Com. v. Parker, III., O ( 2023 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ONEARL ISSAC PARKER, III :
:
Appellant : No. 1458 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 8, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-36-CR-0000823-2020
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED AUGUST 28, 2023
Onearl Isaac Parker, III (Appellant), appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas, following
his open guilty plea and convictions of criminal attempt (attempted homicide),
aggravated assault, persons not to possess a firearm, firearms not to be
carried without a license, delivery of marijuana, and possession with intent to
deliver (PWID).1 The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 18 1/2 to
40 years’ incarceration. Appellant complains the trial court’s aggregate
sentence, including consecutive sentences, was so manifestly excessive as to
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901(a), 2702(a)(1)(4), 6105(a)(1), and 6106(a)(1); see
also 35 P.S. §780-113(a)(30).
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constitute an abuse of the court’s discretion. Based on the following, we
affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
At his open guilty plea, Appellant agreed to the following material facts
as presented by the Commonwealth:
On Christmas night of 2019, the victim [Simon Joseph] and
[Appellant] had a long-standing relationship of approximately four
to five years where the victim would [meet up with] [Appellant]
on a somewhat weekly basis, purchase a small amount of
marijuana. On this particular night, [Joseph] met up with
[Appellant] and purchased this amount of marijuana where he
gave [Appellant] $70 in exchange for approximately 10.62 grams
of marijuana. He did question the amount of the marijuana that
he had been given. [Appellant] began to act strange, wanted to
take the marijuana back from the victim, and started walking in
circles. At one point, [Joseph tried] to leave the scene. When he
turned his back to leave, [Appellant] began to shoot him multiple
times. Once [Joseph] was down on his knees, he was pistol-
whipped in the back of his head with the gun.
[Appellant] then pointed the gun at [Joseph’s] head and
pulled the trigger; however, the gun was out of bullets at this
point.
[Appellant] took off running at which point [Joseph] was
rushed to Lancaster General Hospital where he received lifesaving
medical treatment, and without this treatment he would have
died.
After an investigation by the Manheim Township Police
Department, [Appellant] was arrested the following day. [A
s]ubsequent search warrant of [Appellant]’s apartment yielded
over two pounds of marijuana and drug paraphernalia along with
a firearm that was found on [Appellant]’s bathroom floor. This
firearm was tested ballistically and found to match the fired shell
casings that were found at the shooting scene.
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It was determined that [Appellant] was a person not to
possess as he had two prior adjudications in 2011, one for
aggravated assault and one for a robbery.
He also did not possess a valid license to carry this firearm.
N.T., 3/21/22, at 9-10.2
Appellant was subsequently charged with criminal attempted homicide,
aggravated assault, prohibited possession of a firearm, carrying a firearm
without a license, delivery of marijuana, and PWID. See Information,
2/28/22.
On March 21, 2022, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to all six
counts. See N.T., 3/21/22, at 9. The trial court ordered the completion of a
pre-sentence investigation (PSI), including a mental health evaluation. See
id. at 14; see also Order, 3/22/22. On September 8, 2022, the trial court
imposed an aggregate sentence of 18 1/2 to 40 years’ incarceration.
Specifically, Appellant was sentenced to the following: (1) a term of 17 1/2 to
35 years’ incarceration for the attempted homicide conviction; (2) a
concurrent term of six to 12 years’ imprisonment for persons not to possess
firearms; (3) a concurrent term three-and-one-half to seven years’
incarceration for firearms not to be carried without a license; (3) a concurrent
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2 Appellant disputed the allegations that he “pistol-whipp[ed] [Joseph] and
[stood] over him with the empty gun,” but otherwise agreed with the
Commonwealth’s recitation of the facts. N.T., 3/21/22, at 11. Counsel noted
that despite the factual dispute, “the elements of the crime are still present.”
Id.
