Com. v. Fortune, L. ( 2023 )

J-S18041-23
2023 PA Super 158COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
LANCELOT FORTUNE :
:
Appellant : No. 2687 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 29, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-45-CR-0000495-2018
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 29, 2023
Appellant Lancelot Fortune appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County after a jury convicted
Appellant of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of tampering
with/fabricating evidence. Appellant claims the trial court erred in precluding
him from offering an insanity defense and in denying the public defender’s
request to withdraw due to an alleged conflict of interest. We affirm.
The trial court summarized the factual background of this case:
On January 15, 2018, Pocono Township Police Department
officers were dispatched to conduct a welfare call at a residence
located at 145 Marcelle Terrace, Pocono Township. Upon arrival,
officers discovered one deceased male, identified as Richard B.
Fells, in the garage and one deceased female, identified as Sharon
Fortune Fells (hereinafter “Victims”), inside the residence on a
couch. Both Victims appeared to have suffered multiple stab
wounds.
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Upon speaking with the Victim’s daughter, Selina Taylor,
officers learned that [Appellant] lived at the Victims’ residence on-
and-off for years. Taylor stated that [Appellant] had not lived at
the residence for approximately one year, but still frequented the
residence. In addition, Taylor stated that [Appellant] resided at
814 Sarah Street in Stroudsburg.
On January 15, 2018, a search warrant was executed at 145
Marcelle Terrace and the curtilage. Passive blood drops were
observed throughout the first floor of the residence. In addition,
several kitchen knives with apparent blood transfer on them were
observed on the kitchen counter. Further, bloody shoe print
impressions were observed on the garage floor leading away from
the male victim. Finally, on a piece of board located on the
stairway leading to the house from the garage, a fingerprint in
apparent dried blood was recovered. That same day, the
fingerprint was preliminarily identified as matching the right
middle finger of [Appellant].
Following the fingerprint identification, officers went to
[Appellant’s] residence at 814 Sarah Street and encountered
[Appellant], who presented with several small scratches on his
face. A search warrant was executed on [Appellant’s] residence
and uncovered blood on the interior of the entrance, a bloody shirt
from the bedroom, and a pair of black sneakers containing a tread
pattern consistent with those observed in the Victims’ garage. As
a result, [Appellant] was detained and transported to the PSP
Stroudsburg barracks.
While in custody, [Appellant] was provided a Miranda
Rights Warning and Waiver. [Appellant] waived his Miranda
rights and related that he had stabbed Sharon Fortune Fells
multiple times in the throat while she rested on the living room
couch. In addition, [Appellant] related that he knew Richard Fells
would be returning shortly and waited in hiding behind the door
leading to the garage. Upon Richard Fells’ return, [Appellant]
related that he stabbed the Victim multiple times in the neck and
body.
After killing the Victims, [Appellant] admitted to taking the
Victims’ Lincoln Navigator and leaving the scene. [Appellant]
related that he drove to his apartment, changed clothes, then
drove to the Philadelphia area where he watched the movie
Jumanji at a movie theater in King of Prussia and stayed overnight
at a hotel. In addition, [Appellant] related that he threw the
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murder weapon into the river at Penn’s Landing and discarded
clothing in the surrounding area. Following this trip to the
Philadelphia area, [Appellant] returned to the scene, left the
Victims’ vehicle in the driveway, and returned to his apartment.
Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 11/14/22, at 2-3.
Appellant was charged with the aforementioned offenses in connection
with the Victims’ deaths. Thereafter, Appellant submitted to competency
evaluations by both parties. On November 20, 2018, the trial court held a
hearing pursuant to the Mental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”) at which it
found Appellant was incompetent to stand trial. The trial court cited to the
expert report of Dr. Robert Morrow, M.D., who diagnosed Appellant with
paranoid schizophrenia and indicated that Appellant “continues to be grossly
psychotic.” Order, 11/20/18, at 1. Based on Dr. Morrow’s recommendation,
the trial court directed that Appellant be committed to a state hospital.
