Com. v. Williams, M. ( 2023 )

J-S17029-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MARSHAWN TYLIQUE WILLIAMS :
:
Appellant : No. 1321 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 15, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-25-CR-0001115-2021
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 3, 2023
Appellant, Marshawn Tylique Williams, appeals from the September 15,
2022 judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie
County that imposed an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole to be followed by 18½ to 37 years’ incarceration after a
jury convicted Appellant of second-degree murder, robbery – inflicts serious
bodily injury upon another, and conspiracy to commit robbery.1 We affirm.
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(b), 3701(a)(1)(i), and 903 (3701(a)(1)(i)),
respectively. The trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole for Appellant’s second-degree murder conviction. The
trial court also imposed a sentence of 10 to 20 years’ incarceration for
Appellant’s robbery conviction and 8½ to 17 years’ incarceration for his
conspiracy to commit robbery conviction. The conspiracy sentence was set to
run consecutively to the robbery sentence, and the robbery sentence was set
to run consecutively to the second-degree murder conviction.
J-S17029-23
The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history as follows:
In autumn of 2019, Appellant, [] and others, hatched a scheme to
steal money and marijuana from a known dealer[, the victim.]
Their objective was to make entry into [the victim’s house], raid
his [supply] of marijuana and cash, and flee with the loot. On
December 7, 2019, [Appellant], along with other co-conspirators,
attempted to execute the plan. Lying in wait in [the victim’s]
backyard, they ambushed [the victim’s] friend, Daniel Dugan
[(“Dugan”), who was] on his way to watch a football game at [the
victim’s] house, forcing Dugan to knock on the backdoor at
gunpoint. When [the victim] answered the door, a struggle
ensued, one of the conspirators fired a gun, and minutes later,
[the victim] lay dead with bullet wounds to the head and neck.
On June 9, 2022, a jury found [Appellant] guilty of murder in the
second degree, robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, and
[criminal attempt to commit burglary of an overnight
accommodation with a person present]. On September 15, 2022,
the [trial] court sentenced [Appellant] to an aggregate term of
imprisonment of life [without the possibility of parole] plus 18½
to 37 years[’ incarceration. That same day, the trial court vacated
Appellant’s conviction of criminal attempt to commit burglary.]
On September 26, 2022, [Appellant] filed a motion to reconsider
and modify sentence, which the [trial] court denied on October
11, 2022.
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Appellant was also convicted of, and sentenced for, criminal attempt to
commit burglary of an overnight accommodation with a person present. 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a). On September 15, 2022, the trial court vacated
Appellant’s conviction of, and sentence imposed for, criminal attempt to
commit burglary “as [this offense was] inconsistent with 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 906,
in light of the conviction and sentence for conspiracy to commit robbery[.]”
Trial Court Order, 9/15/22; see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 906 (stating, “[a] person
may not be convicted of more than one of the inchoate crimes of criminal
attempt, criminal solicitation or criminal conspiracy for conduct designed to
commit or to culminate in the commission of the same crime”).
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Trial Court Opinion, 2/9/23, at 1 (footnote and extraneous capitalization
omitted). This appeal followed.2
Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
Did the Commonwealth present insufficient evidence to sustain
Appellant's convictions for all charges when the evidence did not
establish [a] sufficient connection between [] Appellant and the
firearm in question or that [A]ppellant was present at the time of
the shooting?
Appellant’s Brief at 2 (extraneous capitalization omitted).
Appellant’s issue raises a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his convictions for which our standard and scope of review are
well-settled.
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be
resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
must be evaluated[,] and all evidence actually received must be
considered. Finally, the [fact-finder] while passing upon the
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2 Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925.
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credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Reed, 216 A.3d 1114, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2019).
“A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the second degree,
commonly known as felony murder in Pennsylvania, when the homicide is
committed while [a] defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice
in the perpetration of a felony.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(b); see also
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 135 A.3d 1097, 1101 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal
denied, 135 A.3d 1097 (Pa. 2016). The Crimes Code defines the term
“perpetration of a felony” as “[t]he act of the defendant in engaging in or
being an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight
after committing, or attempting to commit robbery, rape, or deviate sexual
intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary or kidnapping.”3 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(d).
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3 As we shall detail more fully below, Appellant’s direct involvement in the
killing and robbery of the victim does not implicate a theory of accomplice
liability. Nevertheless, we offer the following explanation of an “accomplice”
to facilitate a complete understanding of the offense of second-degree murder.
