In Re: Inv. Term of: J.I.A., a Minor ( 2023 )

J-S21002-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN RE: INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
OF: J.I.A., A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: C.L.S., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 222 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Decree Entered January 9, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Orphans’ Court at
No(s): 2022-01046
IN RE: INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
OF: U.T.A., A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: C.L.S., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 223 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Decree Entered January 9, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Orphans’ Court at
No(s): 2022-01047
IN RE: INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
OF: D.M.M., A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: C.L.S., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 224 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Decree Entered January 9, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Orphans’ Court at
No(s): 2022-01045
J-S21002-23
BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: AUGUST 9, 2023
C.L.S. (“Mother”) appeals the January 9, 2023 decrees involuntarily
terminating her parental rights to her sons, J.I.A. and U.T.A., born respectively
in June 2009 and March 2011, and her daughter, D.M.M., born in August
2020.1 After careful review, we affirm.
We glean the factual and procedural history of this matter from the
certified record, which the orphans’ court has summarized, as follows:
Mother is the natural mother of J.I.A., U.T.A., and D.M.M. [U.S.A.,
Jr. (“Father”) is the father of U.T.A. and J.I.A., while t]he father
of D.M.M. is unknown . . . .[2/3]
[Lebanon County Children and Youth Services (“CYS” or “the
agency”)] first became involved with the family on August 16,
2020, due to Mother’s substance use and mental health behavior
issues. On that date, Mother went into a hospital with D.M.M. and
J.I.A., and was acting erratically, hallucinating, and winging
D.M.M. around. The hospital tested Mother because of her erratic
behaviors. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine. D.M.M.
was one week old at the time. Emergency custody of D.M.M. was
granted to CYS, and she was placed into foster care. On August
18, 2020, a shelter care hearing was held for D.M.M. [She] was
adjudicated dependent on September 14, 2020. Mother signed
over guardianship of J.I.A. and U.T.A. to S.M., a family friend. The
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Mother has two other children who are not the subject of the instant appeal.
2 The termination decree with respect to D.M.M. also terminated the rights of
any unknown father. No such individual has ever come forward.
3 On the same day, the orphans’ court also entered decrees terminating
Father’s parental rights to U.T.A. and J.I.A. Father filed appeals at 182 and
183 MDA 2023, which we have addressed in a separate writing.
-2-
J-S21002-23
agency opened a case for all of the children in November 2020.
At that time, Father was [living apart from the family in New York],
Mother’s whereabouts were unknown, and the case was being
monitored by the agency.
Concerns for truancy arose later in January 2021. Mother became
involved but then left the state. On January 20, 2021, concerns
arose about S.M. regarding suspected drug use, home conditions,
and that she refused to drug test when requested. The agency
requested emergency custody of U.T.A. on January 26, 2021[,
which was granted the same day.] On January 28, 2021, a shelter
care hearing was held for U.T.A. The agency filed a dependency
petition on February 2, 2021, and U.T.A. was adjudicated
dependent on February 8, 2021. [At this time, Mother’s
whereabouts were unknown to the agency, although she was
suspected to be in New York with Father.]
Thereafter, during the summer of 2021, the agency received
reports that J.I.A. was back in Pennsylvania at the maternal
grandmother’s home; however, the agency could not confirm
these reports. Father and Mother alleged that J.I.A. was in New
York with a relative. The relative, however, denied having J.I.A[.]
The agency located J.I.A. at his football game on September 17,
2021. The same day, the agency was awarded emergency
custody of J.I.A. He was placed into a kinship foster home with
his football coaches[.] On November 29, 2021, J.I.A. was
adjudicated dependent[.]
[The orphans’ court initially established a permanency goal of
reunification with respect to D.M.M., U.T.A., and J.I.A. Mother
was assigned numerous objectives including, inter alia, obtaining
suitable housing, finding stable employment, submitting to
regular drug tests, and following-up on pertinent
recommendations with respect to her mental health and addiction
issues. See N.T., 1/9/23, at 21-22; see also CYS Exhibit 3
(permanency plan for J.I.A.), CYS Exhibit 4 (permanency plan for
U.T.A.), CYS Exhibit 5 (permanency plan for D.M.M.).]
....