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term of one to five years’ imprisonment for delivery of marijuana; and (4) a
consecutive term of one to five years’ incarceration for PWID. See N.T.,
9/8/22, at 18-19. The aggravated assault conviction merged with the
attempted homicide conviction for sentencing purposes.3
On September 15, 2022, Appellant filed a timely motion to reconsider
his sentence. He alleged it was “shocking, cruel, and totally insensitive” that
the trial court inflicted a near-maximum sentence, despite the presence of
mitigating factors including his “acceptance of responsibility, remorse, mental
and emotional health issues, and the lack of any significant record or violence.”
Appellant’s Motion to Reconsider Sentence, 9/15/22, at 1. The trial court
denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion the next day.4
Appellant subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal, followed by a
timely, court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on
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3 The court also ordered Appellant to pay restitution in the amount of $454.52.
See N.T., 9/8/22, at 19.
4 Nearly two weeks later, the trial court received a handwritten pro se
submission from Appellant amending his post-sentence motion to include an
ineffective counsel claim, based on counsel’s “fail[ure] to have a mental health
professional/expert evaluate [Appellant] after the court’s evaluator diagnosed
[him],” allegedly prejudiced remarks by defense counsel during sentencing,
and a breakdown in communication with defense counsel about subpoenas
and his first plea offer. He also reiterated the discretionary sentencing claims
already set forth by defense counsel. Appellant’s Pro Se Letter, 9/27/22, at 1
(unpaginated). The court ordered the pro se correspondence be entered on
the docket on October 11, 2022, and served on the parties. See Order,
10/11/22, at 1.
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appeal. See Notice of Appeal, 10/17/22; see also Appellant’s Statement of
Errors Complained of On Appeal, 11/15/22.5 The trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) opinion on December 7, 2022.
II. Statement of Issue on Appeal
Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:
I. Was the trial court’s aggregate sentence of 18.5 to 40 years
of incarceration so manifestly excessive under the circumstances
of the instant case, especially considering [Appellant]’s
circumstances, and was the imposition of consecutive sentences
an abuse of the court’s discretion?
Appellant’s Brief at 6.
Appellant’s argument that his sentence was manifestly excessive in light
of his personal circumstances and the court’s imposition of consecutive
sentences presents an issue regarding the discretionary aspects of sentencing.
III. Standard of Review
The standard of review for discretionary aspects of sentencing is well-
settled as an abuse of discretion. “[T]here is no absolute right to appeal when
challenging the discretionary aspect of a sentence. . . . Rather, an [a]ppeal
is permitted only after this Court determines that there is a substantial
question that the sentence was not appropriate under the sentencing code.”
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5 Additionally, on April 24, 2023, Appellant filed a letter with this Court,
requesting copies of his guilty plea transcripts. See Pro Se Letter, 4/23/23.
That same day, this Court forwarded Appellant’s pro se letter to his counsel
pursuant to Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032 (Pa. 2011). See Jette
Letter, 4/24/23.
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Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1268 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal
citations & quotation marks omitted). Further, it merits mention that a guilty
plea without any sentencing restrictions does not bar a discretionary
sentencing claim. See Commonwealth v. Hill, 66 A.3d 365, 367 (Pa. Super.
2013). In order to successfully preserve a discretionary sentencing challenge,
an appellant must satisfy the following test:
[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902
and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see
Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal
defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial
question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under
the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation
omitted).
The determination of whether a substantial question has been raised is
made “on a case-by-case basis; the fact that a sentence is within the statutory
limits does not mean a substantial question cannot be raised.”
Commonwealth v. Giordano, 121 A.3d 998, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(internal citation omitted). We have held before that a substantial question is
raised where an appellant notes “an excessive sentence claim [ ] in
conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating
factors.” Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 770 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(citation omitted); see also Dodge, 77 A.3d at 1271-72 (holding that a
substantial question was found where [an a]ppellant challenged
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unreasonableness of sentence in combination with trial court’s failure to
consider nature of the defendant’s offenses, despite aggregate sentence
falling within standard guidelines range).
