Com. v. Fondrk, J. ( 2023 )


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  • J-S28020-23
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    JEFFREY MARK FONDRK                          :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 99 WDA 2023
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 15, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Criminal Division
    at No(s): CP-65-CR-0003252-2019
    BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                             FILED: OCTOBER 23, 2023
    Appellant, Jeffrey Mark Fondrk, appeals from the September 15, 2022
    judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland
    County that imposed an aggregate sentence of 13 to 26 years’ incarceration
    after a jury convicted Appellant of third-degree murder and aggravated
    assault.1 We affirm.
    The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history as follows:
    This case arises out of two separate incidents. The first occurred
    on November 26, 2016, when [the victim, Appellant’s wife,] was
    treated at [a hospital] for a head injury. As a result of that
    hospital visit, aggravated assault charges were filed against
    [Appellant]. A preliminary hearing on those charges was held on
    January 17, 2017, and the charges were held for court. [The]
    magisterial district [court] set a bond condition that [Appellant]
    ____________________________________________
    * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c) and 2702(a)(1), respectively.
    J-S28020-23
    was to have no contact with [the victim] and refrain from visiting
    their shared residence.[FN1]
    [Footnote 1: The aggravated assault charge was] nolle
    prossed by the Commonwealth after [the victim’s] death [in
    2017,] and [new charges, including an aggravated assault
    charge, were filed against Appellant at trial court docket
    number CP-65-CR-0003252-2019.]
    The second incident occurred on July 8, 2017, when Pennsylvania
    State Police responded to a 911 [emergency services] call from
    the [] residence [shared by the victim and Appellant, reporting]
    an unconscious victim. [The] victim was transported to the
    hospital where she died on July 18, 2017. As a result of the state
    police investigation, [Appellant] was charged with the following:
    Count One: Murder of the First Degree, in violation of 18
    Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a);
    Count Two: Murder of the Third Degree, in violation of 18
    Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c);
    Count Three: Aggravated Assault, in violation of 18
    Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1);
    Count Four: Intimidation of a Witness or Victim, in violation
    of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4952(a)(3);
    Count Five: Retaliation Against a Witness, Victim, or Party,
    in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4953(a).
    A jury trial was held before [the trial] court in June [] 2022. The
    [trial] court granted [Appellant’s] motion for acquittal at Counts
    Four and Five at trial. The jury ultimately found [Appellant] guilty
    at Counts Two and Three [and not guilty at Count 1].
    [Appellant] was sentenced by [the trial] court on September 15,
    2022[,] to the following terms and conditions: at Count Two, 10[
    to ]20 years[’] incarceration at a state correctional institution,
    receive a dual-diagnosis evaluation, complete recommended
    treatment, submit a [deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”)] sample, pay
    costs and fees, and have no contact with [the] victim's family; at
    Count Three, 3[ to ]6 years[’] incarceration[, which was set to run
    consecutively] to [the sentence imposed at] Count Two [and
    included] the same terms and conditions [as imposed at Count
    Two. Appellant] received credit for time served from July 22,
    2019[, to September 15, 2022, a total of 1,152 days. Appellant]
    -2-
    J-S28020-23
    subsequently filed [a] post-sentence motion[] on September 20,
    2022.
    [Appellant] filed a brief in support of his post-sentence motion[]
    on November 1, 2022. [Appellant] contended that his convictions
    for both [third-degree] murder [] and aggravated assault were
    "not supported by the weight of the evidence to such a degree
    that the convictions should offend the [trial] court's sense of
    justice." [Appellant] asserted that the Commonwealth did not
    prove that he acted with the requisite malice to support his
    conviction for [third-degree] murder[.] Additionally, [Appellant]
    claimed that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he caused
    [the] victim's injuries for the aggravated assault [conviction].
    The Commonwealth filed a brief in opposition to [Appellant’s]
    post-sentence motion[] on December 5, 2022.
    Trial   Court   Opinion,     1/10/23,     at   1-3   (record   citations,   extraneous
    capitalization, and emphasis omitted). On January 10, 2013, the trial court
    denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion. This appeal followed.2
    Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying [] Appellant's
    post-sentence motion where the Commonwealth failed to prove []
    Appellant acted with the requisite malice to sustain a third-degree
    murder conviction, rendering his conviction against the weight of
    the evidence?
