Com. v. Centra, J. ( 2023 )

J-S28039-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JUSTIN JAMES CENTRA :
:
Appellant : No. 1097 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 1, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-17-CR-0000182-2021
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JUSTIN JAMES CENTRA :
:
Appellant : No. 1165 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 1, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-17-CR-0000942-2020
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: October 24, 2023
Appellant, Justin James Centra, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County after a jury found
him guilty of Attempt to Commit Aggravated Indecent Assault of a Child; three
counts of Indecent Assault; Indecent Exposure; three counts of Corruption of
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S28039-23
a Minor; Terroristic Threats, nineteen counts of Intimidation of Witnesses or
Victims; and nineteen counts of Intimidation, Retaliation or Obstruction in
Child Abuse Cases. Classified as a sexually violent predator and sentenced to
an aggregate term of incarceration of eighteen years and three months to
forty-two-years’ incarceration, Appellant challenges the consolidation of his
cases, the jury instruction on the charge of Intimidation of Witnesses, and the
legality of his sentence on the charge of Intimidation of Witnesses. We affirm.
The trial court sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history, as
follows:
On August 24, 2020, Lawrence Township Police Department
received a call regarding sexual abuse of a minor. [K.W.] reported
that her stepdaughter, L.W., had returned home in the middle of
the night from her grandmother, [S.C.’s], house. Also at the
house was J.C., L.W.’s cousin, and Defendant [hereinafter
“Appellant”], Justin Centra. Appellant is [related to all persons
noted]. L.W. reported that she woke up around 3 a.m. to find
Appellant rubbing her legs and trying to get into her pants.
Appellant also asked L.W. if she would show Appellant “hers”, and
if L.W. would like to see “his.” L.W. then contacted a friend and
asked the friend to give her a ride home.
L.W. was taken to the Child Advocacy Century (“CAC”) for an
interview. While L.W. was being interviewed, J.C. contacted K.W.
and stated that Appellant had also been abusing J.C. for several
years. Subsequently, J.C. was interviewed at the CAC. During
her interview, J.C. recalled multiple instances of sexual abuse by
Appellant. J.C. additionally claimed that Appellant was verbally
and physically abusive.
Based on the statements of J.C. and L.W., a Criminal Complaint
was filed against Appellant on August 25, 2020. The Complaint
charged Appellant with Aggravated Indecent Assault of a Child, 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(b); Attempted Aggravated Indecent Assault of a
Child, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(b); Corruption of Minors, 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 6301(a)(1)(ii); Indecent Exposure, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3127(a);
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Terroristic Threats, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(1); and Disorderly
Conduct, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(4). Appellant had his
preliminary hearing on September 9, 2020, and all charges were
waived to Court.
While Appellant was detained pending trial on the Aggravated
Indecent Assault case, Appellant wrote sixteen letters to J.C. and
made a total of twenty phone calls to J.C., [S.C.], and [K.W.]
Within the majority of the letters, Appellant instructed J.C. to tell
the doctor, the District Attorney, and the Judge that she wanted
Appellant to be released from jail. Additionally, Appellant told J.C.
that she needed to tell the District Attorney that J.C. heard
Appellant snoring during the time that L.W. accused Appellant of
assaulting her. Moreover, Appellant instructed J.C. to tell the
doctor and the District Attorney that J.C. only said that Appellant
was abusing her because J.C. was upset that Appellant was not
spending his money on J.C.
Between August 28, 2020, and December 15, 2020, Appellant
made numerous phone calls while he was incarcerated. Over the
phone, Appellant instructed [S.C.], J.C, and [K.W.] to tell the
District Attorney that L.W. was lying. He further instructed [S.C.]
and [K.W.] to take L.W. to the District Attorney’s office and have
L.W. tell them she was lying about the incident. On December 16,
2020, [K.W.] took L.W. to the District Attorney’s Office; once
there, L.W. left a message that she needed to tell the District
Attorney that she lied about the incident.
