G.V. Homes, Inc. v. Frempong, S. ( 2023 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
G.V. HOMES, INC. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
STEVE A. FREMPONG AND AGNES :
FREMPONG :
: No. 2511 EDA 2022
Appellants :
Appeal from the Judgment Entered October 3, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No(s): 190800206
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED AUGUST 23, 2023
Steve A. Frempong and Agnes Frempong appeal, pro se, from the
judgment entered against them and in favor of G.V. Homes, Inc., in this
ejectment action. After the Frempongs failed to pay taxes on a piece of
property they owned in Philadelphia, G.V. Homes purchased the property
through a tax lien sale. The Frempongs now challenge the trial court’s finding
that G.V. Homes has the right to possess the property. After review, we affirm.
In the Frempongs’ prior appeal in this matter, we summarized the
relevant factual and procedural history as follows:
This case involves an extensive and meandering procedural
history, including appeals to both the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court and this Court. Briefly, the Frempongs were
the owners of property located in the city and county of
Philadelphia. The Frempongs failed to pay real estate taxes for the
property for several years. See Complaint, 8/6/19, Exhibit A
(indicating that taxes on the property had been delinquent since
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2002). In 2015, the City of Philadelphia filed a petition for rule to
show cause why the property should not be sold free and clear
from all liens, and in March 2016, the trial court authorized a real
estate tax lien sale on the property. G.V. Homes purchased the
property through the tax lien sale on December 19, 2017.
The Frempongs refused to vacate the property or permit
G.V. Homes to enter the property, and ultimately, G.V. Homes
filed a complaint in ejectment and trespass on August 5, 2019.
Additional litigation ensued.
The trial court conducted a bench trial on March 17, 2021,
after which the trial court found in favor of G.V. Homes and
awarded G.V. Homes possession of the property. The Frempongs
subsequently filed a motion for post-trial relief requesting that the
court dismiss the ejectment action, set aside the verdict, or
conduct a new trial; the trial court denied the motion. Additionally,
upon praecipe of G.V. Homes, the trial court issued a writ of
possession. …
G.V. Homes, Inc. v. Frempong, 285 A.3d 940, 1236 EDA 2021 (Pa. Super.
filed Sept. 21, 2022) (unpublished memorandum at 1-3) (footnotes omitted).
The Frempongs filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s denial of
their post-trial motion. Because a final judgment had not been entered on the
docket, this Court quashed the Frempongs’ appeal. See id. (unpublished
memorandum at 3). While the appeal was pending, the Frempongs filed an
emergency motion for stay of eviction, which this Court denied.
The Frempongs also filed a “motion for preliminary injunction” on the
same date they filed their first appeal. The trial court considered the motion
as a request for a stay and denied the motion. On appeal, this Court concluded
the issue was precluded by the law of the case doctrine because we addressed
the claim, i.e., the motion to stay, during the Frempongs’ first appeal. See
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G.V. Homes, Inc. v. Frempong, 281 A.3d 1073, 1577 EDA 2021 (Pa. Super.
filed June 16, 2022) (unpublished memorandum).
On October 3, 2022, the Frempongs filed a praecipe for entry of the
judgment against them, and judgment was entered on the docket on the same
date. The instant appeal followed.1
The Frempongs identify four claims in their appellate brief, each of which
principally challenges the trial court’s finding in favor of G.V. Homes in the
ejectment action. The Frempongs repeatedly argue that the trial court lacked
authority to authorize the tax lien sale in March 2016, and therefore, any title
G.V. Homes acquired through the sale was void.2
When addressing nonjury trial verdicts, this Court’s standard of review
is deferential to the trial court:
Our appellate role in cases arising from nonjury trial verdicts is to
determine whether the findings of the trial court are supported by
____________________________________________
1 G.V. Homes filed an application to quash the Frempongs’ appeal, which this
Court denied without prejudice. G.V. Homes did not file a brief in this matter.
