Resp. Elec., Inc. v. Com of PA Penn State Health ( 2023 )


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  • J-A16040-23
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
    RESPONSE ELECTRIC, INC.                      :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :
    PENN STATE HEALTH LANCASTER                  :
    MEDICAL CENTER                               :   No. 1389 MDA 2022
    :
    :
    APPEAL OF: ENVIRONMENTAL AIR                 :
    SYSTEMS, LLC.                                :
    Appeal from the Order Entered September 2, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Civil Division at
    No(s): CI-22-00419
    BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and McCAFFERY, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                   FILED: AUGUST 15, 2023
    Environmental Air Systems, LLC (EAS) appeals from the order entered
    September 2, 2022, in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas. The
    trial court granted a motion for reconsideration, filed by Response Electric,
    Inc. (REI), of its prior order striking a mechanics’ lien claim, and reinstated
    the mechanics’ lien.1 EAS presents three issues for our review: (1) whether
    this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal; (2) whether the trial court erred
    when it reconsidered its prior order more than 30 days after it was entered;
    and (3) whether the trial court properly struck the mechanics’ lien claim when
    ____________________________________________
    1 As will be discussed infra, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Penn State
    Health Lancaster Medical Center (Penn State Health) did not participate in
    these proceedings and is not a party to this appeal.
    J-A16040-23
    REI failed to file an affidavit of service as required by the Mechanics’ Lien Law. 2
    Because we conclude the trial court had no authority to reconsider its prior,
    final order after the appeal period expired, we are constrained to vacate the
    order on appeal, and remand for reinstatement of the court’s July 18, 2022,
    order.
    We discern the following relevant facts and procedural history from the
    certified record. Penn State Health is the owner of a property located at 2148
    State Road in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, where it is constructing a Central
    Utility Plant (the Project). See REI’s Mechanic[s’] Lien Claim, 1/24/22, at ¶¶
    2, 4; EAS’s Brief at 4; REI’s Brief at 1. EAS, a subcontractor for the Project,
    entered into a subcontract with REI to provide “electrical work and engineering
    work” for the Project. REI’s Mechanic[s’] Lien Claim at ¶ 4. REI maintains
    that it completed the work requested on September 22, 2021, but that it was
    still due $24,581.43 for labor and materials. See id. at ¶¶ 5-7. Thus, on
    January 24, 2022, REI filed the underlying mechanics’ lien claim against Penn
    State Health in the amount of $24,581.43. Relevant herein, on February 24,
    2022, a signed Sheriff’s Return of Service was docketed, which stated that the
    mechanics’ lien claim was served on Penn State Health the day before,
    February 23rd.
    Meanwhile, on February 23, 2022, EAS filed a motion requesting
    permission to file a bond to discharge and release the mechanics’ lien on Penn
    ____________________________________________
    2 See Mechanics Lien Law of 1963, 49 P.S. §§ 1101-1902.
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    State Health’s property.         See EAS’s Motion to File Bond to Discharge
    Mechanics’ Lien, 2/23/22, at 1-2 (unpaginated). EAS asserted, inter alia, “as
    the entity that allegedly failed to pay REI, EAS [was] a ‘party in interest’”
    pursuant to the Mechanics’ Lien Law. Id. at 2. On March 23, 2023, the trial
    court granted the motion and ordered EAS to “enter and post with the court a
    lien bond in the amount of $49,162.86[,]” double the lien amount.3 Order,
    3/23/23. The court further stated, “[w]hen the bond is posted, the lien shall
    discharge as to [Penn State Health’s] property and attach to [EAS’s] bond.”
    Id. (footnote omitted). Thereafter, on April 1, 2022, EAS posted the requisite
    lien bond.