    2. Whether the trial court erred in denying [] Appellant's
    post-sentence motion where the Commonwealth failed to prove
    (1) [] Appellant caused a 2016 head injury to his then-wife and
    (2) that the wound was consistent with serious bodily injury in
    order to sustain a conviction for aggravated assault?
    ____________________________________________
    2 The trial court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors
    complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure
    1925(b). On February 27, 2023, the trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion,
    relying on its January 10, 2023 opinion that accompanied the order denying
    Appellant’s post-sentence motion.
    -3-
    J-S28020-23
    Appellant’s Brief at 2 (extraneous capitalization omitted).
    Appellant’s issues raise claims that the jury’s verdicts were against the
    weight of the evidence,3 for which our standard and scope of review is as
    follows:
    Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of
    [the trial court’s] discretion, not of the underlying question of
    whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because
    the trial [court] had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence
    presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration
    to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial [court] when
    reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is [or is
    not] against the weight of the evidence. One of the least
    assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the [trial]
    court’s conviction that the verdict was or was not against the
    weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in
    the interest of justice.
    Commonwealth v. Horne, 
    89 A.3d 277
    , 285 (Pa. Super. 2014), citing
    Commonwealth v. Widmer, 
    744 A.2d 745
     (Pa. 2000). A trial court abuses
    its discretion “where the course pursued represents not merely an error of
    judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the
    law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of
    partiality, prejudice, bias[,] or ill-will.” Horne, 
    89 A.3d at 285-286
     (citation
    ____________________________________________
    3 To the extent Appellant purports  to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
    introduced in support of his convictions, a review of Appellant’s appellate brief
    dispels such claims. See Appellant’s Brief at 21-22 (stating, “the weight of
    the evidence suggests [] Appellant’s conviction for [third-degree murder]
    should not stand as the jury should not have found [] Appellant acted with
    malice in contributing to [the victim’s] death[; t]he weight of the evidence
    suggests the jury erred in two respects in convicting [] Appellant of
    aggravated assault”).
    -4-
    J-S28020-23
    omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Clay, 
    64 A.3d 1049
    , 1055 (Pa. 2013)
    (stating, “[t]he term ‘discretion’ imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom[,]
    and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion within the framework of the
    law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the [trial
    court]”). For an appellant to prevail on a weight of the evidence claim, “the
    evidence must be so tenuous, vague[,] and uncertain that the verdict shocks
    the conscience of the [trial] court.” Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 
    820 A.2d 795
    , 806 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted),
    appeal denied, 
    833 A.2d 143
     (Pa. 2003).
    When the challenge to the weight of the evidence is predicated on
    the credibility of trial testimony, our review of the trial court's
    decision is extremely limited. Generally, unless the evidence is so
    unreliable [or] contradictory as to make any verdict based thereon
    pure conjecture, these types of claims are not cognizable on
    appellate review.
    Commonwealth v. Bowen, 
    55 A.3d 1254
    , 1262 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal
    denied, 
    64 A.3d 630
     (Pa. 2013). Importantly, “[a] motion for new trial on the
    grounds that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, concedes
    that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict.” Widmer, 744 A.2d at
    751; see also Commonwealth v. Martin, 
    297 A.3d 424
    , 437 (Pa. Super.
    2023) (stating that, “[a] true weight of the evidence challenge concedes that
    sufficient evidence exists to sustain the verdict but questions which evidence
    is to be believed” (citation, original quotation marks, and original brackets
    omitted)).
    -5-
    J-S28020-23
    Regarding his conviction for third-degree murder,4 Appellant contends
    that the jury’s determination that he acted with malice is contrary to the
    weight of the evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 16-21. Instead, the evidence,
    Appellant asserts, “suggests [he] acted negligently, not maliciously, with
    respect to providing [the victim] the care she needed after falling as he did
    not know the severity of her injury.”            Id. at 18.   Appellant avers that
    “[t]owards the end of her life, [the victim] was an unhealthy anorexic who
    suffered from anemia and was incapable of controlling her alcoholism[, and
    the victim] frequently injure[d] herself by falling due to her intoxication.” Id.
    at 19. Appellant argues that his testimony at trial, as well as the testimony
    of his and the victim’s son, support a finding that the victim “did not appear
    to be injured and there was no reason to alert 911 [emergency services] until
    ____________________________________________
    4 Section 2502(c) of the Crimes Code defines third-degree murder as all other
    kinds of murder aside from first-degree murder (intentional killing) and
    second-degree murder (perpetration of a felony). 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c).