Based on the letters and phone calls made by Appellant, a second
Criminal Complaint was filed on February 10, 2021. The second
Complaint charged Appellant with Intimidation of Witnesses or
Victims, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4952(a)(2); Intimidation, Retaliation or
Obstruction in Child Abuse Cases, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4958(a)(2)(ii);
and Obstruction 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4958(b.1). Appellant waived his
preliminary hearing on February 24, 2021, and all charges were
bound over to Court. Afterwards, both cases proceeded with the
normal pre-trial filings and procedures. On May 25, 2021, the
Commonwealth filed a Motion to Consolidate the two cases. A
hearing on the Commonwealth’s Motion was held on June 28,
2021. Subsequently, [the trial court] granted the Motion, and the
two cases were joined for the purposes of a jury trial.
A three-day jury trial began on September 29, 2021. On October
1, 2021, the jury convicted Appellant of Attempt to Commit
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Aggravated Indecent Assault of a Child; three counts of Indecent
Assault; Indecent Exposure; three counts of Corruption of a Minor;
Terroristic Threats; nineteen counts of Intimidation of Witnesses
or Victims; and nineteen counts of Intimidation, Retaliation or
Obstruction in Child Abuse Cases.fn A hearing to determine
whether Appellant is a sexually violent predator and a sentencing
hearing was held on April 1, 2022. [The trial court] classified
Appellant as a sexually violent predator and sentenced Appellant
to an aggregate term of incarceration of eighteen years and three
months to forty-two years.
Fn: Appellant was found not guilty of the Aggravated
Indecent Assault of a Child charge regarding J.C.;
Intimidation of Witnesses or Victims regarding L.W.;
Intimidation, Retaliation or Obstruction in Child Abuse
Cases regarding L.W.; and twenty counts of Obstruction.
Appellant filed a Post-Sentence Motion on April 27, 2022. On
October 24, 2022, [the trial court] entered an Order denying
Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion by operation of law due to the
expiration of the 120-day deadline. Appellant filed a Notice of
Appeal on September 22, 2022. Following Order of this Court, the
Appellant submitted [its] Matters Complained of on Appeal
[pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)].
Trial Court Opinion, 12/21/2022, at 1-3.
Appellant raises in his counseled appellate brief the following preserved
issues for our consideration:
1. Whether the [trial court] erred when it granted the
Commonwealth’s motion to consolidate Case No. CP-17-CR-
942-2020 and CP-17-CR-182-2021 for Trial?
2. Whether the [trial court] erred when it failed to instruct the
jury that they must find that the Intimidation of Witnesses
counts amount to a Felony of the 1st Degree?
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3. Whether the Trial Court erred when it sentenced [Appellant]
for counts of Intimidation of Witnesses as felonies of the first
degree, when a finding that such counts were felony 1 offenses
was required to be made by the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt?
Brief of Appellant at 6.
Appellant first contends that the trial court erred when it granted the
Commonwealth’s motion to consolidate the case at No. 182 of 2021, charging
him with witness intimidation and/or improper interaction with victims and
witnesses, with the case at No. 942 of 2020, charging him with the underlying
offenses committed against L.W. The trial court's decision in this regard is
reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard, as this Court has
consistently held that whether “separate indictments should be consolidated
for trial is within the sole discretion of the trial court and such discretion will
be reversed only for a manifest abuse of discretion or prejudice and clear
injustice to the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 107 A.3d 206,
210 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations omitted). “Appellant bears the burden of
establishing such prejudice.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Melendez–
Rodriguez, 856 A.2d 1278, 1282 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc )).
The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure govern the joinder and
severance of offenses as follows:
Rule 582. Joinder—Trial of Separate Indictments or
Informations
(A) Standards
(1) Offenses charged in separate indictments or informations may
be tried together if:
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(a) the evidence of each of the offenses would be admissible in a
separate trial for the other and is capable of separation by the jury
so that there is no danger of confusion; or
(b) the offenses charged are based on the same act or transaction.
***
Pa.R.Crim.P. 582(A)(1).
Rule 583. Severance of Offenses or Defendants.