-3-
J-S21002-23
On December 20, 2022, petitions for involuntary termination of
parental rights were filed by the agency.[4] On January 9, 2023,
the court held a termination hearing. As of the date of the
hearing, D.M.M. had been in placement for approximately twenty-
nine months (i.e., nearly her entire life), U.T.A. had been in
placement for approximately twenty-four months, and J.I.A. was
in placement for approximately sixteen months. [The agency
adduced testimony from CYS foster care supervisor Angelica
Farrisi. Although Mother] attended the hearing, . . . she was . . .
unwilling to participate, walked out multiple times, and eventually
left the [courthouse] entirely.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/3/23, at 4-6 (cleaned up).
The same day, the orphans’ court entered decrees terminating Mother’s
parental rights to U.T.A., J.I.A., and D.M.M. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). The court also entered orders changing
each child’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption.
On February 6, 2023, Mother filed separate, timely notices of appeal at
the captions above, along with concise statements of error complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). Thereafter, the court authored a
joint Rule 1925(a)(2)(ii) opinion setting forth its findings with respect to the
termination decrees as to U.T.A., J.I.A, and D.M.M. This Court sua sponte
consolidated the above-captioned cases pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 513.
____________________________________________
4 On December 20, 2022, the orphans’ court appointed a guardian ad litem
and separate legal counsel to represent, respectively, the best interests and
the legal interests of D.M.M., U.T.A., and J.I.A. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a).
Legal counsel for the children has filed a brief in this Court advocating that
the orphans’ court’s termination decrees be affirmed.
-4-
J-S21002-23
Mother has raised a single issue for our consideration: “Whether the
[orphans’] court erred when it entered [decrees] on January 9, 2023
terminating [Mother’s] parental rights?” Mother’s brief at 5.
Our standard of review in this context is well-settled:
In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
decree of the termination court is supported by competent
evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must
accept the orphans’ court’s findings of fact and credibility
determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the
orphans’ court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence,
an appellate court may not disturb the orphans’ court’s ruling
unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.
An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the
reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the
facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court
may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration
of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
will. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial
courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple
hearings.
In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, the orphans’
court must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her
child with the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care,
protection, and support. Termination of parental rights has
significant and permanent consequences for both the parent and
child. As such, the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving
party to establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing
evidence, which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and
convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.
Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa. Super. 2022) (cleaned up).
The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511 of the Adoption Act, which necessitates a bifurcated analysis
-5-
J-S21002-23
that first focuses upon the “eleven enumerated grounds” of parental conduct
that may warrant termination pursuant to § 2511(a)(1)-(11). Id. at 830. If
the orphans’ court determines that a petitioner has established grounds for
termination under at least one of these subsections by “clear and convincing
evidence,” the court then assesses the petition under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b),
which focuses upon the child’s developmental, physical and emotional needs
and welfare. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). This Court “need
only agree with any one subsection of § 2511(a), in addition to § 2511(b), in
order to affirm the termination of parental rights.” T.S.M., supra at 267.
In the instant case, the orphans’ court found that termination was
appropriate pursuant to § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8) and § 2511(b). Our
implicates § 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provide as follows:
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
....
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of
removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
removal or placement of the child continue to exist and
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
and welfare of the child.
....
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
-6-
J-S21002-23
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8), (b).
In order to satisfy § 2511(a)(8), the petitioner must prove that: (1) the
child has been removed from the parent’s care for at least twelve months; (2)
the conditions which led to the removal or placement still exist; and (3)
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the
child. See In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 943 (Pa.Super. 2018).
Furthermore, termination pursuant to § 2511(a)(8) does not require an
evaluation of a parent’s willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led
to the removal or placement of the child. See In re M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434,
446 (Pa.Super. 2017). Furthermore, when proceeding pursuant to
§ 2511(a)(8), we need not consider “any efforts by the parent to remedy the
conditions” that were “first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the [termination] petition.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). Rather, our inquiry
is focused upon whether the at-issue “conditions” have been “remedied” such
that “reunification of parent and child is imminent at the time of the hearing.”
In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa.Super. 2009).
This Court has acknowledged:
[T]he application of Section (a)(8) may seem harsh when the
parent has begun to make progress toward resolving the problems
-7-
J-S21002-23
that had led to removal of her children. By allowing for
termination when the conditions that led to removal continue to
exist after a year, the statute implicitly recognizes that a child’s
life cannot be held in abeyance while the parent is unable to
perform the actions necessary to assume parenting
responsibilities. This Court cannot and will not subordinate
indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a
parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future. Indeed, we
work under statutory and case law that contemplates only a short
period of time, to wit eighteen months, in which to complete the
process of either reunification or adoption for a child who has been
placed in foster care.
