In Re: Adoption of T.S., a minor Appeal of: T.J.S. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: T.S., A MINOR               IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: T.J.S., NATURAL FATHER               No. 1919 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order entered October 29, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Orphans’ Court, at No(s): TPR 14-00132
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, and FITZGERALD*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:                             FILED APRIL 24, 2015
T.J.S. (“Father”) appeals from the orphans’ court order entered on
October 29, 2014, granting the petition filed by Allegheny County Children
Youth and Families (“CYF” or the “agency”), to involuntarily terminate
Father’s parental rights to T.S. (“Child”).1 We affirm.
The orphans’ court accurately set forth the factual background and
procedural history in its opinion entered on December 19, 2014, which
incorporated factual findings from its October 29, 2014 order terminating
Father’s parental rights. We adopt the orphans’ court’s factual findings, and
set forth only as much of the factual background and procedural history as is
necessary to our disposition of this appeal.
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
On October 29, 2014, the orphans’ court entered an order involuntarily
terminating the parental rights of Child’s mother, S.Y. (“Mother”). Mother
did not file a notice of appeal from the order terminating her parental rights,
nor is she a party to the instant appeal.
J-S17030-15
1. [Child] was born [in April of 2011]; he is 3 years old.
[S.Y.] is the biological mother of [Child]. [T.J.S.] is [Child’s]
father.    Paternity is established as [F]ather signed an
acknowledgment of paternity.
2. [Child] was removed from the care of his parents on
April 22, 2012. He was adjudicated dependent on May 30, 2012.
3. On May 30, 2012, [the orphans’ court] entered the
following findings of fact in support of the adjudication of
dependency.      (See Order of Adjudication & Disposition,
contained within CYF Exhibit [3])[.]
a. On April 20, 2012[,] Pittsburgh Police were called to
the Pleasant Valley Shelter for an infant with a burn.
When the police responded, they observed a “large
blister” on the child’s left index finger.
b. Mother told the police that [Child] was burned by a
candle when he put his finger into it. Mother explained
that the electricity had been shut off and she was using
candles as a result. See CYF exhibit 3 – photo of the
child’s injured finger.
c. [Child] was taken to Allegheny General Hospital[,]
where he was diagnosed with a second degree burn to his
left index finger and required further medical attention.
d. [Child] also received [a] complete medical
examination, including a skeletal survey. The skeletal
survey revealed healing fractures to the 9th and 10th rib
and an elbow joint diffusion. Elbow joint diffusions most
commonly occur as a result of an injury or arthritis.
There was no fracture to the elbow. In the opinion of Dr.
Richard Daffner, the rib fractures were “months old” and
highly suspicious for accidental injury due to the location
of the fractures and because rib fractures are rare in
children. As a result, Dr. Daffner [] concluded that the
injuries to the ribs were most likely inflicted as a result of
child abuse. The child would have experienced severe
pain at the time of the injury.
e. [Child] was transported to West Penn Hospital for
treatment of his burn wound. He was examined by Dr.
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Ariel Abally, burn surgeon, on April 21, 2012. Dr. Abally
found a second degree burn on the left index finger. Dr.
Abally stated that the burn occurred within days prior to
examination but could not give an exact time. He could
not give the cause. He testified that a flame burn could
occur in a very short period of time. Blistering should
occur in 2 to 3 hours. [Child] will recover completely. He
will not have a scar or other lasting effects.
f. Other than the broken ribs, the joint diffusion, and
the burn, [Child] was and is in good health.
g. Mother told the caseworker that [Child’s] hand had
moved over a burning candle while having his diaper
changed and reports treating the area with first aide
cream. Mother denied seeing a blister. Mother was
unable to explain the old rib fractures and joint diffusion.
h. CYF implemented crisis services on April 20, 2012[,]
upon completion of a home assessment where it was
found that the home was without electricity.
i. Mother initially denied the domestic violence in the
home but subsequently acknowledged that [F]ather
assaulted her the evening of April 20, 2012, which
resulted in a black eye to the left side of her face. Mother
said she went to West Penn emergency room for
treatment[,] and was diagnosed with a broken nose and
other facial fractures. Father was arrested and charged
with two counts of aggravated assault, disorderly
conduct, endangering the welfare of another person, and
resisting arrest. See CYF Exhibit 4 – photo of [M]other’s
black eye.
***
m. Father also acknowledged a history of drug abuse
and mental health diagnosis including intermittent
explosive disorder and bipolar disorder. Father received
treatment through TADISO. Father began methadone
maintenance on 3/26/12. He was non-compliant with
treatment and made no progress. [H]e was discharged
AMA [Against Medical Advice] when he stopped coming.
No aftercare plan was developed. See CYF Exhibit 5.
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***
4. [The orphans’ court] also found that [Child] was a
victim of child abuse, but that the perpetrator was unknown.
5. [Child] has significant behavioral issues. He has been
expelled from two day care programs. He currently attends the
Mathilda Theiss Therapeutic Pre-School Program.
6. [Child] is placed in the foster home of [M.C. and D.C.].
He has been in this home since his initial removal. He has
remained in care and has never been returned to the care of
either parent.
7. Both [M]other and [F]ather have substantial criminal
histories. See CYF Exhibits 1 and 2.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/19/14, Exhibit “A” at 1-3.
On July 18, 2014, CYF filed a petition to involuntarily terminate the
parental rights of Mother and Father pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2), (5),
(8), and (b) of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101–2938. On October 29,
2014, the orphans’ court held a hearing on the termination petition. Father
was present at the hearing and was represented by counsel. CYF presented
the testimony of Valerie Johnson, the CYF caseworker supervisor assigned to
the case since June 11, 2012.        N.T., 10/29/14, at 8–104.      Neil D.
Rosenblum, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist who evaluated Father on five
occasions, testified as an expert for CYF. 