    On April 8, 2022, REI filed a civil complaint against EAS, seeking
    damages for breach of contract and quantum meruit in the same amount as
    the mechanics’ lien claim. EAS filed preliminary objections asserting, inter
    alia, that REI was prohibited from “filing a breach of contract claim in the same
    action as a mechanics’ lien claim[,]” and, in any event, the parties’ subcontract
    included both an arbitration clause and a forum selection clause, which
    required any civil action be brought in Guilford County, North Carolina.4 EAS’s
    Preliminary Objections to REI’s Complaint, 6/3/22, at 2-4, 6-7.        REI filed
    preliminary objections to EAS’s preliminary objections, arguing that EAS’s
    ____________________________________________
    3 See 49 P.S. § 1510(d) (providing security “may be entered . . . double the
    amount of the required deposit” to have lien discharged).
    4 EAS is a limited liability company with a registered business address in High
    Point, North Carolina. See REI’s Complaint, 4/8/22, at ¶ 2.
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    objections were untimely filed and the forum selection clause is unenforceable.
    See REI’s Preliminary Objections to EAS’s Preliminary Objections to REI’s
    Complaint, 6/20/22, at 3-5 (unpaginated).
    While the competing preliminary objections to the civil action were
    pending, on July 1, 2022, EAS filed a motion to strike the mechanics’ lien. It
    argued that REI failed to file an affidavit of service within 20 days of the service
    of the lien as required by Section 1502(a)(2) of the Mechanics Lien Law.5 See
    EAS’s Motion to Strike Mechanics’ Lien Claim, 7/1/22, at 2. Further, because
    a mechanics’ lien must be filed within six months after work is completed 6 ─
    which REI acknowledged was in September of 2021 ─ EAS asserted the
    mechanics’ lien action “should be dismissed with prejudice.” Id. at 4.
    REI filed a response and supporting brief, averring that the sheriff’s
    return of service, docketed on February 23, 2022, satisfied the requirements
    of Section 1502. See REI’s Brief in Support of Response in Opposition to EAS’s
    Motion to Strike Mechanic[s’] Lien Claim, 7/8/22, at 3.         EAS filed a reply,
    disputing REI’s assertion. Thereafter, on July 18, 2022, the trial court entered
    an order which: (1) granted EAS’s motion to strike the mechanics’ lien claim
    due to REI’s failure to file an affidavit of service; (2) sustained EAS’s
    ____________________________________________
    5 See 49 P.S. § 1502(a)(2) (requiring mechanics’ lien claimant to, inter alia,
    file “affidavit of service of notice, or the acceptance of service, . . . within
    twenty (20) days after service [of lien claim] setting forth the date and manner
    of service”).
    6 See 49 P.S. § 1502(a)(1) (mechanics’ lien claim must be filed “within six (6)
    months after the completion of [the] work”).
    -4-
    J-A16040-23
    preliminary objection to REI’s civil complaint based upon the misjoinder of
    actions; (3) dismissed as moot EAS’s remaining preliminary objections; and
    (4) overruled REI’s preliminary objections to EAS’s preliminary objections.
    See Order, 7/18/22, at 1-2. We note that an order striking a mechanics’ lien
    claim is final and appealable. See Caldwell v. Carter, 
    23 A. 575
     (Pa. 1892).
    Therefore, REI could have filed an appeal from the July 18th order within 30
    days, that is, no later than August 17, 2022.
    However, on August 15, 2022 ─ two days before the appeal period
    expired ─ REI instead filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the trial court’s
    July 18th order. See REI’s Motion for Reconsideration of [Trial] Court’s July
    [18], 2022 Order Striking its Mechanics’ Lien Claim & Seeking Reinstatement
    of Said Claim, 8/15/22, 2-3 (unpaginated).            Notably, REI did not file a
    supporting brief “concurrently” with the motion, as required by local Lancaster
    County Rule of Civil Procedure 208.3(b)(A).7 Further, although the motion
    was properly docketed, the trial court maintains that it did not receive notice
    of the filing at that time. See Trial Ct. Op. at 2.
    Thereafter, on August 25, 2022, a week after the appeal deadline, EAS
    filed a praecipe to deem REI’s motion for reconsideration withdrawn pursuant
    to local Rule 208. See Lancaster Cty R.C.P. 208.3(b)(A) (“If a brief is not filed
    with the motion, the motion shall be deemed withdrawn, without prejudice,
    ____________________________________________
    7 See Lancaster Cty R.C.P. 208.3(b)(A) (“The moving party shall file a
    motion, proposed order and supporting brief concurrently.”) (emphasis
    added).