Id. at 11-12 (emphasis in original) (cleaned up).
This Court has also explained that,
while both § 2511(a)(8) and § 2511(b) direct us to evaluate the
“needs and welfare of the child,” we are required to resolve the
analysis relative to § 2511(a)(8), prior to addressing the “needs
and welfare” of [the child], as proscribed by § 2511(b); as such,
they are distinct in that we must address § 2511(a) before
reaching § 2511(b).
In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc)
(cleaned up).
If a petitioner establishes adequate grounds for termination pursuant to
§ 2511(a), the court turns to § 2511(b), which requires that it “give primary
consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). “Notably, courts should consider the
matter from the child’s perspective, placing [their] developmental, physical,
and emotional needs and welfare above concerns for the parent.” In the
Interest of K.T., ___ A.3d ___, 2023 WL 4092986 at *13 (Pa. June 21,
2023). This determination “should not be applied mechanically,” but “must
-8-
J-S21002-23
be made on a case-by-case basis,” wherein “the court must determine each
child’s specific needs.” Id. at *14. Accordingly, as our Supreme Court has
recently explained, there is no “exhaustive list” of factors that must be
considered in this context. Id. at *18 n.28.
Since its holding in In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481 (Pa. 1993), our Supreme
Court has mandated that a court’s § 2511(b) analysis must include
“consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and child.” T.S.M.,
supra at 267. Thus, the court must determine whether the “trauma” caused
by sundering the parent-child bond is “outweighed by the benefit of moving
the child toward a permanent home.” Id. at 253 (cleaned up). Specifically,
the recognized threshold for this finding is that the court must determine
whether termination will sever a “necessary and beneficial relationship,” such
that the child “could suffer extreme emotional consequences.” K.T., supra
at *16. Our Supreme Court has emphasized, however, that such
consequences must constitute more than mere proof of “an adverse or
detrimental impact from severance of the parental bond” in order to preclude
termination. Id. at *18. Thus, “courts correctly refine their focus on the
child’s development and mental and emotional health rather than considering
only the child’s ‘feelings’ or ‘affection’ for the parent, which even badly abused
and neglected children will retain.” Id. at *16 (citing T.S.M., supra at 267).
Our case law reflects that a court’s analysis pursuant to § 2511(b) is not
narrow but must include consideration of “intangibles such as love, comfort,
-9-
J-S21002-23
security, and stability.” T.S.M., supra at 267. Indeed, our Supreme Court
has affirmed that “the parental bond is but one part of the overall subsection
(b) analysis.” K.T., supra at *18. Thus, “courts must not only consider the
child’s bond with the biological parent, but also examine the . . . love, comfort,
security, and stability the child might have with the foster parent.” K.T.,
supra at *17 (cleaned up). In conformity with this instruction, our Supreme
Court has noted that Pennsylvania courts should also consider, where
appropriate pursuant to the particular facts of a case, related factors such as:
(1) the child’s need for permanency and length of time in foster care; (2)
whether the child is in a pre-adoptive home and bonded with foster parents;
and (3) whether the foster home meets the child’s needs. Id. at *18.
With these overarching legal principles in mind, we turn to Mother’s
arguments. Although broadly framed and troublingly succinct, we discern that
her argument consists of two allegations: (1) that there was insufficient
evidence to find grounds for termination pursuant to § 2511(a); and (2) that
the severing of Mother’s parental rights would have a “detrimental effect”
upon J.I.A., U.T.A., and D.M.M., such that termination should be precluded
pursuant to § 2511(b). See Appellant’s brief at 9-11 (“[Mother] has worked
to the best of her ability to fulfill her goals and consistently maintained her
desire to resume the parental responsibilities for her children. . . . To sever
that bond, [Mother] argues would have a detrimental effect on the children.”).
- 10 -
J-S21002-23
We will address each of these claims, beginning with the orphans’ court’s
§ 2511(a) analysis.
