Com. v. Stone, A. ( 2023 )

J-S21030-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ANDRE A. STONE :
:
Appellant : No. 1674 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 1, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Criminal
Division at No(s): CP-49-CR-0000470-2020
BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 23, 2023
Appellant Andre A. Stone appeals from the sentence imposed following
his conviction for first-degree murder. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence and argues that the trial court erred in rejecting his diminished
capacity defense. We affirm.
The trial court summarized the underlying facts of this matter as follows:
On the afternoon of April 14, 2020, in the City of Shamokin,
Appellant kills his live-in girlfriend by strangling her in their home,
then walks to the police station and tells the person who answers
the door matter of factly that he wants to turn himself in. To
dispel any disbelief he presents to the police a photo of the dead
woman on the floor with her back against a couch. The police
immediately go to the residence, where they find the victim as
pictured and unresponsive, without any pulse. They return to the
station to further question the Appellant after administering the
Miranda[1] warnings. Appellant writes out a confession and then
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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is questioned further whereby he elaborates on the event.
Appellant is then charged with murder, aggravated assault and
strangulation.
In pretrial proceedings, Appellant makes application for a mental
health evaluation, whereby the court appointed a forensic
psychiatrist for purposes of compatibility and competency to stand
trial. A report was provided to only Appellant’s counsel that was
dated April 22, 2022. Thereafter, Appellant filed on October 13,
2022, a notice of mental [infirmity] defense[, a]fter the
psychiatrist found that he was competent to stand trial. At the
same time, Appellant made an informed decision to forego a jury
trial. The bench trial covered two days commencing on October
18, 2022. At the conclusion, this court entered a verdict of guilty
of murder in the first degree, as well as on the aggravated assault
and strangulation charges.
Trial Ct. Op., 2/15/23, 1-2. The trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of
life without parole, and a concurrent term of four to eight years for
strangulation. The aggravated assault charge merged with first-degree
murder for sentencing purposes.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) statement. The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing
Appellant’s claims.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues, which we have
reordered as follows:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in finding premeditation
and malice aforethought (elements required for a first degree
murder conviction) based on the weight of the evidence
presented at trial.
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in [its] consideration of a
diminished capacity defense to mitigate murder in the first
degree to murder in the [third] degree.
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3. The questions involved in this appeal relate to whether or not
reversible error was committed in the aforementioned [trial
c]ourt order(s)/opinion(s)when the trial court misquoted a
police transcript, and did thereby commit a mistake of fact that
goes to specific intent. Specifically, when [Appellant] was
asked, did you intend to kill the victim, he answered in the
negative “No. I intended to kill myself.”
Appellant’s Brief at 10.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first claim, Appellant challenges the evidence establishing the
intent element for first-degree murder.2 Appellant’s Brief at 13-14.
Specifically, Appellant argues that first-degree murder “requires malice
aforethought and premeditation” and “[t]here was little if any evidence
presented at trial to support that these elements were proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. In support, Appellant contends that “the weight of
the evidence supports the contrary” because “[t]he couple were in an
argument about having an affair on the part of the deceased at the time of
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2 Although Appellant appears to conflate weight and sufficiency claims in his
brief, the two concepts are distinct. Indeed, a weight claim concedes that
there is sufficient evidence, but that some facts so outweigh the others that
to ignore them or accord them equal weight would be a miscarriage of justice.
Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751-52 (Pa. 2000). Further,
“[a] weight of the evidence claim must be preserved either in a post-sentence
motion, by a written motion before sentencing, or orally prior to sentencing.
Failure to properly preserve the claim will result in waiver, even if the trial
court addresses the issue in its opinion.” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 238
A.3d 482, 497 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.Crim.P.
607(A). Here, our review of the record confirms that Appellant did not file a
post-sentence motion. Therefore, to the extent Appellant intends to challenge
the weight of the evidence on appeal, that claim is waived. See Rivera, 238
A.3d at 497.
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her death, they were drinking alcohol, [and Appellant] was not taking his
medications for a very serious mental illness, [p]sychosis.” Id. at 14.
Additionally, Appellant claims that “[t]he weight of the evidence supports that
this crime occurred in the heat of passions, and was neither planned or
premeditated in any way.” Id.
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard
of review is as follows:
Because a determination of evidentiary sufficiency presents a
question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope
of review is plenary. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,
we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient
to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
The facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth
need not preclude every possibility of innocence. It is within the
province of the fact-finder to determine the weight to be accorded
to each witness’s testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving
every element of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh
the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-
finder.