Id. at 105–137.

Father, who was
incarcerated, testified on his own behalf.   

Id. at 139–157.

Finally, Father
presented the testimony of his mother, Child’s paternal grandmother. 

Id. at 158–160.

   Both CYF and Father presented several exhibits, which were
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admitted into evidence.    At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court
terminated Father’s parental rights. 

Id. at 174.

On November 26, 2014, Father timely filed a notice of appeal, raising
the following issues:
A. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion and err in
determining that the termination of Father’s parental rights
would best serve the needs and welfare of [Child][?]
B. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion and err in finding
by clear and convincing evidence that [Child] would not be
adversely affected by severance of the strong bond extant
between [Father] and [Child]?
C. Did the Trial Court [] abuse its discretion and err as a
matter of law in determining that reunification with Father was
no longer viable when Father had clearly shown his ability to
parent and care for [Child]?
D. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion and err as a
matter of law in determining that due to Father’s history of
intermittent incarceration there exists only a minimal bond with
[F]ather?
E. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and err as a
matter of law in determining that there was clear and convincing
evidence that it was and is nearly impossible for Father to
maintain or improve the parent/child relationship between Father
and [C]hild?
F. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and err as a
matter of law in determining that there was clear and convincing
evidence that grounds for termination clearly exist as to [F]ather
when contradictory and erroneous testimony was offered by the
same witness?
G. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and err as a
matter of law in determining that parental rights should be
terminated when a less restrictive option of Subsidized
Permanent Legal Custodianship was available?
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[H.] Did the trial court abuse its discretion and err as a
matter of law in determining that termination of Father’s
parental rights was in the best interests of [Child] when [Child]
is clearly bonded to[Father][?]
Father’s Brief at 6–7.
In reviewing an appeal from the termination of parental rights, we
employ the following standard:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights
cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often
have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple
hearings.
In re T.S.M., 