Here, the record reflects that Appellant has fulfilled the first three
requirements required to warrant appellate review of a discretionary
sentencing claim. Appellant satisfied the first two prongs by timely filing both
a motion to reconsider his sentence and notice of appeal.6 Appellant also
included a compliant Rule 2119(f) statement in his appellate brief. See
Appellant’s Brief at 10. Finally, Appellant has raised a substantial question by
combining his claim of an excessive sentence with an allegation that the trial
court failed to consider his mitigating factors and rehabilitative needs when
assigning his sentence. See Caldwell, 117 A.3d at 770. Appellant has
therefore satisfied all elements required to grant appellate review.
IV. Analysis
In his sole argument on appeal, Appellant avers that the trial court failed
to adequately consider his personal mitigating circumstances and
rehabilitative needs and, as a result, imposed a sentence that was “so
manifestly excessive as to constitute an abuse of discretion.” Appellant’s Brief
at 16. Appellant claims the court should have considered the following
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6 See Appellant’s Motion to Reconsider Sentence at 1-2; see also Notice of
Appeal, 10/17/22.
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mitigating evidence: (1) his substance abuse problems; (2) he erroneously
believed he was being robbed by the victim; (3) his mental health issues in
addition to his drug and alcohol usage “triggered a paranoia attack and false
belief, causing him to do what he did[;]”7 and (4) he expressed remorse at
sentencing and accepted responsibility by pleading guilty to all charges. See
id. at 18-20. Appellant concludes, “Although the [trial c]ourt claims to have
taken the above mitigation into consideration, the resulting sentence does not
reflect that. There was no need to warehouse [Appellant] for that extreme
length of time.” Id. at 20.
The trial court’s breadth of discretion at sentencing is well-settled:
[S]entencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of
the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on
appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Moreover, the
sentencing court has broad discretion in choosing the range of
permissible confinements which best suits a particular defendant
and the circumstances surrounding his crime. . . . [I]n imposing
a sentence, the trial judge may determine whether, given the facts
of a particular case, a sentence should run consecutive to or
concurrent with another sentence being imposed.
Commonwealth v. Hill, 66 A.3d 365, 370 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). We have held that the trial court’s
sentence is presumed to be thoroughly reasoned and should be upheld except
in extreme circumstances:
When imposing sentence, the trial court is required to
consider the particular circumstances of the offense and the
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7 Appellant’s Brief at 19.
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character of the defendant. The trial court should refer to the
defendant’s prior criminal record, age, personal characteristics,
and potential for rehabilitation. However, where the sentencing
judge had the benefit of a pre-sentence investigation report
(“PSI”), it will be presumed that he or she was aware of the
relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and
weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory
factors.
[Moreover,] [w]hen imposing a sentence, the sentencing
court must consider the factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b),
that is, the protection of the public, gravity of offense in relation
to impact on the victim and community, and rehabilitative needs
of the defendant. . . . Furthermore, [a] trial court judge has wide
discretion in sentencing and can, on the appropriate record and
for the appropriate reasons, consider any legal factor in imposing
a sentence[.] The sentencing court, however, must also consider
the sentencing guidelines.
Commonwealth v. Clemat, 218 A.3d 944, 959-960 (Pa. Super. 2019)
(internal citations omitted).
Here, a review of the record reveals the following. The trial court had
the benefit of the PSI. See N.T., 3/8/22, at 3. Appellant had a prior record
score (PRS) of five. See N.T., 9/8/22, at 4; see also Guideline Sentence
Forms, 4/27/22. The offense gravity score (OGS) for each of his convictions
are as follows: (1) criminal attempt (attempted homicide) was 14, (2)
aggravated assault was 11, (3) persons not to possess a firearm was 11, (4)
possession of a firearm without a license was nine, (5) delivery of marijuana
was three, and (6) PWID was five. The applicable sentencing guidelines
provide that the standard ranges were: (1) 210 to 240 months’ imprisonment
for attempted homicide; (2) 90 to 108 months’ incarceration for aggravated
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assault;8 (3) 72 to 90 months’ imprisonment for persons not to possess a
firearm; (4) 42 months’ incarceration for possession of a firearm without a
license;9 (5) six to 16 months’ imprisonment for delivery of marijuana, and
(6) 12 to 18 months’ incarceration for PWID. See Pennsylvania Commission
on Sentencing Guideline Sentence Form, 4/27/22, at 1-7. Each sentence fell
within the standard guidelines range for the corresponding offense. See Trial
Ct. Op., 12/7/22, at 5.
