Com. v. Redanauer, R. ( 2023 )

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2023 PA Super 274COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
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ROBERT REDANAUER : No. 1631 EDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered July 15, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): MC-51-CR-0007444-2021,
MC-51-CR-0007445-2021
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
ROBERT REDANAUER : No. 1632 EDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered July 15, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): MC-51-CR-0007444-2021,
MC-51-CR-0007445-2021
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BOWES, J., OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN,
J., MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
DISSENTING OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED DECEMBER 28, 2023
The majority holds that the Commonwealth is foreclosed from appealing
the orders entered below because it construes them as acquittals. While it is
clear that the court purported to enter adjudications of not guilty, it was
without the power to do so because the proceeding on July 15, 2021, in my
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view, unquestionably amounted only to a preliminary hearing. While a rose
by any other name may smell as sweet in a Shakespeare play, an order finding
a defendant not guilty will not serve as an acquittal for double jeopardy and
appellate jurisdiction purposes simply because a court names it thusly. Since
I refuse to mechanically apply form over substance so as to give the orders
below the power of acquittals when the court lacked the power to acquit
Redanauer in the absence of a trial and, where the court, in fact, prevented
the Commonwealth from presenting evidence outside the scope of a
preliminary hearing, I respectfully dissent.
To illustrate why the court lacked the authority to acquit Redanauer, I
begin with a brief overview of the procedural history. Redanauer was charged
by a single criminal complaint based upon an incident where he allegedly
brandished a firearm and threatened the children of his paramour, one of
whom was a minor and the other an adult. In line with the practice of
Philadelphia’s Preliminary Arraignment System, the complainants were
assigned separate municipal court docket numbers: Case 7444 for the minor
victim, and Case 7445 for the adult victim. Notably, each docket listed the
other under “consolidated defendant cases.” Criminal Docket for Case 7444,
at 1 (capitalization omitted); Criminal Docket for Case 7445, at 1 (same).
Both dockets were listed for trial in the Philadelphia Municipal Court on
July 15, 2021. Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed a request at the lead
docket number, Case 7444, for the matter to be re-listed as a preliminary
hearing so that it could exercise its right to a jury trial based upon one of the
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victims in the matter being a juvenile. By order, the president judge granted
the request for the matter to be scheduled for a preliminary hearing on July
15, 2021.
While both dockets technically remained listed for trial, in accordance
with the order, a preliminary hearing was held before the Honorable James
Murray Lynn as to both dockets on July 15, 2021. At the hearing, the
Commonwealth’s sole witness was Daniel Taylor, the adult victim at Case 7445
and a witness for the charges filed at Case 7444. The caption on the transcript
of the proceeding clearly identified it as a preliminary hearing for both dockets.
Indeed, the conduct of all involved clearly indicated that everyone understood
the proceeding to be a preliminary hearing for both Case 7444 and Case 7445.
For example, Judge Lynn chastised the Commonwealth and curtailed its direct
examination of Mr. Taylor when it perceived that it had exceeded the scope of
a preliminary hearing, as evidenced by the following exchange:
Commonwealth: [Mr. Taylor, d]o you recall what you were
wearing - -
Judge Lynn: Who cares.
Commonwealth: Okay.
Judge Lynn: Why do you care?
Commonwealth: No problem. I can go to the next question.
Judge Lynn: We are at a preliminary hearing.
Commonwealth: We are.
Judge Lynn: Why are we talking about this man’s clothes?
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Commonwealth: I can ask another question.
Judge Lynn: Don’t waste my time.
Commonwealth: Got it.
Judge Lynn: It is completely irrelevant with what we are
doing here today. Have you been doing this
long?
Commonwealth: Yes.
Judge Lynn: With who?
Commonwealth: Various rooms and various judges. I was in the
room for two years.
Judge Lynn: Not here.
Commonwealth: Nope. May I?
Judge Lynn: Just ask relevant questions.
N.T. 7/15/21, at 9-10 (emphasis added).