Commonwealth v. Palmer, 192 A.3d 85, 89 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation
omitted and formatting altered).
First-degree murder is defined as follows: “[a] criminal homicide
constitutes murder of the first degree when it is committed by an intentional
killing.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a). Our Supreme Court has explained that “[t]o
sustain a conviction for first-degree murder, the Commonwealth must
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) a human being was unlawfully
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killed; (2) the defendant was responsible for the killing; and (3) the defendant
acted with malice and the specific intent to kill.” Commonwealth v. Jacoby,
170 A.3d 1065, 1076 (Pa. 2017) (citation omitted). Our Supreme Court has
held that “[s]pecific intent to kill can be proven where the defendant knowingly
applies deadly force to the person of another. Death caused by strangulation
is sufficient to infer the specific intent required for a conviction of first degree
murder.” Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 701 A.2d 492, 507 (Pa. 1997)
(citations omitted).
Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:
The very nature of strangulation provides an opportunity for the
assailant to desist at any time during the period it takes to
manually choke one to death. There is the struggle until
unconsciousness which offers a person significant opportunity for
a change of heart. “The law does not require a lengthy period of
premeditation; indeed, the design to kill can be formulated in a
fraction of a second.” Commonwealth v. Jordan, 65 A.3d 318,
323 (Pa. 2013).
This killing of his girlfriend by Appellant was not just accomplished
by strangulation alone; rather, when she still showed signs of life,
he proceeded to apply force on her neck with his foot. This brutal
act reinforces the Commonwealth’s burden establishing
premeditation. Appellant described in his police interview as
noted above that despite his efforts in strangling her with his
hands, she was still breathing and showed signs of life so he got
on top of her, used his whole body, particularly his feet to make
sure she was dead. The coroner’s findings corroborated that she
had a fracture[d] hyoid bone in her neck that was uncommon with
just strangulation.
Clearly, the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that
Appellant had a willful, premeditated, and deliberate intent to kill
his girlfriend. His attack never let up or desist with the
strangulation until he made sure with his feet that all of her life
was gone.
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Trial Ct. Op. at 4-5.
Following our review of the record, we agree with trial court’s
conclusions. See Palmer, 192 A.3d at 89. As noted by the trial court, the
Commonwealth presented evidence that Appellant killed the victim by
strangulation, which is sufficient to establish specific intent for first-degree
murder. See Hawkins, 701 A.2d at 507. Further, to the extent Appellant
requests that we re-weigh the evidence presented at trial, we decline to do so
on appeal. See Palmer, 192 A.3d at 89. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled
to relief on this claim.
Diminished Capacity
Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in rejecting his
diminished capacity defense. Appellant’s Brief at 14. In support, Appellant
argues that he “suffered from a psychotic disorder” and the “possibility that
[he] was in a state of psychosis at the time of the incident was very real, as
[Appellant] was not taking his prescribed medications for a substantial period
of time and was also drinking alcohol at the time.” Id. He further contends
that the Commonwealth failed to present any evidence that Appellant was “not
in a state of psychosis at the time of the killing.” Id.A defense of diminished capacity is “an extremely limited defense”
where a defendant admits criminal liability generally but seeks to mitigate a
first-degree murder charge to third-degree murder. Commonwealth v.
Hutchinson, 25 A.3d 277, 312 (Pa. 2011) (citations omitted). “To establish
a diminished capacity defense, a defendant must prove that his cognitive
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abilities of deliberation and premeditation were so compromised, by mental
defect or voluntary intoxication, that he was unable to formulate the specific
intent to kill.” Id. (citations omitted).
However, our Supreme Court has explained:
The mere fact of intoxication does not give rise to a
diminished capacity defense. Evidence that the defendant
lacked the ability to control his or her actions or acted impulsively
is irrelevant to specific intent to kill, and thus is not admissible to
support a diminished capacity defense. Furthermore, diagnosis
with a personality disorder does not suffice to establish
diminished capacity.
Id. (citations omitted and emphases added); see also Commonwealth v.
Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1141 (Pa. Super. 2009) (explaining that
“personality disorders or schizoid or paranoid diagnoses are not relevant to a
diminished capacity defense” (citation omitted)).