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    J-A16040-23
    upon praecipe of an opposing party.”) (emphasis added). That same day, REI
    filed a second, identical motion for reconsideration ─ this time, however, REI
    concurrently filed a supporting brief. See REI’s Motion for Reconsideration of
    [Trial] Court’s July [18], 2022 Order Striking its Mechanics’ Lien Claim &
    Seeking Reinstatement of Said Claim, 8/25/22; REI’s Brief in Support of its
    Motion for Reconsideration of [Trial] Court’s July [18], 2022 Order Striking its
    Mechanics’ Lien Claim & Seeking Reinstatement of Said Claim, 8/25/22.
    On September 2, 2022, the trial court entered the order on appeal,
    which:   (1) granted REI’s motion for reconsideration; (2) reinstated REI’s
    mechanics’ lien claim; and (3) denied EAS’s motion to strike the lien claim.
    See Order, 9/2/22. In a footnote, the court explained that the sheriff’s return
    of service, which was docketed within 20 days of service of the lien claim,
    satisfied the requirements of Section 1502. See id. at n.1. EAS filed this
    timely appeal on September 26, 2022, and complied with the trial court’s
    directive to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of
    on appeal.
    On December 6, 2022, this Court directed EAS to show cause as to: (1)
    whether the order on appeal, granting a motion for reconsideration, was final
    and appealable; (2) whether EAS had standing since it did not appear to be a
    party to the mechanics’ lien claim; and (3) whether the appeal should be
    transferred to the Commonwealth Court because the Commonwealth of
    Pennsylvania was a named party. Order, 12/6/22. After EAS filed a timely
    response, we discharged the rule on February 7, 2023. Order, 2/7/23.
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    J-A16040-23
    EAS presents the following three issues for our review:8
    A. Whether the Superior Court may exercise appellate jurisdiction
    over this appeal?
    B. Whether the trial court erred in vacating its initial decision to
    strike the mechanics’ lien claim, when it issued its order
    granting reconsideration more than thirty (30) days after
    initially granting EAS’[s] motion to strike the mechanics’ lien
    claim, in violation of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505?
    C. Whether the trial court erred in reinstating the mechanics’ lien
    claim, where the Mechanics’ Lien Law and controlling case
    authorities conclusively require a claimant to file an affidavit of
    service within 20 days of service of the mechanics’ lien claim?
    EAS’s Brief at 3-4 (some capitalization omitted).
    EAS first addresses the concerns raised by this Court in the rule to show
    cause, and “incorporates by reference the arguments contained in its
    [r]esponse[.]” EAS’s Brief at 28-29. This Court’s show cause order raised
    three questions concerning our jurisdiction over this appeal: (1) whether EAS,
    who is not a named party in the action, has standing to appeal; (2) whether
    the appeal should be transferred to the Commonwealth Court since Penn State
    Health is a named party; and (3) whether the order on appeal ─ granting
    reconsideration of a prior order ─ is final and appealable. See Order, 12/6/22.
    Preliminarily, we agree that EAS is an “aggrieved” party which has
    standing to appeal the order at issue, and that the matter should not be
    ____________________________________________
    8 We have reordered EAS’s claims for purposes of disposition.
    -7-
    J-A16040-23
    transferred to the Commonwealth Court.9 By way of background, we reiterate
    that Penn State Health is the captioned defendant in this matter because it is
    the owner of the property, and project, at issue. However, EAS is the entity
    that contracted with REI and allegedly failed to pay REI.        Therefore, EAS
    posted bond to remove the mechanics’ lien from Penn State Health’s property.
    Moreover, EAS is the named defendant in REI’s breach of contract civil action.
    Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 501 provides that “any party
    who is aggrieved by an appealable order . . . may appeal therefrom.”
    Pa.R.A.P. 501. Further, the Judicial Code defines a “party” as “[a] person who
    commences or against whom relief is sought in a matter.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 102.