2 The Frempongs also allege that notice and service of the underlying tax
petition were defective and that they had not exhausted their right to redeem
the property. The Frempongs raised these claims in previous Commonwealth
Court appeals. See City of Philadelphia v. Frempong, 227 A.3d 973, 68
C.D. 2019 (Pa. Cmwlth. filed Apr. 24, 2020) (unpublished memorandum)
(regarding redemption and ability to pay); City of Philadelphia v.
Frempong, 196 A.3d 282, 959 C.D. 2016 (Pa. Cmwlth. filed Sept. 19, 2018)
(unpublished memorandum) (wherein the Frempongs alleged defects in notice
and service of the tax petition). Throughout its opinion in the instant matter,
the trial court referenced the Frempongs’ repeated attempts to raise these
issues despite the court’s reminders that it would only consider evidence
pertaining to the issue of ejectment. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/24/23, at 5-
13.
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competent evidence and whether the trial court committed error
in any application of the law. The findings of fact of the trial judge
must be given the same weight and effect on appeal as the verdict
of the jury. We consider the evidence in a light most favorable to
the verdict winner. We will reverse the trial court only if its findings
of fact are not supported by competent evidence in the record or
if its findings are premised on an error of law. However, where the
issue concerns a question of law, our scope of review is plenary.
Gamesa Energy USA, LLC v. Ten Penn Ctr. Assocs., L.P., 181 A.3d 1188,
1191 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation, brackets, and ellipses omitted).
“Ejectment is a possessory action only, and can succeed only if the
plaintiff is out of possession, and if he has a present right to immediate
possession.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Long, 934 A.2d 76, 79 (Pa. Super.
2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted). As this Court has explained,
[T]o prevail in an ejectment action, the plaintiff must show title at
the commencement of the action and can recover, if at all, only
on the strength of his own title, not because of weakness or
deficiency of title in the defendant. If a plaintiff in ejectment has
presented at trial prima facie evidence that it has title to the
property at issue, the burden then shifts to the defendant, unless
the plaintiff’s proof necessarily defeats the plaintiff’s claim of title.
Conversely, if the plaintiff’s claimed chain of title is faulty, the
plaintiff has not shown a prima facie case, and the plaintiff’s
ejectment case fails. …
Becker v. Wishard, 202 A.3d 718, 722 (Pa. Super. 2019) (internal citations,
quotation marks, and footnote omitted).
Here, after a bench trial, the trial court concluded G.V. Homes
established its superior right of possession. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/24/23,
at 5. After purchasing the property at the tax lien sale, G.V. Homes “acquired
fee simple legal title to the Property by [Sheriff’s] Deed dated January 25,
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2018, and recorded in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on February 23, 2018, in
Deed Book No. 1708, Writ No. 2012, Document ID No. 53331428.” Id. G.V.
Homes produced the certified and recorded deed at trial, which provided prima
facie evidence of its chain of title and right of possession. See id.; see also
Complaint, 8/6/19, Exhibit A (certified sheriff’s deed transferring property to
G.V. Homes and transfer tax certification), B (title report); N.T., 3/17/21, at
22 (wherein a copy of the certified sheriff’s deed was admitted into evidence
during the nonjury trial).
Upon review, we conclude the trial court’s findings are supported by
competent evidence. Further, we find no error in the trial court’s legal
conclusion that G.V. Homes offered prima facie evidence of its superior title
to the property. See Dunn v. Milanovich, 152 A. 757, 758 (Pa. 1930) (“[A]
prima facie right is always sufficient to entitle plaintiff to recover, until and
unless a better title is shown to exist in favor of the adverse party.”). Our
review of the transcripts from the nonjury trial also confirms that the
Frempongs failed to introduce evidence to defeat G.V. Homes’s claim or to
otherwise establish their right to possession. Therefore, the Frempongs’ claims
merit no relief.
Judgment affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/23/2023
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