The orphans’ court’s relevant findings pursuant to § 2511(a)(8) began
by noting that J.I.A., U.T.A., and D.M.M. had been in placement for at least
twelve months prior to the filing of a termination petition. See Orphans’ Court
Opinion, 3/3/23, at 21 (“[A]s of January 9, 2023, D.M.M. had been in
placement for approximately twenty-nine months (nearly her entire life),
U.T.A. had been in placement for approximately twenty-four months, and
J.I.A. had been in placement for approximately sixteen months.” (cleaned
up)). The orphans’ court also concluded that the conditions that had
precipitated removal continued to exist. Id. at 8-9 (“The serious reasons for
why [J.I.A., U.T.A., and D.M.M.] were placed continued to exist, including
concerns about housing, the ability to provide financially, lack of ability to do
drug tests, and mental health [concerns].”). Finally, the orphans’ court found
that termination would ultimately serve the needs and welfare of J.I.A., U.T.A.,
and D.M.M. Id. at 26-27 (“[Mother does] not contribute positively towards
the psychological health of [the children].”). In reaching these conclusions,
the orphans’ court relied principally upon the testimony of Ms. Farrisi, who
was the foster care supervisor assigned to this family by CYS. See N.T.,
1/9/23, at 5-6. Our review confirms that her testimony supports the orphans’
court’s conclusions with respect to § 2511(a)(8).
- 11 -
J-S21002-23
Initially, Ms. Farrisi testified regarding the respective placement terms
of the J.I.A., U.T.A., and D.M.M., which were all in excess of twelve months
as set forth by the orphans’ court. Id. at 21, 34. There is no dispute these
placements satisfy the twelve-month threshold pursuant to § 2511(a)(8).
With respect to the removals that occurred in the above-captioned
cases, Ms. Farrisi testified that D.M.M. was removed in August 2020 after
Mother presented to a hospital with substance abuse and mental health issues
within one week of D.M.M.’s birth. See N.T., 1/9/23, at 6-7. She stated that
U.T.A. and J.I.A. resided with maternal grandmother and, then, S.M. Id. at
8-9, 15. However, she explained that both guardianships were deemed to be
unsuitable due to concerns regarding illicit narcotics. Id. CYS was awarded
emergency custody of U.T.A. in January 2021 due to the ongoing lack of a
suitable home. Id. at 15. At that time, Ms. Farrisi reported that J.I.A.’s
whereabouts were unknown to CYS and neither parent would cooperate with
their efforts to find him. Id. at 16-17. Ultimately, J.I.A. was located and
placed in foster care in September 2021, when he was found to be living in a
hotel. Id. at 18.-19.
Ms. Farrisi also averred that, in connection with these removals, the
permanency goal established with respect to each child was initially
reunification and required Mother to, inter alia: (1) obtain suitable housing;
(2) find stable employment; (3) submit to regular drug tests; and (4) follow-
up on pertinent recommendations with respect to her mental health and
- 12 -
J-S21002-23
addiction issues. Id. at 21-22; see also CYS Exhibit 3 (permanency plan for
J.I.A.), CYS Exhibit 4 (permanency plan for U.T.A.), CYS Exhibit 5
(permanency plan for D.M.M.).
Although Ms. Farrisi allowed that Mother had made “moderate” progress
on these goals, she concomitantly testified that Mother largely failed to comply
with these permanency directives and, thereby, failed to address the
circumstances that first caused the removal of D.M.M., U.T.A., and J.I.A.
Specifically, she reported that Mother never obtained verifiable housing or
stable employment prior to the filing of the termination petitions. Id. at 27-
30, 37. Furthermore, Ms. Farrisi testified that Mother refused to participate
in the court-mandated drug testing regimen until just two days before the
termination hearing. Id. at 29-30. Additionally, she also noted that Mother
failed to follow-through with the “recovery support services” recommended
following her completion of a drug and alcohol evaluation. Id. at 29, 38.
Finally, Ms. Farrisi also testified concerning whether termination would
ultimately serve the interests and welfare of D.M.M., U.T.A., and J.I.A.
Specifically, she averred that J.I.A.’s, U.T.A.’s, and D.M.M’s respective need
for stability and permanency would be best served by terminating Mother’s
parental rights. Id. at 40. Her conclusion on this point is also further
buttressed by the long duration of the respective placements of each child,
- 13 -
J-S21002-23
the longest of which began at D.M.M.’s birth and continued for over twenty-
nine months prior to the filing of a termination petition.5 Id. at 21, 34.
