Com. v. Ceja, A. ( 2023 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
ANDRES CEJA : No. 623 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered April 8, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at CP-36-CR-0001939-2021
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 3, 2023
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order granting the
motion of Andres Ceja (Defendant) and suppressing evidence recovered from
Defendant’s car.1 After careful review, we reverse and remand.
The suppression court recounted the following evidence:
Officer [Robert] Burns was stopped in his marked patrol vehicle at
the intersection of South Lime Street and East State Street in
Quarryville, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, when he witnessed
a black Honda on East State Street making a right-hand turn onto
South Lime Street. Suppression Transcript pg. 11; 21-24. Officer
Burns observed that the driver’s side headlight of the Honda was
inoperable, as well as having blue neon ornamental lighting in the
headlights as well. Suppression Transcript pgs. 11-12; 24-2.
Officer Burns subsequently initiated a traffic stop and [made
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 The Commonwealth has certified that the order will terminate or
substantially handicap the prosecution. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).
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contact with] the driver, [Defendant]. Suppression Transcript
pgs. 12; 9-10, 14; 22-25.
Upon [contacting Defendant], Officer Burns testified that he
detected a “strong odor of marijuana emanating from inside of the
vehicle, as well as that the inspection[ sticker] appeared to be
placed in the window from another vehicle.” Suppression
Transcript, pg. 16; 9-14. … [T]he remnants of a marijuana
cigarette, known as a “roach,” could be seen in plain view in the
passenger side door pocket. Affidavit of Probable Cause for
Search Warrant ¶ 7. Officer Burns further testified that the VIN
number on the inspection stickers did not match the VIN plate on
the black Honda, confirming the inspection stickers came from a
different vehicle. Suppression Transcript pg. 17; 2-4. Upon being
asked to produce a vehicle registration or valid [proof of]
insurance for the vehicle, [Defendant] was unable to produce
either document. Suppression Transcript pg. 17; 9-16.
[Defendant] indicated to Officer Burns that the vehicle was not
registered, as he had just purchased the vehicle to flip it and had
not gotten the vehicle legally registered yet. Suppression
Transcript, pg. 17; 17-21. Officer Burns further noted in his
testimony that the vehicle tag on the black Honda is what is known
as a “dead tag” meaning that the Honda’s tag was no longer valid
and was registered to the [previous] owner of that vehicle.
Suppression Transcript pg. 18; 3-5.
Suppression Court Opinion, 8/8/22, at 1-2.
Because Officer Burns had detected the odor of marijuana inside the
vehicle, he began to question Defendant.
Officer Burns asked [Defendant] whether [] he was prescribed
medical marijuana or had a medical marijuana card, to which
[Defendant] answered that he did not possess a medical
marijuana card. Suppression Transcript pg. 18; 6-17. This
conversation took place to the rear of [Defendant’s] vehicle near
the vehicle’s trunk. Suppression Transcript pg. 18; 11-13. At this
point, Officer Burns asked [Defendant] if he had marijuana in the
vehicle, to which [Defendant] replied that he did not. Suppression
Transcript pg. 18; 18-23. Officer Burns subsequently requested
[Defendant’s] consent to search the vehicle; this request was
denied by [Defendant]. Suppression Transcript pgs. 18-19; 24-3.
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Officer Burns then asked [Defendant] if he had any prior
drug arrests on his record, and [Defendant] responded that he
had been arrested in the past for marijuana violations.
Suppression Transcript pg. 19; 5-8. [Officer] Burns then testified
that, at this point, he noticed the odor of marijuana was also “very
strong to the rear of the vehicle.” Suppression Transcript pg. 19;
9-11. Upon putting his face towards the trunk area of the vehicle
near the seams of the vehicle, Officer Burns stated that the odor
of marijuana was “extremely strong” from there. Suppression
Transcript pg. 19; 9-13. At this point, Officer Burns advised
[Defendant] that the black Honda was going to be secured and
towed from the scene[.] Suppression Transcript pg. 19; 14-16.
Officer Burns testified that he intended to secure the vehicle for
the purpose of preserving evidence and—noting that because of
the (1) odor of marijuana, (2) the lack of a medical marijuana
card, and (3) [Defendant’s] previous arrests for marijuana
violations—that he intended to apply for a search warrant.
Suppression Transcript pg. 19; 17-24.