    Caselaw has established that in order to convict a person of third-degree
    murder, the Commonwealth must prove that the person acted with malice and
    that the person’s actions resulted in the death of another.                 See
    Commonwealth v. Fisher, 
    80 A.3d 1186
    , 1191 (Pa. 2013); see also
    Commonwealth v. Akhmedov, 
    216 A.3d 307
    , 322 (Pa. Super. 2019)
    (stating, “[t]hird[-]degree murder occurs when a person commits a killing
    which is neither intentional nor committed during the perpetration of a felony,
    but contains the requisite malice”), appeal denied, 
    224 A.3d 364
     (Pa. 2020).
    “The malice required to sustain a third[-]degree murder or aggravated assault
    conviction exists where the accused acts in gross deviation from the standard
    of reasonable care, failing to perceive that such actions might create a
    substantial and unjustifiable risk of death or serious bodily injury” and may be
    “inferred from the circumstances of the accused's conduct.” Akhmedov, 216
    A.3d at 322 (citation and original quotation marks omitted).
    -6-
    J-S28020-23
    the following day when she did not awake.” Id. Appellant asserts that “his
    acts appear to be more in line with an individual[] wholly unequipped to
    navigate his wife’s alcoholism and his own lack of medical training.” Id. at
    20. Appellant contends his “acts or omissions were not born of ill-will or a
    callousness toward his wife’s apparent distress[, thereby giving rise to a
    finding of malice. Rather, his acts or omissions were born from his] ignorance
    of [the victim’s] need for immediate medical treatment as her state was no
    different than the unconscious state he had found her in dozens of times
    before.” Id. at 20-21.
    In finding that Appellant’s third-degree murder conviction was not
    against the weight of the evidence, the trial court stated that “the jury's
    conclusion that [Appellant] acted in a way which transcended negligence and
    reached the level of malice does not shock one's sense of justice upon review
    of the evidence and testimony presented during trial.” Trial Court Opinion,
    1/10/23, at 7. It was reasonable, the trial court concluded, for the jury to find
    that Appellant “consciously disregarded an unjustifiable and extremely high
    risk that his actions or lack of actions may cause death or serious bodily
    injury.” Id. The trial court noted that Appellant “was inconsistent about the
    incident while testifying [at trial], indicating he only heard [the victim’s] head
    hit the [piece of furniture] first then admitting to seeing and hearing the
    incident.” Id. at 6 (record citation omitted). The trial court further explained
    that the evidence presented at trial demonstrated that (1) Appellant “had
    knowledge of his wife's anorexia, anemia, depression, slight stature,
    -7-
    J-S28020-23
    alcoholism, and medical history[; (2) Appellant] admitted to grabbing [the
    victim] by the face to push her away from him the night of the incident[; (3)
    Appellant] did not try to wake [the victim], even though she was unconscious
    after the incident[ but, instead,] drank a [carbonated beverage] and watched
    part of a [television] show while [the victim] lay unconscious beside him[; (4)
    Appellant] went to work the next day and left [the victim] on the floor[; and
    (5) Appellant only] called 911 [emergency services] approximately 43 hours
    after the incident.” Id. at 6 (record citations omitted).
    Critical to finding Appellant guilty of third-degree murder was the jury’s
    determination of witness credibility.            Here, the trial court, in denying
    Appellant’s post-sentence motion raising a weight of the evidence claim,
    considered the evidence presented at trial and the reasonableness of the jury’s
    credibility determination. In particular, the trial court noted that Appellant, in
    his testimony at trial, was inconsistent about the events leading up to the
    victim’s injuries, and ultimately to her death.5 Id. at 6.      The trial court also
    ____________________________________________
    5 At trial, Appellant explained that the victim sustained her injuries when she
    hit her head on a piece of furniture after Appellant pushed her away from him
    in the course of an argument. N.T., 2/23/22, at 326-328. After the victim hit
    her head on the furniture, she remained on the floor in what Appellant
    described as a “passed out state” due to her consumption of alcohol. Id. at
    328. Appellant testified that a short time later, after watching television, he
    went to bed and left the victim lying on the flooring, figuring that the victim
    would eventually wake up and come to bed. Id. at 330. Later, Appellant
    testified that, before Appellant went to work the next morning, he and his son
    put the victim in bed. Id. at 332. Still later, Appellant testified that the victim
    was already in bed before he went to work the next morning and that he
    checked on her condition before leaving for work and found she continued to
    -8-
    J-S28020-23
    explained that the Commonwealth witness, who was admitted as an expert in
    forensic pathology, testified that the autopsy results and his post-mortem
    examination of the victim’s body contradicted the explanation that the victim’s
    injuries were sustained from a fall during which the victim struck a piece of
    furniture. N.T., 6/22/22, at 246. Appellant’s assertion that the trial court
    erred by denying his post-sentence motion raising a weight of the evidence
    claim based upon his testimony and the testimony of his son (see Appellant’s
    Brief at 18-19) invites this Court to do nothing more than reassess the witness
    credibility and reweigh the evidence in an attempt to convince us to alter the
    result reached by the jury, as fact-finder, and considered by the trial court as
    in alignment with the evidence presented at trial.       We decline Appellant’s
    invitation since the jury, while passing on the credibility of the witnesses and
    weight of the evidence is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Dunkins, 
    229 A.3d 622
    , 634 (Pa. Super. 2020), aff’d,
    
    263 A.3d 247
     (Pa. 2021), cert. denied, 
    142 S.Ct. 1679 (2022)
    . Moreover, we
    discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that Appellant’s
    conviction of third-degree murder was not against the weight of the evidence.
