Interest Of: I.S.R., a minor, Appeal of: S.D. ( 2017 )

J-S24015-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: I.S.R., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.D. :
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: No. 1786 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Order October 21, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County
Civil Division at No(s): 20046 OF 2014 O.C.
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., STABILE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED APRIL 18, 2017
S.D. (“Mother”) appeals from the order entered on October 21, 2016,
denying, without prejudice, her petition to terminate the parental rights of
D.R. (“Father”) to their daughter I.S.R. (born in August 2012) (“Child”),
pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (5), and (b). 1 We
affirm.
In its opinions entered on October 21, 2016 and December 7, 2016,
the trial court set forth the factual background and procedural history of this
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
Father has not filed a brief in this appeal, nor has he filed an appeal on his
own behalf.
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appeal. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/21/16, at 1-3; and Trial Court Opinion,
12/7/16, at 1-3.
In its opinion entered on October 21, 2016, the trial court stated as
follows:
Before the [c]ourt for consideration is a Petition for
Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights filed by the
Petitioner/Natural Mother, [S.D.] (hereinafter, “Mother”) which
seeks to terminate the parental rights of the Respondent/Natural
Father, [D.R.], (hereinafter, “Father”) regarding the minor child,
[I.S.R.] (hereinafter, “I.S.R.”), born [in August 2012]. The
Petition alleges as the bases for termination of parental rights
the statutory authority set forth in Sections 2511(a)(1) and (5)
of the Adoption Act.
Section 2511(a)(1) provides that the rights of a parent
may be terminated if the parent by conduct continuing for a
period of at least six (6) months immediately preceding the filing
of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to
perform parental duties. 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(1). Section
2511(a)(5) provides that parental rights may be terminated
where the child has been removed from the care of the parent
by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for
a period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the
removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent
cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable
period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to
the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to
the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period
of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve
the needs and welfare of the child. 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(5).
The [trial court] initially conducted hearings in this matter
on March 6, 2015, July 30, 2015, September 8, 2015 and
November 13, 2015. The record was then closed. The [trial
court] thereafter entered an Order on November 13, 2015 which
directs … [F]ather to file a brief within fourteen (14) days of
receipt of the notes of testimony for the November 13, 2015
hearing, and Mother to file a brief no later than fourteen (14)
days after receipt of Father’s brief. The notes of testimony
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regarding the November 13, 2015 hearing were filed on
November 19, 2015. … [F]ather filed his brief on December 10,
2015, and Mother filed her brief on January 4, 2016.
The record before the [trial court] as of November 13,
2015 establishes that the natural parents resided together for a
short period of time both before and after the child’s birth. They
never married. The parents’ relationship with each other was
very contentious, with Mother filing at least three (3) Protection
From Abuse actions against Father. Additionally, multiple
Contempt of Court Petitions arising from alleged violations of the
Protection From Abuse Act were filed by Mother. After the child’s
birth, Father underwent treatment in drug and alcohol
rehabilitation. He failed to exercise his custodial rights with
I.S.R. while he was in treatment.
Of utmost importance to rendering a decision in this
matter is that the initial Petition for Termination of Parental
Rights indicates that [A.D.], I.S.R.’s Godmother, is named as the
proposed adoptive parent. The testimony establishes that [A.D.]
is 39 years old, is married, has three (3) children and is the best
friend of the maternal grandmother, [D.B.] (hereinafter,
“Maternal Grandmother”). The following testimony references
the intentions of [A.D.] relative to the prospective adoption as
set forth beginning on page 22 of the transcript from the March
6, 2015 hearing:
Page 22 - Question: Is it your intention to adopt the
minor child if rights were terminated, Father’s rights were
terminated?
Page 23 - Answer: Yes.
Question: Is your Husband aware of that fact?
Answer: Yes.
Question: Is he agreeable to that?
Answer: Yes.
(N.T., March 6, 2015, p. 22). [A.D.’s] other testimony can be
summarized as referring to her involvement with Mother and her
relatively consistent involvement with I.S.R. since her birth.
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In addition to [A.D.’s] interest in becoming an adoptive
parent, the hearing testimony reflects that Maternal
Grandmother is also willing to serve as adoptive parent.
Maternal Grandmother is married. Mother does not reside with
either prospective adoptive parent.
