Com. v. Samuels, J. ( 2023 )


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  • J-S33045-23
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    JARRETT D. SAMUELS, JR.                      :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 168 WDA 2023
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 12, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-43-CR-0000343-2022
    BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                      FILED: October 5, 2023
    Appellant, Jarrett D. Samuels, Jr., appeals from the judgment of
    sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County following
    his negotiated guilty plea to the sole charge of aggravated assault, 18
    Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1). After a careful review, we affirm.
    The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: Appellant was
    charged with criminal attempt             (first-degree   murder),   two   counts of
    aggravated assault, and recklessly endangering another person1 in connection
    with the shooting of Tyreek Barnett. On October 11, 2022, Appellant, who
    ____________________________________________
    * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 2702(a)(1), 2702(a)(4), and 2705, respectively.
    J-S33045-23
    was represented by privately retained counsel, proceeded to a guilty plea
    hearing.
    During the hearing, guilty plea counsel indicated he explained
    Appellant’s rights to him, and Appellant understood those rights.       N.T.,
    10/11/22, at 2-3. Guilty plea counsel confirmed Appellant executed a written
    guilty plea.   Id. at 10.     The trial court advised Appellant that, if the
    Commonwealth made a sentencing recommendation, and the trial court did
    not accept the recommendation, Appellant would be permitted to withdraw
    his guilty plea. Id. at 3. Appellant indicated he understood. Id. Appellant
    also indicated he was not under the influence of any drugs, alcohol, or
    medications. Id.
    The Commonwealth informed the trial court that the parties had reached
    an agreement whereby Appellant would plead guilty to one count of
    aggravated assault under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1), and in exchange, the
    Commonwealth would nolle pros the remaining charges as well as recommend
    a sentence of six years to twenty years in prison with credit for time served
    from March 20, 2022, to the time of sentencing. Id. at 4. Appellant confirmed
    his understanding of the plea agreement, and he confirmed that, aside from
    this plea agreement, no one had promised him anything or threatened him in
    any manner. Id. Appellant specifically confirmed he was satisfied with the
    services of guilty plea counsel. Id. at 6.
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    Appellant indicated he understood that if he went to trial the
    Commonwealth “would have to convince a jury of 12 persons unanimously
    and beyond a reasonable doubt…that [Appellant] caused serious bodily injury
    to another intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances
    manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life[, which] in this
    case [was that Appellant] shot somebody.”        Id. Appellant confirmed he
    understood he was pleading guilty to a “felony of the first degree[, which]
    carries a maximum fine of $25,000 and a maximum of 20 years in a state
    penitentiary.” Id.
    The following relevant exchange then occurred:
    [GUILTY PLEA COUNSEL]: [Appellant], do you admit that on or
    about March 20th of 2022, while in the City of Sharon, County of
    Mercer, you did intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause
    serious bodily injury to the victim, Tyreke (phonetic spelling)
    Barber [sic],[2] under circumstances manifesting extreme
    indifference to the value of human life by shooting the victim in
    his upper leg with a semi-automatic rifle?
    [APPELLANT]: Yes.
    THE COURT: Commonwealth satisfied?
    [DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: Yes, Your Honor.
    ____________________________________________
    2 As discussed infra, Appellant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
    During the evidentiary hearing on his motion, Appellant acknowledged that
    the victim’s name is “Tyreek Barnett.” N.T., 12/6/2, at 5-6. However, he
    confirmed at the evidentiary hearing that, when he entered his guilty plea and
    defense counsel referred to “Tyreke (phonetic spelling) Barber,” he
    understood counsel to be referring to “Tyreek Barnett.” Id.
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    Id. at 7 (footnote added).3
    Based on the aforementioned, the trial court indicated that “[Appellant]
    appearing before [the trial] court with counsel, and voluntarily, knowingly,
    and intelligently entering a plea of guilty to one count of Aggravated Assault,
    causing serious bodily injury with a deadly weapon, said plea is accepted.”
    Id. at 9. The trial court noted the charge was a felony of the first degree in
    violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1). Id.
    The    trial   court   acknowledged       the   Commonwealth’s   sentencing
    recommendation of six years to twenty years in prison with credit for all time
    served, and the trial court indicated that, in the event the trial court did not
    accept the recommendation, Appellant would be permitted to withdraw his
    guilty plea. Id. The trial court noted all remaining charges were nol prossed.