[Defendant’s] vehicle was then towed to the Quarryville
Police Station, where it was secured in a garage bay and
monitored by video during the duration of its seizure. Suppression
Transcript pg. 20; 6-20. Officer Burns then contacted Officer
[Aaron] Haun, the affiant in this case, and requested that he
obtain a search warrant in the morning for the vehicle, which
Officer Haun did obtain. Suppression Transcript pgs. 20-21; 23-
3. Officer Haun, upon searching the vehicle, recovered six large
vacuum seal[-]style bags in the trunk containing approximately
665 grams of marijuana. Suppression Transcript pg. 21; 16-24.
Additionally, a large vacuum sealer, a small digital scale, a small
clear glassine baggie, and cotton balls were recovered from the
backseat of the vehicle. Suppression Transcript pgs. 21-22; 25-
3.
Suppression Court Opinion, 8/8/22, at 1-3 (italics omitted).
On April 1, 2021, the Commonwealth charged Defendant with
possession with intent to deliver, possession of a controlled substance,
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possession of drug paraphernalia, and violations of the Motor Vehicle Code.2
On October 19, 2021, Defendant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion to suppress
physical evidence. Defendant argued his “stop, arrest and [the] subsequent
search warrant were all unlawful and obtained in violation of the United States
Constitution, the Pennsylvania Constitution, Pennsylvania Law, and the
Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure.” Pre-trial Motion, 10/19/21, at 2.
The court held a suppression hearing on April 6, 2022. At the beginning
of the hearing, the Commonwealth asked Defendant’s counsel (Counsel) to
clarify the “exact legal theory upon which you’re proceeding.” N.T., 4/6/22,
at 4. Counsel replied:
My understanding is that the – the cop is saying the headlight is
out. I don’t see any evidence – haven’t seen any evidence that
the headlight was out. My understanding is that he can testify to
that.
Second of all – that would be the probable cause to pull him
over.
More importantly, Judge, once he’s pulled over[,] the smell
of marijuana was the reason that was stated by the officer as to
towing the vehicle and applying for the search warrant. Under
case law, I don’t believe that – just the smell of marijuana is no
longer enough to apply for a search warrant to search the car.
Id. at 4-5.
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2 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), (16), and (32); 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1301(a),
1786(f), 4303(a), and 4730(a)(1).
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At the conclusion of the hearing, Counsel argued Officer Burns lacked
probable cause to stop the car because the headlight was operable. Id. at
31-32. However, after reviewing photographs of the car, the suppression
court found, “clearly that headlight is out on that side.” Id. at 32. Counsel
then stated, “the main thrust of my argument today would be the plain smell
doctrine. Under case law … plain smell alone is not enough to apply for a
search warrant to tow the car.” Id. at 33. Counsel never challenged Officer
Burns’ credibility or his account of the interaction in asserting that the
Commonwealth did not establish probable cause. Id. at 32-33.
The suppression court granted Defendant’s suppression motion from the
bench. The court stated, “there’s not enough here to make [the court]
comfortable with the idea that probable cause existed to take the steps to
actually search the areas of the vehicle that this contraband was located
within.” Id. at 40. The court did not address whether the initial seizure of
the vehicle was supported by probable cause.
The Commonwealth timely filed a notice of appeal and court-ordered
concise statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The suppression court
issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion explaining that it granted suppression
because Officer Burns lacked probable cause to seize the vehicle for the
purpose of obtaining a search warrant. Suppression Court Opinion, 8/8/22,
at 4-10.
The Commonwealth raises the following issues for review:
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I. Whether the [suppression] court erred in finding that the
affidavit of probable cause was insufficient to support the
search warrant?
II. Whether the Commonwealth waived any challenge to the
[suppression] court’s decision on the initial seizure of the
vehicle?
III. Whether the [suppression] court erred in finding that there
was no probable cause to temporarily secure [Defendant’s]
vehicle for the [purpose] of obtaining a search warrant?
Commonwealth Brief at 4.
Preliminarily, we recognize:
When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, we
follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider only the
evidence from the defendant’s witnesses together with the
evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the
entire record, remains uncontradicted. The suppression court’s
findings of fact bind an appellate court if the record supports those
findings. The suppression court’s conclusions of law, however, are
not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if
the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.
Commonwealth v. Vetter, 149 A.3d 71, 75 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations
omitted).
In its first issue, the Commonwealth argues that the affidavit to obtain
the warrant to search Defendant’s car was supported by probable cause.
Commonwealth’s Brief at 13-16. The Commonwealth contends there was
probable cause because: (1) Officer Burns detected a strong odor of marijuana
coming from the vehicle; (2) Defendant admitted he did not have a medical
marijuana card; (3) the remnants of a marijuana cigarette were in plain view;
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and (4) Defendant admitted to prior arrests for drug offenses, which were
confirmed by a review of Defendant’s criminal history. Id. at 15.