In researching this matter, the [trial court] studied the
case of In re: Adoption of M.R.D and T.M.D., 128 A.3d 1249
(Pa.Super. 2015). Significantly, this Superior Court case was
issued on December 8, 2015, after close of testimony, but prior
to the time briefs were due/filed. The In re: M.R.D. case was
important at the relevant time because it provides the following:
“Any individual may become an adopting parent.” 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2312. The “any individual” language permits
a non-spouse to adopt even where one of the natural
parents continues to retain custody, upon “cause shown.”
In re Adoption of R.B.F., 569 Pa. 269, 280-81, 803
A.2d 1195, 1202 (2002); 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2901. A non-
spouse adoptive nominee can be a child’s maternal
grandfather. In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 326
(Pa.Super. 2010). The purpose of the “cause shown”
approach, borrowed from Section 2901, is consistent with
legal precedent which requires the court to analyze the
integrity of the “proposed adoption” and if it is likely to
happen. See, In re T.R., 502 Pa. 165, 169 n. 10, 465
A.2d 642, 644 n. 10 (1983) (insisting court should
actually consider adoptive candidate’s intent to adopt,
and not merely accept adoption averment on its face, to
determine if petitioner(s) genuinely seek termination
“solely as an aid to adoption”). See also, In re
Adoption of L.J.B., supra at 230, 18 A.3d at 1108
(stating court should consider, and not merely accept on
its face, averment of intent to adopt, to ascertain that
termination is sought as aid to adoption and formation of
new parent-child relationship).
[In re: M.R.D., 128 A.3d at 1260].
Based upon the law set forth in In re: M.R.D., the date
the Superior Court decided the matter and the relative lack of
information regarding cause shown for Mother to retain custody
and the intent to adopt by proposed adoptive parents as
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submitted during hearings in the underlying matter, the [trial
court] entered an Order on March 1, 2016 which extended an
opportunity for the parties to file a supplemental brief in light of
the In re: M.R.D. Superior Court decision.1 Father filed a
Supplemental Memorandum on March 15, 2016, and Mother filed
a Supplemental Memorandum on March 21, 2016. Following a
review of the supplemental memoranda, the [trial court] entered
an Order on April 1, 2016 reopening the record so as to address
issues surrounding the prospective adoption as it relates to the
recently decided Superior Court decision in In re: M.R.D.
An evidentiary hearing was conducted on August 30, 2016.
During this hearing, Mother and Maternal Grandmother appeared
and testified. Through testimony, it was confirmed that the
[m]aternal [g]randmother desired to serve as adoptive parent
and that Mother did not intend to terminate her parental rights
over I.S.R.[] Also, Mother and Maternal Grandmother did not
intend to reside together.
On August 29, 2016 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania at
In re: Adoption of M.R.D. and T.M.D., [145 A.3d 1117], 2016
WL 4541129 (Pa. 2016)[,] decided the appeal from the Superior
Court and reversed and remanded the matter.2 In doing so, the
Supreme Court concluded that the Adoption Act does not permit
a maternal grandfather to adopt a minor child with the child’s
mother without the mother relinquishing her parental rights
simply as means to facilitate a termination of the biological
father’s parental rights. The Supreme Court reasoned that the
grandfather and mother were not part of an intact cohabitating
family unit, and relinquishment of parental rights by the mother
was necessary to avoid unique complications. The Supreme
Court further reasoned that[,] by allowing such an adoption, the
door would open for misuse of adoption proceedings by spiteful
parents seeking to involuntarily terminate the rights of unwanted
parents.
As a result of the most recent decision regarding an
adoption with mother and grandparent serving as parents as set
forth in the Supreme Court decision of In re: M.R.D., supra,
[the trial court] concludes it is bound to deny … Mother’s Petition
for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights since Maternal
Grandmother is the proposed adoptive parent and there is no
indication that Mother is relinquishing her parental rights. As
such, the [trial court] will dismiss Mother’s Petition for
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Termination of Parental Rights without prejudice should a
different adoptive parent be willing and able to serve as such.
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1
A Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the
Superior Court regarding In re: M.R.D. was filed with the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania [on January 7, 2016, and was
granted] on March 16, 2016.
2
On August 29, 2016, the court conducted its own research
through Westlaw to investigate whether the Supreme Court
issued this decision. However, the [trial court] did not find a
posting of the decision on said date.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/21/16, at 1-6 (footnotes in original).