    Id. Guilty plea counsel confirmed the guilty plea was “in [Appellant’s] best
    interests.” Id. The trial court scheduled Appellant’s sentencing hearing for
    November 9, 2022.
    Prior to the sentencing hearing, on November 1, 2022, guilty plea
    counsel filed a motion to withdraw his representation. Therein, counsel
    explained that “[Appellant] notified [guilty plea counsel] [indicating] that he
    desires to withdraw his guilty plea…and no longer wants the services of [guilty
    ____________________________________________
    3 We note the record reveals there is video footage of the crime, as well as
    still images, which depict Appellant as driving a vehicle and shooting the victim
    with a rifle pointing out of the vehicle’s window. N.T., 11/10/22, at 23-24.
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    plea   counsel,    who   was       privately   retained].”    Motion    to    Withdraw
    Representation, filed 11/1/22, at 1. Further, on or about November 2, 2022,
    Appellant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Therein, Appellant
    relevantly indicated he desired to withdraw his guilty plea in order to “retain
    [his] innocence,…retain his rights,…[and] to have more time to think and
    analyze the circumstances [since he] feels [he] was pressured and forced by
    counsel to do something [he] didn’t want to do[.]” Motion to Withdraw Guilty
    Plea, filed 11/2/22, at 1.
    On November 8, 2022, the trial court held a hearing to address guilty
    plea   counsel’s   petition   to    withdraw.    During      the   hearing,   Appellant
    acknowledged there was video footage of the crime, but he stated that it “was
    not [him]” in the subject vehicle who shot the victim. N.T., 11/10/22, at 25.
    He stated that “[a]nybody could have been in [his] vehicle that day.” Id.
    Accordingly, at the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted
    guilty plea counsel’s petition to withdraw as counsel and continued the matter
    for the appointment of new defense counsel, as well as an evidentiary hearing
    on Appellant’s presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea.                By order
    entered on November 9, 2022, the trial court appointed new counsel to
    represent Appellant.
    On December 6, 2022, Appellant, represented by new counsel,
    proceeded to an evidentiary hearing on his presentence motion to withdraw
    his guilty plea. Counsel confirmed he reviewed Appellant’s pro se motion, and
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    Appellant “would like to proceed with withdrawing his guilty plea.”        N.T.,
    12/6/22, at 3.
    At the hearing, Appellant confirmed that, during the guilty plea colloquy,
    he admitted he shot Mr. Barnett, and “this was an honest answer.” Id. at 6.
    However, Appellant indicated he would like to raise the issue of self-defense.
    Id. That is, Appellant testified he “was admitting to shooting [Mr. Barnett],
    but [he was] saying [he] would have self-defense[.]” Id.
    In support of his claim of self-defense, Appellant testified that, in 2014,
    when he was in high school, Mr. Barnett, who was one of his classmates,
    “flipped [him] out of [his] desk for no apparent reason.” Id. at 7. Appellant
    indicated that over the last eight years Mr. Barnett attacked him on “Facebook
    at wee hours in the morning” and sent him threatening texts. Id. at 8. He
    noted that approximately one week before he shot Mr. Barnett, he read one
    of Mr. Barnett’s Facebook posts wherein Mr. Barnett said he knew Appellant
    had been with a certain female. Id. at 10. Appellant claimed Mr. Barnett
    indicated in the Facebook post that “when he found [Appellant and the
    woman] he was going to beat her ass and fuck [them] up, and you know,
    even kill [them].” Id. Appellant testified Mr. Barnett made a similar Facebook
    post one or two days before Appellant shot him. Id. Appellant admitted that,
    aside from incidents occurring in 2014 while he and Mr. Barnett were seniors
    in high school, no other physical altercations had occurred prior to Appellant
    shooting Mr. Barnett on March 20, 2022. Id. at 12.
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    Regarding the incidents occurring on March 20, 2022, Appellant testified
    one of his female friends called and asked him to give her a ride to the hospital.
    Id. at 13. Appellant agreed and drove to her apartment building. Id. After
    Appellant stopped his vehicle in front of the woman’s apartment, “[Mr.