71 A.3d 251

, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b), and made the
following factual findings to support its termination decision:
8. CYF established a family service plan [(“FSP”)], which
included the following goals for [M]other and [F]ather: to
achieve and maintain sobriety; to address issues of domestic
violence and abuse; to acquire parenting skills to enable them to
meet the medical, educational, and emotional needs of [Child];
to engage in mental health treatment and achieve mental health
stability; to obtain stable housing; [and] to consistently attend
visitation with [Child] to continue and improve the parent/child
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bond. CYF offered both parents a myriad of services to assist
them with achieving [these] goals.
***
12. With respect to [F]ather, for much of the time[,]
[F]ather was compliant with his FSP goals. He consistently
visited his son. He attended court hearings. He maintained
contact with the caseworker and his attorney. He engaged in
and completed domestic violence counseling through the
Domestic [Abuse] Counseling Center (DACC). He participated in
and completed a parenting program. He obtained his GED. For
a significant period, he was sober. As a result of [F]ather’s
compliance and progress[,] it appeared that reunification with
[F]ather was viable.
13. Father was unable to sustain this level of stability,
however. In June of 2013, [F]ather was arrested for public
drunkenness. At the January 2014 permanency hearing, the
court found as follows.
a. Father was referred to in-home services through
Family Resources to work on parenting skills, and to
connect him to community services including individual
therapy.     Family Resources’ services closed due to
[F]ather’s lack of cooperation.
b. Father was scheduled to attend Family Resources for
evaluation and individual therapy; however[,] he did not
attend [the] intake appointment. Father also scheduled
an individual mental health therapy appointment at Turtle
Creek MH/MR but failed to follow through with that
appointment.
c. The caseworker sent information to [F]ather
regarding attending mental health and drug and alcohol
treatment.    The resource guide sent to [F]ather has
contact information for multiple drug and alcohol and
mental [health] treatment facilities. Father is not known
to be enrolled in any D&A or MH treatment at this time.
d. Father has been referred to OCYF Conferencing and
Teaming. A Conference was held on 6/24/13 and a
follow[-]up Teaming Meeting was held on 11/22/13. At
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the meeting, the importance of attending D&A and MH
[treatment] was discussed with [F]ather.
e. Father is not known to be attending therapy or D&A
treatment at this time.
f. The caseworker scheduled drug screens for [F]ather
bi-weekly. Father has missed multiple scheduled screens.
g. Father was referred to Urban League to assist him
with housing.     Father is not known to have located
housing at this time.
h. Father is visiting with [Child], supervised by
[P]aternal [G]randmother at her home.              Father
cooperated only partially with in-home services[,] and
services were cancelled. Father was referred to individual
therapy through Family Resources and Turtle Creek
MH/MR [Mental Health/Mental Retardation], though he
did not attend either evaluation.
i. OCYF provides [F]ather with a monthly bus pass for
meetings, appointments and visitation with [Child]. (See
Order entered on January 21, 2014, contained within CYF
Exhibit 3.)
14. On March 29, 2014, [F]ather was arrested and
subsequently incarcerated in the Allegheny County Jail on
charges of identity theft, false ID to law enforcement, simple
assault, terroristic threats, harassment, public drunkenness, and
disorderly conduct. [Child] was present [] when [F]ather was