Mother filed a timely notice of appeal, along with a concise statement
of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b)
with regard to the October 21, 2016 order.
Mother raises two issues:
I. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in denying Mother’s Petition for
Termination of Parental Rights of the Natural Father by
improperly applying In Re: Adoption of M.R.D. and T.M.D.,
128 A.3d 1249 (Pa.Super. 2015) retroactively, as the decision
was issued subsequent to the filing of the Petition and after the
[t]rial [c]ourt initially concluded testimony[?]
II. Did the lower court err in denying Mother’s Petition for
Termination of Parental Rights of the Natural Father as Mother
Presented sufficient evidence to establish a basis for termination
of Father’s parental rights under Section 2511 (a)(1) and
complied with all of the provisions of the Adoption Act[?]
Mother’s Brief, at 5. As explained below, we need not reach the second
issue.
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Mother’s issue on appeal raises a pure question of law. Our standard of
review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. See In re B.L.J., Jr.,
938 A.2d 1068, 1071 (Pa. Super. 2007).
In In re Adoption of M.R.D., 128 A.3d 1249 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en
banc), this Court held that the trial court properly granted the petition to
terminate the children’s father’s parental rights filed by the child’s biological
mother and her father, the children’s maternal grandfather, so that the
maternal grandfather could adopt the children. We explained that § 2512 of
the Adoption Act governs who may file a petition to terminate parental rights
and the requirements for the petition’s contents. The en banc court stated:
Significantly, “Any individual may become an adopting
parent.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2312. The “any individual” language
permits a non-spouse to adopt even where one of the natural
parents continues to retain custody, upon “cause shown.” In re
Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1202 (Pa. 2002); 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2901. A non-spouse adoptive nominee can be a
child’s maternal grandfather. In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d
321, 326 (Pa. Super. 2010). The purpose of the “cause shown”
approach, borrowed from Section 2901, is consistent with legal
precedent which requires the court to analyze the integrity of the
“proposed adoption” and if it is likely to happen. See In re T.R.,
465 A.2d 642, 644 n.10 (Pa. 1983) (insisting court should
actually consider adoptive candidate’s intent to adopt, and not
merely accept adoption averment on its face, to determine if
petitioner(s) genuinely seek termination “solely as an aid to
adoption”). See also In re Adoption of L.J.B., 18 A.3d 1098,
1108 (Pa. 2011)] (stating court should consider, and not merely
accept on its face, averment of intent to adopt, to ascertain that
termination is sought as aid to adoption and formation of new
parent-child relationship).
128 A.2d at 1260.
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This Court found that the trial court’s determination that the mother
and maternal grandfather had established “cause shown” to proceed with
the maternal grandfather’s proposed adoption of the children was supported
by ample, competent evidence of record. See id., at 1263. We also agreed
with that the trial court’s determination that there was sufficient evidence to
warrant the involuntary termination of the father’s parental rights. See id.
at 1263-1265. We then addressed the father’s contention that the proposed
adoption would not create a new family unit. We rejected the father’s
argument, citing In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d at 326, for the
proposition that “‘cohabitation’ is not the sine qua non of the ‘new family
unit.’” We found the case relied upon by the father, In re Adoption of
L.J.B., was factually distinguishable and misplaced as supporting his
argument. We focused on the familial relationship that the maternal
grandfather had established with the children, instead of the fact that the
mother and the maternal grandfather would not be residing together. See
id., at 1265. Accordingly, this Court affirmed the trial court’s decree. See
id., at 1266.
Our Supreme Court granted Father’s petition for allowance of appeal.
The Court explained the statutory scheme set forth in the Adoption Act as
follows:
Section 2512(a) of the Adoption Act sets forth the parties
who may file a petition for involuntary termination, including,
inter alia, a parent or an agency. Id. § 2512(a). In contrast to
an agency petition, a parent petitioning to terminate the rights
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of the child’s other parent must file a termination petition
containing “an averment that the petitioner will assume custody
of the child until such time as the child is adopted.” Id.