After the Commonwealth rested, Redanauer’s attorney began his
argument to the court by discussing how he approaches “every argument at
a preliminary hearing[,]” and then requested that each docket be discharged
for lack of prima facie evidence. Id. at 23, 26. Nonetheless, he then claimed,
for the first time, that the preceding hearing had been a preliminary hearing
only for Case 7444, and a trial for Docket 7445 because no request for a jury
trial had been filed at that docket number. Id. at 26-27. He contended that
the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence proving guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt at Case 7445, and that if the court acquitted him at Case
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7445, jeopardy would attach and bar prosecution as to Case 7444. Id. at 27-
28.
In response, the Commonwealth argued that the proceeding had been
a preliminary hearing for both dockets, despite no certification being filed
specifically at Case 7445, because the cases had been joined and the
certification at Case 7444 implicitly included Case 7445. Id. at 29. In further
support, the Commonwealth noted that a trial could not have commenced at
Case 7445 because Redanauer had neither waived arraignment nor entered a
plea of not guilty. Id.
At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Lynn purported to acquit
Redanauer at both dockets. He ruled that a trial had been held at Docket
7445 and found Redanauer not guilty. As for Case 7444, Judge Lynn found
Redanauer not guilty because a prima facie case had not been established and
double jeopardy had attached due to the acquittal at Case 7445.
With this backdrop in mind, the Majority quashes because “the
Commonwealth has no right of appeal from a not guilty verdict, even where
that verdict is based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation.” Majority
Opinion at 5 (cleaned up). Respectfully, this is not a situation where the court
acquitted a defendant despite the Commonwealth unequivocally sustaining its
burden of proof, such that the foundation for the verdict is erroneous. In that
event, I of course agree that the Commonwealth would be foreclosed from
appealing. However, this is not what occurred.
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Here, the court proceeded with a preliminary hearing at two dockets,
limited the Commonwealth to only presenting evidence pertinent to a
preliminary hearing, and blindsided the Commonwealth by: (1) claiming, after
the fact, that the Commonwealth had actually been proceeding at a trial on
Case 7445; (2) acquitting Redanauer at that docket for insufficient evidence;
and (3) barring prosecution at Case 7444 based upon double jeopardy. In my
mind, the court’s actions undeniably betrayed the expectations of all involved.
As aptly stated by the Commonwealth, “[j]ust as defendants are entitled to
fair notice of when they are facing trial[,]” so too is the Commonwealth as to
“when it is required to present to the trier of fact all of the testimony and
evidence necessary to sustain its heavy burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial, as opposed to simply clearing the far lower threshold” required
at a preliminary hearing. Commonwealth’s brief at 20 (cleaned up, emphasis
in original).
Indeed, I find that the resulting “acquittals” were, in fact, legal nullities.
It is axiomatic that an acquittal may only operate to acquit a defendant if the
court had the power to enter such a verdict. Our Supreme Court has defined
“power” as “the ability of a decision-making body to order or effect a certain
result.” Domus, Inc. v. Signature Bldg. Sys. of PA, LLC, 252 A.3d 628,
636 (Pa. 2021) (cleaned up). The July 15, 2021 proceeding was clearly
conducted as a preliminary hearing. As I discuss in detail infra, if the
Commonwealth failed to meet its low burden of proof at the preliminary
hearing, the court was required to dismiss the complaint. Pa.R.Crim.P.
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543(E). No authority exists for a court to convict or acquit a defendant
following only a preliminary hearing.
Therefore, for the court to have had the power to acquit Redanauer, the
proceeding had to have been a trial. However, as I noted, the Commonwealth
had invoked its constitutional right to a jury trial. Indeed, that right is
enshrined in Article I, § 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which specifically
provides that “in criminal cases the Commonwealth shall have the same right
to trial by jury as does the accused.” PA. CONST. art. I, § 6. To that end, our
Supreme Court has observed that, “[t]rial by an impartial jury is the only right
guaranteed by both Constitutions, and a criminal defendant may obtain a
bench trial only by waiving the right to a jury—in Pennsylvania, with the
consent of the Commonwealth and the approval of the court.”
Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 36 A.3d 24, 55 (Pa. 2011) (cleaned up).
Herein, the Commonwealth never consented to a waiver of its right to a jury
trial. Furthermore, no other statute or case law authorized the court to sua
sponte transform the preliminary hearing into a trial following the close of
evidence.
Based on the foregoing, the court lacked the power at that time to acquit
Redanauer, and the purported acquittals were therefore legal nullities. See
Commonwealth v. Davis, 242 A.3d 923, 936-37 (Pa.Super. 2020) (holding
that Davis’s “convictions constitute[d] a legal nullity and, as such, are
unworthy of preclusive effect under the compulsory joinder rule and the
principles of double jeopardy”). Stated simply, while the court had jurisdiction
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to conduct the preliminary hearings, it lacked the power, or ability, to
effectuate an acquittal at either docket at that time. See Domus, supra at
636. Since the orders were not acquittals and cannot legally deprive the
Commonwealth of its right to appeal, I would not quash.
Rather, I would reach the merits of the Commonwealth’s claim. The
Commonwealth asserts that the purported orders of “acquittal” should be
reversed because they are “fundamentally inconsistent with the law and the
orderly functioning of the criminal justice system” and “ha[ve] disturbing
implications for the due process rights of all litigants.” Commonwealth’s
supplemental brief at 1. The Commonwealth contends that the two docket
numbers are merely a “quirk of the First Judicial System’s arraignment system
requiring the assignment of a separate consolidated docket number for each
complainant at the preliminary arraignment stage” and that the cases, while
at two separate dockets, remained consolidated, with the lead docket number
being Case 7444, the one at which the Commonwealth filed the request for a
jury trial. Id. at 4. Since the cases were consolidated, the Commonwealth
posits that its inclusion of only the lead docket number in its request for a jury
trial did not operate to separate the dockets. Id.
Upon review of the certified record, I agree with the Commonwealth that
the matter comprised both dockets. Our Rules of Criminal Procedure provide
that “[w]hen more than one offense is alleged to have been committed by one
person arising from the same incident, the issuing authority shall accept only
one complaint, and shall docket the matter as a single case.” Pa.R.Crim.P.
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505(B). Instantly, there was a single incident wherein it was alleged that
Redanauer committed multiple offenses as to two victims. Despite the
matters being docketed separately for each victim pursuant to a local
administrative rule in Philadelphia, they proceeded together as a single case.
As noted, the consolidation was clearly indicated on the respective dockets.
Moreover, pursuant to our Rules of Criminal Procedure, the issuing authority
was required to accept the matter as a single case and the Commonwealth
was required to consolidate all charges for trial if held for court.1 See id.;
Commonwealth v. Griffin, 456 A.2d 171, 175 (Pa.Super. 1983) (cleaned
up). To do so, the Commonwealth is not required to file a pre-trial motion to
consolidate. See id. Based on the foregoing, I would conclude that the two
dockets were joined and proceeded, jointly, to a preliminary hearing on July
15, 2021.
It is axiomatic that “a preliminary hearing is not a trial[.]”
Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 234 A.3d 523, 533 (Pa. 2020). Our
Supreme Court has elucidated as follows:
[T]he principle function of a preliminary hearing is to protect an
individual’s right against an unlawful arrest and detention, and
that the Commonwealth bears the burden at the preliminary
hearing of establishing a prima facie case that a crime has been
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1 While Philadelphia may adopt local rules regarding the procedures it wishes
to impose in managing its docketing systems, it may not do so in derogation
of the meaning and intent of our Rules of Criminal Procedure. See
Pa.St.J.Admin. 103(d)(2) (“Local rules shall not be inconsistent with any
general rule of the Supreme Court or any Act of Assembly. A Rules
Committee, at any time, may recommend that the Supreme Court suspend,
vacate, or require amendment of a local rule.”).