arrested.
15. At the April 2014[] permanency hearing, the court
entered the following findings.
a. Father has had overnight/weekend visitation with
[Child], supervised by [P]aternal [G]randmother at her
home.
b. Father cooperated only partially with in-home
services[,] and services were cancelled.
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c. [Father] was referred to in-home services through
Family Resources to work on parenting skills, and to
connect him to community services including individual
therapy.     Family Resources services closed due to
[F]ather’s lack of cooperation.
d. Father was scheduled to attend Family Resources for
evaluation and individual therapy; however[,] he did not
attend [the] intake appointment.
e. Father also scheduled an individual mental health
therapy appointment at Turtle Creek MH/MR[,] but failed
to follow through with that appointment.
[f.] A follow[-]up Teaming Meeting was held on
11/22/13. At the meeting, the importance of attending
D&A and MH [treatment] was discussed with [F]ather.
Father is not known to be attending [MH] therapy or D&A
treatment at this time. The caseworker scheduled drug
screens for [F]ather bi-weekly.       Father has missed
multiple scheduled screens.       He tested positive for
suboxone in February [of 2014]. (See order entered on
April 2, 2014, contained within CYF exhibit 3.)
16. On August 5, 2014, [F]ather was involved in an
altercation with [M]other[,] and was stabbed in the head by
[Mother’s] paramour.
17. Father is currently incarcerated in the Allegheny County
Jail.
18. Dr. Rosenblum completed evaluations in this case on:
July 12, 2012; September 12, 2012; May 29, 2013; January 1,
9, and 29, 2014; May 5, 2014; and October 21, 2014. These
evaluations included individual evaluations of [M]other and
[F]ather[,] and interactional evaluations of [Child] with [M]other,
[F]ather, foster parents, and [P]aternal [G]randmother.
19. Based upon the evaluations, observations and opinions of
Dr. Rosenblum, [the orphans’ court found] that neither parent is
capable of safely parenting and meeting the needs of [Child] on
a daily basis. Both [M]other and [F]ather are unstable. [The
orphans’ court] also [found] that [Child’s] primary bond is with
his foster parents[,] with whom he has resided for most of his
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life. [Child], who is 42 months old, has been in care for 30
months or for 71% of his life.
20. [The orphans’ court] also [found] that due to the
length of time in care, that [Child] has no real bond with
[Mother] and has only a minimal bond with [Father]. Mother’s
and [F]ather’s consistent incarceration has made it nearly
impossible to maintain or improve the parent/child relationship.
21. Additionally, the constant incarceration of both
[M]other and [F]ather establishes that they have not achieved
the stability and commitment necessary to meet the needs of
[Child].
22. [Child] has behavioral concerns that require stable
parenting and continued services, which he is currently
receiving. [The orphans’ court found] that removal from this
environment would be contrary to the welfare of [Child] and
perhaps harmful.
23. CYF has clearly proven that grounds for termination of
parental rights [exists] as to both [M]other and [F]ather.
24. [Child] has been in care for most of his life. He
deserves to remain in a permanent and nurturing environment.
Permanence is critical to his well-being. To make him wait for
[M]other or [F]ather to resolve their criminal issues and acquire
the necessary stability to parent him would be a great injustice.
CYF has clearly proven that termination of parental rights best
serves the needs and welfare of [Child].
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/19/14, Exhibit “A” at 3–6.
In In Re Adoption of C.D.R., ___ A.3d ___, 