Based on the foregoing, we find ample support for the orphans’ court’s
conclusions pursuant to § 2511(a)(8), namely, that D.M.M., U.T.A., and J.I.A.:
(1) have each been in placement for at least twelve months of time; (2) the
conditions that precipitated their removal continue to exist; and (3)
termination of Mother’s parental rights will best serve the needs and welfare
of J.I.A., U.T.A., and D.M.M. Accordingly, we will turn our review to the
orphans’ court’s findings pursuant to § 2511(b).
Although we reiterate that Mother’s arguments border on cursory, we
are able to discern that she is essentially averring that severing her alleged
parental bond with J.I.A., U.T.A., and D.M.M. will have a “detrimental” effect
upon them and, thus, should not be allowed. Mother’s brief at 11.
Preliminarily, we note that Mother’s arguments misapprehend the
nature of the bond analysis required by § 2511(b). As our Supreme Court
recently pronounced in K.T., indicia of a “detrimental” effect to a child
stemming from the termination of parental rights is not the correct touchstone
in this arena. See K.T., supra at *16. Rather, there must be “extreme
emotional consequences” in order to preclude termination. Id. Thus, to the
____________________________________________
5 As discussed more fully in our discussion of § 2511(b), the children are all
in pre-adoptive foster homes that are meeting their respective needs.
- 14 -
J-S21002-23
extent that Mother asserts that the effects of severing the bond will be
“detrimental” to D.M.M., U.T.A., and J.I.A., such arguments miss the mark.
Pursuant to § 2511(b), the orphans’ court acknowledged that Mother
shared a bond with D.M.M., U.T.A., and J.I.A., but found that those bonds
were not “necessary or beneficial.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/3/23, at 27.
Rather, the court concluded that termination would serve the “needs and
welfare” of J.I.A., U.T.A., and D.M.M. by providing them with much-needed
permanency and stability. Id. at 27-28. The court also found termination
appropriate given that each child was residing in pre-adoptive foster homes,
wherein they had bonded with their foster parents and were “doing well.” Id.
The court also found that termination would serve the “best interests” of J.I.A.,
U.T.A., and D.M.M. due to Mother’s ongoing lack of housing, employment, or
progress on her mental health and addiction issues. Id. at 28.
Again, the testimony of Ms. Farrisi supports the court’s conclusions.
Although Ms. Farrisi allowed that Mother shared a bond with each of the
children, she opined that these connections were not parental or positive:
Q. What about all three children’s relationship with [Mother]?
How do they interact or bond with her?
A. I would say they’re bonded. I think each child has a
different take on the situation and on their relationship with her.
I know [D.M.M.] knows her as Mommy, but she doesn’t have a
strong bond, I would say, towards distinguishing her as the only
mother figure.
As far as [J.I.A.], I would say he’s bonded to [Mother]. I think it’s
maybe more of the friendship level.
- 15 -
J-S21002-23
And with [U.T.A.], I would say there’s definitely a lot of hurt from
[Mother] and some disappointed there with the relationship.
N.T., 1/9/23, at 33-34. In describing these bonds, Ms. Farrisi also noted that
both J.I.A. and U.T.A. have expressed disappointment concerning Mother’s
spotty participation and inappropriate behavior at weekly, supervised
visitations.6 Id. at 51-52. They also shared their reluctant desire to be
adopted. Id. at 40. Additionally, Ms. Farrisi reported that D.M.M., U.T.A.,
and J.I.A. are all thriving in their respective foster placements and are bonded
with their pre-adoptive foster families. Id. at 20-21.
Based on the foregoing, we find that the orphans’ court’s relevant
findings pursuant to § 2511(b) are supported by the record. Instantly, the
court found that J.I.A.’s, U.T.A.’s, and D.M.M.’s developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare would be best served by terminating Mother’s
parental rights due to: (1) the lack of a parental bond with Mother; (2) the
continued lack of housing, absence of financial support, and drug-related
concerns; and (3) the stability and permanency offered by the preadoptive
foster families with whom D.M.M., U.T.A., and J.I.A. are currently residing.
See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/3/23, at 27-28. As detailed above, Ms. Farrisi’s
undisputed testimony fully supports these conclusions.
____________________________________________
6 Of note, Ms. Farrisi also testified that Mother never progressed beyond
supervised visitations. See N.T., 1/9/23, at 29.
- 16 -
J-S21002-23
Pursuant to the reasoning set forth above, we find that Mother’s claim
for relief lacks merit. Thus, we will affirm the decrees terminating her parental
rights to D.M.M., U.T.A., and J.I.A.
Decrees affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/9/2023
- 17 -