testimony and evidence from the No. S-172-2009 action be
    incorporated and admitted at the September 2021 trial and in the prior action,
    Henne was already qualified as an expert witness. See East End’s Brief at 35.
    As East End points out: “Appellants cannot complain that . . . Henne lacks the
    qualifications to testify as an expert, yet in the same breath introduce
    testimony and evidence admitted in the [No. S-172-2009 action] wherein . .
    . Henne was qualified as an expert.” 
    Id.
    Additionally, as mentioned above, Appellants submit that the only
    objective evidence of East End’s intent is the Strause Deed. Contrary to their
    assertion, Henne did rely on objective evidence — the language of the Strause
    - 31 -
    J-S18044-22
    Deed at the time the land was conveyed to East End’s predecessor. Moreover,
    he also relied on “previous description[s] where they were recited [to] connect
    them [in order] to understand what the intent was to be conveyed here.” N.T.,
    9/13/21, at 35. As analyzed infra, Henne provided specialized knowledge as
    to how the deed should be interpreted. Thus, Henne’s testimony parallels
    Appellant’s stance regarding the Strause Deed. Accordingly, Appellant’s fifth
    argument has no merit.
    (e) Issue Six
    In their sixth claim, Appellants argue the trial court erred in shifting the
    burden of proof to them to demonstrate that East End’s grantor did not intend
    to convey more than he did. See Appellants’ Brief at 38. Specifically, they
    aver:
    By placing on [Appellants] the burden of presenting
    evidence that Strause did not intend to transfer 150 acres of land
    to [East End], the trial court misapplied the law requiring a plaintiff
    to bear the burden of proving superior title to a preponderance of
    evidence, and instead placed on [Appellants] the impossible
    burden of proving a negative: that the grantor in a deed created
    more than 90 years before the trial did not intend to convey the
    disputed area.
    Id. at 39.
    Initially, we point out that Appellants filed a quiet title action regarding
    the Property in March of 2015, which was consolidated with East End’s quiet
    title action that was filed in November of 2015. Appellants ignore the fact that
    they technically share the same burden of proof with East End.
    - 32 -
    J-S18044-22
    Moreover, we recognize that the plaintiff bears the initial burden of proof
    for a prima facie case involving a quiet title action. See Woodhouse Hunting
    Club, Inc., 
    183 A.3d at 457
    . “Until and unless the plaintiff has made a prima
    facie case by showing title sufficient upon which to base a right of recovery,
    the defendant is not required to offer evidence of his title.”        Hallman v.
    Turns, 
    482 A.2d 1284
    , 1287 (Pa. Super. 1984). In other words, once the
    plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie claim of title, the burden of proof then
    shifts to the defendant to present evidence to establish his own title.
    Here, the trial court found East End presented “extensive evidence of
    grants of property over the course of centuries that coincide with the property
    claim to be owned by it[.]”      Opinion and Order of Court, 11/18/21, at 1.
    Consequently, the burden shifted to Appellants to present evidence to
    establish their own title.   See Hallman, 482 A.2d at 1287.           As the court
    correctly determined, Appellants did not offer any “additional evidence in
    support of their claim to title[,]” and therefore, they “failed to prove their claim
    to title[.]” Opinion and Order of Court, 11/18/21, at 1. The record supports
    the trial court’s conclusion and Appellants’ sixth claim warrants no relief.
    (f) Issues Eight, Nine, Ten, and Eleven
    In their eighth argument, Appellants assert the court erred in “failing to
    acknowledge the 1950 Tax Claim Bureau [D]eed as prima facie evidence of
    title to the premises including the disputed area.” Appellant’s Brief at 41.
    They maintain that “[i]t is beyond dispute that the tax sale deed is conclusive
    - 33 -
    J-S18044-22
    proof of ownership and title.” Id. at 42 (citation omitted). Additionally, they
    state:
    The Tax Claim Bureau . . . acted within its authority and issued a
    valid deed to [Appellants’] predecessors in 1950 without objection
    from [East End] or any other adjoining owner. The description
    was sufficiently specific for the Tax Assessment Office to assess
    the land and to plot the land on the assessment map. Indeed,
    none of the deeds in [East End]’s chain of title prior to the straw
    conveyance to itself contain a metes and bounds description,
    either.
    Id. (record citation omitted).
    In their nineth argument, Appellants suggest that the court erred in
    failing to give weight to the fact that no challenge was ever made to the
    legitimacy of the Tax Claim Bureau’s sale. See Appellants’ Brief at 43. To
    support their claim, they simply state:
    As argued above, since no challenge to the Tax Claim Bureau
    [D]eed issued in 1950 to [Appellants’] predecessors in title was
    ever challenged by [East End] or by any other property owner,
    that deed must be conclusively presumed to be definitive of the
    83 acre tract therein conveyed. The time for objection to the Tax
    Claim Bureau’s deed has long since passed and no objection
    should now be entertained.
    Id. at 43.
