In the Int. of: M.I.F., Appeal of: S.F. ( 2023 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: M.I.F., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.F., MOTHER :
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: No. 1072 EDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered April 3, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-DP-0000552-2021
IN THE INTEREST OF: M.I.F., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
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APPEAL OF: S.F., MOTHER :
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: No. 1073 EDA 2023
Appeal from the Decree Entered April 3, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000027-2023
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 3, 2023
S.F. (“Mother”) appeals from the April 3, 2023 decree granting the
petition filed by the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) to
involuntarily terminate her parental rights to her daughter, M.I.F., born in May
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2021 (“Child”).1 Mother further appeals from the April 3, 2023 order changing
Child’s permanency goal to adoption pursuant to Section 6351 of the Juvenile
Act (42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6375). We affirm the termination decree and dismiss
the appeal from the goal change order as moot.
We summarize the factual and procedural history as follows. The family
came to the attention of DHS in May 2021, at the time of Child’s birth, as a
result of mental health and substance abuse concerns related to Mother. See
N.T., 4/3/23, at 9. Specifically, the Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”),
Turning Points for Children, case manager, Michole Allen, testified:
There was a [General Protective Services (“GPS”) report] made
regarding Mother. It was mostly regarding her mental health. The
GPS stated that Mother was making odd statements, such as she’s
an angel. And if the child was a boy, she was going to have sex
with the child. There was also an allegation of Mother using
marijuana and PCP throughout her entire pregnancy. The report
also stated that she was not receiving any type of prenatal care
during her pregnancy.
Id. As a result, DHS obtained protective custody of Child on May 26, 2021.
See Order of Protective Custody, 5/26/21.2 Upon her discharge from the
hospital, Child was placed in foster care, where she has remained. See N.T.,
4/3/23, at 9, 36, 66.
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1 By separate decree of the same date, the trial court terminated the parental
rights of Child’s father, J.T. (“Father”). Father did not file an appeal or
participate in the instant appeals. We refer to Mother and Father collectively
herein as “Parents.”
2 For purposes of this matter, we cite to the dependency record, when
necessary, as it is part of the certified record in this case.
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The court adjudicated Child dependent on August 31, 2021, and ordered
supervised visitation for Mother. See Order of Adjudication and Disposition,
8/31/21. The court established a permanency goal of reunification. See
Permanency Review Order, 11/30/21, at 1; see also Permanency Review
Orders, 3/1/22, 5/31/22, 8/29/22, & 1/6/23.3 In furtherance of reunification,
DHS created a single case plan requiring, inter alia, Mother to: maintain her
mental health, employment, and housing; participate in visitation with Child;
comply with CUA directives; and sign all necessary consents. See N.T.,
4/3/23, at 12.
Throughout the ensuing dependency proceedings, the court conducted
permanency review hearings at regular intervals. From November 2021
through August 2022, the court characterized Mother’s compliance with the
permanency plan as “full” or “substantial” and her progress toward alleviating
the causes of Child’s placement as “substantial.” Permanency Review Orders,
11/30/21, 3/1/22, 5/31/22, & 8/29/22, at 1. In fact, Mother’s visitation
progressed to unsupervised in March 2022, and overnight in May 2022. See
Permanency Review Order, 3/1/22, at 2; Permanency Review Order, 5/31/22,
at 2; see also N.T., 4/3/23, at 13, 40. The court additionally noted the
potential for reunification. See Permanency Review Order, 5/31/22, at 2;
Permanency Review Order, 8/29/22, at 2.
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3 The court established a concurrent goal of adoption on January 6, 2023. See
Permanency Review Order, 1/6/23, at 1.
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However, by January 2023, the court described Mother’s compliance as
“minimal” and progress as “minimal.” Permanency Review Order, 1/6/23, at
1. Significantly, after suffering a miscarriage, Mother failed to attend visitation
from September 2022 until February 2023, and expressed a desire to execute
documentation to voluntarily terminate her parental rights. See N.T., 4/3/23,
at 13-16. In December 2022, she additionally forwarded Child’s social security
card and birth certificate, as well as milestone letters for Child, to Foster
Mother. Id. at 21, 71-72, 113. Despite Mother then indicating that she had
an “epiphany” and “wanted reunification,” requesting visitation in February
2023, Ms. Allen expressed concerns with Mother’s mental health and her
relationship with Father. Id. at 16-17, 24-25, 63-65. As such, Ms. Allen
stated that Child could not be safely reunified with Mother. Id. at 26, 35, 63-
64.
