Com. v. Robinson, R. ( 2023 )

J-A10029-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
RAHEEM ROBINSON :
:
Appellant : No. 1570 EDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 3, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001523-2015
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED AUGUST 18, 2023
Appellant, Raheem Robinson, appeals from the order entered in
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, denying his petition filed under
the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
Appellant was arrested and charged with first-degree murder and related
offenses in connection with the murder of Shaquille Hall (“Victim”). Sakinah
Wyatt, Appellant’s girlfriend at the time of the murder, testified that she met
Victim approximately three weeks before he was murdered when Victim asked
Ms. Wyatt if she wanted to buy a phone from him. Ms. Wyatt did not have
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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her ID card with her, so she invited Victim into her home while she looked for
the card. She did not find the card, but she told Victim she would buy the
phone later.
On April 30, 2014, Appellant and Ms. Wyatt were in her bedroom when
she heard noises outside of the room. Upon opening the door, Ms. Wyatt
found Victim standing in her hallway. Neither Appellant nor Ms. Wyatt had
invited Victim into the home. Ms. Wyatt testified that she saw Appellant yell
at Victim, pull out a gun, and shoot Victim. Ms. Wyatt ran out of the home
after the first shot but heard a second shot. At trial, the jury viewed a video
taken on the day of the murder which showed Appellant entering a nearby
store, walking out, and pouring bleach on his hands. A couple of days later,
Victim’s body was found in an alley by the same store. The body was wrapped
in a sheet and had bleach poured over it.
Appellant testified that Ms. Wyatt called him on April 30, 2014, and
frantically asked him to come over. When Appellant arrived at her home, Ms.
Wyatt and a man named “Money” asked Appellant to help move a body
wrapped in a sheet. Appellant began to help but threw up on his hands.
Appellant explained that he went to the store to wash the vomit off with
bleach, and he did not return to help with the body.
During her direct examination, Ms. Wyatt testified that after the murder,
she visited Appellant six times while Appellant was incarcerated for charges
unrelated to the current incident. Ms. Wyatt explained that she visited him
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because, “I was scared because he threatened my life” and wanted Appellant
to “think everything is still cool” between them. (N.T. Trial, 1/6/16, at 120-
21). Defense counsel did not object to Ms. Wyatt’s testimony. During cross-
examination, the following exchange took place:
Defense: Now, you said you were so frightened, but you
agreed yesterday, when [the prosecutor] asked you some
questions, that you had gone to visit [Appellant] while he
was in jail, right?
Ms. Wyatt: Yes.
Defense: And you agreed that he was in jail for some other
offense, not this, not this homicide, right?
Ms. Wyatt: Right.
Defense: As a matter of fact, it was a domestic violence
case, right?
Ms. Wyatt: Right.
Defense: With his girlfriend, right?
Ms. Wyatt: I guess.
Defense: Now, you didn’t go visit him one time, two times,
or three. You went and visited him six times, right?
Ms. Wyatt: Yes.
Defense: As a matter of fact, this was all before, this was
all before the police went and got you and brought you down
to Homicide for you to ask you what you knew about this
homicide; right? This was all before that, right?
Ms. Wyatt: Right.
* * *
Defense: And then when it’s time to leave, the person that
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you’re saying that you’re afraid of and that you’re scared of
and who threatened to kill you and called you all sorts of
defaming language, you actually give him a kiss on the
cheek and embrace when you leave, right?
Ms. Wyatt: I give him a hug. I don’t kiss.
* * *
Defense: You give him a hug. You hug the man who killed
a man in your house and threatened to do you or have
somebody else do it. You saw him six times and hugged
and embraced each time, right?
Ms. Wyatt: Yes.
(See N.T. Trial, 1/7/16, at 18-20). Appellant later testified that the
Commonwealth dropped the charges for the prior domestic violence arrest.
Additionally, the court instructed the jury as follows:
You have heard evidence that in June of 2014, [Appellant]
was arrested on charges relating to allegations of domestic
violence. Those charges were withdrawn by the
Commonwealth at the scheduled preliminary hearing.
This evidence is before you for a limited purpose, and that
is to explain the circumstances under which Sakinah Wyatt
visited [Appellant] during the summer of 2014 at the House
of Corrections.
You must not consider this evidence for any purpose or in
any manner other [than] the purpose I just stated. You
must not consider this evidence as tending to show that
[Appellant] is a person of bad character or that he has
criminal tendencies from which you might be inclined to
infer his guilt on this case.
(See N.T. Trial, 1/13/16, at 182-83).
Ms. Wyatt also testified about damage to her home, stating “when we
had to start coming to court, that’s when my door was kicked in, my windows
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was busted out.” (N.T. Trial, 1/6/16, at 119). During closing arguments, the
prosecutor argued that Ms. Wyatt was scared because “after she testified, she
believes people came after her because her property was burglarized shortly
thereafter.” (See N.T. Trial, 1/13/16, at 135).
The jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder, possessing an
instrument of crime, and abuse of a corpse on January 14, 2016. On the same
day, the court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment for first-degree
murder, a concurrent sentence of two and a half to five years’ imprisonment
for possession of an instrument of crime, and a consecutive sentence of one
to two years’ imprisonment for abuse of a corpse. Appellant filed a direct
appeal on January 22, 2016, and this Court dismissed the appeal on March
18, 2016 for failure to file a brief. Subsequently, Appellant filed a PCRA
petition, and the court reinstated Appellant’s direct appeal rights nunc pro
tunc on June 8, 2017. On June 28, 2018, this Court affirmed the judgment of
sentence, and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on December
19, 2018. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 1870 EDA 2017 (Pa.Super
June 28, 2018) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 650 Pa. 136, 199
A.3d 346 (2018).
Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition on November 22, 2019.
The court appointed counsel, who filed an amended PCRA petition on February
1, 2021. Following an evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court denied relief on
June 3, 2022. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on June 11, 2022. On
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June 14, 2022, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement of errors complained of on appeal, and Appellant timely complied
on June 17, 2022.
Appellant raises two issues for our review:
Did the trial court err in denying post-conviction relief after
an evidentiary hearing when trial counsel was ineffective
for:
(a) failing to file a motion in limine to preclude testimony
regarding [Appellant’s] incarceration for an unrelated
offense, failing to object when this testimony was
elicited, repeating the information himself, and failing
to object during the Commonwealth’s closing
argument when this information is again brought up
by the Assistant District Attorney; and
(b) failing to file a motion in limine to preclude testimony
regarding damage to witness Sakinah Wyatt’s home
(which could not be connected to [Appellant] in any
way), then failing to object when the information was
elicited, and failing to object during the
Commonwealth’s closing argument when this
information is again brought up by the
Commonwealth?
(Appellant’s Brief at 4).
In his issues combined, Appellant argues that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to certain prior bad acts evidence. Specifically
in his first issue, Appellant asserts that mention of his prior arrest for an
unrelated offense suggested Appellant had a propensity to commit criminal
acts. In his second issue, Appellant complains that Ms. Wyatt’s testimony
about property damage to her home insinuated that Appellant caused the
damage. Appellant contends that trial counsel had no reasonable basis for
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failing to object to introduction of these prior bad acts, especially where the
conviction relied solely on the credibility of Ms. Wyatt’s testimony about
witnessing Appellant shoot Victim against the credibility of Appellant’s own
testimony. Appellant reasons that the verdict may have been different but for
counsel’s ineffectiveness, and this Court should grant a new trial. We
disagree.
Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to
examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s determination
and whether its decision is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Conway,
14 A.3d 101 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 612 Pa. 687, 29 A.3d 795(2011). This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if
the record contains any support for those findings. Commonwealth v. Boyd,
923 A.2d 513 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 593 Pa. 754, 932 A.2d 74(2007). “The PCRA court’s factual findings are binding if the record supports
them, and we review the court’s legal conclusions de novo.” Commonwealth
v. Prater, 256 A.3d 1274, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal denied, ___ Pa.
___, 268 A.3d 386 (2021).
Pennsylvania law presumes counsel has rendered effective assistance.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 597 Pa. 109, 950 A.2d 294 (2008). When
asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner is required
to demonstrate: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had
no reasonable strategic basis for his action or inaction; and, (3) but for the
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errors and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Commonwealth v.
Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 724 A.2d 326 (1999). The failure to satisfy any prong
of the test for ineffectiveness will cause the claim to fail. See Williams,
supra.“The threshold inquiry in ineffectiveness claims is whether the
issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis
for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit….” Commonwealth
v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 524, 645 A.2d 189, 194 (1994). “Counsel cannot be
found ineffective for failing to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.”
Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 852 A.2d 323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004).
Once this threshold is met we apply the ‘reasonable basis’
test to determine whether counsel’s chosen course was
designed to effectuate his client’s interests. If we conclude
that the particular course chosen by counsel had some
reasonable basis, our inquiry ceases and counsel’s
assistance is deemed effective.
Pierce, supra at 524, 645 A.2d at 194-95 (internal citations omitted).
“A finding that a chosen strategy lacked a reasonable basis is not
warranted unless it can be concluded that an alternative not chosen offered a
potential for success substantially greater than the course actually pursued.”
Commonwealth v. Howard, 553 Pa. 266, 274, 719 A.2d 233, 237 (1998).
As a general rule, a lawyer should not be held ineffective
without first having an opportunity to address the
accusation in some fashion. …
In recent years, this Court has expressed a distinct
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preference for a hearing on counsel’s strategy before
venturing to hold that counsel lacked a reasonable basis for
his or her actions or inactions. …
…Review of the reasonableness of counsel’s trial
performance is not measured by an exercise in “spot the
objection,” as might occur in a law school evidence
examination. Counsel are not constitutionally required to
forward any and all possible objections at trial, and the
decision of when to interrupt oftentimes is a function of
overall defense strategy being brought to bear upon issues
which arise unexpectedly at trial and require split-second
decision-making by counsel. The fact that an appellate
court, reviewing a cold trial record, cannot prognosticate a
reasonable basis for a particular failure to raise a plausible
objection does not necessarily prove that an objectively
reasonable basis was lacking.
