Com. v. Brunson, W. ( 2023 )

J-A17011-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
WILLIAM BRUNSON :
:
Appellant : No. 541 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 6, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0008747-2017,
CP-51-CR-0008748-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
WILLIAM BRUNSON :
:
Appellant : No. 542 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 6, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0008747-2017,
CP-51-CR-0008748-2017
BEFORE: KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED AUGUST 22, 2023
William Brunson (Brunson) appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court)
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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after a jury found him guilty of various sexual offenses committed against his
grandsons. On appeal, he challenges the weight of the evidence. We affirm.
At the end of a two-day jury trial held in July 2021, Brunson was
convicted of two counts each of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI)
with a child, indecent assault of a person under 13 years old, endangering the
welfare of a child and unlawful contact with a minor.1 The two victims were
Brunson’s grandsons: S.N. (born 2013) and S.C.W. (born 2011). The mother
of the two boys was Brunson’s daughter, Lucretia. Brunson committed the
offenses while living with Lucretia and her children (and several other family
members) in the home of the children’s great-aunt, Jaleecia. Because the
offenses were committed in June 2017, S.N. and S.C.W. would have been
three and six years old at the time of the offenses, respectively.
The trial summarized the evidence presented at trial as follows:
S.N. testified that on one occasion several years earlier,
when he was three or four, he was in Pop Pop’s bedroom, in the
city and county of Philadelphia, watching a movie with his older
brother S.C.W. and his Pop Pop, Defendant William Brunson. N.T.
Trial 6/9/21, at 53-56. S.N. testified that while in the room, Pop
Pop pulled down S.N.’s pants and Pop Pop put his penis in S.N.’s
butt. Id. at 56. S.N. further stated that Pop Pop used his hand
to physically cover S.N.’s mouth while Pop Pop put his penis in
S.N.’s butt and that S.N. tried to scream but could not. Id. at
103. S.N. testified that he was touched one time and that his Pop
Pop never put his penis in S.N.’s mouth. Id. at 65, 74. S.N.
testified that the incident ended when his uncle, Qaudir, came into
the room, saw what was happening, helped both children and they
ran and told their mom, Lucretia. Id. at 95-97.
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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3123(b), 3126(a)(7), 4304(a)(1) and 6318(a)(1).
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S.C.W. testified to an occasion four years earlier at his Aunt
Jaleecia's house, Jaleecia Wells, where he was called into his Pop
Pop’s bedroom along with his brother S.N. Id. at 110-12. At the
time, S.C.W. was six years old. Id. at 125. S.C.W. testified that
in the room Pop Pop touched S.C.W.’s butt with his “D” [penis]
and “that was it”. Id. at 118. Upon further examination, S.C.W.
testified that Pop Pop’s “D” went around his butt, not inside. Id.
at 120. S.C.W. further testified that Pop Pop then put his penis
around S.N.’s butt. Id. at 121. S.C.W. explicitly stated multiple
times that Pop Pop never put his penis in S.C.W.’s mouth or
anywhere other than around his butt. Id. at 121-23. S.C.W.
likewise testified to never observing Pop Pop put his penis in S.N.’s
mouth or anywhere other than around his butt. Id. S.N. testified
that he tried to escape but Pop Pop grabbed his arms and dragged
him back into the room. Id. at 159-60. The incident ended when
S.N. ran out of the room for help and told his mother. Id. at 152.
Jeffery Daly of the Philadelphia Police, Special Victims Unit
testified that on June 24, 2017, he was assigned to investigate the
alleged assault of S.N. and S.C.W., by their grandfather, William
Brunson. Id. at 167-68. In that capacity, he interviewed Lucretia,
the mother of the children. Id. He testified that she was the only
individual he interviewed and that he did not attempt to obtain
any evidence because the disclosure occurred four days after the
alleged assault. Id. at 171-72.
Baron Martin, Social Worker for Philadelphia Department of
Human Services, testified that he was assigned to an allegation of
child abuse at 123 West Ashmead Street in June of 2017. Id. at
196-200. As part of his investigation, he went out to that address
on June 25, 2017, where he met with Lucretia, the mother of the
children. Id. at 201. Mr. Martin testified he observed Lucretia to
be frantic. Id. Lucretia explained to Mr. Martin that William
Brunson had sexually assaulted the children while she ran out to
the deli. Id. at 202. Mr. Martin explained that his visit to the
home was unannounced and that he was not able to speak with
the children. Id. at 205. Furthermore, the children had not been
taken to a hospital for medical examination. Id. at 207. Upon
cross examination, Mr. Martin stated that while he attempted to
interview Lucretia regarding the allegations, she was not able to
specifically answer how the boys had been assaulted; rather, “she
said, I quote ‘he did it.’” Id.