On January 19, 2023, DHS filed a petition for the termination of parental
rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), as well as
a petition for a change of Child’s permanency goal from reunification to
adoption. The trial court held a hearing on the petitions on April 3, 2023.
Mother was present and represented by counsel. The Child, then almost two
years old, was represented by a guardian ad litem (“GAL”).4 DHS presented
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4 Insomuch as Child’s legal interests were incapable of ascertainment due to
her young age, we find Section 2313(a) satisfied by the representation of
Attorney Newton. See In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092-93 (Pa. 2018)
(holding, “if the preferred outcome of a child is incapable of ascertainment
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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the testimony of Ms. Allen, and Child’s foster mother, J.L.E. (“Foster Mother”).
Additionally, Mother testified on her own behalf.5
By decree dated and entered April 3, 2023, the trial court involuntarily
terminated Mother’s parental rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Further, by order also dated and entered
April 3, 2023, the court changed Child’s permanency goal from reunification
to adoption. Thereafter, on April 30, 2023, Mother timely filed notices of
appeal, along with concise statements of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).6 This Court consolidated
Mother’s appeals sua sponte on May 17, 2023.
On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights
of [Mother] under 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(1)?
2. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights
of [Mother] under 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(2)?
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because the child is very young and pre-verbal, there can be no conflict
between the child’s legal interests and his or her best interests; as such, the
mandate of Section 2313(a) of the Adoption Act [(23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938)]”
is satisfied).
We note that Child’s GAL argued in favor of termination. See N.T.,
3/20/23, at 82. He, however, did not submit a brief to this Court.
5 DHS also offered DHS Exhibits 1 through 4, which the court admitted without
objection. See N.T., 4/3/23, at 7-8. Mother proffered Mother’s Exhibits 1
through 3, which the court admitted. Id. at 59, 62.
6 On May 19, 2023, the trial court filed a Notice of Compliance with Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925(a), dated May 18, 2023, in which it references its
reasoning placed on the record.
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3. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights
of [Mother] under 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(5)?
4. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights
of [Mother] under 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(8)?
5. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights
of [Mother] under 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(b)?
6. Whether the trial court erred by determining it to be in …
[C]hild’s best interest to change the goal from reunification to
adoption?
Mother’s Brief at 5-6 (cleaned up).
We review involuntary termination orders for an abuse of discretion,
which our Supreme Court has explained “is limited to a determination of
whether the decree of the termination court is supported by competent
evidence.” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021). When
applying this standard, appellate courts must accept the trial court’s findings
of fact and credibility determinations if they are supported by the record. See
Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021). “Where the trial
court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate court may
not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it has discerned an error of law or
abuse of discretion.” In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa.
2021). An abuse of discretion in this context exists “only upon demonstration
of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id.The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by Section
2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis. See
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. The trial court must initially determine whether the
conduct of the parent warrants termination under one of the eleven
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enumerated grounds set forth at Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the petitioner has established grounds for termination under
Section 2511(a) does it then engage in assessing the petition under Section
2511(b), which focuses upon the child’s needs and welfare. See In re T.S.M.,
71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). To involuntarily terminate parental rights, the
petitioner must satisfy both Section 2511(a) and (b) by clear and convincing
evidence, which is evidence that is so “clear, direct, weighty, and convincing
as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of
the truth of the precise facts in issue.” C.M., 255 A.3d at 359 (citation
omitted).
In the case sub judice, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We have long
held that, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only
agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well
as Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004)
(en banc). Instantly, we will analyze the court’s termination decrees pursuant
to Section 2511(a)(1) and (b),7 which provides as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least
six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition
either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing
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7 This corresponds with Mother’s first and fifth issues.
Given our disposition
herein, we need not address Mother’s second, third, and fourth issues. See
In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).
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parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform
parental duties.
...
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (b).
In order to establish grounds for termination pursuant to Section
2511(a)(1), “[a] petitioner … must demonstrate by competent, clear and
convincing evidence, ‘[t]he parent by conduct continuing for a period of at
least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has
evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has
refused or failed to perform parental duties.’” C.M., 255 A.3d at 363-64
(citation and footnote omitted). While undefined,
our courts long have interpreted parental duties in relation to the
needs of a child, such as love, protection, guidance and support.
Parental duties are carried out through affirmative actions that
develop and maintain the parent-child relationship. The roster of
such positive actions undoubtedly includes communication and
association. The performance of parental duties requires that a
parent exert himself to take and maintain a place of importance
in the child’s life.
L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 592 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Furthermore, “[f]ortitude is required, as a parent must act with ‘reasonable
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firmness’ to overcome obstacles that stand in the way of preserving a parent-
child relationship and may not wait for a more suitable time to perform
parental responsibilities.” Id. (citation omitted).