    In Appellants’ tenth claim, they allege the trial court erred in failing to
    find that they were presumptively the legitimate owners of 83 acres of land,
    which included the Property. See Appellants’ Brief at 43. They claim:
    The trial court's failure to recognize that the Tax Claim
    Bureau acted with full statutory authority granted to it by the Real
    Estate Tax Sale Law, and that the time for objection to the
    issuance of the 1950 has long since expired, led the trial court to
    conclude erroneously that there was no presumptive ownership of
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    J-S18044-22
    the disputed area in [Appellants’ deed]. This is contrary to law.
    The Tax Claim Bureau deed is conclusive proof of ownership and
    title and is prima facie evidence of title[.]
    Id. at 43-44.
    In their eleventh argument, they contend the trial court erred by finding
    that the 1950 Tax Claim Bureau Deed was not conclusive evidence of title,
    which they claim “is based on a misinterpretation of the [the 2014 McGovern
    decision], in holding that deeds not containing a full metes and bounds
    description cannot convey title to real estate.”       Appellants’ Brief at 44
    (footnote omitted). They allege that the “deed description . . . was sufficiently
    specific to allow the county assessment office to assess the property for taxes
    and to configure its location on the county tax map” and “to allow a
    professional engineer to plot out the precise boundaries of the parcel.” Id.
    (record citation omitted). Further, they state the 1950 Tax Claim Bureau Deed
    “should therefore have been found to conclusively . . . establish ownership of
    the premises including the disputed area[.]” Id. at 44-45.
    In rejecting these claims, the trial court determined:
    [Appellants] contend the trial court erred in failing to find
    the Tax Claim Bureau acted pursuant to law in conveying 83 acres
    of land that included the [Property] and that no challenge was
    ever made to the legitimacy of the Tax Claim Bureau’s power to
    convey real estate. Those issues were not before the court; there
    was no challenge to the authority of the Tax Claim Bureau to
    convey real estate or its actions in having conducted the upset
    sale and issued a deed to the Dolbins. The issue was whether the
    Tax Claim Bureau’s description of the property was sufficient to
    identify it. In the prior action, the court found the tax deed merely
    contained a description of the acreage of the property, the
    condition of the land and that it was located in Wayne Township.
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    J-S18044-22
    It did not contain any other type of legal description that would
    allow for a survey to accurately define its boundaries. See, e.g.,
    [Bannard] v. New York State Natural Gas Corp., 
    293 A.2d 41
    (Pa. 1972) (tax sale of land invalid where description of land is
    not sufficient to identify property taxed and sold).
    There was no need for the court to find [Appellants] were
    presumptively the owners of the 83 acres. Even if it had, the court
    concluded title to the disputed 50 acres was in East End based
    upon Henne’s boundary survey and examination of East End’s
    unbroken chain of title.
    Trial Ct. Op., 1/31/22, at 7-8.
    We agree with the trial court’s well-reasoned analysis while providing
    the following additional comments. First, there is no evidence the trial court
    incorrectly ignored the 1950 Tax Claim Bureau Deed or questioned its validity.
    Second, we note that the law of the case doctrine states that a court
    involved in the later phases of a litigated matter should not reopen questions
    “decided by another judge of that same court or by a higher court in the earlier
    phases of the matter.” Morgan v. Petrol Products Equip. Co., 
    92 A.3d 823
    ,
    827 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).
    Here, in support of their assertion that they provided substantial
    evidence to support their quiet title claim, Appellants essentially ask us to
    revisit the same evidence that was before this Court in the 2014 McGovern
    decision — the 1950 Tax Claim Bureau Deed and their predecessors’ expert’s
    (Manhart) testimony. However, it merits mention that in that prior decision,
    the panel considered this evidence and rejected these assertions, concluding:
    (1) the 1950 Tax Claim Bureau Deed did not satisfy the McGoverns’
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    J-S18044-22
    evidentiary burden because while “tax deeds can be evidence of ownership
    and title, it does not necessarily follow that all tax deeds qualify as prima facie
    evidence of good title[;]”21 (2) the 1950 Tax Claim Bureau Deed did not
    include a sufficient description because it “merely contain[ed] a description of
    the acreage of the property, a description of the condition of the land, and the
    township in which the property is located [but did] not contain any other type
    of legal description that would allow for a survey to accurately define where
    the boundaries of the property exactly lie[;]” 22 (3) Manhart “conceded” that
    he “had not specifically identified the 83 acres referenced in the tax claim
    deed.”23 We decline to reopen the issue of whether the 1950 Tax Claim Bureau
    Deed provided sufficient proof for Appellants to quiet title to the Property.24
    Accordingly, these four arguments fail, and we need not address them further.
    ____________________________________________
    21 McGovern, 1954 MDA 2013 (unpub. memo. at 6-7).
    22 Id. at 7.
    23 Id. at 8.
    24 One could also conclude that these claims are precluded based on collateral
    estoppel.
    [O]nce a court has decided an issue of fact of law necessary to its
    judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a
    suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first
    case. This doctrine is known as issue preclusion, or more
    traditionally, as collateral estoppel.
    *       *    *
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    J-S18044-22
    (g) Issue Twelve
    In their twelfth claim, Appellants assert the trial court erred in failing to
    recognize that East End’s deed description was “ineffective to convey” 150
    acres of land because “the description fail[ed] to close its borders.”