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Lucretia testified that in June of 2017 she was living with
her aunt at 123 Ashmead with her two sons, S.C.W. and S.N. N.T.
Trial, 6/10/21 at 3-6. Lucretia testified that around June 24th she
was scrolling through social media when S.N. told her that Pop
Pop, whom she identified as her father William Brunson, had
shown him pictures with girls in ripped panties, like the pictures
Lucretia was looking at. Id. at 16. She stated at first she was
not concerned but later decided to follow-up on her son’s
statement. Id. at 15. She stated that S.N. told her that Pop Pop
was “humping on him.” Id. at 16. She stated that upon hearing
this, she went and confronted S.C.W. who also said Pop Pop had
been “humping on him” and stated that “it did not go in because
it hurted.” Id. at 17-18. Lucretia further testified that she and
her aunt then examined the children’s privates and noticed that
S.C.W.’s rectum was red. Id. at 19-20.
Lucretia further testified that she had left her sons in the
care of William Brunson on June 21, 2017, for a couple of hours
while she went to the laundromat. Id. at 87. She stated when
she left the house it was the afternoon and her sons as well as
some of the other children in the home were running around and
playing. Id. at 88. She stated when she returned the house
seemed normal, just messier from the playing, and that no one
complained about any inappropriate touching. Id. at 87-92.
Lucretia further stated that on the morning of June 24th, the day
her children disclosed, she had previously gotten into an argument
with Mr. Brunson for an unrecalled reason and had kicked him out
of the home. Id. at 48, 94.
Christian Dozier, forensic interviewer for Philadelphia
Children’s Alliance testified to conducting a forensic interview of
S.N. and S.C.W. on July 12, 2017. Id. at 125-126. Ms. Dozier
testified to noting S.N.’s inability to explain what happens when
people lie and what would happen if someone lied to his mother.
Id. at 131. Ms. Dozier further testified that she was not concerned
with the three-week delay between disclosure and interview,
although she acknowledged the importance of interviewing
children as close to disclosure as possible. Id. at 143-45.
Additionally, S.N. testified that he spoke with his mother after Pop
Pop was arrested and his mother told him what to say and how to
say it. Id. at 99.
The Commonwealth presented a video-taped interview of
S.N. conducted at Philadelphia Children’s Alliance on July 12,
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2017. In the video, S.N. stated that Will [Defendant] pulled his
pants down and put his dick in his and S.C.W.’s butt cheeks. He
stated that Will put his dick on the floor and asked to be his
boyfriend. At first, S.N. stated that nothing happened with his
mouth but later in the interview said that Will put his dick in both
his mouth and his brother’s. S.N. stated that his brothers, Zadeek
and Quadir were present. S.N. further stated that he was shown
naked pictures and that Tayone[, an older family member,] was
in them. S.N. described Will as a bitch and as gay but was not
able to answer what it means to be gay.
The Commonwealth presented a video interview of S.C.W.
conducted at Philadelphia Children’s Alliance on July 12, 2017.
S.C.W. stated that Pop Pop showed him naked pictures, put his
“D” in his mouth, and humped on him. S.C.W. stated that his dick
went on the outside of his butthole and it felt sloppy and hairy.
S.C.W. stated that he threw up after Will put his penis in his mouth
and made a gagging gesture. He further stated that it happened
on more than one day and on days when Pop Pop got smart with
his mom.
Jaleecia Wells testified that in June of 2017 her niece,
Lucretia, awoke her crying that William Brunson had touched her
children, S.N. and S.C.W. Id. at 161-62. She testified that she
asked to check the kids but S.C.W. said no. Id. at 162-63. Ms.
Wells further stated that S.N. told her that Pop Pop “touched me
down there”, that “he would jerk off in the middle of their butts”
and make them watch “nasty videos.” Id. at 166-67. Ms. Wells
stated that she examined S.N.’s butt and noticed redness as well
as something “linty, like somebody tried to wipe it off.” Id. at
167. Ms. Wells testified that her examination of S.N. took place
on June 24, 2017, four days after the incident. Id.