In assessing Section 2511(a)(1), trial courts should consider the entire
history of the case and avoid applying the statutory six-month requirement
mechanically. C.M., 255 A.3d at 364. However, the General Assembly’s
emphasis on the six months immediately preceding the filing of the
termination petition indicates this timeframe is the “most critical period for
evaluation” of a parent’s conduct. L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 592.
“[T]he question of whether a parent has failed or refused to perform
parental duties must be analyzed in relation to the particular circumstances of
the case.” In re Burns, 379 A.2d 535, 540 (Pa. 1977). Thus, “even where
the evidence clearly establishes a parent has failed to perform affirmative
parental duties for a period in excess of six months…, the court ‘must examine
the individual circumstances and any explanation offered by the parent to
determine if that evidence, in light of the totality of circumstances, clearly
warrants permitting the involuntary termination [of parental rights].’” L.A.K.,
265 A.3d at 593 (citation omitted). The totality of the circumstances includes
consideration of the following: “(1) the parent’s explanation for his or her
conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between the parent and child, if
any, including any efforts made by the parent to reestablish contact with the
child; and (3) the effect that termination of parental rights would have on the
child pursuant to Section 2511(b).” Id. As explained by our Supreme Court,
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“the purpose of this analysis is to give effect to our mandate that courts avoid
a mechanical application of the law regarding the termination of parental
rights. The law must be applied with the purpose of serving needs and welfare
of each individual child in his or her particular circumstances.” Id.
Instantly, with respect to the determination that DHS satisfied the
statutory grounds to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section
2511(a)(1), the trial court found that Mother evidenced a settled purpose to
relinquish her parental claim and failed to perform parental duties for the six
months immediately preceding the filing of the termination petition. N.T.,
4/3/23, at 128-29. The court stated, “Mother in essence relinquished any
parental claim [and] expressed on more than one occasion that she was not
in any position, nor does she desire to reunify.” Id. at 128. The court
continued, “There was nothing in the six months preceding the filing of the
petitions in this case for either parent to establish that they in any way were
trying to establish a parental claim to the child. [T]o the contrary, they failed
to perform parental duties.” Id. at 129.
Mother acknowledges that, while grieving her loss from a miscarriage,
she expressed a desire to voluntarily relinquish her parental rights. See
Mother’s Brief at 14. She asserts, however, that in February 2023, she
requested to resume visitation and had two visits with Child prior to the
subject hearing. Id. Mother further argues that she was continuing to engage
in therapy, as confirmed by a letter from her therapist, and had maintained
housing and employment. Id. at 15.
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Upon review, we are constrained to agree with the trial court. The
record supports the determination that Mother evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing her parental claim to Child and failed to perform parental duties
in the six months immediately preceding the filing of the termination petition
in January 2023. As revealed, Mother ceased visitation with Child from
September 2022 to February 2023, after suffering a miscarriage. See N.T.,
4/3/23, at 13-14. During this time, she also did not independently reach out
to see Child or inquire as to how Child was doing. Id. at 20, 27, 70-72.
Mother explained that she was grieving and “at that time [she] believed that
was the best decision that a mother could make.” Id. at 111. She “needed
for [C]hild to be in an environment where she got the love and attention that
she needed,” and that was “safe.” Id. at 111-12. Ms. Allen confirmed that,
until February 2023, Mother exhibited an intent to not reunify with Child. Id.
at 22, 62-63. Although Foster Mother wanted Mother to remain involved in
Child’s life, Ms. Allen stated that Mother “wanted to be known as a surrogate.”
Id. at 19.
Indeed, Ms. Allen testified that Mother indicated a desire to sign
paperwork voluntarily terminating her parental rights (“VOLs”). Subsequent
to advising Mother to consider this decision further, Mother contacted Ms.
Allen at the end of October 2022, and reiterated her desire to voluntarily
terminate her parental rights, as follows:
[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: Between September of 2022 and February
of 2023, did you speak with Mother?
MS. ALLEN: Yes.
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[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: And what was the nature of your
conversations with her?
MS. ALLEN: Mother contacted me. And she expressed that she
wanted to sign VOLs.
[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: As a result, did you have VOLs drafted?
MS. ALLEN: Not until November.
[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: Why did you wait to have them drafted until
November?
MS. ALLEN: I informed Mother that I thought she was making an
impulsive decision. I told her that after suffering the miscarriage,
I really believe that she needed to take time to just grieve her
los[s] and consult with her therapist.