Moreover, at the September 8, 2022, sentencing proceeding, the
Commonwealth emphasized the gravity of Appellant’s conduct, stating “the
only set of circumstances . . . that makes us not here for a homicide
sentencing as opposed to an attempted homicide sentencing is the fact that
[Appellant] ran out of bullets[.]”. N.T., 9/8/22, at 5. The Commonwealth
further stated the victim “is very lucky to be alive” because he “suffered
serious bodily injury.” Id. at 6. The Commonwealth asked the court to hold
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8 A deadly weapon enhancement was applied to the attempted homicide and
aggravated assault sentences.
9 Our review of the sentencing guidelines indicates that the standard range for
the offense of possession of a firearm without a license — where the OGS is
nine and the PRS is five — is a term of 48 to 60 months. See 204 Pa. Code §
303.16(a). Appellant does not raise an argument regarding the different
ranges. In any event, Appellant received the benefit because his sentence
would have fallen in the mitigated range.
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Appellant “accountable for what he’s done and fashion a sentence that is in
accordance with the sentencing guidelines.” Id.10
Defense counsel argued that Appellant is not “a person that has been
engaged in violent behavior[.]” N.T., 9/8/22, at 7. Counsel also highlighted
the purported role played by mental illness and addiction in Appellant’s
wrongful conduct, as well as Appellant’s acceptance of responsibility. See
N.T., 9/8/22, at 6-10. Counsel stated: “[T]here’s no doubt in my mind that
something happened there that triggered the paranoia in [Appellant] where
[he] felt that he was going to be robbed [by the victim].” Id. at 7-8.
Appellant also invoked his right to allocution, reciting a letter he wrote
to the victim and the trial court:
I want to apologize to the victim for the pain I caused and
inflicted. I’m deeply sorry. I’m remorseful. I also want to
apologize to the victim’s parents because I have a son and I don’t
know what I would do in [a] situation like this if it happened to
my son. I also want to apologize to everybody here, like the
courts and everybody, for exhausting your resources on a crime
that . . . should not have been committed in the first place.
I’m not a bad person. I made a mistake. Some mistakes
are worse than others. I’m truly sorry for everything.
Your Honor, I inflicted a lot of people with a bad decision I
made. I ask that you shed a light on my lack of record and the
fact that this is my first time being incarcerated in Lancaster
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10 The Commonwealth also raised at sentencing that a prior “psychiatrist
[gave] the implication that [Appellant] was playing up some [of] the [mental
health] criteria that he presented because that was a court-ordered
evaluation,” referring to a discrepancy in some diagnoses between his 2011
and 2022 evaluations. N.T., 9/8/22, at 5.
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County Prison, and I’m going to make it my last. I don’t want to
waste my life in jail. And just I hope I can get a second chance.
I hope I can get a second chance because I still have goals I want
to accomplish.
My first goal is to get another trade and a job. I want to be
a productive person in society and still have a chance to see my
kids grow up and everything, do everything the right way, raise
them the right way. And I apologize. That’s all.
N.T., 9/8/22, at 10-11.