Ms. Wells further testified to being present when Lucretia
spoke to police but to not having made a statement herself at such
time. Id. at 165-66, 172. Ms. Wells did not recall ever speaking
to any DHS worker but did recall a worker coming out to the
house. Id. at 173. Medical records were presented by stipulation
of counsel indicating that both S.C.W. and S.N. were evaluated at
Saint Christopher’s Hospital for Children on June 25, 2017, at 9
p.m. Both children were evaluated for alleged sexual assault to
mouth and anus and neither child displayed any associated
symptoms; rather both children appeared healthy, with normal
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genitalia and anus, and had no complaints of pain, vomiting, or
discomfort. Id. at 180-183.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/31/22, at 1-6 (cleaned up; footnotes omitted).
On October 6, 2021, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of 6
to 15 years’ imprisonment for both counts of IDSI and no further penalty on
the remaining counts. After sentencing, Brunson filed a timely post-sentence
motion for a new trial alleging that the jury’s verdict was against the weight
of the evidence. That motion was denied by operation of law on February 15,
2022, after which Brunson filed this appeal.2 On appeal, he challenges the
denial of his post-sentence motion to set aside the jury’s verdict as being
against the weight of the evidence.3
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2 The order denying the post-sentence motion by operation of law listed both
trial court dockets. When a single order resolves issues arising on more than
one docket, separate notices of appeal must be filed from that order at each
docket. See Commonwealth v. Young, 265 A.3d 462, 477 (Pa. 2021).
Brunson filed a notice of appeal at each separate trial court docket number,
listing both docket numbers on each notice. See Commonwealth v.
Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141, 1148 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc). We consolidated
the appeals sua sponte.
3 Our standard of review for a challenge to the denial of a motion for a new
trial based on the weight of the evidence is well settled.
A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against
the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the
trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere
conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts
would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of
the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts,
certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them
or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.
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I.
On appeal, Brunson raises several arguments for why the jury’s verdict
was against the weight of the evidence. First, he alleges that the boys’ mother
fabricated the allegations because she admitted that she disliked Brunson and
wanted him out of the house. Second, he contends that the boys were
coached on what to say because both contradicted their forensic interviews in
trial in the same manner. Third, he emphasizes that there was no physical
evidence of injuries to corroborate the boys’ allegations. Fourth and finally,
Brunson alleges that the jury ignored character evidence that he admitted at
trial.
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An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a
weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review
applied by the trial court. Appellate review of a weight claim is a
review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question
of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
To successfully challenge the weight of the evidence, a defendant
must prove the evidence is so tenuous, vague and uncertain that
the verdict shocks the conscience of the court.
Commonwealth v. Arias, 286 A.3d 341, 352 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citations
and quotation marks omitted).
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A.
Brunson first contends that the boys’ mother fabricated the allegations
against Brunson because of her hatred for him and that she enlisted her two
sons to lie about the abuse to get him out of house. In support, Brunson notes
that she admitted at trial that before the boys disclosed the abuse to her, she
was angry with Brunson.
Q. When is the last time you saw your father, prior to today?
A. The day that my son told me everything, we was arguing that
morning.
Q. About what?
A. I did not like him for some reason. I don’t know if it was me
pregnant, but my feelings was just not right with him.
Q. What do you mean?
A. Like I just did not like him. Just to look at him just made me
mad.
Q. Why?
A. That’s the thing, I didn’t know. Maybe it was my pregnant
emotions. Like, I was pregnant, I mean maybe just the pregnant
emotion, but something did not sit right with me with him.
N.T., 6/10/21, at 48.
While the boys’ mother admitted to having a frayed, contentious
relationship with her father, it was the jury’s prerogative to determine her
credibility and whether she fabricated the allegations. See Commonwealth
v. Wallace, 244 A.3d 1261, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2021) (“The weight of the
evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact, which is free to believe all, part,
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or none of the evidence, and to assess the credibility of the witnesses.”)