    Barnett] bolted out the door [of the residence]…[and] started approaching
    [Appellant’s] car[.]” Id. Appellant testified Mr. Barnett threatened to “beat
    his ass” and told him to get out of the car. Id. at 14. Appellant admitted he
    “brandished” his gun so that Mr. Barnett could see it, and, since Mr. Barnett
    would not stop making verbal threats, move away from Appellant’s car, or
    stop “moving his hands in ways that were…confusing to [Appellant],”
    Appellant “fired one shot into his leg, upper leg.” Id. Appellant admitted he
    was not sure whether Mr. Barnett was armed; however, he “thought [he saw]
    a silver handle of a gun” on Mr. Barnett. Id. at 15. Appellant stated he was
    in fear for his life at the time, so he “took the first precaution,” which was to
    shoot Mr. Barnett. Id.
    On cross-examination, when shown video footage from a camera that
    recorded the shooting, Appellant admitted he was sitting in his vehicle, which
    was in the middle of the street, when he shot Mr. Barnett. Id. at 17. Appellant
    also admitted the video depicts him shooting Mr. Barnett with “a long rifle out
    the window.” Id. at 18. Appellant admitted the rifle was “an AR-15 assault
    rifle.”    Id. at 20.   Appellant admitted the video showed him stopping his
    vehicle with the barrel of the rifle sticking out of the window, moving the
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    vehicle forward five or six feet with the barrel of the rifle still out, stopping the
    vehicle, and shooting Mr. Barnett, who was “still in the grass of the front yard
    of the apartment building.” Id. at 28-29, 45. Appellant admitted Mr. Barnett
    never made it out of the yard before Appellant shot him. Id. at 29.
    Appellant admitted the video does not depict any evidence that Mr.
    Barnett was in possession of a weapon; however, Appellant testified he
    thought he saw a gun in Mr. Barnett’s waistband when Mr. Barnett exited the
    apartment’s door, which was out of view of the camera. Id. at 20. Appellant
    clarified he thought he saw the victim with a gun in his waistband before
    Appellant stopped his vehicle. Id. at 35, 45. When asked by the trial court
    why he did not keep driving when he thought he saw Mr. Barnett with a gun
    before he stopped his car, Appellant responded, “everything was just going so
    fast, and that’s when [his female friend] literally got brought out the door.”
    Id. at 45.
    Appellant admitted Mr. Barnett never pointed any gun at Appellant. Id.
    at 26. Appellant specifically admitted that, when he fired his rifle, Mr. Barnett
    did not have a gun or any other weapon in either of his hands. Id. at 21-22.
    Appellant also admitted the video depicts him driving away immediately after
    he shot Mr. Barnett, and he admitted he did not call the police after he shot
    Mr. Barnett. Id. at 21-22, 42.
    Appellant admitted that, at the time of the shooting, Mr. Barnett was
    dating one of Appellant’s ex-girlfriends; however, Appellant testified he had
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    “moved on.” Id. at 22. He denied that when he shot Mr. Barnett in the leg
    he was aiming for his genitals. Id. When asked by the Commonwealth “why
    [Appellant] believe[d] it was necessary in self-defense to shoot [Mr. Barnett]
    with an AR-15 rifle when he had no weapon in his hand[,]” Appellant replied
    “[Mr. Barnett] could have pulled the gun and then boom, blew [Appellant’s]
    brains out.” Id. at 31-32.
    Appellant testified that, before he entered his guilty plea, he advised his
    guilty plea counsel that he had a claim of self-defense. Id. at 36. He testified
    he did not tell the trial court during the guilty plea colloquy that he had a claim
    of self-defense because guilty plea counsel pressured him not to do so. Id. at
    37. Appellant admitted one of the reasons he entered a guilty plea was to
    avoid a harsh sentence should he be convicted by a jury. Id. at 40.
    At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied
    Appellant’s presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Specifically, the
    trial court indicated it did “not credit some of [Appellant’s] testimony.” Id. at
    56. However, the trial court further indicated that, even if it “believed every
    word he said,” Appellant’s testimony, as a matter of law, would not establish
    the elements for self-defense. Id. Thus, the trial court concluded Appellant
    did not have a plausible claim of innocence based on self-defense. Id.
    On January 12, 2023, the trial court imposed the agreed upon sentence
    of six years to twenty years in prison with credit for time served. Appellant
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    filed a timely, counseled notice of appeal. All Pa.R.A.P. 1925 requirements
    have been met.
    On appeal, Appellant sets forth the following issue in his “Statement of
    Questions Involved” (verbatim):
    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Appellant’s] motion
    to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing?