And then I told her, you know, after you consult with your
therapist, after you take some time, contact me. And we’ll talk
again. Mother contacted me at the end of October of 2022.
And she stated, “Remember you told me that I should take time
to think about signing VOLs?” I stated, “Yes.” She stated, “Well
I still want to sign the paperwork.”
Id. at 15-16.
Moreover, in December 2022, after contacting Foster Mother for her
address, Mother sent Child’s social security card and birth certificate, as well
as milestone letters for Child, to Foster Mother. Id. at 21, 71-72, 113. Foster
Mother corroborated that Mother did not want reunification at that time. She
testified, “[Mother] told me to take care of [Child], not to worry about her.
She told me, during the conversation when she asked for my address, that
that would be the last time that she would call.” Id. at 72-73. As such, and
of significance, Ms. Allen recognized that Mother “had not taken steps to take
and maintain a place of importance in [Child]’s life” from September 2022 to
February 2023. Id. at 26.
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Once Mother requested visitation in February 2023, she was offered and
participated in two supervised visits prior to the subject hearing, one in
February and one in March 2023. Id. at 17-18.8 As recounted by Ms. Allen,
Mother did not request for such visitation to be expanded. Id.
While Mother never executed documentation to voluntarily terminate
her parental rights and subsequently expressed a desire for reunification and
re-engaged in visitation, given Mother’s clear desire to relinquish her parental
role and failure to perform parental duties in the six months immediately
preceding the filing of the termination petition, we discern no abuse of
discretion in the court’s finding grounds for termination pursuant to Section
2511(a)(1). Hence, we do not disturb it.
Having found sufficient grounds for termination pursuant to Section
2511(a)(1), we next must determine whether termination was proper under
Section 2511(b), which affords primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d
at 267. “[T]he determination of the child’s ‘needs and welfare’ requires
consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and child. The
‘utmost attention’ should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
permanently severing the parental bond.” Id. (internal citations omitted). As
our Supreme Court recently explained in Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085,
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8 When asked about the visitation schedule, Ms. Allen explained, “Because
there was no visitation order in the last [c]ourt order from January; she had
one visit in February and one visit in March.” N.T., 4/3/23, at 17.
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1113 (Pa. 2023), “a court conducting a Section 2511(b) analysis must
consider more than proof of an adverse or detrimental impact from
severance of the parental bond. We emphasize analysis of the parental bond
is but one part of the overall subsection (b) analysis, which includes a
determination of whether the bond is necessary and beneficial to the child,
i.e., whether maintaining the bond serves the child’s developmental, physical,
and emotional needs and welfare.” K.T., supra (emphasis added).
In addition, the K.T. Court held that the “Section 2511(b) inquiry must
also include consideration of other important factors.” Id. While not inventing
an exhaustive list of considerations, the Court explained that the inquiry must
consider and weigh certain evidence if it is present in the record,
including, but not limited to, “the child’s need for permanency and the length
of time in foster care…; whether the child is in a pre[-]adoptive home and
bonded with foster parents; and whether the foster home meets the child’s
developmental, physical, and emotional needs, including intangible needs of
love, comfort, security, safety, and stability.” Id. (footnote omitted); see
also id. at 1113 n.28.
In concluding that termination of Mother’s parental rights best serves
Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant to
Section 2511(b), the trial court stated:
With regards to [Section] 2511(b), this court finds that Child does
not have a parental bond with either Mother or Father in this case.
Even if Child recently recognized Mom at one of the two visits that
she had this year, there is no indication of a parent/child bond.
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The last visit -- I believe the testimony was that the visit in March
ended early after [C]hild -- Mom said Child was exhausted. The
testimony from the CUA worker is that Child didn’t want to even
interact with Mom and put a toy in-between [her and] Mother.
There is no indication of a parent/child bond, which would be
impossible for Parents to have given their lack of contact with
Child during Child’s life.
Due to the lack of visitation, it would have been impossible for
Parents, given that they did not avail themselves for more visits,
to establish a parental bond. I find that Child would suffer no
irreparable harm if the rights of Parents were terminated, as Child
has been having all of [her] needs met by [Foster Mother], who
has been there for this [C]hild.
I am heartened by the fact that [Foster Mother], and I hope that
Parents will avail themselves of this, [does] not want to eliminate
Parents from Child’s life. I would encourage Parents to avail
themselves of [Foster Mother’s] willingness to have them
participate in Child’s life.
This is not something that happens every day when we’re in this
situation in court. And I would encourage Parents to avail
themselves so they can continue to be present in Child’s life. But
I do find at this time it’s in Child’s best interest to change the goal
to adoption, as Child has been in the same home since Child was
four days of age. Child’s needs are being met by [Foster Mother].