(citation omitted). That the boys’ mother testified that she was upset with
Brunson before she contacted the police does not equate to an abuse of the
trial court’s discretion where it concluded that the verdict was not against the
weight of the evidence. Rather, it appears that the jury credited the children’s
testimony about the abuse as truthful and rejected Brunson’s argument that
the boys’ mother fabricated the allegations and coaxed her two sons into lying
about the abuse. Under such circumstances, we will not intrude on the jury’s
credibility determination and find that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying a new trial. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 195 A.3d 594, 601 (Pa.
Super. 2018) (rejecting weight of the evidence claim that victim had motive
to fabricate because jury viewed and credited victim’s testimony); see also
Commonwealth v. Tharp, 830 A.2d 519, 528 (Pa. 2003) (“A verdict is not
contrary to the weight of the evidence because of a conflict in testimony”);
Commonwealth v. Furness, 153 A.3d 397, 404 (Pa. Super. 2016) (rejecting
defendant’s weight claim and explaining that credibility and conflicts in
evidence are for the fact-finder to resolve; a reviewing Court may not disturb
these findings).
B.
Brunson’s second argument is similarly premised on his contention that
the boys lied about the allegations and were coached by their mother about
what to say. Brunson bases this contention on the inconsistencies between
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the boys’ forensic interviews and their trial testimony. On this point, Brunson
highlights that each boy’s testimony varied in the same ways; namely, the
frequency and the type of abuse. He points out that the boys told the forensic
interviewer that the abuse was both anal and oral and happened several times,
while at trial, the boys testified that the abuse was only anal and happened
only once. Brunson also notes that the boys’ testimony about revealing the
abuse differed from the boys’ mother’s claims about how the boys disclosed
the abuse.
Again, however, it was for the jury to resolve the inconsistencies in the
boys’ testimony about what kind and how often Brunson abused them.4
Indeed, as noted above, “the jury was the ultimate fact-finder and the sole
arbiter of the credibility of each of the witnesses.” Commonwealth v.
Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1080 (Pa. 2017). “Issues of witness credibility
include questions of inconsistent testimony...” Id. at 1081 (citation omitted).
“A jury is entitled to resolve any inconsistencies in the Commonwealth’s
evidence in the manner that it sees fit.” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, the jury heard both the boys’ testimony and viewed their forensic
interviews from July 2017 about the abuse. While there were inconsistencies
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4 Contrary to Brunson’s argument, S.N. did not testify at trial that Brunson
only abused him anally. Instead, S.N. testified that he saw Brunson “put his
penis in my brother’s mouth and his butt.” N.T., 6/9/21, at 63. When asked
if he did the same thing to him, S.N. replied, “Yes.” Id.
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between the testimony and interviews, none of the inconsistencies rose to the
level required for this Court to reverse the determination of the trial court,
which had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence, concerning the weight
of the evidence. See Cramer, supra at 601 (when trial court finds a verdict
not against the weight of the evidence, appellate court must give gravest
consideration to trial court’s conclusion because it had opportunity to hear and
see evidence presented).
C.
Brunson next focuses on the lack of any physical evidence to corroborate
that he abused the boys. At trial, the parties entered into a stipulation that
the boys’ mother took them to the hospital on June 25, 2017, because of the
allegations. Neither child had any tears or lacerations, nor any rashes or
abrasions; both were tested for sexually transmitted diseases and found to be
negative. Furthermore, because the alleged abuse happened four days before
the examination, no evidence collection kit was used. See N.T., 6/10/21, at
180-83. Brunson believes that the absence of any physical evidence
corroborating the abuse claims supports his contention that the allegations
were fabricated.
However, “the uncorroborated testimony of a sexual assault victim, if
believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient” to sustain a conviction. See
Commonwealth v. Diaz, 152 A.3d 1040, 1047 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation
omitted); see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 3106 (explaining that the “testimony of a
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complainant need not be corroborated in prosecutions” for sexual offenses).
That the Commonwealth did not present evidence about the boys suffering
any injuries as a result of the abuse is of little import, as the examination did
not occur until several days after the alleged abuse. The jury was free to
determine what weight to give to the lack of any corroborating physical
evidence, and we will not disturb the trial court’s determination concerning
weight on this basis. Here, the jury credited S.N. and S.C.W. about what
happened, and their testimony was sufficient on its own to support its verdict.