Further, the trial court ordered that all proceedings be stayed as long as
Appellant’s incompetency persisted.
Nearly one year later, on September 4, 2019, at a subsequent MHPA
hearing, the trial court determined that Appellant had regained competency
to stand trial. The trial court based its decision on the testimony of Dr. William
Hoctor, Jr., M.D., who attributed the improvement to Appellant’s consistent
treatment and medication. Appellant was transferred to the Monroe County
Correctional Facility.
Prior to trial, Appellant filed notice of his intent to seek an insanity
defense pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 568. Appellant provided that he would offer
the expert testimony of Dr. Morrow, who would testify that Appellant suffered
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from a mental disease, namely paranoid schizophrenia. In addition, Appellant
indicated that he planned to call numerous lay witnesses to testify as to
Appellant’s general mental health and their observations of Appellant near the
time of the Victims’ murders.
On May 25, 2021, the Commonwealth filed a Motion In Limine to
Preclude Insufficient Insanity Defense, emphasizing that Dr. Morrow authored
an expert report indicating that while Appellant suffered from paranoid
schizophrenia, Dr. Morrow opined that Appellant did not meet the legal
standard for insanity as there was evidence showing that Appellant had
volitional control over his actions and knew what he did was wrong.
On June 15, 2021, the trial court entered an order and opinion granting
the Commonwealth’s motion in limine and specifically providing that Appellant
was “precluded from raising a defense of insanity at trial.” Order, 6/15/21, at
1. The trial court concluded that Appellant could not, as a matter of law,
establish an insanity defense without presenting expert testimony concluding
that Appellant was legally insane.
Appellant proceeded to a jury trial at which he was convicted of two
counts of first-degree murder and one count of tampering with/fabricating
evidence. Thereafter, on September 29, 2022, Appellant was sentenced to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Appellant filed a timely notice
of appeal and complied with the trial court’s direction to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
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I. Did the court commit an error of law in prohibiting
[Appellant] to testify in order to establish the defense of
insanity?
II. Did the court abuse its discretion by denying the Monroe
County Public Defender’s [Motion] to Withdraw from the
case due to a conflict of interest?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
First, Appellant claims the trial court committed an error of law in
precluding him from raising an insanity defense. Although Appellant concedes
that his expert witness concluded that he was not legally insane, Appellant
asserts that he should have been permitted to present an insanity defense for
the jury’s consideration based on the testimony of his expert and several lay
witnesses as well as his own testimony.
To evaluate Appellant’s specific argument, it is helpful to set forth the
law applicable to an insanity defense. It is well-established that “criminal
defendants may be presumed sane for purposes of determining their criminal
liability.” Commonwealth v. Rabold, 951 A.2d 329, 341 (Pa. 2008) (quoting
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 766 (2006)). As a result, a defendant has
the burden of proving an insanity defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 315(a) (“[t]he mental soundness of an actor engaged in
conduct charged to constitute an offense shall only be a defense to the
charged offense when the actor proves by a preponderance of evidence that
the actor was legally insane at the time of the commission of the offense”).
Section 315 of the Crimes Code contains the following definition of legal
insanity:
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(b) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the phrase “legally
insane” means that, at the time of the commission of the offense,
the actor was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he
was doing or, if the actor did know the quality of the act, that he
did not know that what he was doing was wrong.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 315. This definition of legal insanity (often referred to as the
“M’Naghten rule”) is derived from the common law principle set forth in the
seminal case of Regina v. M’Naghten, 9 Eng.Rep. 718 (1843). See Rabold,
951 A.2d at 348 n.1.1 Our courts have provided that:
[t]o plead the defense of insanity suggests that the defendant
committed the act, but was not legally culpable. Commonwealth
v. Mizell, 493 Pa. 161, 164, 425 A.2d 424, 426 (1981). An
insanity defense focuses upon a defendant's capacity, at the time
of the offense, to understand the nature and quality of his actions
or whether he knew that his actions were wrong.
Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 319 n. 29, 865 A.2d
761, 788 n. 29 (2004).