A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of
an offense if:
(1) with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of
the offense, he:
(i) solicits such other person to commit it; or
(ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person
in planning or committing it; or
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“A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he[,
or she,] inflicts serious bodily injury upon another[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 3701(a)(1)(i). “An act shall be deemed “in the course of committing a theft”
if it occurs in an attempt to commit theft or in flight after the attempt or
commission.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(2). “A defendant [] may be guilty of
robbery as an accomplice or co-conspirator as long as the defendant
possessed the requisite mens rea to commit the criminal act and the additional
elements of accomplice liability or conspiratorial liability are established.”
Mitchell, 135 A.3d at 1102. “A person is a conspirator if the defendant: 1)
entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another
person or persons; 2) with a shared criminal intent; and 3) an overt act was
done in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Id. (citation and original quotation
marks omitted).
The essence of a criminal conspiracy is the common understanding
that a particular criminal objective is to be accomplished. Mere
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(2) his conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his
complicity.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 306(c). “When causing a particular result is an element of an
offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in
the commission of that offense, if he acts with the kind of culpability, if any,
with respect to that result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense.”
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 306(d). “Accomplice liability may be established wholly by
circumstantial evidence. Only the least degree of concert or collusion in the
commission of the offense is sufficient to sustain a finding of responsibility as
an accomplice. No agreement is required, only aid.” Mitchell, 135 A.3d at
1102 (citation and original quotation marks omitted).
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association with the perpetrators, mere presence at the scene, or
mere knowledge of the crime is insufficient. Rather, the
Commonwealth must prove that the defendant shared the criminal
intent, i.e., that the [defendant] was an active participant in the
criminal enterprise and that he had knowledge of the
conspiratorial agreement.
Commonwealth v. Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010, 1016 (Pa. Super. 2002)
(citation and quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 795 A.2d 1010 (Pa.
2002). “A conspiracy is almost always proved through circumstantial
evidence.” Lambert, 795 A.2d at 1016. As association between alleged
conspirators, a defendant’s knowledge of the commission of the crime, the
defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime, and, in some situations, the
defendant’s participation in the object of the conspiracy “may furnish a web
of evidence linking an accused to an alleged conspiracy beyond a reasonable
doubt when viewed in conjunction with each other and in the context in which
they occurred.” Id. (citation omitted).
In finding sufficient evidence existed to support Appellant’s convictions,
the trial court explained,
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom,
the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's guilty verdicts as to
all convictions. In particular, there is sufficient evidence from
which the jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
[Appellant] was both in the backyard during the incident and that
he pointed a gun at [the victim] when [the victim] answered the
door, thereby attempting to obtain the personal property of the
victim using force, threat, or intimidation, as necessary to sustain
the robbery conviction. Most notably, the testimony of [Dugan]
puts an individual matching [Appellant’s] description in the
backyard. Other evidence, such as the testimony of [Michael]
Toles [(“Toles”)] and [Melissa] Seaman [(“Seaman”)], and the still
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photographs, videos, and [tele]phone [call-]logs, provide ample
support for the conclusion that the "light skinned" African
American individual identified by Dugan is, in fact, [Appellant].
Trial Court Opinion, 2/9/23, at 3-4.4
The record demonstrates that, at trial, Toles testified that prior to the
murder, he was romantically involved with Seaman and was friends with
Appellant. N.T., 6/6/22, at 155. Toles stated that, approximately six weeks
prior to the murder, he was driving a vehicle in which Appellant and Derrick
Elverton [(“Elverton”)5] were passengers. Id. at 155-157, 159. During the
ride, a conversation ensued that involved a discussion of the victim and
committing a “lick,” which Toles explained was a drug transaction involving a
robbery, as a means of making money. Id. at 155. Toles testified that
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4 The trial court further found that “Dugan's testimony further demonstrates
that [Appellant] brandished a gun, and critically, that he pointed the gun at
[the victim] before [the victim was] shot by another co-conspirator.”
Trial Court Opinion, 2/9/23, at 4 (emphasis added). Our careful review of
Dugan’s trial testimony as a whole, coupled with other evidence, viewed in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, as detailed
infra, reveals that Dugan implicated Appellant, based upon both his clothing
and complexion, as the individual who brandished a firearm, pointed a firearm
at the victim, and fired the fatal shot. See N.T., 6/2/22, at 85-134; see also
N.T., 6/6/22, at 146.
As discussed infra, even setting the trial court’s finding aside, there is
sufficient evidence of Appellant’s awareness and participation with others in
the criminal plot to acquire the victim’s property through force or threat of
force to support Appellant’s multiple convictions.
5 Elverton was one of the co-defendants in the criminal trial involving
Appellant. The other two co-defendants were Damarjon Beason (“Beason”)
and Anthony Blanks (“Blanks”).