2015 Pa. Super. 54

(Pa.
Super. 2015) (filed March 17, 2015), we explained that termination of
parental rights under Section 2511 requires a bifurcated analysis:
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if
the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
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termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.

Id. at *2

(quoting In re L.M., 

923 A.2d 505

, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(citations omitted)).
This Court may affirm the orphans’ court’s decision regarding the
termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section
2511(a).2 In re B.L.W., 

843 A.2d 380

, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).
We will analyze the court’s decision to terminate under sections 2511(a)(2)
and (b), which provide as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
2
In its brief, CYF asserts that it proved by clear and convincing evidence
that Father’s parental rights were rightly terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(a)(8), which authorizes termination when:
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent or
under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or
more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child
continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best
serve the needs and welfare of the child.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8). However, because the orphans’ court did not
specifically address termination under subsection 8, we will confine our
discussion to termination under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).
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***
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his
physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of
the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
***
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(2), the party seeking
termination must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the
following elements:
(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal;
(2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the
child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 

825 A.2d 1266

, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
omitted).   “‘The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section
2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not
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limited to affirmative misconduct.     To the contrary those grounds may
include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties.’” In
re C.D.R., slip op. at *3 (quoting In re A.L.D. 

797 A.2d 326

, 337 (Pa.
Super. 2002)).
Although the majority of Father’s appellate argument focuses on
whether termination of his parental rights best served the needs and welfare
of Child, see Father’s Statement of Questions Involved, A, B, D, G, H, he
also contends that the orphans’ court erred in terminating his rights under
section 2511(a)(2) because, despite his incarcerations, reunification with
Child remained a viable option.      Father also submits that there was no
evidence presented that he could not maintain or improve his relationship
with Child and criticizes the CYF caseworker’s testimony concerning his
participation and completion of certain programs, describing her statements
as erroneous and contradictory.       See Father’s Statement of Questions
Involved, C, E, and F. We interpret these arguments as a challenge to the
court’s finding that Father was unable to maintain the level of stability that
he had demonstrated at earlier permanency reviews in 2012 and 2013.
Our review of the record reveals that [Child] was removed from his
parents’ care shortly before his first birthday, due to child abuse by an
unnamed perpetrator, Mother’s admitted drug abuse, domestic violence
between Mother and Father, and Father’s drug abuse and mental health
diagnosis that included intermittent explosive disorder and bipolar disorder.
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CYF Ex. 3. Order of Adjudication and Disposition–Child Dependent, May 30,
2012.     While Father was initially compliant with the goals stated in the
permanency plans associated with this case, after Father’s arrest in June
2013 for public drunkenness, he was unable to sustain his progress.       The
orphans’ court detailed that the in-home services tasked with helping Father
to improve his parenting skills were closed due to Father’s lack of
cooperation. Father did not appear for evaluation and individual therapy
appointments, and was not known to enroll in or seek any court-
recommended drug and alcohol or mental health treatment.3        Additionally,
Father missed multiple drug screens, and did not obtain independent
housing. The court also noted that Father was arrested again on March 29,
2014, in the presence of Child, and on August 5, 2014, was involved in an
altercation with Mother when he was stabbed in the head by Mother’s
paramour.     Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/19/14, Exhibit A, at 4–5.
Based on the foregoing evidence, we conclude that the orphans’ court
appropriately considered Father’s incarcerations in addressing the evidence
offered to support the termination of his parental rights.    While Father is
correct that incarceration of a parent, standing alone, cannot constitute
3
At the termination hearing, Father represented that he was receiving dual
counseling services from a licensed social worker. He stated that he
provided CYF with the therapist’s business card and signed a release “for
attendance records only, because I don’t feel it’s [CYF’s] business to know
what I’m talking about.” N.T., 10/29/14, at 143. The CYF caseworker
testified that the agency did not receive any confirmation of Father’s
treatment with that therapist. 

Id. at 31,

52.
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proper grounds for the termination of that parent’s rights to his child, see In
re R.I.S., 

36 A.3d 567

, 574 (Pa. 2011), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has also observed that incarceration can be a determinative factor in a
court’s conclusion that grounds for termination exist under 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(a)(2) where the parent’s incarceration has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence. In re Adoption of
S.P., 

47 A.3d 817

, 828 (Pa. 2012). Here, Father’s continued incarcerations,
along with his failure to keep scheduled appointments for evaluation and
individual therapy, his mental health issues, his limited cooperation with in-
home services, his non-compliance with scheduled drug screenings, his
continued conflict with Mother, and his inability to secure housing all
demonstrate acts of refusal and incapacity to provide Child with essential
parental care or control.
Additionally,   Father’s    unbalanced     behavior    and     continued
incarcerations argue against Father’s contention that he could maintain or
improve his relationship with Child.   We do not agree with Father that no
evidence on this subject was presented at the termination hearing as the
testimony of CYF’s witnesses and CYF exhibits confirmed that, after Father’s
June 2013 arrest, he expended minimal effort to assume his parental
obligations.   See In re A.L.D., 