    Here, EAS is clearly the entity “aggrieved” by the trial court’s order reinstating
    the mechanics’ lien claim ─ the lien is attached to the bond EAS posted.
    Indeed, EAS is the entity that will be required to pay REI if, in fact, the action
    is resolved in REI’s favor.         Because EAS has “a substantial, direct and
    immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation[,]” we conclude it has
    standing to appeal the court’s order. See Johnson v. Am. Standard, 
    8 A.3d 318
    , 329 (Pa. 2010).
    Further, because the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, while a named
    defendant, is not an aggrieved party, we agree that we are not required to
    transfer this matter to the Commonwealth Court. Pursuant to Section 762 of
    ____________________________________________
    9 REI agrees with EAS’s position on both of these issues.     See REI’s Brief at
    22.
    -8-
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    the Judicial Code, the Commonwealth Court has “exclusive jurisdiction of
    appeals from final orders” in “Commonwealth civil cases.”            42 Pa.C.S. §
    762(a)(1). However, as explained supra, although Penn State Health is the
    owner of the property and project at issue, EAS entered into a subcontract
    with REI and posted bond to discharge the mechanics’ lien from the property
    ─ thus, EAS is the entity that will be liable for any judgment. For this reason,
    we agree that the appeal was properly filed in this Court.
    The final jurisdictional issue concerns the appealability of the trial court’s
    September 2, 2022, order, which purported to grant reconsideration of a
    final order more than 30 days after it was entered. Preliminarily, we reiterate
    that an order striking a mechanics’ lien is final and appealable. See Caldwell,
    23 A. at 575.    However, an order refusing to strike a mechanics’ lien is
    “interlocutory and unappealable.” H.P. Starr & Sons, Inc. v. Stepp, 
    211 A.2d 78
    , 79 (Pa. Super. 1965). We recognize that the trial court’s September
    2, 2022, order effectively refused to strike the mechanics’ lien claim ─ the
    court granted REI’s motion for reconsideration, reinstated REI’s mechanics’
    lien claim, and denied EAS’s motion to strike the lien claim.          See Order,
    9/2/22.
    Nevertheless, the primary issue on appeal is whether the trial court had
    jurisdiction on September 2nd to grant reconsideration of the final, appealable
    order it had entered more than 30 days prior on July 18th. See 42 Pa.C.S. §
    5505 (if no appeal is taken, court may modify or rescind any order within 30
    days of entry); Mfrs. & Traders Tr. Co. v. Greenville Gastroenterology,
    -9-
    J-A16040-23
    SC, 
    108 A.3d 913
    , 916 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“A court lacks the authority to grant
    reconsideration of a final order more than 30 days after its entry.”); Valley
    Forge Ctr. Assocs. v. Rib-it/K.P., Inc., 
    693 A.2d 242
    , 245 (Pa. Super.
    1997) (motion for reconsideration tolls 30-day appeal period only when court
    enters order “expressly granting” reconsideration before expiration of 30-day
    period) (citation omitted).
    This Court considered a similar issue in Gardner v. Consolidated Rail
    Corp., 
    100 A.3d 280
     (Pa. Super. 2014). In that case, on February 20, 2013,
    the trial court entered a final, appealable order granting the defendants’
    motion to transfer venue based on forum non conveniens. 
    Id. at 282
    . The
    next day, the plaintiff filed a timely motion for reconsideration, but not a notice
    of appeal. 
    Id.
     On April 10, 2013, more than 30 days after the entry of its
    order, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and vacated
    the February 20th order.10 See 
    id.
     The defendants then appealed to this
    Court. We exercised appellate jurisdiction to consider whether the trial court
    lacked the jurisdictional authority to grant a motion for reconsideration more
    than 30 days after the order at issue was entered. See 
    id. at 282-83
    . In that
    case, we concluded the trial court had no authority to grant the motion for
    ____________________________________________
    10 Similar to an order refusing to strike a mechanics’ lien, an order denying a
    motion to transfer venue based on forum non conveniens is not final or
    appealable. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(c); Ritchey v. Rutter’s Inc., 
    286 A.3d 248
    ,
    253 (Pa. Super. 2022) (interlocutory order denying motion to transfer venue
    appealable upon this Court’s grant of petition for review pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
    1311).