Commonwealth v. Yasipour, 957 A.2d 734, 738–39 (Pa.Super. 2008).
Further, this Court has clarified that:
The rule sets forth two separate and distinct aspects of the
defense in Pennsylvania: a cognitive incapacity prong and a moral
incapacity provision. Where the defendant alleges that he did not
know what he was doing, he is presenting a cognitive incapacity
insanity defense. On the other hand, if the defendant submits that
he did not understand that what he was doing was wrong, he is
advancing a moral incapacity defense.
Commonwealth v. Andre, 17 A.3d 951, 958–59 (Pa.Super. 2011).
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1 See also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 314(d) (“Nothing in this section shall be deemed to
repeal or otherwise abrogate the common law defense of insanity
(M’Naghten’s Rule) in effect in this Commonwealth on the effective date of
this section”).
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Appellant claims the trial court should have allowed him to present an
insanity defense through the testimony of his expert, Dr. Morrow, as well as
multiple lay witnesses. Appellant desired to offer Dr. Morrow to testify to
Appellant’s schizophrenia diagnosis to establish that Appellant was laboring
under a “disease of the mind” as set forth in Section 315.
Appellant also indicated that he intended to offer the testimony of
numerous lay witnesses in support of his insanity defense. Appellant’s
proposed lay witnesses included five troopers who spoke with and observed
Appellant on the day of his arrest, Appellant’s father to testify as to the
timeline of events that led up to the Appellant’s diagnosis of schizophrenia as
well as the Victims’ murders, several family members to testify about their
observations of Appellant three weeks prior to the Victim’s murder, and a
neighbor to testify that he observed Appellant three hours before the murder.
The Commonwealth has argued that Appellant is not entitled to raise an
insanity defense as a matter of law as his expert witness, Dr. Morrow, opined
that while Appellant suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, he does not meet
the legal standard for insanity in light of the evidence of record. Dr. Morrow
provided the following in his expert report:
[Appellant’s] past psychiatric history [is consistent] with a
diagnosis of Paranoid Schizophrenia … As to whether [Appellant]
might be considered criminally insane at the time of the alleged
incident, I generally use the [M’Naghten] rule for assessment
purposes. As the Court is aware, the [M’Naghten] rule states that
a criminal defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity if at the
time of the alleged criminal act, the defendant was so deranged
that he did not know the nature or quality of his actions, or if he
knew the nature and quality of his actions, he was so deranged
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that he did not know what he was doing was wrong. There are
multiple citations on the typed and recorded transcript indicating
that [Appellant] knew his actions were wrong as evidenced by his
hiding and disposing of the evidence of his crimes. And, although
he was psychotic, he had some volitional control over his actions,
as even though he admits murdering his aunt and uncle, he chose
not to murder his father when he had the opportunity when he
went to his house.
Addendum to Dr. Morrow’s Psychiatric Evaluation, 2/17/20, at 4.
Therefore, Dr. Morrow made the following conclusions:
With regard to the extent to which [Appellant’s] mental illness
impacts on his degree of criminal responsibility, it is my
psychiatric opinion that he does not meet all the criteria to justify
rendering a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, which
generally states that the person is not held responsible for his
actions because the severity of his mental disorder rendered him
incapable of distinguishing right from wrong … his actions
following the alleged murders document that he had some
awareness of the wrongfulness of his actions as he attempted to
destroy or dispose of evidence of his acts, and had some volitional
control over his actions at the time of the alleged criminal acts. I
can state with a reasonable degree of medical and psychiatric
certainty that at the time of the alleged murders, [Appellant] was
in the throes of a severe paranoid delusional psychosis that
diminished his ability to act in a rational and lawful manner.
Therefore I believe it is appropriate to consider rendering a verdict
of guilty but mentally ill.
Addendum to Dr. Morrow’s Psychiatric Evaluation, 2/17/20, at 4.