    Appellant’s Brief at 4. We review the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s
    presentence    motion    to   withdraw    his    guilty   plea     for   abuse   of
    discretion.   Commonwealth        v. Baez,      
    169 A.3d 35
    ,   39    (Pa.Super.
    2017); Commonwealth v. Islas, 
    156 A.3d 1185
    , 1187 (Pa.Super. 2017).
    As this Court recently held:
    Where a defendant requests to withdraw his guilty plea
    before he is sentenced, the trial court has discretion to grant the
    withdrawal and that discretion is to be liberally exercised to permit
    withdrawal of the plea if two conditions are present: 1) the
    defendant demonstrates a fair and just reason for withdrawing the
    plea and 2) it is not shown that withdrawal of the plea would cause
    substantial prejudice to the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v.
    Carrasquillo, 
    631 Pa. 692
    , 
    115 A.3d 1284
    , 1291-92
    (2015); Baez, 
    169 A.3d at 39
    ; Islas, 
    156 A.3d at 1188
    ; see
    also Pa.R.Crim.P. 591(A) (“At any time before the imposition of
    sentence, the court may, in its discretion, permit, upon motion of
    the defendant,…the withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo
    contendere and the substitution of a plea of not guilty”)[.]
    Commonwealth v. Jamison, 
    284 A.3d 501
    , 505 (Pa.Super. 2022).
    In the case sub judice, since there was no showing that withdrawal of
    Appellant’s guilty plea would have prejudiced the Commonwealth, the sole
    issue with respect to Appellant’s presentence motion to withdraw his guilty
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    J-S33045-23
    plea is whether Appellant satisfied the requirement that he demonstrate a fair
    and just reason for withdrawing the plea.
    Appellant argues he demonstrated a fair and just reason because he
    raised a plausible claim of innocence.      Specifically, Appellant contends he
    acted in self-defense when he shot Mr. Barnett.
    A plausible claim of innocence, supported by some facts or
    evidence in the record, constitutes a fair and just reason for
    allowing presentence withdrawal of a guilty plea. Islas, 
    156 A.3d at 1191-92
    . Where, however, the defendant merely makes a bare
    assertion that he is innocent without any proffer of any supporting
    basis for that claim, the trial court in its discretion may deny
    withdrawal on the ground that the defendant has not shown a fair
    and just reason for withdrawal of the plea. Commonwealth v.
    Norton, 
    650 Pa. 569
    , 
    201 A.3d 112
    , 120-23 (2019);
    Commonwealth v. Hvizda, 
    632 Pa. 3
    , 
    116 A.3d 1103
    , 1105,
    1107 (2015); Baez, 
    169 A.3d at 39-41
    .
    Jamison, 284 A.3d at 505 (some citations omitted). See Carrasquillo,
    supra (holding a fair and just reason exists where the defendant makes a
    claim of innocence that is plausible).
    “Stated more broadly, the proper inquiry on consideration
    of such a withdrawal motion is whether the accused has made
    some colorable demonstration, under the circumstances, such
    that permitting withdrawal of the plea would promote fairness and
    justice.” Norton, supra, 
    201 A.3d at 120-21
    [.] “[T]rial courts
    have discretion to assess the plausibility of claims of innocence.”
    
    Id. at 121
    .
    We review that exercise of discretion as follows:
    When a [trial] court comes to a conclusion
    through the exercise of its discretion, there is a heavy
    burden [on the appellant] to show that this discretion
    has been abused. An appellant cannot meet this
    burden by simply persuading an appellate court that
    it may have reached a different conclusion than that
    reached by the trial court; rather, to overcome this
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    J-S33045-23
    heavy burden, the appellant must demonstrate that
    the trial court actually abused its discretionary power.
    An abuse of discretion will not be found based on a
    mere error of judgment, but rather exists where the
    [trial] court has reached a conclusion which overrides
    or misapplies the law, or where the judgment
    exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
    partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. Absent an abuse
    of that discretion, an appellate court should not
    disturb a trial court’s ruling.
    ***
    [I]t is important that appellate courts honor trial
    court’s discretion in these matters, as trial courts are
    in the unique position to assess the credibility of
    claims of innocence and measure, under the
    circumstances, whether defendants have made
    sincere and colorable claims that permitting
    withdrawal of their pleas would promote fairness and
    justice.