§ 2512(b) (emphasis added). Thus, the petitioning parent must
demonstrate that an adoption of the child is anticipated in order
for the termination petition to be cognizable. See In re B.E.,
377 A.2d 153, 155 (Pa. 1977); In re Adoption of L.J.B., 18
A.3d 1098, 1107 (Pa. 2011) (plurality). Section 2512(b)’s
adoption requirement is consistent with the rationale behind
permitting the involuntary termination of a parent’s rights, which
we have explained is “to dispense with the need for parental
consent to an adoption when, by choice or neglect, a parent has
failed to meet the continuing needs of the child,” rather than “to
punish an ineffective or negligent parent, or provide a means for
changing the surname of the child.” B.E., 377 A.2d at 155;
L.J.B., 18 A.3d at 1108 (quoting B.E.).
Because a termination petition filed by one parent against
the other must occur in the context of an anticipated adoption,
and because adoption is a statutory right, we note that the
parent seeking termination must strictly comply with all
pertinent provisions of the Adoption Act in order for the adoption
to be valid. See In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195,
1199 (Pa. 2002) (“To effect an adoption, the legislative
provisions of the Adoption Act must be strictly complied with.”).
While the Adoption Act provides that “[a]ny individual may
become an adopting parent,” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2312, relevant to the
instant matter, Section 2711 of the Act requires the parent
seeking termination to consent to the adoption and to relinquish
his or her parental rights. Id. § 2711(a)(3) (requiring consent to
adoption by the parent of an adoptee who is under 18 years of
age); § 2711(d)(1) (setting forth contents of consent, including
the statement “I understand that by signing this consent I
indicate my intent to permanently give up all rights to this
child”). Requiring parental consent to the adoption and the
relinquishment of his or her parental rights “permits the child
and the adoptive parent or parents to establish a new parent-
child relationship.” B.E., 377 A.2d at 156. Thus, where “no new
parent-child relationship is contemplated[,] . . . the involuntary
termination of . . . parental rights . . . is not permitted under the
Adoption Act.” Id.; L.J.B., 18 A.3d at 1108 (quoting B.E.).
An exception to this relinquishment requirement exists,
however, in second-parent adoption cases where the adopting
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party is the spouse of the parent seeking termination — that is,
in the context of a stepparent adoption. Indeed, where the
parent consents to an adoption of his child by his or her spouse
— i.e., the stepparent — the consenting parent is permitted to
retain his or her parental rights. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2903.
(“Whenever a parent consents to the adoption of his child by his
spouse, the parent-child relationship between him and his child
shall remain whether or not he is one of the petitioners in the
adoption proceeding.”).
Additionally, if the parent does not consent to relinquish
his or her parental rights, the court nevertheless may enter an
adoption decree upon “cause shown.” Id. § 2901. In R.B.F.,
wherein parents sought to have their domestic partners adopt
their children, but did not wish to relinquish their parental rights,
we interpreted Section 2901’s “cause shown” language as giving
the trial court the discretion to grant an adoption petition in
circumstances where, as in that case, the party seeking adoption
is unable to meet the statutory requirements for adoption, but
has demonstrated cause for his or her noncompliance with those
requirements. R.B.F., 803 A.2d at 1201-02.
In re Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1120 (footnote omitted) (emphasis
in original).
Our Supreme Court went on to discuss the novel issue before it as
follows:
As noted above, we held in R.B.F. that, in cases in which a
party seeking adoption is unable to meet the statutory
requirements under the Adoption Act, Section 2901 allows the
party to show “cause” as to why he or she cannot meet those
requirements, and, upon such a showing, the trial court has the
discretion to waive the requirement and grant the adoption
petition. R.B.F., 803 A.2d at 1201-02. In those consolidated
cases, same-sex couples sought a second-parent adoption of the
legal parent’s child without the legal parent having to relinquish
his or her parental rights. Finding that it was, indeed, possible
for parties to waive the relinquishment requirement under
Section 2901 upon a showing of cause, we remanded to the
respective trial courts to determine whether the couples showed
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cause to waive the requirement under the particular
circumstances of their cases. Id. at 1203.
Similar to the appellants in R.B.F., [the mother and
grandfather] also seek to waive the Adoption Act’s
relinquishment requirement, albeit under a different factual
scenario. Indeed, unlike in R.B.F., which did not involve
involuntary termination due to the absence of a second legal
parent, there obviously is no intimate relationship between the
legal parent [(the mother)] and the prospective adoptive parent
[(the grandfather)]. Rather, [the mother] and [the grandfather],
who share a parent-child relationship of their own, seek to waive
the relinquishment requirement in order to allow [the
grandfather] to adopt [the children] and co-parent them with
[the mother], thereby facilitating the termination of [the
father’s] parental rights. Thus, we consider for the first time
whether a parent and a grandparent — and, more specifically,
[the mother and the grandfather] — may establish cause under
Section 2901 to waive the requirement that the parent relinquish
her parental rights when the grandparent seeks to adopt that
parent’s children — his grandchildren.