The trial court found that the facts of this case presented an issue of
first impression: “whether a defendant, may as a matter of law, offer an
insanity defense where: (1) [the] defendant’s sole mental health expert opines
that the defendant suffered from a mental disease – here, schizophrenia – but
concludes that the mental disease did not cause [the] defendant’s inability to
know what he was doing or judge its wrongfulness under M’Naghten; and
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(2) [the] defendant seeks to establish the requisite causation between the
diagnosed mental disease and his alleged inability to know what he was doing
or judge its wrongfulness based solely on lay testimony.” T.C.O. at 8-9.
Our Supreme Court has established that where a defense expert opines
that the defendant suffers from a mental disease but determines that such
mental disease did not cause the defendant to be unable to know the nature
and quality of his actions or judge the wrongfulness of his actions, this expert
testimony is not relevant to a determination of whether the defendant was
legally insane. Commonwealth v. Faulkner, 595 A.2d 28, 36 (Pa. 1991).
In that case, Faulkner filed a direct appeal to the Supreme Court from
his two death sentences after a jury convicted him of two counts of first-
degree murder and related offenses. Faulkner challenged the trial court’s
decision to grant the prosecution’s motion in limine to preclude the testimony
of defense experts, who opined that Faulkner “was probably psychotic” and
“may have been delusional” at the time of his crimes, but concluded that
Faulkner knew the nature and quality of his acts and knew what he was doing
was wrong. Id. at 36. The trial court determined that this expert testimony
was insufficient to establish that Faulkner was M’Naghten insane, but “would
only permit the jury to find [Faulkner] ‘guilty, but mentally ill;’ a designation
that would not affect a jury’s verdict of guilt. Id. at 35.2
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2“A person who timely offers a defense of insanity in accordance with the
Rules of Criminal Procedure may be found ‘guilty but mentally ill’ at trial if the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, stating
that “[t]estimony from psychiatric experts is relevant if it can establish that
the defendant was insane under the M’Naghten standard … or to negate
specific intent to commit first degree murder.” Id. at 36. Given the defense
experts had determined that Faulkner was aware of the nature and quality of
his behavior and knew what he was doing was wrong, the Supreme Court
concluded that the expert testimony “was not relevant to a determination of
whether [Faulkner] was ‘M’Naghten insane’ and was properly excluded by
the trial judge” from the guilt phase of the capital murder trial. Id.
Likewise, in this case, the testimony of Appellant’s expert, Dr. Morrow,
was not relevant to a determination of whether Appellant was legally insane
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trier of facts finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person is guilty of an
offense, was mentally ill at the time of the commission of the offense and was
not legally insane at the time of the commission of the offense.” 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 314(a). Section 314 defines “mentally ill” as “[o]ne who as a result of mental
disease or defect, lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
the law.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 314(c). We also note that:
[a] defendant found guilty but mentally ill or whose plea of guilty
but mentally ill is accepted under the provisions of 18 Pa.C.S. §
314 (relating to guilty but mentally ill) may have any sentence
imposed on him which may lawfully be imposed on any defendant
convicted of the same offense. Before imposing sentence, the
court shall hear testimony and make a finding on the issue of
whether the defendant at the time of sentencing is severely
mentally disabled and in need of treatment pursuant to the
provisions of … the Mental Health Procedures Act [(50 P.S. § 7101
et seq)].
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9727.
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as Dr. Morrow expressly opined that Appellant knew the nature and quality of
his actions in killing the victims and knew what he did was wrong, as evidenced
by his attempts to dispose of evidence of the murders and his display of
volitional control over his actions. See Pa.R.E. 401-402 (evidence is relevant
if it makes a fact more or less probable, irrelevant evidence is not admissible).
Not only did Appellant fail to offer a qualified expert opinion in support
of his insanity defense, we emphasize that Appellant’s sole expert witness
provided an opinion that contradicted his insanity defense. The opinion of a
defense expert who concludes that the accused suffered from mental illness,
but was not legally insane, is not sufficient to rise to the level of an insanity
defense under the M’Naghten rule. See Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 329
A.2d 212, 215 (Pa. 1974) (finding that “the presence of a psychosis, albeit a
severe mental disease, is not necessarily tantamount to ‘insanity’ under
M'Naghten”).