    Norton, supra, 
    201 A.3d at 120, 121
     (citations omitted).
    The trial court’s discretion, however, is not unfettered.
    “[T]he term ‘discretion’ imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom
    and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion, within the
    framework of the law, and is not exercised for the purpose of
    giving effect to the will of the judge.” 
    Id. at 121
    [.] The trial court
    must be mindful that the law requires trial courts to grant
    presentence plea withdrawal motions liberally and make credibility
    determinations supported by the record. 
    Id.
     The trial courts in
    exercising their discretion must recognize that before judgment,
    the courts should show solicitude for a defendant who wishes to
    undo a waiver of all constitutional rights that surround the right
    to trial—perhaps the most devastating waiver possible under our
    constitution. Finally, this Court must not substitute its judgment
    for that of the trial court; rather, we must discern whether the
    trial court acted within its permissible discretion. Norton, supra,
    
    201 A.3d at 121
    .
    Commonwealth v. Garcia, 
    280 A.3d 1019
    , 1023-23 (Pa.Super. 2022) (some
    quotation marks and quotations omitted).
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    J-S33045-23
    Here, in explaining the reasons it denied Appellant’s presentence motion
    to withdraw his guilty plea, the trial court relevantly indicated the following:
    In the present case, [Appellant] argues the [trial] court
    committed an error of law in denying [Appellant’s] motion to
    withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing. “A defendant is
    bound by the statements which he makes during his plea
    colloquy[,]…a defendant ‘may not assert grounds for withdrawing
    the plea that contradict statements made when he pled guilty,’
    and he may not recant the representations he made in court when
    he entered his guilty plea.” [Commonwealth v. Jabbie, 
    200 A.3d 500
    , 506 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citations omitted).]
    At the [guilty plea] hearing on October 11, 2022, [Appellant]
    agreed he intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly caused bodily
    injury to the victim under circumstances manifesting extreme
    indifference to the value of human life by shooting the victim in
    the upper leg with a semi-automatic rifle without any mention of
    self-defense. [N.T., 10/11/22, at 7.] [During the November 10,
    2022, hearing regarding privately retained counsel’s petition to
    withdraw his representation, Appellant contradicted his
    statements, which he made at the guilty plea hearing.
    Specifically, Appellant] proclaimed his innocence but made no
    assertion of self-defense. [Rather,] at the November 10, 2022,
    hearing, [pointing to the video footage of the crime,] [Appellant]
    proclaimed his innocence by stating “that’s not me” and
    “[a]nybody could have been in that vehicle that day[.]” [N.T.,
    11/10/22, at 25.] [Appellant] did not assert self-defense; he
    denied all involvement [at the November 10, 2022, hearing]….At
    the [evidentiary] hearing [regarding his motion to withdraw his
    guilty plea] on December 6, 2022, [Appellant] asserted a claim of
    self-defense.
    [At the December 6, 2022, hearing,] on direct examination,
    [Appellant] first stated the victim verbally threatened him, but he
    remained unsure of whether the victim brandished a weapon.
    Next, [Appellant] stated he was sure he saw the victim holding
    something silver but wasn’t sure if he saw a weapon or not. Next,
    [Appellant] stated he thought he saw the silver handle of a gun.
    On cross-examination, [Appellant] stated he was certain the
    victim brandished something. Next, [Appellant] stated the victim
    showed him a gun in his waistband, but he claimed all actions
    taken by the victim occurred prior to the victim entering camera
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    J-S33045-23
    view. [Appellant] then stated the victim was not brandishing
    anything when [Appellant] shot the victim.
    Under Carrasquillo, supra, [Appellant] has failed to
    demonstrate a fair and just reason for withdrawing the plea. The
    video [footage] on record shows [Appellant] driving towards the
    victim, who was on foot, with the barrel of his rifle already out the
    window, stopping, repositioning the vehicle for a better angle,
    aiming a rifle out the window, shooting the victim, and driving
    away. [Appellant] does not dispute the contents of the video.
    Thus, [Appellant] has failed to articulate a colorable self-defense
    claim or demonstrate any alternative fair and just reason for
    withdrawing the plea.
    In order to sustain a claim of self-defense, an individual
    must prove the following: “(1) reasonably believed that force was
    necessary to protect himself against death or serious bodily
    injury; (2) was free from fault in provoking the use of force against
    him; and (3) did not violate any duty to retreat.”