“A search warrant must be supported by probable cause.” U.S. Const.
amend. IV; Pa. Const. art. I, § 8. Probable cause exists “where the facts and
circumstances within the affiant’s knowledge and of which he has reasonably
trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that a search should be conducted.”
Commonwealth v. Torres, 177 A.3d 263, 265 (Pa. Super. 2017).
In Commonwealth v. Gray, 503 A.2d 921 (Pa. 1985), our Supreme
Court adopted a “totality of the circumstances” test, originally set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), as
the appliable law under the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Court concluded
the “approach is as workable here as in those other areas of criminal
procedure where a common-sense, practical approach is indicated.” Gray,
503 A.2d at 926. Under this test:
the task of an issuing authority is simply to make a practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all of the circumstances
set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and
basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information,
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place.
***
It is the duty of a court reviewing an issuing authority’s
probable cause determination to ensure that the magistrate had a
substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. In
so doing, the reviewing court must accord deference to the
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issuing authority’s probable cause determination[] and
must view the information offered to establish probable
cause in a common-sense, non-technical manner.
***
[Further, a reviewing court is] not to conduct a de novo
review of the issuing authority’s probable cause determination[;
the court’s task is] simply to determine whether or not there is
substantial evidence in the record supporting the decision to issue
the warrant.
Commonwealth v. Torres, 764 A.2d 532, 537-38, 540 (Pa. 2001) (emphasis
added) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Notably, “the affidavit of
probable cause must establish a ‘substantial nexus’ between the [place to be
searched] and [the] criminal activity or contraband sought to permit the
search[.]” Commonwealth v. Mendoza, 287 A.3d 457, 463 (Pa. Super.
2022) (citation omitted).
Here, Defendant challenged the finding of probable cause, not the
authenticity of the allegations in the affidavit of probable cause. N.T., 8/8/22,
at 4-5. Courts in Pennsylvania are not permitted to consider evidence outside
the four corners of the warrant in cases where the defendant is challenging
the adequacy of the probable cause determination. See Commonwealth v.
Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 891 (Pa. 1991) (reversing denial of suppression
where the trial court considered oral testimony of police officers which
supplemented an affidavit of probable cause); see also Commonwealth v.
Taylor, 850 A.2d 684, 687-88 (Pa. Super. 2004) (discussing different
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analyses when a defendant is challenging the adequacy of the determination
of probable cause versus the authenticity of the information in the affidavit).
In ruling from the bench, the suppression court found the evidence failed
to establish probable cause for the search warrant based on discrepancies
between Officer Burns’ testimony at the suppression hearing, and Officer
Haun’s statements, as affiant, in the affidavit of probable cause. Suppression
Court Opinion, 8/8/22, at 38-39; Affidavit of Probable Cause, 4/1/21, at 1-2.
The suppression court’s reasoning was contrary to the law and looked beyond
the four corners of the warrant. See Commonwealth v. Leed, 186 A.3d
405, 413 (Pa. 2018) (“At any hearing on a motion for the return or suppression
of evidence, or for suppression of the fruits of evidence obtained pursuant to
a search warrant, no evidence shall be admissible to establish probable cause
other than the affidavits provided for in [Rule 203](B).” (citation omitted)).
As its second basis for granting suppression, the court found the only
allegation supporting the warrant was the smell of marijuana, which was
insufficient to support probable cause under the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court’s decisions in Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916 (Pa. 2019), and
Commonwealth v. Barr, 266 A.3d 25 (Pa. 2021). N.T., 4/6/22, at 39-40.
However, subsequent case law interpreting Hicks and Barr have rendered
the suppression court’s conclusion unsustainable.
“Historically, Pennsylvania courts have held the smell of marijuana alone
was sufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.”
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Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 287 A.3d 1, 9 (Pa. Super. 2022).
Following the passage of the Medical Marijuana Act (MMA),3 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court revisited the issue.
In Hicks, the Supreme Court considered a claim involving the legal
possession of a firearm. The Court observed that a person’s possession of a
concealed firearm in a public setting is conduct “in which hundreds of
thousands of Pennsylvanians are licensed to engage lawfully” and is “an
insufficient basis for reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”
Hicks, 208 A.3d at 945.