See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 479 (Pa. Super. 2018)
(holding that a victim’s testimony alone, if believed by the fact-finder, is
sufficient to sustain a conviction).5
Brunson also contends that this case is factually analogous to
Commonwealth v. Karkaria, 625 A.2d 1167 (Pa. 1993). There, our
Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction of forcibly raping his 14-
year-old stepsister, holding that the Commonwealth’s evidence, in its entirety,
was so unreliable and contradictory that the conviction could not have been
based upon anything other than conjecture and surmise. In so doing, the
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5 We also reject Brunson’s argument that the jury’s verdict is against the
weight of the evidence because the police failed to obtain Brunson’s cell phone
records to corroborate that he showed the children pornographic materials.
Like the lack of any physical evidence, the jury was free to determine what
weight to give to the police decision not to obtain Brunson’s cell phone records
to check his browser history. At trial, the investigating detective testified he
was not an expert on the matter and was not sure if he would have been able
to obtain such records. See N.T., 6/9/21, at 187.
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Court acknowledged that questions of credibility are to be resolved by the
finder of fact and the verdict will not be disturbed if the evidence is credible,
but also recognized the following:
This concept, however, must be distinguished from an equally
fundamental principle, that a verdict of guilt may not be based
upon surmise or conjecture. Following this principle, courts of this
jurisdiction have recognized that where evidence offered to
support a verdict of guilt is so unreliable and/or contradictory as
to make any verdict based thereon pure conjecture, a jury may
not be permitted to return such a finding.
Id. at 1170 (citations omitted).
With this in mind, our Supreme Court determined that the record was
“riddled with inconsistencies” and observed that the victim’s testimony was
“disturbingly vague,” thus casting “serious doubt upon the jury’s ability” to
find that the crime of rape occurred during the time alleged. Id. at 1171. The
alleged rape victim could not provide the date of any alleged assault, and in
her initial report to police, was unable to recall the defendant ever penetrating
her. Id. Additionally, other witnesses testified that the defendant was rarely
in the home during the charged time. Id. As a result, our Supreme Court
held that the evidence, “carefully reviewed in its entirety, is so unreliable and
contradictory that it is incapable of supporting a verdict of guilty, and thus, is
insufficient as a matter of law.” Id. at 1172.
After review, we do not agree with Brunson’s contention that this matter
is like Karkaria where the trial court rendered a verdict based solely upon
vague and contradictory evidence that failed to establish the elements of the
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crimes charged. First, there is no dispute that the boys’ testimony and their
forensic interviews contained inconsistencies about what happened; namely,
about whether Brunson abused them both anally and orally, as well as how
many times it happened. That said, there was no such evidence rendering
the boys’ claims impossible. Thus, despite some mere inconsistencies in the
evidence, the jury credited S.N.’s and S.C.W.’s testimony that Brunson
committed the sexual offenses against them while he was living with them.
In contrast, in Karkaria, the alleged victim’s own testimony disproved
her allegations of rape because the timeframe when she said the rapes
occurred was contradicted by uncontested evidence about when the defendant
and his brother would have been in the house, thus making her claims
factually impossible when she claimed they happened. In contrast, here, while
there were inconsistencies concerning certain aspects of the Commonwealth’s
evidence, there was no evidence that would render the boys’ allegations
factually impossible like that involved in Karkaria. In the absence of such
evidence, we will not disturb the trial court’s determination that the jury’s
verdict was against the weight of the evidence. See Commonwealth v.
Izurieta, 171 A.3d 803, 809-10 (Pa. Super. 2017) (affirming denial of
defendant’s weight of the evidence claim based on argument that minor victim
was not credible and testified inconsistently because determination of victim’s
credibility was within exclusive province of the jury).
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D.
In his fourth and final argument, Brunson argues that the jury’s verdict
was against the weight of the evidence because he presented three witnesses
at trial who testified about his law-abiding reputation. Again, however, it was
within the jury’s prerogative as fact-finder to determine what weight (if any)
to give these character witnesses and weigh it against the testimony of his
two grandsons that he committed the sexual offenses against them in June
2017. Even if the jury credited this character evidence, it was still free to
credit the boys’ testimony and convict Brunson of the offenses. Accordingly,
for all these reasons, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
denial of Brunson’s motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence.
See Commonwealth v. Brown, 212 A.3d 1076, 1085 (Pa. Super. 2019)
(finding no abuse of discretion in trial court’s rejection of weight claim where
defendant presented his own testimony and several character witnesses).
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/22/2023
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