Chaudhry, I. v. Doe, J. ( 2023 )


Menu:
  • J-S11032-23
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
    IMTIAZ CHAUDHRY                         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    v.                         :
    :
    JOHN J. HUNT, III, JOHN DOE,            :
    UNKNOWN OCCUPANT                        :
    :
    :
    APPEAL OF: JOHN J. HUNT, III            :        No. 2612 EDA 2022
    Appeal from the Judgment Entered September 30, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
    Civil Division at No(s): 2021-03098
    BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                           FILED AUGUST 29, 2023
    Appellant, John J. Hunt, III, appeals pro se from the judgment entered
    in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, which granted immediate
    possession of property to Appellee, Imtiaz Chaudhry. We affirm.
    The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this
    appeal as follows:
    On April 26, 2021, Appellee filed an amended complaint
    against Appellant and unknown occupants at the property
    to obtain possession of the land following a foreclosure
    action in which the property was sold at a sheriff’s sale on
    June 26, 2019 to U.S. Bank, National Association, who gave
    title to Appellee on November 10, 2020. Appellant has
    continued to occupy the property since the sheriff’s sale
    without permission of the owner.       The counts in the
    amended complaint were for ejectment, trespass and rent
    and mesne profits. [On February 2, 2022, Appellee filed a
    motion for summary judgment.         Appellant responded,
    opposing the motion, on February 6, 2022.] On May 12,
    2022, [the] court granted Appellee’s motion for summary
    judgment as to count 1, ejectment, and count II, trespass,
    J-S11032-23
    but denied it as to count III, rent and mesne profits. No
    appeal was taken from this order.
    On July 5, 2022, [the] court scheduled argument to address
    count III for August 3, 2022. Appellant failed to appear at
    the scheduled court date and [the] court relisted this matter
    for a hearing on September 13, 2022. Appellant failed to
    appear at the hearing despite being served with the order.
    Appellee orally motioned to dismiss count III[. The trial
    court granted the motion] and further ordered immediate
    possession of the property to [Appellee].
    On September 1[9], 2022, Appellant filed a motion to strike
    the judgment for possession of the premises. [The c]ourt
    treated the motion as a notice of appeal … and directed
    Appellant to file a concise statement of matters complained
    of on appeal in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) within
    twenty-one (21) days. On September 30, 2022, Appellee
    filed [a] praecipe for judgment in ejectment and praecipe
    for writ of possession. On October 2, 2022, Appellant filed
    a notice of appeal and a motion to strike the writ of
    possession and impose supersedeas on appeal. On October
    4, 2022, Appellant filed a timely statement of matters
    complained of on appeal.
    (Trial Court Opinion, filed 11/17/22, at 1-2) (unnecessary capitalization
    omitted).
    Appellant raises the following four issues on appeal:
    I. Does Pa.R.C.P. 227.4 allow the Prothonotary to enter
    “Summary Judgment as a matter of Legal Opinion” or
    “Summary Verdict” into Final Judgment under the rule of
    procedure, leading to the issuance of Writ to the Sheriff?
    II. Will “Summary Judgment as Matter of Law” determine
    the verdict or the jurisdiction? Is the Defendant required to
    rebut the Plaintiff, or is the Plaintiff required to prove their
    complaint to the fact finder under Art 1. Pa. Const.?
    III. Did jurisdiction fail under Pa.R.C.P. 1054(b) when the
    amended complaint failed to “abstract the title back to
    common source of possession” within 21 years, and
    -2-
    J-S11032-23
    moreover failed to raise any claim in Pa.R.C.P. 1061(b)?
    IV. Does the action of ejectment being in the nature of
    “equitable bill to redeem” by settled precedent run to our
    counterclaim under Pa.R.C.P. 1061(b)(4), where the trial
    court must impose a constructive trust or similar remedy?
    (Appellant’s Brief at 6-7).
    Preliminarily, it is well settled that “Rule 1925 is a crucial component of
    the appellate process because it allows the trial court to identify and focus on
    those issues the parties plan to raise on appeal.” Kanter v. Epstein, 
    866 A.2d 394
    , 400 (Pa.Super. 2004), cert. denied, 
    546 U.S. 1092
    , 
    126 S.Ct. 1048
    ,
    
    163 L.Ed.2d 858
     (2006). “The Statement shall concisely identify each ruling
    or error that the appellant intends to challenge with sufficient detail to identify
    all pertinent issues for the judge.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii).
    This Court has considered the question of what constitutes
    a sufficient [concise] statement on many occasions, and it
    is well-established that [an a]ppellant’s concise statement
    must properly specify the error to be addressed on appeal.
    The [concise] statement must be specific enough for the
    trial court to identify and address the issue an appellant
    wishes to raise on appeal. Further, this Court may find
    waiver where a concise statement is too vague. When a
    court has to guess what issues an appellant is appealing,
    that is not enough for meaningful review. A [c]oncise
    [s]tatement which is too vague to allow the court to identify
    the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no
    [c]oncise [s]tatement at all.
    In re A.B., 
    63 A.3d 345
    , 350 (Pa.Super. 2013) (internal citations omitted).
    Here, the trial court decided that Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement
    was “incoherent and vague as to legal error.” (Trial Court Opinion at 7). The
    court explained:
    -3-
    J-S11032-23
    Appellant fails to specifically identify how [the court]
    committed an error of law, erred in interpreting the law,
    and/or failed to apply the appropriate standard of review.
    Therefore the issues must be deemed waived because they
    are too vague to enable this Court to satisfy its obligation
    under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) to prepare an opinion addressing
    them.
    (Id. at 8).1    We agree with the trial court’s analysis that Appellant’s Rule
    1925(b) statement was insufficient to permit the trial court to identify the
    issues Appellant sought to raise on appeal. Appellant’s appellate issues are
    waived on this basis. See In re A.B., 
    supra.
     Accordingly, we affirm.
    Judgment affirmed.
    Judge McLaughlin joins this memorandum.
    Judge Olson concurs in the result.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/29/2023
    ____________________________________________
    1 Notwithstanding its waiver analysis, the court provided reasons for its ruling,
    explaining that it granted Appellee’s request to dismiss count III after
    Appellant twice failed to appear at court proceedings to address that count
    and Appellee orally motioned to dismiss it. The court further opined that there
    was no error of law in granting Appellee’s request to dismiss count III, and
    because there were no matters pending before the court it was appropriate to
    grant Appellee immediate possession of the property. (Id.)
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2612 EDA 2022

Judges: King, J.

Filed Date: 8/29/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/29/2023