We explained in R.B.F. that a party could show cause by
clear and convincing evidence if he or she demonstrated that
“the purpose of Section 2711(d)’s relinquishment of parental
rights requirement will be otherwise fulfilled or is unnecessary
under the particular circumstances of [his or her] case.” Id. The
purpose behind the termination or relinquishment of an existing
parent’s rights prior to an adoption is to facilitate a “new parent-
child relationship” between the child and the adoptive parent,
B.E., 377 A.2d at 156 (“Termination of parental rights permits
the child and the adoptive parent or parents to establish a new
parent-child relationship through adoption”), and to protect “the
integrity and stability of the new family unit.” J.D.S., 763 A.2d
at 871; L.J.B., 18 A.3d at 1108. Accordingly, [the mother and
grandfather] may show cause to waive the relinquishment
requirement only if they can establish that permitting [the
grandfather] to adopt [the children] while [the mother] retains
her parental rights will promote a new family unit or that it is
otherwise unnecessary to require [the mother] to relinquish her
parental rights under the circumstances of this case.
Id., at 1127 (footnote omitted).
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The Court held that the mother and the maternal grandfather had
failed to establish legal cause to excuse the requirement that the mother
relinquish her parental rights under § 2711 prior to the proposed adoption,
and, thus, the adoption could not proceed, stating as follows:
In the standard adoption case, termination and
relinquishment of parental rights is necessary so that the child
may be adopted by, and form new bonds with, his or her new
family, unencumbered by the former legal parents. By contrast,
in second-parent adoption cases in which the relinquishment of a
parent's rights is not required — i.e., stepparent adoptions and
adoptions by same-sex couples — relinquishment of the parent’s
rights is unnecessary, and indeed damaging. In such cases, the
parent and the prospective adoptive parent are committed
partners — that is, they are involved in a horizontal relationship,
are equals as between each other, and are equals with respect
to the child. Adoption in such circumstances allows the
prospective adoptive parent to create a new parent-child
relationship with the legal parent’s child and a family unit
together with the co-parent to whom he or she is committed.
Thus, because the legal parent and prospective parent in
second-parent adoption cases are part of the same family unit,
the relinquishment requirement undermines, rather than
promotes, family stability.
The same cannot be said for the instant case, however,
because [the mother and grandfather] are not similarly part of
an intact family unit. Indeed, rather than being involved in a
committed, horizontal relationship such as stepparents or same-
sex partners, [the mother and grandfather] share a vertical,
parent-child relationship. Moreover, in this case, [the
grandfather] will remain married to [the grandmother] and will
continue to live in a separate residence with her after the
adoption. Adoption does not foster a family unit under
circumstances where, as here, the adopting party is already part
of — and will continue to be part of — a family unit that is
separate from the unit which he seeks to promote and join
through adoption.
Additionally, relinquishment is necessary in this case to
avoid a host of unique complications. For example, such an
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arrangement would create confusing hybrid relationships within
the family — [the grandfather] would be both [the children’s]
father and grandfather, [the grandmother] would be both a
grandmother and a stepmother, and, more confusing still,
because of [the grandmother’s] status as a stepmother, [the
mother would be both a mother to Children and, technically,
their stepsister. Further complicating matters, if Mother ever
seeks to marry, the Act does not require [the grandfather] to
terminate his parental rights in favor of [the mother’s] spouse;
thus, he could decide to remain [the children’s] father and
prevent [the mother’s] spouse from having legal rights over [the
children]. [The grandfather] has neither considered, nor
explained, how his role with [the children] might change if [the
mother] married. N.T., 8/13/13, at 23-26.
Lastly, although the orphans’ court rejected the possibility
in the instant case, permitting [the grandfather] to adopt and
co-parent [the children] with [the mother] would nevertheless
open the door for misuse of adoption proceedings by spiteful
parents as a means to involuntarily terminate the rights of
unwanted parents. . . .