Subsequently, in Barr, the Supreme Court stated, “the MMA makes
abundantly clear that marijuana no longer is per se illegal in this
Commonwealth.” Barr, 266 A.3d at 41. However, the Court clarified that
possession of marijuana remains illegal under the Controlled Substance, Drug,
Device and Cosmetic Act (CSA)4 “for those not qualified under the MMA.” Id.
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3 35 P.S. § 10231.101 et seq. The Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted
the MMA effective May 17, 2016.
4 35 P.S. §§ 780-101 et seq. See also 35 P.S. § 10231.304(a) (“Except as
provided in [the MMA], the use of medical marijuana is unlawful and shall ...
be deemed a violation of the [CSA].”). The MMA “create[d] a temporary
program for qualified persons to access medical marijuana, for the safe and
effective delivery of medical marijuana, and for research into the effectiveness
and utility of medical marijuana.” Commonwealth v. Jezzi, 208 A.3d 1105,
1111 (Pa. Super. 2019) (emphasis and citations omitted). “Outside the MMA,
marijuana remains a prohibited Schedule I controlled substance for the
general citizenry who are unqualified under the MMA.” Id. at 1115 (citation
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Our Supreme Court then held “the odor of marijuana may be a factor, but
not a stand-alone one, in evaluating the totality of the circumstances for
purposes of determining whether police had probable cause to conduct a
warrantless search.” Id. (emphasis added). The Court
Emphasize[d] that the realization that a particular factor
contributing to probable cause may involve legal conduct does not
render consideration of the factor per se impermissible, so long as
the factor is considered along with other factors that, in
combination, suggest that criminal activity is afoot. [T]he totality-
of-the-circumstances analysis encompasses the consideration of
factors that may arguably be innocent in nature.
Id. at 41-42.
Recently, this Court applied Barr to the issue of whether the smell of
marijuana, in combination with other factors, provided sufficient probable
cause to support a search warrant. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 296 A.3d 1270(Pa. Super. 2023). In Boyd, the defendant was subject to a traffic stop and
unsuccessfully sought to suppress evidence resulting from the search of his
car pursuant to a search warrant. After discussing Barr, we considered the
totality of the circumstances presented in the affidavit of probable cause: the
police officer who conducted the traffic stop was an experienced officer with
specialized training in narcotics investigation; the defendant displayed
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omitted). “[T]he General Assembly has not enacted legislation amending the
MMA, CSA, or the DUI statutes to remove marijuana from its Schedule I
designation under state law.” Commonwealth v. Stone, 273 A.3d 1163,
1172 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc) (footnote omitted).
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nervous behavior; the car had multiple air fresheners masking the odor of
marijuana; and the defendant acknowledged he did not possess an MMA card.
Id. We concluded that when considered together, the totality of the facts
“create[d] sufficient suspicion of criminal activity to create probable cause to
search for contraband.” Id. at 1278.
Instantly, the affidavit of probable cause described Officer Burns and
Officer Haun as experienced police officers with extensive training in narcotics.
Affidavit of Probable Cause, 4/1/21, at 1-2. Officer Burns served as a member
of a county-wide Drug Task Force for six years. Id. at 1. Based upon his
experience, Officer Haun averred that drug users often hide contraband in
secure locations in a car (like the trunk) and build “stash” places within the
car. Id. The affidavit explained that the initial traffic stop was based on the
car having an inoperable headlight. Id. The affidavit also mentioned the
strong odor of marijuana coming from the car, and Defendant not having an
MMA card. Id. at 2. In addition, “[t]he remnants of a marijuana cigarette …
[could] be seen in plain view in the passenger side door pocket.” Id. Lastly,
“[a] review of [Defendant’s c]riminal [h]istory revealed multiple prior arrests
for drug offenses[.]” Id.
Based on the totality of these circumstances, the information contained
in the four corners of the affidavit established “sufficient suspicion of criminal
activity to create probable cause to search for contraband.” Boyd, 296 A.3d
at 1278. Further, there exists a substantial nexus between the allegations in
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the affidavit and the search of the entire vehicle. Accordingly, we reverse the
grant of suppression. See Commonwealth v. Arias, 286 A.3d 341, 348-49
(Pa. Super. 2022) (applying Barr and concluding police officer possessed
sufficient probable cause for a warrantless search of a vehicle, where the car
had been in a high-crime area for an extended period of time; the male driver
had not exited the car during that time; the vehicle’s license plate was
registered to a different car owned by a woman; and an odor of marijuana
was coming from the vehicle).
Next, in its second issue and third issues, the Commonwealth challenges
the suppression court’s determination in its Rule 1925(a) opinion that there
was insufficient probable cause to justify the seizure of Defendant’s car while
obtaining the search warrant. Commonwealth’s Brief at 17-21.