Later in the proceeding, the trial court extensively discussed Appellant’s
background and its reasoning behind the sentencing, even lamenting the
difficulty of determining an appropriate sentence:
I will note for the record that I have considered the penalties
authorized by the legislature. I’ve considered the sentencing
guideline as submitted and applicable ranges. I’ve considered
facts and circumstances of the underlying offenses. I’ve
considered the entirety of the presentence investigation, including
all attachments, those attachments being court documentation
regarding the current offenses, a 2011 psychological evaluation
conducted by Dr. Hugh Smith[, Ph.D.], and a 2022 psychological
evaluation ordered as part of the presentence investigation by Dr.
[Zoë Selhi, M.D.]. I’ve also considered, with great consideration,
the extent of the sentencing memorandums submitted by counsel
for the [Appellant] and all of the letters attached thereto. I’ve
considered the position of the [prosecutor], the comments of
[defense counsel] and the [Appellant]’s comments here today.
I’ve considered the [Appellant]’s rehabilitative needs, the need for
there to be a deterrence and the need for the protection of the
entire community.
* * *
It is noted that the troubled foster placements led to certain
emotional and mental distress on the part of [Appellant],
aggressive outbursts on the part of [Appellant] and a delayed
ability to speak. In addition, [Appellant] was subject to violence
as a child in Philadelphia.
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* * *
As noted, [Appellant] is high school graduate, having
graduated from the Warwick School District in 2015. There was
also certain vocational technical training [Appellant] received
during his academic years. It is noted that [Appellant] did and
was subject to an Individualized Education Plan and there was a
noted history of certain emotional behavior difficulties during his
academic years.
As discussed, [Appellant] has a 2011 juvenile conviction for
aggravated assault and robbery. There’s another juvenile
misdemeanor conviction. As an adult there’s a 2014 disorderly
conduct and paraphernalia, in 2015 a small amount of marijuana,
and in 2016 criminal trespass, theft from a motor vehicle and
other minor offenses.
[Appellant] does have a notable mental health history that
was reflected in detail in the [PSI] and in all reports that I
reviewed. [Appellant] was diagnosed with [attention-deficit
disorder (ADD), attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)],
Mixed Reception Expressive Language Disorder and potential
academic concerns at a young [age]. There was some treatment
of those as a teen. In a 2011 [Doctor] Hugh Smith report it spoke
about the potential diagnosis of Disruptive Behavior Disorder and
cannabis abuse.
In 2020, the most recent report, reflected [post traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD)], substance abuse disorder, ADD, potential
persuasive development disorder and potential intellectual
development disorder. There were additional evaluations
contained in [Appellant’s] sentencing memorandum, which also
reflected similar diagnoses.
In addition, [Appellant] has a notable drug and alcohol
history, again, using alcohol sporadically between the ages of 13
and 14. From the ages of 20 and 21 until his current incarceration,
[Appellant] was using alcohol on a daily basis. It is noted that
[Appellant] considers himself to be an alcoholic and three times
suffered from alcohol poisoning. [Appellant] began using
marijuana at age 12 and there’s a long-term daily usage of
marijuana. In addition, there was use of Xanax beginning at ages
13 and 14 that was daily between the ages of 18 and 21, Percocet
beginning at age 18 daily until the time of his current incarceration
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and certain other experimentation between the ages of 20 and 21
involving the use of Ecstasy, methamphetamine, [phencyclidine
piperidine (PCP)] and cough syrup. There’s no history of any drug
or alcohol counseling or treatment.
It is noted that [Appellant] has a sporadic employment
history having worked in packing facilities, demolition work and
food service, however, [Appellant] also has a demonstrable
history of receiving Social Security disability payments.
[Appellant], I will tell you when I was a practicing attorney
maybe I thought judges had it easy. I thought judges would look
at the sentencing guidelines and make sentencing decisions
easily. I have learned over the last nine years this job is far from
easy because I have to take into account the entirety of the
situation, the entirety of what happened, the entirety of who you
are as a person and what your needs may be. And I will tell you
that that is not an easy job. . . .
I have no doubt you are remorseful. . . . And [defense
counsel] is right that you stepped up and accepted responsibility.
And that will be considered. . . .