    [Commonwealth v. Miller, 
    172 A.3d 632
    , 640 (Pa.Super. 2017)
    (citation omitted).] The record contains a video of [Appellant] in
    his car approaching the victim, parking in the middle of the street,
    pointing a rifle out the driver’s side window of the vehicle, and
    shooting the victim. [Appellant] has made admissions of his
    involvement in the shooting and to the accuracy of the video
    [during the guilty plea hearing].
    Under the first prong of the test established in Miller,
    [Appellant] has failed to provide any evidence to support a claim
    of reasonable belief that force was necessary to protect himself
    against death or serious bodily injury. During every moment of
    the video, [Appellant] was in his car in the middle of the street
    with nothing to impede or encumber his escape and the victim
    was on foot. [Appellant] could have simply driven away from the
    scene to avoid any potential risk of death or serious bodily injury
    from the victim.
    Under the second prong of the test established in Miller,
    [Appellant] has failed to provide any evidence to support a claim
    that [Appellant] was free from fault in provoking the use of force
    against him. The video provides a clear view of the incident for
    the entire duration of this incident and establishes [Appellant]
    approached the victim without any present provocation, parked
    his vehicle in the middle of the road (where [Appellant] had clear
    sight of the victim), aimed a rifle, and shot the victim. [Appellant]
    was the aggressor at all times during the incident.
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    J-S33045-23
    Under the third prong of the test established in Miller,
    [Appellant] has failed to provide any evidence to support a claim
    that [Appellant] fulfilled a duty to retreat. As stated above,
    [Appellant] was in his car in the middle of the street with nothing
    to impede or encumber his escape. The records shows no
    evidence whatsoever demonstrating [Appellant] made any
    attempt to retreat.      The record shows [Appellant] was the
    antagonist at all times and failed to fulfill the duty to retreat
    requisite for the survival of a self-defense claim.
    ***
    [Appellant] has failed to assert a plausible claim of
    innocence or supporting facts or evidence which may establish a
    fair and just reason for the allowance of presentence withdrawal
    of his guilty plea. [Appellant] has failed to provide any facts or
    evidence whatsoever to support his claim and makes only a barren
    claim lacking any substantiation. Due to [Appellant’s] failure to
    provide any supporting basis of his innocence claim, the [trial]
    court was within its authority to deny withdrawal on the grounds
    of a defendant’s failure to establish a fair and just reason for
    withdrawal of a plea. Thus, [his] argument holds no merit.
    Trial Court Opinion, filed 3/8/23 (footnotes omitted).4
    We find no abuse of discretion. Norton, supra. As the trial court noted,
    Appellant admitted during the October 11, 2022, guilty plea hearing that he
    “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly” shot the victim with a semi-automatic
    rifle. N.T., 10/11/22, at 7. He is bound by these statements and cannot now
    assert challenges to his plea that contradict these statements. See Jamison,
    supra.
    Further, in assessing the plausibility of Appellant’s claim of innocence
    based on self-defense, the trial court properly considered the strength of the
    ____________________________________________
    4 We note the trial court opinion is unpaginated.
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    J-S33045-23
    Commonwealth’s evidence (including video footage and still photographs of
    the crime) in relation to the nature of Appellant’s claim (consisting solely of
    Appellant’s testimony, which the trial court found contradictory and incredible,
    in part, and, in any event, even if wholly believed, would not meet establish
    self-defense as a matter of law). See Garcia, 280 A.3d at 1027; Islas, 
    156 A.3d at 1190
    .
    Additionally, in considering the plausibility of Appellant’s claim of
    innocence, the trial court properly considered the timing of Appellant raising
    the claim of self-defense. See 
    id.
     Specifically, after Appellant admitted he
    was the shooter during the October 11, 2022, guilty plea hearing, he then
    proclaimed he was not the shooter during the November 10, 2022, hearing.
    Thereafter, despite having several opportunities to do so, Appellant raised the
    claim of innocence based on self-defense during the December 6, 2022,
    evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, considering the totality of the circumstances,
    the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding Appellant’s claim of
    self-defense was not a fair and just reason for presentence withdrawal of
    Appellant’s guilty plea. See 
    id.
    For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    Affirmed.
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    10/5/2023
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Document Info

Docket Number: 168 WDA 2023

Judges: Stevens, P.J.E.

Filed Date: 10/5/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024