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Appellant was part of the conversation and was present in the vehicle during
the conversation about committing a “lick” that involved the victim Id. at
161, 164.
Toles testified that several weeks later, he was again driving a vehicle
in which Appellant was a passenger, along with Seaman and Luis Tirado
(“Tirado”) who went by the street-name “Moo-Moo”. Id. at 165-167. Toles
stated that Appellant raised the subject of the victim and committing a “lick.”
Id. at 168. Thereafter, Toles drove the vehicle to the victim’s house where
Appellant, Tirado, and Toles exited the vehicle and approached the victim’s
house with the intent to commit a robbery. Id. at 169-173. Toles stated that
he knew Appellant had a gun with him. Id. at 170. Ultimately, the three
individuals decided not to carry out the “lick” after Tirado’s cellular telephone
rang as the individuals approached the victim’s house and “threw everybody
off.” Id. at 173. Toles testified that Appellant was “calling the shots” that
evening, and Appellant made the decision to abort the robbery. Id. at 174.
Toles further testified that, on the day of the murder, he received a
telephone call from Appellant in which Appellant requested a ride. Id. at 177.
When Toles arrived to pick Appellant up, Appellant was waiting with Elverton
and another individual, later identified as Beason. Id. at 179-181. Toles
drove Appellant, Elverton, and Beason to the victim’s neighborhood. Id. at
183. After dropping Appellant and the other two individuals near the victim’s
house, Toles waited in his parked vehicle. Id. at 190. Appellant, Elverton,
and Beason returned to the parked vehicle for a brief period of time, at which
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point Beason obtained a handgun from a person, later identified as Blanks,
who was walking on the street nearby. Id. at 193-197. After obtaining a
handgun, Appellant, Elverton, and Beason exited the vehicle and walked
towards the victim’s house. Id. at 197-200. Shortly thereafter, Toles stated
that he “thought [he] heard gunshots.” Id. at 201. Toles left the area in his
vehicle, and returned to his house where he discovered Seaman and
Appellant. Id. at 203-204. It was at this time that Appellant told Toles that
“things went bad” and the victim “got shot.” Id. at 204.
Seaman testified that several weeks prior to the murder, Appellant
stated that the victim “would be a good lick,” meaning someone who was
easily robbed. N.T., 6/3/22, at 170-171. Seaman stated that she rode in a
vehicle to the victim’s house, and remained in the vehicle while Appellant,
Toles, and Janiya Blanks got out of the vehicle to “check out [the victim’s]
house.” Id. at 171,174. Seaman testified that she returned to the victim’s
neighborhood shortly thereafter, this time in a vehicle with Toles, Appellant,
and Tirado Id. at 176. The purpose of this excursion was so Appellant, Toles,
and Tirado could rob the victim. Id. at 176. Seaman remained in the vehicle,
but she was unable to see where the three individuals went after exiting the
vehicle. Id. at 177-178.
Seaman further testified that on the evening of the murder, Appellant
returned to her house and told her that “they went to go lick [the victim] and
then it went bad.” Id. at 181. Seaman stated that Appellant asked her to
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“get rid of some pants” for him. Id. at 181-182 (explaining that the pants in
question were the pants Appellant was then wearing).
Dugan testified that he and the victim were friends, and that on the day
of the murder, he went to the victim’s house so they could watch a
championship football game together. N.T., 6/2/22, at 86-87. After parking
his vehicle near the victim’s house, Dugan exited his vehicle and proceeded
towards the victim’s backyard via a driveway. Id. at 95-97. As he approached
the victim’s backyard, Dugan saw a person standing on the back porch of the
victim’s house wearing a light blue jacket. Id. at 95-96, 99. As Dugan was
about to enter the victim’s backyard, another individual approached him from
behind, and Dugan felt something “like a butt of a gun” being pressed against
the side of his torso. Id. at 96-98. The person that approached Dugan walked
with Dugan to the victim’s backdoor. This individual wore a black jacket. Id.
at 99. As he walked towards the victim’s backdoor, Dugan saw a third
individual, who was also wearing a black jacket. Id. at 99. The individual
holding a handgun to Dugan’s back instructed Dugan to knock on the victim’s
backdoor. Id. at 100-101. As the victim opened the door, Dugan stood on
the other side of the door and two individuals stood on either side of Dugan.6
Id. at 102-103. After the victim opened the door, Dugan stated the individual
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6 The individual that Dugan first observed standing on the victim’s back porch
did not move from his position and was not either of the two individuals who
were standing behind Dugan as he knocked on the victim’s backdoor. N.T.,
6/2/22, at 100.