797 A.2d 326

, 340 (Pa. Super. 2002)
(citation omitted) (parents are required to make diligent efforts towards the
reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities).     Although
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Father testified that he had completed parenting and domestic violence
programs in 2013, the evidence shows that Father’s compliance with court-
recommended therapy and cooperation with in-house services to improve
parenting skills spiraled downward after Father’s June 2013 arrest.       Other
than continuing visits with Child, nothing in Father’s behavior after that point
established that he was able to maintain or improve his relationship with
Child.
Father’s final argument on the section 2511(a)(2) prong of the
termination inquiry is that the orphans’ court erred in finding that CYF
presented sufficient evidence to support termination of his parental rights
because     the   CYS   caseworker’s    testimony   was   either   erroneous   or
contradictory.    While Father correctly states that the caseworker initially
misspoke about specific dates related to Father’s incarcerations and Father’s
participation in and completion of domestic violence classes, the information
on these subjects was later sufficiently clarified. Indeed, the orphans’ court
found that Father did complete parenting and domestic violence programs.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/19/14, Exhibit A, at ¶ 12.         Furthermore, the
orphans’ court, as the finder of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility
of witnesses, and it is within that court’s province to resolve all conflicts in
testimony. In re B.C., 

36 A.3d 601

, 605 (Pa. Super. 2012). In accord with
our deference to the fact-finding court as the determiner of the credibility of
witnesses, we cannot conclude that the orphans’ court erred in accepting the
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caseworker’s testimony because of the rather inconsequential discrepancies
in her statements. See In re E.M.I., 

57 A.3d 1278

, 1284 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(fact-finder is sole and final arbiter of conflicts in evidence).
Our review of the record supports the orphans’ court decision that
Father is incapable of parenting Child and has left Child without essential
parental care or control.     Although Father was initially very motivated to
work towards reunification with Child, since Father’s June 2013 arrest, he
regressed dramatically. We agree with the orphans’ court that for the two
and one-half years that Child has been in foster care, Father, by virtue of his
incarcerations and resistance to participation in programs designed to
improve his mental health and parenting skills, cannot meet the parental
needs of Child.    Father has shown a continued inability to parent Child,
leaving Child without Father’s essential care.      Additionally, Father has not
taken measured steps to remedy his inability to parent. We thus conclude
that the orphans’ court did not err or abuse its discretion in terminating
Father’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).
As we determined that the requirements of section 2511(a)(2) have
been met, we proceed to review whether the mandates of section 2511(b)
are satisfied.   In re Adoption of C.L.G., 

956 A.2d 999

, 1008–1009 (Pa.
Super. 2008) (en banc).        This Court has stated that while the focus in
terminating parental rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, we
evaluate the child’s interests in a section 2511(b) analysis. 

Id. at 1008.

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Evidence in support of termination under section 2511(b) should be
analyzed as follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a
court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child
have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as
love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 

53 A.3d 781

,
791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [

620 A.2d 481

, 485 (Pa.
1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child’s
“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional
bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost attention”
should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
permanently severing the parental bond. In re 

K.M., 53 A.3d at 791

.
In re T.S.M., 

71 A.3d 251

, 267 (Pa. 2013).       We have held that while a
parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is an integral component of a
subsection 2511(b) analysis, it is only one factor to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.        In re
K.K.R.–S., 

958 A.2d 529

, 535–536 (Pa. Super. 2008).         Additionally, the
mere presence of an emotional bond does not prevent the termination of
parental rights when the parent is unable to serve the needs of the child. In
re T.D., 

949 A.2d 910

, 923 (Pa. Super. 2008). “Rather, the trial court must
examine the status of the bond to determine whether its termination ‘would
destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.’” In re A.D., 

93 A.3d 888

, 897–898 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting In re Adoption of T.B.B.,

835 A.2d 387

, 397 (Pa. Super. 2003)).
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Here, the orphans’ court appropriately considered that Child’s primary
bond is with his foster parents, with whom he has resided since he was one
year old.   See In re T.S.M., 

71 A.3d 251

at 268 (courts must determine
whether child has bond with foster parent). Child, forty-two months old at
the time of the termination hearing, had been in care for thirty months,
seventy-one percent of his life. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/19/14, Exhibit
A, ¶ 19. The orphans’ court also found that, due to the length of his time in
care, Child had only a minimal bond with Father as his consistent
incarceration made it nearly impossible to maintain or improve the
parent/child relationship.      