[The mother and grandfather] have not met their burden
of showing that the proposed adoption by [the grandfather]
would serve the underlying purposes of relinquishment, or that
relinquishment is otherwise unnecessary under the
circumstances of this case. See R.B.F. In other words, they
have not demonstrated that the proposed co-parenting
arrangement would create a new family unit or a new parent-
child relationship, particularly, and significantly, given [the
grandfather’s] existing parent-child relationship with [the
mother], and his intention to continue living in a separate
residence with [the grandmother] following the adoption.
***
As the proposed adoption is not otherwise valid, we need not
consider whether the adoption would have been in [the
children’s] best interests.
In sum, [the mother and grandfather] have not
demonstrated that, under Pennsylvania law, a valid adoption of
[the children] is anticipated; thus, their termination petition is
not cognizable, and so they are precluded from seeking the
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involuntary termination of [the father’s] parental rights.
Accordingly, we reverse the order of the Superior Court and
remand to the orphans’ court for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Id., at 1128-1130 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion entered on December 7, 2016, the trial
court stated the following:
This Opinion is issued pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. No. 1925(a) in
support of the Opinion and Order of Court of October 21, 2016
which denies the Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental
Rights filed by the [n]atural [m]other, [S.D.]. After a careful
review of the Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, in
addition to the record established in the above-captioned case,
[the trial court] determines that the Opinion issued on October
21, 2016 sets forth sufficient justification for its decision
regarding the errors complained of on appeal. To that extent,
the Superior Court is directed to the Opinion. Notwithstanding,
so as to more fully address each issue raised by the [n]atural
[m]other in order to assist the Superior Court, the Trial Court
submits this Opinion.
For purposes of this appeal, the operative facts include
that the [n]atural [m]other desired to retain her parental rights,
while petitioning that the [n]atural [f]ather’s rights be
terminated. The prospective adoptive parent was the maternal
grandmother with whom the [n]atural [m]other did not reside.
Testimony was initially completed on November 13, 2015, and
the record closed. A briefing schedule was implemented for the
parties by Order of Court.1 On December 8, 2015, the Superior
Court issued an Opinion in In re: Adoption of M.R.D and
T.M.D., 128 A.3d 1249 (Pa.Super. 2015), which was directly
applicable to the matter pending before the [trial court]. No
party addressed the Superior Court decision in their respective
brief. As such, by Order of Court of March 1, 2016, the [trial
court] extended an opportunity for the parties to file a
supplemental brief in light of the In re: M.R.D. Superior Court
decision.2 Following receipt and review of the supplemental
memoranda, the [trial court] believed it required additional
evidence on the issue of the prospective adoption as it related to
the Superior Court decision in In re: M.R.D. As such, the matter
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was reopened and a further hearing was scheduled by the Trial
Court for June 2, 2016. This hearing was subsequently continued
to August 30, 2016. On August 29, 2016, the day prior to the
hearing, the Supreme Court issued its Opinion in In re: M.R.D.,
145 A.3d 1117 (Pa. 2016). The evidentiary hearing in the matter
sub judice was conducted on August 30, 2016. The record was
then closed again.
In In re: M.R.D., supra, the Supreme Court concluded
that the Adoption Act does not permit a maternal grandfather to
adopt a minor child with the child’s mother without the mother
relinquishing her parental rights, simply as means to facilitate a
termination of the biological father’s parental rights. The
Supreme Court reasoned that the mother and grandfather in In
re: M.R.D. were not part of an intact cohabitating family unit,
and relinquishment of parental rights by the mother was
necessary to avoid unique complications. The Supreme Court
further reasoned that[,] by allowing such an adoption, the door
would open for misuse of adoption proceedings by spiteful
parents seeking to involuntarily terminate the rights of unwanted
parents. Because the [n]atural [m]other here desired to retain
her parental rights, to have the parental rights of the [n]atural
[f]ather terminated and to have the maternal grandmother serve
as the adoptive parent of the child without the [n]atural
[m]other and maternal grandmother residing together as an
intact family, the [trial court] felt bound by the Supreme Court
decision in In re: M.R.D. to deny the [n]atural [m]other’s
Petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of the [n]atural
[f]ather.
The [n]atural [m]other raises the following two errors
complained of on appeal: 1) that the [trial court] improperly
denied the [n]atural [m]other’s Petition for Termination of
Parental Rights by applying In Re: Adoption of M.R.D. and
T.M.D., 128 A.3d 1249 (Pa.Super. 2015)[,] retroactively, as that
decision was issued subsequent to the filing of the Petition and
after the [trial court] initially concluded testimony; and, 2) that
the [trial court] improperly denied the [n]atural [m]other’s
Petition as Mother presented sufficient evidence to establish a
basis for the termination of the Father’s parental rights.