Nevertheless, Appellant indicates he would offer Dr. Morrow’s diagnosis
of paranoid schizophrenia in conjunction with the testimony of numerous lay
witnesses regarding Appellant’s general mental health as well as Appellant’s
acts, words, conversations, behavior, and appearance close to the time of the
alleged crime. Appellant also seems to suggest that he would offer his own
testimony in support of his insanity defense.
However, Appellant cannot handpick select portions of his expert’s
testimony to show an alleged mental disease, elicit only that testimony, ignore
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his expert’s ultimate conclusion, and then attempt to substitute lay witness
testimony to attempt to establish his insanity defense.
Lay witnesses may not offer an opinion about an accused’s “mental
capacity in relation to the ultimate determination to be made by the jury” but
may only testify as to their general opinion as to a defendant’s mental capacity
based on facts and observations. Commonwealth v. Knight, 364 A.2d 902,
909-10 (Pa. 1976).
We agree with the trial court that “a lay juror may be tempted to conflate
mental illness with legal insanity when confronted with a parade of non-expert
lay witness testimony regarding [Appellant’s] mental state.” T.C.O. at 17.
Moreover, none of the lay witnesses would have been able to testify as to
Appellant’s state of mind at the time of the commission of the murders, but
would only state their observations of Appellant’s behavior and mental state
before and after the murders.
The lay witness testimony as to Appellant’s behavior did not provide a
sufficient factual basis for the jury to find that Appellant was suffering “a defect
of reason” from a mental disease that caused Appellant to be incapable of
understanding the nature and quality of his act in killing the Victims and
incapable of understanding that what he was doing was wrong. See White v.
Commonwealth, 616 S.E.2d 49, 54 (Va.App. 2006), affirmed, 636 S.E.2d
353 (Va. 2006) (holding the trial court did not err in precluding White from
raising an insanity defense when the sole defense expert testified that White
was not legally insane and the proposed lay witnesses’ “recital of the
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defendant’s behavior did not provide a factual base from which a jury could
find that the defendant was suffering from a mental disorder or disease that
prevented him from distinguishing right from wrong”).3
We agree with the trial court’s finding that a defendant must present
expert testimony finding him M’Naghten insane before he can introduce lay
testimony in support of his insanity defense.4 As noted above, Appellant’s sole
expert witness contradicted Appellant’s insanity defense and Appellant could
only offer testimony from lay witnesses as to their observations of Appellant’s
behavior, most of which occurred days, if not weeks, before or after the
Victims’ murders. This would allow the jury to speculate as to whether
Appellant lacked the cognitive and moral capacity to understand his actions of
murdering the Victims.
As Appellant failed to provide a qualified witness to provide a factual
basis to allow the jury to find Appellant was legally insane, the trial court did
not err in precluding Appellant from raising an insanity defense.
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3 This Court may cite to the decisions of other states for persuasive authority.
See Hill v. Slippery Rock Univ., 138 A.3d 673, 679 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2016)
(noting that “the decisions of other states are not binding authority for this
Court, although they may be persuasive”) (citation omitted).
4 We recognize that this Court has held that the Commonwealth is not required
to present expert testimony to prove an accused’s sanity, but may offer lay
testimony to show the defendant knew the nature and quality of his or her
actions and knew the actions were wrong. Yasipour, 957 A.2d at 738–39
(finding the jury had the right to disbelieve the defendant's insanity defense
and credit the testimony of the prosecution’s eyewitnesses)). However, we
remind Appellant that the defense has the burden to prove the insanity
defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
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Appellant also claims the trial court erred in denying the Monroe County
Public Defender’s motion to withdraw from this case due to a conflict of
interest. We briefly summarize the facts related to this claim.