The court may order separate trials of offenses or defendants, or
provide other appropriate relief, if it appears that any party may
be prejudiced by offenses or defendants being tried together.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 583. Under Rule 583, the prejudice the defendant suffers due
to the joinder must be greater than the general prejudice any defendant
suffers when the Commonwealth's evidence links him to a crime.
Commonwealth v. Lauro, 819 A.2d 100, 107 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal
denied, 574 Pa. 752, 830 A.2d 975 (2003).
The prejudice of which Rule [583] speaks is, rather, that which
would occur if the evidence tended to convict [the] appellant only
by showing his propensity to commit crimes, or because the jury
was incapable of separating the evidence or could not avoid
cumulating the evidence. Additionally, the admission of relevant
evidence connecting a defendant to the crimes charged is a
natural consequence of a criminal trial, and it is not grounds for
severance by itself.
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Collins, 703 A.2d 418, 422 (Pa. 1997), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 1015, 119 S.Ct. 538, 142 L.Ed.2d 447 (1998)) (internal
citations omitted).
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From these two rules, our Supreme Court established the following test
for deciding whether a court should join or sever charges:
[1] whether the evidence of each of the offenses would be
admissible in a separate trial for the other; [2] whether such
evidence is capable of separation by the jury so as to avoid danger
of confusion; and, if the answers to these questions are in the
affirmative, [3] whether the defendant will be unduly prejudiced
by the consolidation of offenses.
Collins, 703 A.2d at 422 (quoting Commonwealth v. Lark, 543 A.2d 491,
496–97 (Pa.1988)).
Nevertheless, evidence of other crimes is admissible to demonstrate:
(1) motive; (2) intent; (3) absence of mistake or accident; (4) a
common scheme, plan or design embracing the commission of two
or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to
prove the others; or (5) to establish the identity of the person
charged with the commission of the crime on trial, in other words,
where there is such a logical connection between the crimes that
proof of one will naturally tend to show that the accused is the
person who committed the other.
Commonwealth v. Janda, 14 A.3d 147, 156 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Morris, 425 A.2d 715, 720 (Pa. 1981)).
Evidence of other crimes also may be admitted to demonstrate the
defendant's consciousness of guilt. Commonwealth v. Selenski, 919 A.2d
229 (Pa. Super. 2007), aff'd, 994 A.2d 1083 (Pa. 2010) (stating: “[T]he
offenses were properly consolidated, as evidence of the escape would be
admissible in the homicide trial to show the Defendant's consciousness of
guilt; evidence of the homicide would be admissible in the escape trial to show
the Defendant's motive for escaping...”). “Additionally, evidence of other
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crimes may be admitted where such evidence is part of the history of the case
and forms part of the natural development of the facts.” Commonwealth v.
Dozzo, 991 A.2d 898, 902 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quoting Collins, 703 A.2d at
423).
The above jurisprudence applies in the case sub judice. Here, the sexual
assault-related offenses were admissible to establish motive for the charged
witness intimidation—which allegedly began four days after the assault
charges were filed—and the witness intimidation offense was admissible to
show consciousness of guilt of the charged sexual assault. Moreover, the
overarching timeline of events comprising the two charges would be
admissible at a trial at each docket to relate the complete sequence of relevant
events. See Rule 582, supra. Finally, unfair prejudice would not result, as a
jury could easily separate the evidence to the extent they involved distinct
allegations of conduct occurring on different dates and locations. Accordingly,
we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the
Commonwealth’s motion for joinder.
In his remaining argument, Appellant addresses both his second and
third issues assailing, respectively, jury instructions to the intimidation of
witnesses charges and the legality of his sentences on those convictions. The
basis for each issue is Appellant’s contention that the trial court violated
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Apprendi and its progeny1 by instructing the jury that the most serious crime
the Commonwealth had charged him with was a felony of the first degree,
rather than allowing the jury to determine the most serious charges filed
against him. Appellant misconstrues the factual determination to be made by
the jury in deliberating on a witness intimidation case.