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with the handgun to his back raised the handgun and fired a shot towards the
victim. Id. at 103-104. Dugan described the shooter as “a light-skinned
African American” or “a Hispanic person[.]” Id. at 111. Dugan stated that
the victim, upon seeing the shooter raise a handgun towards him, reached for
the handgun, and after a shot was fired, the victim’s body fell towards Dugan.
Id. at 105. The three individuals then fled the victim’s backyard leaving
Dugan with the victim’s body. Id. Dugan was unable to identify any of the
assailants in a police line-up. Id. at 112. On cross-examination, Dugan
agreed, however, that he saw only one of the three individuals with a
handgun. Id. at 120
Michael Hertel, a detective sergeant with the City of Erie Police
Department, (“Detective Hertel”) testified that, based upon information
supplied by Dugan, police suspected that three individuals were involved in
the murder and that two of the individuals wore “black or dark coats” and one
of the individuals wore a “light blue coat.” N.T., 6/3/22, at 242. While
investigating the crime scene, the police recovered, inter alia, a handgun, from
inside in a cardboard box near the crime scene, a light blue jacket and blue
sweatpants, both of which were discovered under a wheelchair ramp affixed
to a nearby house, and a cellular telephone, which was discovered in close
proximity to the jacket and sweatpants. Id. at 243-244. The police were also
able to obtain video surveillance footage from several cameras positioned
throughout the surrounding neighborhood. Id. at 246-247. In one video
recording, three individuals were observed walking westbound towards the
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victim’s house shortly before the murder. Id. at 248-249. One of the
individuals (Beason) was observed wearing a black jacket with a red emblem
on the left breast area of the jacket, gray sweatpants, and black “Jordan 4
Retro” sneakers with white soles. Id. at 252, 255. A second individual
(Elverton) was observed wearing a light blue jacket, a dark-colored sweatshirt
with a hood, blue sweatpants, and gray and white sneakers. Id. at 252-253.
The third individual (Appellant) was observed wearing a black jacket, a black
knit hat, blue jeans “with a little bit of stonewash,” and black sneakers. Id.
at 253. The third individual’s jacket had a “distinguishing mark” on the right
breast area of the jacket, which Detective Hertel described as a “white mark”
that was either a defect in the jacket or part of the jacket. Id. at 254.
In short, the video surveillance footage showed three individuals exiting
a parked vehicle near the crime scene and, shortly before the murder, walking
in the victim’s neighborhood, returning to the parked vehicle for a short period
of time, exiting the parked vehicle a second time, walking back towards the
victim’s neighborhood, and approaching the victim’s backyard via the
backyard of a house adjacent to the victim’s house. Id. 248-276; see also
N.T., 6/6/22, at 64-72. After the three individuals were observed returning
to the parked vehicle but before they were observed exiting the vehicle a
second time, another individual (Blanks) was observed approaching the
parked vehicle, standing next to the driver’s side of the vehicle for a short
period, and then walking away from the vehicle. N.T., 6/3/22, at 262-276;
see also N.T., 6/6/22, at 64. Shortly after the murder, one of the three
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individuals (Elverton) was observed near the crime scene wearing a hooded
sweatshirt, pants, and shoes and holding a handgun. N.T., 6/3/22, at 276.
This individual was not wearing a jacket. Id. at 277.
After the three individuals approached the victim’s backyard, Dugan was
observed arriving at the victim’s house. N.T., 6/6/22, at 72-73. Shortly
thereafter, the three individuals were observed running away from the victim’s
house. Two individuals (one individual was wearing a dark jacket, light colored
pants, and black sneakers (Beason); the other individual was wearing a
hooded sweatshirt (Elverton)) ran in one direction and Appellant ran in a
different direction. Id. at 74-77, 82, 86. Moments later, Dugan was observed
leaving the victim’s house. Id. at 78. One of the two individuals who fled the
crime scene together (Beason) is observed shortly thereafter talking on his
cellular telephone. Id. at 89-90.
As part of his investigation, Detective Hertel was able to obtain
information, including photographs, from a co-defendant’s social media
accounts. Detective Hertel testified that he obtained a photograph, captured
on November 29, 2019, of Elverton wearing a light blue jacket.7 Id. at
125-127. Elverton’s online account for his cellular telephone showed that
Elverton’s cellular telephone was put into “lost mode” on December 9, 2019.
Id. Shortly before the cellular telephone was placed in “lost mode,” the global
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7 The parties stipulated that Elverton was the major source of DNA discovered
on both the light blue jacket and light blue sweatpants that were discovered
from the crime scene. N.T., 6/7/22, at 187, 209.