    - 10 -
    J-A16040-23
    reconsideration, so that its April 10th order was invalid. See id. at 283. Thus,
    based upon our exercise of jurisdiction in Gardner, we likewise conclude that
    we may consider the appeal before us.
    Accordingly, having disposed of the jurisdictional prerequisites, we now
    consider EAS’s second issue on appeal, which directly challenges the trial
    court’s authority to grant REI’s motion for reconsideration of a final,
    appealable order more than 30 days after the order was entered. See EAS’s
    Brief at 12. EAS argues that while Section 5505 of the Judicial Code permits
    a trial court to modify or rescind any final order, it must act within 30 days of
    the entry of the order, or it loses jurisdiction to do so. See id. Here, EAS
    maintains that REI should have filed both a notice of appeal and a motion for
    reconsideration in order to preserve its rights, since a motion for
    reconsideration does not toll the 30-day period for filing an appeal unless the
    trial court expressly grants reconsideration during that time period. See id.
    at 13-14. Because REI failed to do so, and the trial court did not expressly
    grant reconsideration until after the expiration of the 30-day appeal period,
    EAS insists the trial court’s September 2, 2022, order is a nullity. See id. at
    18.
    EAS correctly cites the law concerning reconsideration of a final order.
    Section 5505 of the Judicial Code authorizes a trial court to “modify or rescind
    any order within 30 days after its entry, . . . if no appeal from such order has
    been taken or allowed.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505. However, even after a party has
    filed an appeal from a final order, Pa.R.A.P. 1701 authorizes a trial court to
    - 11 -
    J-A16040-23
    grant reconsideration of a final order if: (1) an application for reconsideration
    is filed within the 30-day appeal period; and (2) the court expressly grants
    reconsideration before the expiration of the appeal period.             Pa.R.A.P.
    1701(b)(3)(i)-(ii).   “A timely order granting reconsideration under [Rule
    1703(b)(3)] render[s] inoperative any such notice of appeal . . . filed or
    docketed with respect to the prior order.” Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(3).
    As this Court has explained:
    Under section 5505, the trial court has broad discretion to modify
    or rescind an order, and this power may be exercised sua sponte
    or invoked pursuant to a party’s motion for reconsideration. [T]he
    trial court may consider a motion for reconsideration only if the
    motion for reconsideration is filed within thirty days of the entry
    of the disputed order.          The mere filing of a motion for
    reconsideration, however, is insufficient to toll the appeal period.
    If the trial court fails to grant reconsideration expressly within the
    prescribed 30 days, it loses the power to act upon both the
    [motion] and the original order.
    PNC Bank, N.A. v. Unknown Heirs, 
    929 A.2d 219
    , 226 (Pa. Super. 2007)
    (citations & quotation marks omitted). See also Valley Forge Ctr. Assocs.,
    693 A.2d at 245 (“[A]lthough a party may petition the court for
    reconsideration, the simultaneous filing of a notice of appeal is necessary to
    preserve appellate rights in the event that either the trial court fails to grant
    the petition expressly within 30 days, or it denies the petition.”).
    Turning to the present matter, on July 18, 2022, the trial court entered
    an order granting EAS’s motion to strike REI’s mechanics’ lien claim.          On
    August 15th, REI filed a motion for reconsideration ─ two days before the
    expiration of the appeal period on August 17th. REI did not simultaneously
    - 12 -
    J-A16040-23
    file a notice of appeal. Thus, the trial court facially exceeded its authority
    pursuant to Section 5505 and Rule 1701, when it granted reconsideration of
    its July 18th order on September 2, 2022, 16 days after the appeal period
    expired.
    Nevertheless, in its opinion, the trial court maintains that despite the
    jurisdictional time restrictions cited above, all courts retain the authority to
    open or vacate a final judgment after the 30-day appeal period when there is
    “extraordinary cause” requiring the court’s intervention.        Trial Ct. Op.