    Appellants’ Brief at 45. Specifically, they state: “An examination of the deed
    from [East End] to itself in 1963 revealed that the description did not close
    and was out 402 feet north and south and 168 feet east and west.” Id. (record
    citation omitted). Relying on Petition of Twp. Of N. Versailles, 
    190 A. 350
    (Pa. Super. 1937), they conclude that because East End’s deed description
    does not close, “it cannot prevail against the [the Kowalczyk-Strang-Dolbin
    Deed]” that Appellants recorded in 2014, which they claim “contains a legally
    ____________________________________________
    In Pennsylvania, issue preclusion is appropriately invoked when
    four conditions are met: First, the issue determined in the prior
    action is identical to that presented in the subsequent action;
    second, the previous judgment is final on the merits; third, the
    party against whom the defense is invoked was a party or in
    privity with a party in the first action; and fourth, the party against
    whom estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
    the issue on its merits in the prior action
    Rue v. K-Mart Corp., 
    691 A.2d 498
    , 500 (Pa. Super. 1997) (en banc)
    (citation & quotation marks omitted). Here, the sufficiency issue determined
    in the prior action is identical to the one presented in the present action.
    Second, the prior judgment was final on the merits. Third, Appellants were in
    privity to the McGoverns as subsequent landowners. Fourth, the McGoverns
    had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue on its merits in the prior
    action.
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    J-S18044-22
    sufficient description created by a professional engineer.” Id. at 46 (record
    citation omitted).
    In addressing this claim, the trial court found the following:
    [T]o the extent the legal description does not close, as
    [Appellants] contend, Henne attributed it to a “typographical
    error” in that a course in distance was omitted. He said it was,
    nonetheless, a “perfectly acceptable surveying practice when a
    survey is clearly referenced in a deed to refer to the survey itself
    in order to correct the mistake that was made in the deed.”
    Trial Ct. Op., 1/31/22, at 8 (record citation omitted).
    We agree with the trial court’s determination.        Moreover, it merits
    mention that Appellants’ reliance on Petition of Twp. Of N. Versailles is
    misplaced. In that case, the township petitioned to ascertain the location of
    a disputed boundary line with a neighboring borough. In their brief, Appellants
    cite the following passage from the case:
    Regarding the Miller-Martin description, the lower court calls
    attention to the fact that it will not close by more than 33 feet. As
    stated in the first opinion: “Because of its inaccuracies, the Miller-
    Martin description cannot prevail as against the McKinney survey
    and description, which accurately close. . .”
    Petition of Twp. Of N. Versailles, 190 A. at 354; see also Appellants’ Brief
    at 45.     However, Appellants omitted the remainder of the court’s
    determination:
    [T]he Miller-Martin description cannot prevail as against the
    McKinney survey and description, which accurately close, rest with
    exactitude upon fixed objects and are reasonably corroborated by
    the plans of railroad and steel companies, and by the description
    in deed from Matlack to Carnegie Steel Co., in 1892.
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    J-S18044-22
    Id. As East End points out, this Court “did not rule that unclosed boundaries
    are per se void[.]” East End’s Brief at 45. Appellants have failed to present
    other case law that would persuade us otherwise.
    Moreover, the survey at issue is the 1961 survey completed by Eliot
    Ziegler for East End Gun Club prior to the 1963 Deed. See N.T., 9/13/21, at
    47. Appellants fail to explain how the survey affects Henne’s research and
    conclusion that the Property “belong[ed] to East End[.]” N.T., 9/13/21, at 72.
    Accordingly, their penultimate issue fails.
    (h) Issue Thirteen
    In their final claim, Appellants argue the trial court “erred in failing to
    apply the precept of law that an owner of real estate cannot disavow or impugn
    his/her own deed.” Appellants’ Brief at 46 (emphasis omitted). They allege:
    A deed is the definitive document by which the quality of
    title and quantity of real estate held by a property owner is
    determined. To allow a property owner to vary by fiat the quality
    of title or the quantity of area conveyed in one’s deed impugns
    the sanctity of the document and destroys the certainty required
    in conveyancing.
    Id.   Moreover, they state East End attempted to “convey to itself greater
    acreage, therefore greater rights, than it acquired in [the Strause Deed]” and
    such “an attempt to disavow its own deed” is not permitted. Id. at 47.
    As discussed above, East End established that it owned the Property
    pursuant to the Strause Deed and subsequent 1963 Deed. Moreover, while
    the deeds may have referenced “100 acres more or less,” East End presented
    substantial evidence that that language in the deeds actually equated to 150
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    J-S18044-22
    acres, when the land was properly surveyed.          Contrary to Appellants’
    suggestion, there is no evidence to support their assertion that East End is
    attempting to convey to itself greater acreage than it acquired via the Strause
    Deed. Accordingly, their final argument has no merit.
    Judgment affirmed.
    President Judge Emeritus Bender joins the memorandum.
    Judge McLaughlin did not participate in the consideration or decision of
    this matter.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/7/2023
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