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positioning of the cellular telephone showed that the cellular telephone was
located “kitty-corner across the street” from the Erie Police Department. Id.
at 130. The parties stipulated at trial that the cellular telephone discovered
near the crime scene contained a telephone number and electronic mail
account associated with Elverton.8 N.T., 6/7/22, at 106.
Photographs and videos obtained from Beason’s social media account
showed Beason wearing a black jacket with a red emblem on the chest area
of the jacket. N.T., 6/6/22, at 138-139, 143. Another photograph showed
Beason with a pair of Jordan 4 Retro black and white sneakers. Id. at 143.
Finally, a video obtained from Beason’s social media account showed Beason
“describing [Appellant] as light-skinned Mar[.]” Id. at 146. Photographs
obtained of Appellant showed him wearing a dark colored jacket with a white
mark on the jacket. N.T., 6/7/22, at 133.
Detective Hertel agreed that a video of Appellant’s police interview
showed Appellant explaining “through some detail about how [Appellant]
couldn’t imagine how it was for [an individual who was at the victim’s house
on the night of the murder and who witnessed the victim’s death] seeing what
[the individual] saw[.]” N.T., 6/7/22, at 111. Detective Hertel stated that he
did not provide Appellant any details of the last moments of the victim’s life
before Appellant provided details surrounding the victim’s death. Id.
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8The parties further stipulated that Elverton’s DNA was the only source of
DNA obtained from the cellular telephone. N.T., 6/7/22, at 187, 209.
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Appellant also admitted that he knew the victim sold marijuana and that he
purchased marijuana from the victim in the past. Id. at 110, 180.
Craig Stoker, a detective sergeant with the City of Erie Police
Department, (“Detective Stoker”) testified that Toles identified Appellant,
Elverton, and Beason as the three individuals who rode in his vehicle and
exited his vehicle near the crime scene on the night of the murder. N.T.,
6/7/22, at 214-218. Detective Stoker stated that an analysis of Appellant’s
cellular telephone call-log revealed that on the day of the murder, there were
out-going calls from Appellant’s cellular telephone to Elverton’s cellular
telephone and in-coming calls from Elverton’s cellular telephone received by
Appellant’s cellular telephone in the hours preceding the murder. Id. at 231.
During that same time period, out-going and in-coming calls were occurring
between the cellular telephones operated by Beason and Elverton. Id. at
237-239. Appellant made no calls on his cellular telephone between 4:28 p.m.
and 5:49 p.m. on the day of the murder. Id. at 235. The murder took place
at approximately 5:45 p.m. Id. at 229. At 5:49:55 p.m., Appellant placed
an out-going call to Elverton’s cellular telephone. Id. at 234. At 5:56 p.m.
Appellant received a call from Beason’s cellular telephone, and at 5:57 p.m.,
Appellant returned a call to Beason’s cellular telephone. Id. at 235. At
5:57:49 p.m., Beason placed a call to Appellant’s cellular telephone, and he
placed a second call to Appellant’s cellular telephone at 5:59:59 p.m. Id.
Our review confirms that the Commonwealth, which - as the verdict
winner - is entitled to every favorable inference supported by the record,
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proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant both agreed to and
participated in the robbery and murder of the victim. Witness testimony
established that Appellant was present for, and involved in, several
conversations regarding the victim’s known-involvement in the sale of illegal
narcotics. Trial testimony also established that Appellant considered the
victim a good “lick” or an easy target for robbery because he kept both illegal
narcotics and money in his house. Witness testimony and video surveillance
footage placed Appellant and two of his co-defendants, Elverton and Beason,
in the vicinity of the victim’s house both immediately before and after the
murder. Appellant was identified as wearing a black jacket with a white mark
on the chest area. Beason was described as wearing a black jacket with a red
emblem on the chest area. Elverton was described as wearing a blight blue
jacket. Dugan described the shooter as a “light-skinned African American or
Hispanic” man who was wearing a black jacket. A video obtained from a social
media account showed Beason describing Appellant as being “light-skinned.”
Seaman stated that on the evening of the murder, Appellant came to her
house confessing that he participated in a “lick” involving the victim, that the
“lick” had gone bad, and that he needed her to get rid of the pants he wore
during the episode. Finally, during a police interview, Appellant expressed
details regarding the murder that could only have been known by someone
who was present during its commission. In viewing the record in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude there was sufficient
evidence to permit the jury, as fact-finder, to conclude that Appellant was
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guilty of the offenses with which he was charged. Therefore, Appellant’s
sufficiency claim is without merit.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
DATE: 10/3/2023
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