In its second issue, the Commonwealth addresses the question of
whether its third issue is preserved for our review. The Commonwealth
acknowledges it did not raise the third issue in its Rule 1925(b) statement,
but argues we should excuse the deficiency because the suppression court did
not “address the propriety of the initial seizure of [Defendant’s] vehicle [in its
bench ruling].” Id. at 17. The Commonwealth emphasizes that the “first
time the initial seizure was deemed unlawful was in the [suppression] court’s
1925(a) Opinion.” Id.
It is axiomatic that “any issue not raised in a Rule 1925(b) statement
will be deemed waived for appellate review.” Commonwealth v. Bonnett,
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239 A.3d 1096, 1106 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citing Commonwealth v. Lord, 719
A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998)). Rule 1925(b) mandates that the statement
“concisely identify each error that the appellant intends to assert with
sufficient detail to identify the issue to be raised for the judge.” Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b)(4)(ii).
However, this Court has recognized:
If the reasons for the ruling of the [c]ourt are vague, then an
appellant is forced to file an incomplete Rule 1925(b) statement
and there is no violation of Rule 1925(b). Just as the trial judge
cannot be made to guess what an appellant is complaining of on
appeal, an appellant cannot be made to guess what the trial judge
is thinking in his or her ruling.
Commonwealth v. Zheng, 908 A.2d 285, 288 (Pa. Super 2006) (italics
omitted); see also Hess v. Fox Rothschild, LLP, 925 A.2d 798, 804 (Pa.
Super. 2007) (explaining when an appellant cannot ascertain the basis for a
trial court’s rationale, it is not appropriate to find Rule 1925 waiver). Upon
review, we agree with the Commonwealth that under the circumstances,
waiver is not appropriate. We therefore consider the Commonwealth’s third
issue.
In its third issue, the Commonwealth argues the suppression court erred
in finding that Officer Burns “relied solely on the smell of marijuana as the
basis for seizure of [Defendant’s] vehicle.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 18
(quoting Suppression Court Opinion, 8/8/22, at 10). The Commonwealth
maintains that Officer Burns relied on multiple factors in suspecting criminal
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activity, which together were sufficient to support a finding of probable cause.
Id. at 18-21.
In Commonwealth v. Gillespie, 821 A.2d 1221 (Pa. 2003), our
Supreme Court adopted the standard enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court in Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 328 (2001), for
determining when “police may secure the residence of an individual by having
him wait outside his home to preserve the loss of evidence while a warrant is
diligently sought.” Gillespie, 821 A.2d at 1227. The factors to be considered
are whether:
(1) the police had probable cause to believe the suspect’s home
contained evidence of a crime and contraband; (2) the police had
good reason to fear that, unless restrained, the defendant would
destroy the evidence before they returned with a warrant; (3) the
police made reasonable efforts to balance the interests of law
enforcement with those of privacy; and (4) the restraint imposed
was limited in time and scope.
Id. In Commonwealth v. Kubis, 978 A.2d 391 (Pa. Super. 2009), this Court
extended the McArthur factors to apply to motor vehicles, “where the
expectation of privacy is much lower.” Kubis, 978 A.2d at 394.
The suppression court did not address the McArthur factors. Instead,
it applied Barr to find that the seizure of Defendant’s vehicle was not
supported by probable cause. Suppression Court Opinion, 8/8/22, at 6. As
discussed above, subsequent caselaw interpreting Barr does not support the
suppression court’s conclusion that the police lacked probable cause. See
Boyd, 296 A.3d at 1278; Arias, 286 A.3d at 348-49.
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In Kubis, we held that the McArthur factors were met where
police had a reasonable fear that [the a]ppellant, knowing that he
was under investigation, would seek to destroy the evidence were
it not seized. [The] police balanced [the a]ppellant’s privacy
interest with the Commonwealth’s interest in obtaining clearly
incriminating evidence by seizing the vehicle, in which [appellant]
had a lesser expectation of privacy than in his home, as well as
obtaining a warrant before searching the vehicle. [And] the scope
of the seizure was limited; police seized [the a]ppellant’s vehicle,
not his person or his place of dwelling.
Kubis, 978 A.2d at 395.
We see no distinction between this case and Kubis. Therefore, we
conclude that the suppression court erred in granting Defendant’s suppression
motion based on lack of probable cause to seize the car.
For the above reasons, we reverse the grant of suppression and remand
for further proceedings.
Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Date: 10/3/2023
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