    ____________________________________________
    breathe. Id. at 335-336. At some point, Appellant returned home early from
    work, found the victim unresponsive, and someone called 911 emergency
    services. Id. at 336-337.
    -9-
    J-S28020-23
    Regarding his conviction of aggravated assault,6 Appellant contends that
    the inconsistency of the victim’s statements surrounding the cause of her
    injuries in 2016, i.e., one time stating she fell out of bed and hit her head on
    a nightstand and another time stating Appellant caused the injury, “suggest[s]
    that the weight of the evidence favors the notion that [] Appellant did not
    cause the injury to [the victim, and] her statements regarding the cause of
    her injury are not to be believed[.]” Id. at 23-24. Appellant argues that “[a]s
    both the cause and severity of the [victim’s] injury are unclear, the jury was
    forced to render a verdict based on speculation and conjecture[, which was
    contrary to] the weight of the evidence.” Id. at 25.
    In finding that Appellant’s aggravated assault conviction did not “shock
    one’s sense of justice given the totality of the evidence provided at trial[,]”
    the trial court found that “a reasonable jury could perceive [the victim’s]
    inconsistent statements [regarding the cause of her injury in 2016] within the
    context of a difficult domestic violence dynamic wherein [the victim] wanted
    to protect [Appellant,] her husband.” Id. at 11. The trial court noted that the
    jury viewed pictures of the victim’s extensive injuries and heard the victim’s
    accusations that “her husband beat[] her and had done so multiple times a
    month for going on ten years[.]” Id. at 9 (original quotation marks and record
    ____________________________________________
    6 Section 2702(a)(1) of the Crimes Code states that a person is guilty of
    aggravated assault if the person “attempts to cause serious bodily injury to
    another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly[,] or recklessly under
    circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life[.]”
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1).
    - 10 -
    J-S28020-23
    citations omitted).   In particular, the trial court explained that, while the
    victim, at various times, claimed her 2016 injury was caused by falling out of
    bed and hitting her head on the nightstand, both an emergency medical
    services (“EMS”) technician, who responded to the 911 emergency services
    request, and an investigating police officer testified that they did not observe
    any blood on the nightstand despite the fact the victim was “bleeding profusely
    from her head” due to her injury. Id. at 9-10.
    Appellant’s conviction of aggravated assault rests upon credibility
    determinations regarding the testimony and weight assigned to the evidence,
    which, as discussed supra, rests fully within the purview of the jury. The jury,
    as fact-finder, was free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence when
    considering the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be assigned to
    the Commonwealth’s proof. Dunkins, 229 A.3d at 634. Moreover, as the
    trial court explained, the jury’s decision to convict Appellant of aggravated
    assault (and to reject the victim’s one-time explanation that she struck her
    head on the nightstand after falling out of bed) is supported by the testimony
    of the EMS technician and investigating police officer that there was no
    evidence of blood on the nightstand. As such, we find Appellant’s weight of
    the evidence claim to be without merit.
    In sum, based upon on review of the record and the trial court’s
    rationale, we discern no abuse discretion in the trial court’s determination that
    the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    - 11 -
    J-S28020-23
    Date: 10/23/2023
    - 12 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 99 WDA 2023

Judges: Olson, J.

Filed Date: 10/23/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024