Child has not -- [Parents do not] meet any of Child’s needs. And
I find that Child, at this young age, it’s very important for Child to
have permanency. This is a child, it should be noted, that has
special needs and is receiving various types of therapies that
Parents are not familiar with.
They don’t know where Child is receiving the therapy at this point.
There was no testimony that they would be able to care for Child.
And I find that it would be in Child’s best interest to free Child for
adoption.
N.T., 4/3/23, at 133-35 (cleaned up; internal punctuation and capitalization
also corrected).
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Conversely, in arguing a lack of clear and convincing evidence that
termination of Mother’s parental rights best serves Child’s developmental,
physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant to Section 2511(b),
Mother baldly asserts that she wants to visit with Child and reestablish a bond.
See Mother’s Brief at 19.
Upon review, the record supports the finding that termination favors
Child’s needs and welfare under Section 2511(b). Mother’s visitation with
Child progressed to unsupervised visitation in March 2022, and then to
overnight, weekend visitation in May 2022. See N.T., 4/3/23, at 13, 40;
Permanency Review Orders, 3/1/22 & 5/31/22. Ms. Allen acknowledged that,
“to her knowledge,” such visitation was “appropriate.” N.T., 4/3/23, at 40.
However, Mother then ceased participation in visitation in September 2022,
after suffering a miscarriage. N.T., 4/3/23, at 13. While Mother resumed
supervised visitation in February 2023, Ms. Allen raised the following
concerns:
[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: Since September of 2022, how many visits
had [Mother] had with [Child]?
MS. ALLEN: The two in 2023; the one in February and the one in
March.
[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: And at this time, would you have concerns
recommending any sort of unsupervised contact with [Child]?
MS. ALLEN: Yes.
[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: And what are those concerns?
MS. ALLEN: [Child] is no longer familiarized with her mother. At
the last visit, [Child] wouldn’t even engage in the visit unless Ms.
[C.], who is [Foster Mother]’s aunt, unless she was in the visitation
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room. When Ms. [C.] tried to walk out the room, [Child] began
crying, screaming. She wouldn’t let Mother touch her. So she
was asked to stay inside. [Child] would not interact with her
mother throughout the visit. She actually put a toy in-between
the two of them to separate them.
Id. at 18.
Significantly, Mother failed to engage in visitation with her young child
for a period of five months, from the time Child was 16 months old until almost
two years old. As such, despite any prior visitation and contact, Ms. Allen
opined that a parent-child bond did not exist between Mother and Child. Id.
at 35-36. She testified that Child “is just not comfortable” with Mother and
would not suffer any irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights were
terminated. Id. at 26-27.
Instead, Ms. Allen indicated that Child “is very much bonded with the
family, with [Foster Mother] and her aunt” and looks to Foster Mother for her
“daily parental needs.” Id. at 37-38. Notably, Child had been in her current
pre-adoptive foster home since she was four days old. Id. at 37, 66, 79-89.
Ms. Allen described, “[Child] is very playful with [Foster Mother]. She’s very
attached to her.” Id. at 37. Foster Mother further observed, “[Child] is a
very, very happy little girl.” Id. at 78-79.
Moreover, Foster Mother testified that Child has gross motor delays and
did not believe that Mother would be able to care for her. She stated, “[Child]
has gross motor delays. She is not able to walk. … In addition to physical
therapy, she does receive occupational therapy and speech therapy. … And
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just the care that she requires, I’m not sure if [Parents] would be able to do
it.” Id. at 79.
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the record corroborates the
trial court’s determination that termination of Mother’s parental rights best
serves Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare
pursuant to Section 2511(b). As such, we do not disturb it. Since our review
confirms that there was a sufficient basis for the involuntary termination of
Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) and (b), we affirm
the trial court’s decree.
Given our disposition concerning termination, Mother’s appeal from the
goal change order is moot. See In the Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905,
917 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citing In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 616 (Pa. Super.
2002)) (“[E]ven if Father had not waived his goal change claim, it would be
moot in light of our decision to affirm the court’s termination decrees.”).9
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the termination decree and dismiss
the goal change order as moot.
Decree affirmed. Appeal from goal change order dismissed as moot.
____________________________________________
9 Even if not moot, for the reasons we have already discussed throughout this
memorandum with respect to termination, the record confirms that changing
Child’s goal to adoption is in her best interest. See In re A.B., 19 A.3d 1084,
1088-89 (Pa. Super. 2011).
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J-S30002-23
Date: 10/3/2023
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