    11/4/22, at 3. Here, the court opined:
    “Extraordinary cause” exists when some action or oversight
    by the court deprives a litigant of its appella[te] rights. See
    Jackson ex rel. Sanders v. Hendrick, 
    746 A.2d 574
    , 576 (Pa.
    2000) (plurality opinion) (extraordinary cause where trial court’s
    failure to memorialize and file oral order would force litigant to
    forfeit appellate rights); Mfrs. & Traders Tr. Co.[,] 108 A.3d [at]
    921 [ ] (extraordinary cause where court error prevented litigant
    from receiving notice of final order). But see Luckenbaugh v.
    Shearer, 
    523 A.2d 399
    , 401 (Pa. Super. 1987) (extraordinary
    cause “generally” where error in judicial process prevents losing
    party from receiving notice). While extraordinary cause generally
    revolves around the litigant’s notice of a final order, the Superior
    Court has historically accounted for other court errors in its
    reasoning. See Great Am. Credit Corp. v. Thomas Mini
    Markets, Inc., 
    326 A.2d 517
     (Pa. Super. 1974) (analysis
    including court misplacing appellant’s motion to detriment of
    appellate rights).
    Here, [REI] filed their motion for reconsideration on August
    15, 2022, within Section 5505’s thirty-day window. The trial court
    agrees that had it merely failed to act upon [REI’s] timely motion
    for reconsideration, extraordinary cause would not exist. See
    Simpson v. Allstate, 504 A.2d [335, 337-38] (Pa. Super. 1986).
    However, the court was unaware of the filing — or any subsequent
    filings by the parties — until August 30, 2022, when the
    Prothonotary’s Office delivered the file. It is unclear exactly why
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    J-A16040-23
    fifteen days passed from the date of filing to the date this court
    received the motion for reconsideration, but the Prothonotary’s
    Office is generally known to be chronically understaffed and
    backlogged. The delay prevented the court from knowing of the
    time-sensitive issue and from making a timely decision, thus
    forcing [REI] to forfeit their appellate rights. This failure of the
    judicial process constitutes an “extraordinary cause” worthy of the
    court’s intervention.
    The trial court did not err in granting [REI’s] motion for
    reconsideration nor in vacating its initial order, notwithstanding
    the fact that Section 5505’s window for appeal had run, because
    there was an extraordinary cause to justify intervention.
    Trial Ct. Op. at 3-4.
    Although we recognize that “extraordinary cause” can justify a trial
    court’s decision to reconsider or vacate a final order more than 30 days after
    its entry, we conclude the trial court erred when it determined that such
    “extraordinary cause” was present in this case.
    As this Court explained in Mfrs & Traders Tr. Co., 
    supra:
    Our cases have referred to several circumstances under which a
    trial court may modify a final order after more than 30 days have
    passed: “extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction over the subject
    matter, a fatal defect apparent on the face of the record or some
    other evidence of ‘extraordinary cause justifying intervention by
    the court.’” ISN Bank v. Rajaratnam, 
    83 A.3d 170
    , 172 (Pa.
    Super. 2013).
    A court may open at any time a judgment procured by fraud.
    For example, in First Union Mortgage Corp. v. Frempong, 
    744 A.2d 327
    , 334–35 (Pa. Super. 1999), we held that a trial court
    had the authority to modify a final in rem judgment five years
    after its entry. Because of the defendant’s use of aliases and
    corporate alter egos, fraudulent court filings, frivolous bankruptcy
    and removal petitions, and dilatory tactics, the original judgment
    amount no longer reflected what he owed to the plaintiffs. 
    Id.