On March 16, 2020, Appellant filed a “Motion to Represent Self” with the
assistance of his public defender, Frederick Cutaio, Esq. On April 20, 2020,
the trial court held a hearing at which Appellant testified that he “didn’t trust”
his counsel, made allegations that his counsel had lied to him, and expressed
suspicion that he was being “set up.” Notes of Testimony (N.T.), Hearing,
4/20/20, at 6-8. After conducting a thorough colloquy of Appellant, the trial
court denied Appellant’s request to represent himself, but ordered the Public
Defender’s Office to assign Appellant different counsel.
On May 29, 2020, the Public Defender’s Office sought reconsideration of
the trial court’s April 20, 2020 order and requested that conflict counsel be
appointed. The Public Defender’s Office asserted that Appellant had “an
inherent conflict with any attorney in the office” as he “strongly disagree[d]”
with strategy shared by other attorneys in the office. Petition, 5/29/20, at ¶
15-16. After a second hearing, the trial court entered an order on June 23,
2020, denying the Public Defender’s petition and again directing that Appellant
be reassigned counsel from within the Public Defender’s Office. On July 7,
2020, Jason LaBar, Esq., entered his appearance as trial counsel.
Our courts “review a trial court’s denial of counsel’s petition to withdraw
under the abuse of discretion standard.” Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203
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A.3d 1033, 1101 (Pa.Super. 2019) (quoting Commonwealth v. Magee, 177
A.3d 315, 322-23 (Pa.Super. 2017)).
Our rules of criminal procedure require that an attorney for a defendant
must seek leave of court in order to withdraw his or her appearance. See
Pa.R.Crim.P. 120(b)(1). The comment to Rule 120 states in relevant part:
The court must make a determination of the status of a case
before permitting counsel to withdraw. Although there are many
factors considered by the court in determining whether there is
good cause to permit the withdrawal of counsel, when granting
leave, the court should determine whether new counsel will be
stepping in or the defendant is proceeding without counsel, and
that the change in attorneys will not delay the proceedings or
prejudice the defendant, particularly concerning time limits.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 120, cmt.
This Court has provided that:
[n]o brightline rules exist to determine whether a trial court has
abused its discretion in denying a Petition to Withdraw as counsel.
A balancing test must be utilized to weigh the interests of the
client in a fair adjudication and the Commonwealth in the efficient
administration of justice. Thus, a resolution of the problem turns
upon a case by case analysis with particular attention to the
reasons given by the trial court at the time the request for
withdrawal is denied.
Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1102 (quoting Magee, 177 A.3d at 322-23).
In this case, the Public Defender’s Office sought to withdraw from
Appellant’s case and requested that conflict counsel be appointed, based on
an alleged conflict of interest. Specifically, the Public Defender’s Office argued
that as Appellant “strongly disagree[d] with the strategy” as discussed by the
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attorneys in the office, Appellant would “have an inherent conflict with any
attorney in the office.” Petition to be Relieved as Counsel, 5/29/20, at 2.
In his appellate brief, Appellant cites to Commonwealth v. Watson,
835 A.2d 786 (Pa.Super. 2003), in which this Court recognized that the Public
Defender’s Office is considered to be a single law office. Thus, Appellant
argues that any conflict he had with his assigned public defender would be
imputed to the entire Public Defender’s office and disqualify all of its attorneys
from representing Appellant.
It is well established that “[t]o show an actual conflict of interest, the
appellant must demonstrate that: (1) counsel actively represented conflicting
interests; and (2) those conflicting interests adversely affected his lawyer's
performance.” Commonwealth v. Campbell, 260 A.3d 272, 278 (Pa.Super.
2021) (quoting Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 55 A.3d 1108, 1147 (Pa.
2012) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Our Supreme Court has specified
that a “‘material disagreement’ with respect to a course of action in the
representation does not constitute a conflict of interest.” Commonwealth v.
Padilla, 80 A.3d 1238, 1247 n. 10 (Pa. 2013).
In this case, the trial court was correct in finding that Appellant’s
disagreement with his public defender as to trial strategy was not a conflict of
interest. Further, we agree with the trial court’s assessment that, given
Appellant’s mental health issues, Appellant’s disagreement with his counsel
would likely not have been resolved by an assignment of new counsel from a
different office. Thus, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim.
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/29/2023
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