[B]ut on the other hand, everything [the prosecutor] said is
absolutely correct too. But for running out of bullets, we can only
fear where we would have been today. . . .
As much as I’m sympathetic to your situation, I can tell you
that selling drugs, whether it be other drugs or whether it be
marijuana, has an absolutely detrimental effect on his community.
And all of that, in its entirety, is what I have to weigh and what I
have weighed. I have no doubt that a sentence of incarceration
is warranted, because a lesser sentence would depreciate[] the
seriousness of your actions.
N.T., 9/8/22, at 16-18.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court again cited the seriousness
of Appellant’s conduct as a determining factor in assigning his sentence,
stating:
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In sentencing Appellant in the instant matter, the court was
guided by an extensive [PSI]. In fashioning sentence, the court
gave thoughtful consideration to: the penalties authorized by the
Legislature; the sentencing guidelines and all of the applicable
ranges, including the standard aggravated and mitigated ranges;
the facts and circumstances of the current offenses; the [PSI] and
all attachments thereto, including a 2011 psychological evaluation
conducted by Dr. Hugh Smith and a 2022 psychological evaluation
. . . by Dr. [Selhi]; the comments made by the attorney for the
Commonwealth; the comments of Appellant’s attorney; the
position of Appellant; the sentencing mitigation memorandum
submitted by Appellant; Appellant’s rehabilitative needs; the need
for there to be a deterrence; and, the need for the protection of
the entire community.
The court extensively considered and discussed Appellant’s
age, the troubled nature of his formative years, the abuse that
Appellant had witnessed and suffered, Appellant’s positive
relationship with his mother, the strong bond that Appellant
shares with his two children, his educational background, his
criminal history, his mental health history, his drug and alcohol
history, his sporadic employment history, his physical health, and
the sincerity of his remorse for his actions. In addition, the court
openly discussed the difficulty that was presented by sentencing
in this matter.
As reflected in the aforementioned comments and
considerations noted by the court, th[e] court found sentencing in
this matter to be a difficult task. The court believes that sentences
in the standard range were appropriate and that any lesser
sentences would depreciate the seriousness of this conduct. In
addition, th[e] court could not overlook the fact that Appellant
both attempted to end the life of a fellow citizen and engaged
extensively in dealing drugs within the community. As such, the
imposition of a sole consecutive sentence is not excessive or
unreasonable.
Trial Ct. Op. at 7-8 (citations omitted).
Pursuant to our standard of review, we conclude the trial court did not
abuse its discretion with regard to Appellant’s sentence for several reasons.
First, we note that “[w]here the sentencing court impose[s] a standard-range
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sentence with the benefit of a pre-sentence report, we will not consider the
sentence excessive.” Bankes, 286 A.3d at 1307-1308 (internal quotation
omitted). As mentioned above, the trial court had the benefit of a PSI when
it imposed Appellant’s standard range sentences.
Second, contrary to Appellant’s assertions, it is clear the trial court
carefully considered his personal history and rehabilitative needs, as well as
his personal letter, openly acknowledging them at the sentencing hearing and
in its Rule 1925(a) opinion as recited above. Furthermore, with respect to
Appellant’s complaint that the trial court failed to consider his expression of
remorse, the court explicitly stated it took that into consideration. See Trial
Ct. Op. at 8. Appellant fails to accept that even considering the mitigating
factors detailed in the PSI and at the sentencing hearing, the trial court found,
after careful deliberation, a significant sentence of incarceration was
warranted in light of the seriousness of Appellant’s conduct and the protection
of the community. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b); Clemat, 218 A.3d 944, 959-
960. Nonetheless, the trial court acknowledged Appellant’s difficult past and
circumstances, ultimately imposing standard range sentences based on the
gravity of the offense. See id. For the foregoing reasons, we discern the trial
court was within its discretion regarding Appellant’s aggregate sentence.
Accordingly, Appellant’s challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence
fails.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 08/28/2023
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