    “Extraordinary cause” refers to “an oversight or
    action on the part of the court or the judicial process which
    operates to deny the losing party knowledge of the entry
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    J-A16040-23
    of final judgment so that the commencement of the running
    of the appeal time is not known to the losing party.” Orie
    v. Stone, 
    601 A.2d 1268
    , 1271 ([Pa. Super.] 1992) (quotation
    omitted)     (emphasis    removed),    appeal      dismissed      as
    improvidently granted, 
    622 A.2d 286
     ([Pa.] 1993).                For
    example, in Estate of Gasbarini v. Medical Center of Beaver
    County, Inc., 
    409 A.2d 343
    , 344–45 (Pa. 1979), unbeknownst to
    the plaintiff, her attorney had been suspended from the practice
    of law when the defendants successfully argued for dismissal of
    the case on their preliminary objections. Our Supreme Court held
    the trial court could reopen the otherwise final judgment, because
    “it would be harsh, indeed, to hold that [the plaintiff’s] possible
    cause of action be lost forever because of the conduct of an
    attorney this court has deemed unfit for the practice of law in this
    Commonwealth.” Id. at 345.
    Mfrs & Traders Tr. Co., 
    108 A.3d at 919
     (emphasis added).
    Nevertheless, we have emphasized that “extraordinary cause” justifying
    a trial court’s decision to modify a final order more than 30 days after its entry
    is “limited in nature.”   Mfrs & Traders Tr. Co., 
    108 A.3d at 919
    ; see
    Simpson, 504 A.2d at 337 (stating “the discretionary power of the court over
    [final] judgments is very limited.”). Notably, we have held that “mistakes or
    ordinary neglect by counsel do not constitute extraordinary circumstances.”
    Mfrs & Traders Tr. Co., 
    108 A.3d at 919
    . But see Estate of Gasbarini,
    409 A.2d at 344-45 (plaintiff attorney’s suspension from practice of law at the
    time trial court sustained preliminary objections and dismissed complaint ─
    unbeknownst to plaintiff ─ constituted extraordinary cause justifying court’s
    order opening judgment).         Furthermore, “[w]e have also held that
    extraordinary cause does not exist where a party has notice of the entry of
    a final order.” Mfrs & Traders Tr. Co., 
    108 A.3d at 919
     (emphasis added).
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    J-A16040-23
    In the present case, REI does not dispute it had notice of the trial court’s
    July 18th final order striking the mechanics’ lien claim; indeed, it filed a motion
    for reconsideration within the 30-day appeal period. Rather, the error here
    was of its own making ─ REI failed to file a notice of appeal concomitant with
    its motion for reconsideration in order to preserve its appellate rights pursuant
    to Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(3). See Valley Forge Ctr. Assocs., 693 A.2d at 245.
    Recognizing this Court’s disinclination to find extraordinary cause when
    a litigant received timely notice of the entry of a final order, the trial court
    cites our decision in Great Am. Credit Corp., 
    supra,
     for the proposition that
    “the Superior Court has historically accounted for other court errors” in
    affirming a trial court’s decision to vacate a judgment after the expiration of
    the appeal period. See Trial Ct. Op. at 4 (emphasis added). However, the
    court’s reliance on Great Am. Credit Corp. to justify its actions herein is
    misplaced.
    First, Great Am. Credit Corp. was decided prior to the enactment of
    both Section 5505, which authorizes a trial court to modify or rescind an order
    within 30 days after its entry, and Pa.R.A.P. 1701. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505
    (eff. Jun. 27, 1978); Pa.R.A.P. 1701 (eff. Jul. 1, 1976).
    Second, the relevant facts in that case are distinguishable. In Great
    Am. Credit Corp., the guarantor of an installment note moved for summary
    judgment in an action to recover the balance due. Great Am. Credit Corp.,
    326 A.2d at 518. The court granted it as uncontested when the appellee failed
    to file a timely answer. Id. However, the court later learned that the appellee
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    had requested an extension of time, but it was “inadvertently mislaid in
    transmission through court processes.” Id. (record citation omitted). After
    the appeal period expired, the court vacated the order granting summary
    judgment and dismissed the motion; the guarantor then filed a timely appeal.
    Id.
    In affirming the trial court’s grant of relief to the appellee, a panel of
    this Court highlighted “the inherent power of the courts of this Commonwealth
    to act where equity so demands[,]” and noted that the trial court recognized
    it had “improvidently” granted summary judgment “because of its own error.”