Id. at ¶

20.       The court observed that Child’s
behavioral problems required the stable parenting and continued services
that he was receiving in foster care and that removing Child from this stable
“environment would be contrary to the welfare of [Child] and perhaps
harmful.” 

Id. at ¶

22.
In closing its needs and welfare analysis, the orphans’ court declared
that Child “deserves to remain in a permanent and nurturing environment.
Permanence     is   critical   to   his   well-being.     To   make   [Child]   wait
for . . . [F]ather to resolve [his] criminal issues and acquire the necessary
stability to parent [Child] would be a great injustice.”           Orphans’ Court
Opinion, 12/19/14, Exhibit A, at ¶ 25. The orphans’ court thus concluded
that “CYF has clearly proven that termination of [Father’s] parental rights
best serves the needs and welfare of [Child].” 

Id. - 19

-
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With respect to subsection 2511(b), Father raises four separate issues
which can be condensed to an argument that clear and convincing evidence
does not support the orphans’ court needs and welfare of the child analysis.
Specifically, Father alleges that the court did not adequately consider un-
contradicted evidence of the apparent bond between Father and Child or
determine the extent of the harm that would befall Child if the bond was
severed.
Again, we conclude that the record supports the orphans’ court
decision to terminate Father’s parental rights.   In fairness to Father, the
record supports his assertion that he loves Child.     The CYS caseworker
acknowledged that Father loves Child, that Child has a bond with Father, and
responds positively to him.   N.T., 10/29/14, at 86.    Dr. Rosenblum, the
psychologist who conducted evaluations of the family, agreed that Father
loves Child and will offer Child praise and affection, but, he also described
times when Father was passive in his interaction with Child. 

Id. at 114-115.

Dr. Rosenblum described the dynamic between Father and Child as a “mixed
relationship,” explaining that Child requires people to work hard to engage
him and emotionally involve him. 

Id. at 115-116,

120. On the other hand,
Dr. Rosenblum testified that Child has a positive bond with his foster
parents, who wish to adopt him into their family.    

Id. at 116,

110.    The
psychologist described Child’s foster mother as doing “an excellent job of
interacting with [Child], recognizes [Child’s] developmental skills, and
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provide[s] him with a very stable, secure relationship.”         

Id. at 109.

Dr. Rosenblum concluded his assessment by averring that Father had not
moved forward with his ability to provide for Child’s needs and welfare and
questioned Father’s motivation to change.      

Id. at 122–123.

   Finally, and
contrary to Father’s claim that Dr. Rosenblum did not address the effect of
severing the bond of Father with Child, Dr. Rosenblum opined that Child
would not be harmed if Father’s parental rights were terminated. 

Id. There is

clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the
orphans’ court’s determination that Child’s foster parents meet all of Child’s
needs and welfare and that Child’s bond with Father is minimal, such that, if
the bond between Child and Father was severed, Child would not suffer
harm. Further, the record supports the orphans’ court’s determination that
the termination of Father’s parental rights would serve Child’s best interests.
With all of the requirements of termination of parental rights met under
sections 2511(a)(2) and (b), there is no need to address Father’s argument
concerning the orphans’ court’s failure to consider a Subsidized Permanent
Legal Custodianship.4
Accordingly, we affirm the orphans’ court’s order terminating Father’s
parental rights to Child pursuant to sections 2511(a)(2) and (b) of the
Adoption Act.
4
Furthermore, Dr. Rosenblum expressly rejected permanent legal
custodianship as an alternative as it would not meet Child’s needs as well as
adoption. N.T., 10/29/14, at 129–130, 136.
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Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/24/2015
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