Additionally, “a showing of voluntary intoxication can negate the intent
necessary for a conviction of first-degree murder and reduce the crime of
murder from first to third degree.” Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 861 A.2d
898, 907 (Pa. 2004) (citations omitted). However, the evidence presented
“must show that the defendant was unable to form the specific intent to kill
because he was so overwhelmed or overpowered by drugs to the point of
losing his faculties at the time the crime was committed.” Id. at 908 (citation
omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 946 A.2d 645, 653 (Pa.
2008) (requiring that a defendant show that he was “overwhelmed to the point
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of losing his faculties and sensibilities” to prove a voluntary intoxication
defense (citation omitted)).
The defendant bears the burden to prove any defense related to his
mental state by a preponderance of the evidence. See Commonwealth v.
Collins, 810 A.2d 698, 701 (Pa. Super. 2002). As noted previously, the
Commonwealth bears the burden to prove each element of first-degree
murder, including the defendant acted with specific intent to kill, beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Jacoby, 170 A.3d at 1076. However, “evidence of
intoxication places no additional burden on the Commonwealth . . . . [T]he
Commonwealth [is] not required to ‘disprove’ [the defendant’s] intoxication at
the time of the crimes.” Commonwealth v. S. Miller, 897 A.2d 1281, 1285
(Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted).
Finally, a defense of voluntary intoxication “is a question of fact solely
within the province of the [fact-finder], who is free to believe any, all, or none
of the testimony regarding intoxication. Similarly, the defense of diminished
capacity is a matter for a [fact-finder] to believe or disbelieve as it sees fit.”
Commonwealth v. Vandivner, 962 A.2d 1170, 1177 (Pa. 2009) (citations
omitted and formatting altered).
Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:
When the Appellant came to the police station to turn himself in,
he said that his girlfriend was cheating on him and he would not
take it anymore. In his written statement he said, “the last straw
was telling me she was having sex with her cousin and I killed
her.” In the police interview, he related that they argued the night
before, the next day they had more conversation about lost
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pregnancies, being a family, and her cheating on him. This
argument led to him snapping.
Revelations of infidelity are not sufficient provocation to support a
heat of passion defense. Commonwealth v. [D.] Miller, 987
A.2d 638, 649-51 (Pa. 2009); see Commonwealth v. Mason,
130 A.3d 601, 629-30 (Pa. 2015). Appellant’s arguments over
her sex with others as he told it was not such a provoking event
or a surprising revelation. Id. Appellant stated and testified the
argument started the day before, and then it died down. See
Commonwealth v. Frederick, 498 A.2d 1322 (Pa. 1985).
The diminished capacity defense requires proof by a defendant
“that his cognitive abilities of deliberation and premeditation were
so compromised, by mental defect or voluntary intoxication, that
he was unable to formulate the specific intent to kill.”
Hutchinson, 25 A.3d at 312. The defense is extremely limited,
and it operates only to negate premeditation and if successful,
reduces a first-degree murder charge to third-degree murder. A
“diagnosis with a personality disorder does not suffice to establish
diminished capacity.” Mason, 130 A.3d at 631.
The diminished capacity-mental defect defense and the
diminished capacity-voluntary intoxication defense operate the
same way. Id.
Appellant argues that there was photographic evidence of his
drinking to support his brief testimony that he was drinking at the
time, i.e. two red cups on a coffee table in the room. Yet none of
the police noticed any signs of intoxication. They testified he was
lucid, with a normal demeanor at the station. Appellant’s scant
evidence is clearly insufficient.
With regard to his mental state at the time of the strangulation,
Appellant testified that he had a diagnosis of “psychosis not
otherwise specified.” His frame of mind was one of “disbelief that
I just completed such a horrific crime,” and that voices in his head
were telling him to kill, “mostly kill myself.”
The forensic psychiatrist opined that Appellant’s diagnosis was
mild symptoms of an unspecified psychotic disorder. His not
taking medications had only a minimal ramification at the time.
In his report, he concludes that Appellant’s descriptions of
supposed psychiatric symptoms at the time of the offense is
“inconsistent and implausible.” Further, he found upon his
evaluation that there is no objective, contemporaneous evidence
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that he had mental impairments at the time of the offense.
Nothing impaired his capacity to understand the wrongfulness of
his actions or to refrain from engaging in wrongful activity.
Based on all of the foregoing, the diminished capacity-voluntary
intoxication, and diminished capacity-mental defect defenses are
rejected.
Trial Ct. Op. at 5-7.
Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the trial
court’s opinion, we affirm based on the trial court’s analysis of this issue. See
id. The trial court considered Appellant’s mental state and alleged impairment
at the time of the murder, but ultimately concluded that he failed to present
evidence to support a diminished capacity defense. See id. As noted
previously, both voluntary intoxication and diminished capacity are questions
of fact for the fact-finder. See Vandivner, 962 A.2d at 1177. Therefore,
Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim.
Mistake of Fact
In his remaining claim, Appellant argues that the trial court made a
mistake of fact when considering Appellant’s statement to police. Appellant’s
Brief at 13. Specifically, Appellant refers to the trial court’s statement when
announcing the verdict, where the court noted that Appellant had told police
that he had intended to kill the victim. Id. However, Appellant contends that
when he was specifically asked about his intent during the interview, he told
police that he did not intend to kill the victim and had intended to kill himself.
Id. Appellant argues that although the trial court “points to different more
general areas of the transcript” to support its conclusion, “it is a point of
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construction in any written document, that the specific language controls the
general language contained in the document.” Id. Therefore, Appellant
concludes that the trial court made a “mistake of fact” when concluding that
Appellant confessed his intent to kill in the initial interview with police. Id.
The trial court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:
In announcing the verdict in open court, this court stated that
“[Appellant] was asked at the interview [by police] did you intend
to kill her and he answered, yes.” Appellant contends that this
was an erroneous statement of fact by referencing another part of
the interview where Appellant stated that it was not his intention
to kill her but he intended to kill himself. The court’s statement
is a correct finding of fact and conclusion of law. In the police
interviews the same day as the crime was committed, the
following exchange took place:
Office Ray Siko: You said that she wouldn’t die.
[Appellant]: No
Officer Ray Siko: What were you doing at that point when
you said that she wouldn’t die?
[Appellant]: I was trying to get the life out of her.
Officer Ray Siko: And how we[r]e you doing that?
[Appellant]: I was choking her. I was standing on her.
Officer Ray Siko: With your hands?
[Appellant]: And my feet, my whole body.
Further along in the interview, this line of questioning continued:
(Transcript p. 19[.])
Officer Ray Siko: Did you use anything else other than your
hands on her body?
[Appellant]: I just made sure that she was dead.
And Appellant further explained: (Transcript p. 31)
[Appellant]: I realized that she is still alive.
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Office Ray Siko: mm-hmm
[Appellant]: And I made sure. I got on top of her, put my
foot on her just to make sure.
In addition, the court’s statement was in direct reference to the
Appellant’s admission: (Transcript p. 12)
Officer Ray Siko: Can you tell me what happened today?
[Appellant]: Yeah, I killed her.
So, the intention was clear, i.e., to kill, and his girlfriend was the
intended victim as he went to great lengths to make sure she was
actually dead, including taking her pulse in several places and
then stepping on her neck with his foot to end her life for sure.
The autopsy did confirm that the victim died of asphyxia second
to strangulation. The injuries were consistent with strangulation
by two hands around the neck. But a unique finding here by the
autopsy was a fractured neck hyoid bone that is uncommon with
strangulation, but it is explained by a foot impressed on the neck.
There was no evidence whatsoever that backs up Appellant’s
response at the interview, or his trial stating that he wanted to kill
himself. No evidence of any attempt on his part to do any harm
to himself; rather, all the evidence supported his intentional act
of killing his girlfriend.
Trial Ct. Op. at 2-4.
Following our review of the record, we conclude that Appellant is not
entitled to relief on this issue. As noted previously, “[i]t is within the province
of the fact-finder to determine the weight to be accorded to each witness’s
testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.” Palmer, 192
A.3d at 89 (citation omitted). Here, although Appellant told police that he did
not intend to kill the victim, he gave multiple responses indicating the
contrary. See N.T. Trial, 10/18/22, at 101 (reflecting that when Appellant
realized the victim was still alive after the manual strangulation, he placed his
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foot on her neck to make sure she was dead). Further, Appellant does not
dispute that he killed the victim by way of strangulation. As discussed
previously, “[d]eath caused by strangulation is sufficient to infer the specific
intent required for a conviction of first degree murder.” Hawkins, 701 A.2d
at 507 (citation omitted). Under these circumstances, we discern no merit to
Appellant’s mistake of fact claim and conclude that Appellant has no basis for
relief. Accordingly, we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/23/2023
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