    See Great Am. Credit Corp., 326 A.2d at 519. The panel agreed with the
    trial court’s decision not to “penalize” the appellee for the “court’s oversight”
    particularly when the appellee assumed his extension request had been
    granted and had filed an answer within the extended time period. See id. In
    a footnote, the panel further explained:
    [T]he appellee avers that he received a telephone call stating that
    his requested extension had been granted and that a copy of
    appellee’s letter to the court requesting an extension was sent to
    [guarantor’s] counsel. Moreover, the delay between the entering
    of the first Order and the second was, in part, occasioned by the
    fact that appellee never received notice that the motion for
    summary judgment had been granted. He had filed an answer
    and was apparently under the impression that the court was
    considering the case on the merits as presented in the motion and
    answer.
    Id. at 520 n.5 (emphasis added)
    Thus, while at first glance, Great Am. Credit Corp. appears to lend
    support to the trial court’s decision, the trial court overlooks the fact that the
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    J-A16040-23
    aggrieved party in that case ─ unlike here ─ did not receive timely notice of
    the entry of the final order. Indeed, in subsequent decisions, this Court has
    distinguished Great Am. Credit Corp. on that fact. See Mfrs & Traders Tr.
    Co., 
    108 A.3d at 921
     (explaining that in Great Am. Credit Corp., “the trial
    court’s oversight deprived the defendant of notice that it had entered a final
    order, triggering the appeal period[,]” but that the aggrieved party in present
    case “never alleged it was unaware” the trial court entered final, appealable
    order); Luckenbaugh, 523 A.2d at 402 (stating that decision affirming trial
    court’s actions in Great Am. Credit Corp. was “for two main reasons[:]” (1)
    court or staff misplaced appellee’s extension request; and (2) appellee “never
    received notice” of entry of final order) (emphasis added). Accordingly, we
    conclude the trial court erred when it found the existence of “extraordinary
    cause” justifying its decision to vacate its July 18th final order more than 30
    days after it was entered.
    Because we agree the trial court had no jurisdiction to vacate its final
    order striking REI’s mechanics’ lien claim more than 30 days after the order
    was entered, we are constrained to vacate the court’s September 2, 2022,
    order. Further, we direct the trial court to reinstate its July 18, 2022, order
    striking REI’s mechanics’ lien claim.
    Our disposition of this issue renders EAS’s final claim ─ which challenges
    the substantive merit of the court’s September 2nd order ─ moot. As this
    Court has explained, a trial court’s “inherent authority to correct mistakes or
    errors . . . does not allow a court to make substantive changes after more
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    than 30 days have passed.” Mfrs & Traders Tr. Co., 108 A.2d at 921. Thus,
    the propriety of the court’s July 18th order is not before us.11
    Order vacated.         Case remanded with instructions.        Jurisdiction
    relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/15/2023
    ____________________________________________
    11 Nevertheless, despite the fact that our proverbial hands are tied as a result
    of REI’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal, we agree that the trial court’s
    July 18th order was erroneous. As the trial court subsequently recognized,
    this Court has held that a sheriff’s return of service satisfies the “affidavit of
    service” requirement of Section 1502(a)(2) of the Mechanics’ Lien Law. See
    Trial Ct. Op. at 3 n.4, citing J.H. Hommer Lumber Co., Inc. v. Dively, 
    584 A.2d 985
    , 987 (Pa. Super. 1990). Moreover, EAS’s assertion that “the holding
    in J.H. Hommer was overruled by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in its
    2021 decision,” Terra Firma, Bldrs, LLC v. King, 
    249 A.3d 976
     (Pa. 2021),
    is simply incorrect. See EAS’s Brief at 26 n.5. The Terra Firma Court made
    no mention of the J.H. Hommer decision, nor did the Court address the
    propriety of a sheriff’s return of service as a substitute for an affidavit of
    service ─ in fact, in that case, the aggrieved party “concede[d] it never filed
    an affidavit of service” for the mechanics’ lien claim. See Terra Firma, Bldrs,
    LLC, 249 A.3d at 981.
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