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committed and that the accused is probably the one who
committed it. The evidence supporting a prima facie case need
not establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but
must only demonstrate that, if presented at trial and accepted as
true, the judge would be warranted in permitting the case to
proceed to a jury. The Commonwealth establishes a prima facie
case where it produces evidence of each of the material elements
of the crime charged and establishes probable cause to warrant
the belief that the accused committed the offense.
Id. (cleaned up).
The Rules of Criminal Procedure proscribe the court’s power at a
preliminary hearing. “At the preliminary hearing, the issuing authority shall
determine from the evidence presented whether there is a prima facie case
that (1) an offense has been committed and (2) the defendant has committed
it.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 542(D). Rule 543 provides in pertinent part:
(B) If the issuing authority finds that the Commonwealth has
established a prima facie case that an offense has been committed
and the defendant has committed it, the issuing authority shall
hold the defendant for court on the offense(s) on which the
Commonwealth established a prima facie case. If there is no
offense for which a prima facie case has been established, the
issuing authority shall discharge the defendant.
....
(E) If the Commonwealth does not establish a prima facie case of
the defendant’s guilt, and no application for a continuance is made
and there is no reason for a continuance, the issuing authority
shall dismiss the complaint.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 543.
In other words, the court’s sole task at the preliminary hearing on July
15, 2021, was to determine whether the Commonwealth adduced sufficient
evidence to make out a prima facie case as to both dockets. After making
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that determination, the court could either hold the matter over for court or
dismiss the complaint. It could not, however, sua sponte transform the
preliminary hearing into a trial after it was concluded and acquit Redanauer
based upon a finding that the Commonwealth had not met its burden of proof
of beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 270 A.3d
512, 519-20 (Pa.Super. 2022) (holding that guilty plea and resulting judgment
of sentence were legal nullities because magisterial district judge lacked
jurisdiction to convert the preliminary hearing into a guilty plea hearing as to
the summary charges where the original felony and misdemeanor charges had
not been properly withdrawn); Davis, supra at 936-37 (deeming convictions
a legal nullity where magisterial district judge lacked competent jurisdiction
to transform the preliminary hearing into a summary trial); Domus, supra at
636.
Having found that the court lacked the power to acquit Redanauer, I
would vacate the orders appealed from and remand for further proceedings.
Upon remand, the court shall dismiss the complaint at Case 7444, pursuant
to Rule 543(E), because the court already concluded that the Commonwealth
had not met its prima facie burden during the preliminary hearing at that
docket. The Commonwealth may then reinstitute those charges pursuant to
Pa.R.Crim.P. 544(A).2
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2 Rule 544 provides as follows:
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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As for Case 7445, the court must determine whether the Commonwealth
presented, on July 15, 2021, a prima facie case for those charges. Should the
court find that the Commonwealth failed to meet this standard, it shall
discharge Redanauer and dismiss the complaint, not acquit him. Again, if
this occurs, the Commonwealth has the option to refile the charges in
accordance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, should the court
determine that the Commonwealth sustained its low preliminary burden, the
matter shall continue towards trial.
Since I would not quash, but would instead reach the merits of the
Commonwealth’s claim and vacate the orders appealed from, I respectfully
dissent.
Judges Olson and King join this Dissenting Opinion.
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(A) When charges are dismissed or withdrawn at, or prior to, a
preliminary hearing, or when a grand jury declines to indict and
the complaint is dismissed, the attorney for the Commonwealth
may reinstitute the charges by approving, in writing, the re-filing
of a complaint with the issuing authority who dismissed or
permitted the withdrawal of the charges.
(B) Following the re-filing of a complaint pursuant to paragraph
(A), if the attorney for the Commonwealth determines that the
preliminary hearing should be conducted by a different issuing
authority, the attorney shall file a Rule 132 motion with the clerk
of courts requesting that the president judge, or a judge
designated by the president judge, assign a different issuing
authority to conduct the preliminary hearing. The motion shall set
forth the reasons for requesting a different issuing authority.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 544.
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