Commonwealth. v. Colavita, 606 Pa. 1, 34-37, 993 A.2d 874, 895-96
(2010) (internal citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by
Commonwealth v. Bradley, ___ Pa. ___, 261 A.3d 381 (2021).
Prejudice is established when [an appellant] demonstrates
that counsel’s chosen course of action had an adverse effect
on the outcome of the proceedings. The [appellant] must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome. In [Kimball, supra], we held that a “criminal
[appellant] alleging prejudice must show that counsel’s
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”
Commonwealth v. Chambers, 570 Pa. 3, 21-22, 807 A.2d 872, 883 (2002)
(some internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404 provided at the time of Appellant’s
offense: “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove
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a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1) (effective March
18, 2013 to March 31, 2022). Nevertheless, the Commonwealth may
introduce such evidence for another purpose, “such as proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake, or lack of accident.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2) (effective March 18, 2013 to
March 31, 2022).
Further, “[n]ot all improper references to prior bad acts will mandate a
new trial[; m]ere passing references to criminal activity will not require
reversal unless the record indicates that prejudice resulted from the
reference.” Commonwealth v. Stafford, 749 A.2d 489, 496 (Pa.Super.
2000), appeal denied, 568 Pa. 660, 795 A.2d 975 (2000). As well, “[a]n
appellate court will not attribute error when the [t]rial [j]udge provides a
[cautionary] instruction that fully explains the purpose for which the jury may
consider specific evidence.” Commonwealth v. Dargan, 897 A.2d 496, 502
(Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 671, 916 A.2d 1101 (2007).
“[U]nless evidence to the contrary is shown, a presumption exists that the
jury will obey the trial court’s instructions.” Id. at 501.
Instantly, Appellant’s PCRA filings did not include a signed certification
from trial counsel addressing Appellant’s claims. Likewise, trial counsel did
not testify at the PCRA hearing. By failing to proffer input from trial counsel,
Appellant failed to meet his burden of proof to satisfy the “reasonable strategic
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basis” prong for both ineffectiveness claims presented in his PCRA petition.
See Colavita, supra.Nevertheless, the PCRA court determined from the record that trial
counsel had a reasonable strategy for allowing in evidence that Appellant was
incarcerated for an unrelated charge. The PCRA court found that trial counsel
used this evidence to challenge the credibility of Ms. Wyatt’s testimony that
she did not come forward earlier about witnessing the murder because she
was fearful of Appellant. Specifically, the court noted that counsel highlighted
the inconsistency of Ms. Wyatt claiming she was so afraid of Appellant from
witnessing him murder someone and yet willingly chose to visit Appellant six
times while he was incarcerated.
The record supports the court’s conclusion. Trial counsel vigorously
cross-examined Ms. Wyatt regarding her statements that she was fearful of
Appellant by questioning why she continued to associate with Appellant while
he was incarcerated. Additionally, trial counsel highlighted her visits in his
closing argument when he argued to the jury that Ms. Wyatt’s testimony was
not credible. As Appellant acknowledges in his brief, this case hinged largely
on the credibility of Ms. Wyatt’s testimony naming Appellant as the shooter.
Thus, we agree with the PCRA court that trial counsel had a reasonable
strategic basis for permitting the introduction of testimony that Appellant was
incarcerated for an unrelated charge. See Pierce, supra. Additionally, the
jury was informed that the unrelated charges were dropped, and the trial court
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instructed the jury that the evidence could only be used to provide context for
the witness visiting Appellant in prison, minimizing any potential prejudice to
Appellant. See Dargan, supra. See also Chambers, supra.Regarding counsel’s failure to object to the testimony about property
damage to Ms. Wyatt’s home, the PCRA court found that Appellant did not
suffer prejudice from counsel’s failure to object to this testimony. Ms. Wyatt
testified that someone caused damage to her property around the time she
initially testified, which caused her to be afraid. She did not state or imply
that Appellant caused the damage or that Appellant instructed anyone to
cause the damage.
On this record, we agree with the PCRA court’s analysis. Evidence of
vandalism to Ms. Wyatt’s property which was not even attributed to Appellant
has minimal prejudicial value in light of the compelling evidence of Appellant’s
guilt, including Ms. Wyatt’s testimony that she witnessed Appellant shoot
Victim, and the video evidence that showed Appellant pouring bleach on his
hands on the day of the murder in the same area where Victim’s body was
later discovered with bleach poured over it. Therefore, we discern no error in
the court’s conclusion that Appellant failed to demonstrate that he was
prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object to testimony about damage to Ms.
Wyatt’s home. See Chambers, supra. Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/18/2023
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