Generally, “a court may, in its discretion, reopen the case
after a party has closed for the taking of additional testimony,
but such matters are peculiarly within the sound discretion of the
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trial court, and a denial of (an) opportunity for a rehearing for
the purpose of introducing additional evidence will not ordinarily
be disturbed.” Commonwealth v. Deitch Co., 449 Pa. 88, 295
A.2d 834 (1972); see, Colonna v. Colonna, 791 A.2d 353
(Pa.Super. 2001); In re: J.E.F., 187 Pa. 455, 409 A.2d 1165
(1979). Such a ruling will be disturbed only if the court has
abused its discretion. Thomas v. Waters, 350 Pa. 214, 38 A.2d
237 (1944); see also, Van Buren v. Eberhard, 377 Pa. 22,
104 A.2d 98 (1954).
Here, the Superior Court Opinion in In re: M.R.D. was
issued within one month of the final hearing which initially closed
the testimony. The parties’ briefs were due near the time the
Superior Court Opinion was issued, and no party mentioned that
Opinion in their brief. As both the situation in this matter and in
In re: M.R.D. concerned termination of parental rights and a
proposed adoption by a natural parent who sought to retain her
parental rights and a grandparent, the [trial court] felt that the
parties should specifically address this scenario. It is significant
that the [trial court] could not find binding authority for the
[n]atural [m]other’s proposition that a trial court must apply the
law as it stands on the date of the filing of a petition for
involuntary termination of parental rights to the matter being
decided. As such, based upon all of the foregoing, the [trial
court] concludes it proceeded accordingly in reopening the
record and applying the current law, given the timing of the
hearings, the briefing schedules and the dates the relevant
appellate court decisions were issued.
As to the [n]atural [m]other’s argument that the [trial
court] erred in denying the [n]atural [m]other’s Petition because
the [n]atural [m]other presented sufficient evidence to establish
a basis for termination of Father’s parental rights under Section
2511(a)(1) and complied with all provisions of the Adoption Act,
the [trial court] believes that [n]atural [m]other’s point is
reasonable in that the [n]atural [f]ather here did not have
sufficient contact with the minor child to justify him [sic]
retaining his parental rights over the child. However, the [trial
court] based its decision in denying the [n]atural [m]other’s
Petition pursuant to the Supreme Court Opinion in In re:
M.R.D., supra, namely, that an adoption would be improper if
the prospective adoptive parents were a grandparent and a
natural parent whose parental rights are not relinquished who
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did not cohabitate as an intact family, rather than any lack of
involvement by the [n]atural [f]ather with the child.
___________________________________________________
1
The November 16, 2015 Order provides that [c]ounsel for
Natural Father was to file his brief within fourteen (14) days of
receipt of the notes of testimony for the final hearing being filed,
and Counsel for the [n]atural [m]other was to file her brief
within fourteen (14) days of the date the [n]atural [f]ather’s
brief was filed. The notes of testimony were filed on November
19, 2015. Natural Father filed his brief on December 19, 2015,
and Natural Mother filed her brief on January 4, 2016.
2
The Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Supreme Court filed
on January 7, 2016 was granted by the Supreme Court on March
16, 2016.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/7/16, at 1-5 (footnotes in original).
After a careful review of the record in this matter, we find no error of
law on the part of the trial court and no abuse of the trial court’s discretion
in finding the termination petition invalid under the Supreme Court’s holding
in In re Adoption of M.R.D. The trial court was constrained to apply the
Supreme Court’s holding to the instant matter, for the reasons set forth by
the trial court in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. We find no merit to the contention
that the trial court should have rendered its decision when it first closed the
evidence, and applied the law as it had been interpreted as of the time the
petition was filed. Mother does not provide any statutory or case law in her
brief, nor did our independent research reveal any statute or case, that
would have precluded the trial court from delaying its decision, reopening
the record, and then rendering its decision after the Supreme Court had
ruled on the novel issue.
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We affirm the trial court’s order based on the discussion in the trial
court’s opinion filed on December 7, 2016, cited above. As such, we need
not consider the issue of whether the involuntary termination of Father’s
parental rights was warranted pursuant to the evidence in this matter.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/18/2017
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