When reviewing a challenge to a jury instruction, we review the charge
as a whole to determine if it is fair and complete. Commonwealth v. Lake,
281 A.3d 341, 347 (Pa. Super. 2022), appeal denied, 291 A.3d 333 (Pa. 2023)
(citing Commonwealth v. Postie, 200 A.3d 1015, 1026 (Pa. Super. 2018)
(en banc)). “The trial court commits an abuse of discretion only when there
is an inaccurate statement of the law.” Id. (citation omitted). “A charge is
considered adequate unless the jury was palpably misled by what the trial
judge said or there is an omission which is tantamount to fundamental error.”
Id. (citation omitted).
____________________________________________
1 In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147
L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) the U.S. Supreme Court found that the Sixth Amendment
requires a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt “any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum[.]” In other
words, “any fact that increase[s] the prescribed statutory maximum sentence
must be an ‘element’ of the offense [and] be found by a jury.” Alleyne v.
United States, 570 U.S. 99, 106, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013).
The U.S. Supreme Court applied this principle to a criminal statute that
increased the mandatory minimum sentence based on a finding that the
defendant “brandished” a firearm and concluded that “facts that increase the
mandatory minimum sentence are therefore elements and must be submitted
to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 117, 133 S.Ct.
2151.
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In this Court’s recent decision in Lake, we clarified that “the factual
determination [required of a jury deliberating over a witness intimidation
charge] is whether the act of intimidation is connected to the particular
prosecution.” Id. at 350. We set forth the governing statutory scheme, and
explained that the statute’s focus is on the most serious crime charged, since
that is the one a criminal defendant attempts to escape by use of intimidation:
The Crimes Code provides that when determining the grade for a
conviction for Intimidation, the sentencing court must grade an
Intimidation conviction according to the most serious crime that a
defendant prevented a witness from reporting or testifying about.
Of most importance to our analysis, however, is that the
sentencing court must consider the charge that the
Commonwealth filed against a defendant to determine the grading
of the crime that the defendant prevented a witness from
reporting. The statute does not require the sentencing court to
consider whether the defendant is convicted of the underlying
crime:
(b) Grading.—
(1) The offense is a felony of the degree indicated in
paragraphs (2) through (4) if:
***
(2) The offense is a felony of the first-degree if a
felony of the first-degree or murder in the first or
second degree was charged in the case in which the
actor sought to influence or intimidate a witness or
victim as specified in this subsection.
(3) The offense is a felony of the second degree if a
felony of the second degree is the most serious
offense charged in the case in which the actor
sought to influence or intimidate a witness or victim
as specified in this subsection.
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(4) The offense is a felony of the third degree in any
other case in which the actor sought to influence or
intimidate a witness or victim as specified in this
subsection.
(5) Otherwise the offense is a misdemeanor of the
second degree.
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 4952(b)(1)-(5) (some emphasis added).
Id. at 348–49.
Lake then discussed the recent decision in Commonwealth v. Dixon,
255 A.3d 1258, 1264 (Pa. 2021), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held an Apprendi violation occurred because the jury instruction represented
the first time the jury learned that Dixon’s first-degree felony charge of
witness intimidation was connected to his attempt to suppress testimony in a
separate murder trial. Initially, the Court observed that under Section
4952(b)(2), “if a defendant intimidated a witness from testifying at a trial in
which the Commonwealth had charged a defendant with a first-degree felony,
then the sentencing court is to grade the Intimidation conviction as a first-
degree felony. 18 Pa.C.S. § 4952(b)(2).” Id. at 350-51. Turning to the facts
before it, however, the Supreme Court noted that although defendant Dixon
was charged with intimidating a murder trial witness, the Commonwealth had
not presented at his trial any evidence about the charge brought at the
separate trial. It held, therefore, that this omission precluded the jury from
making the factual connection between Dixon’s act of Intimidation and the
first-degree felony charge prosecuted in his friend’s trial. Instead, it was the
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trial court that made the factual connection, which brought about the
Apprendi violation.
Dixon affords Appellant no relief, however, for its facts are
distinguishable from those in the case sub judice. Here, the record establishes
that the Commonwealth presented evidence to the jury that Appellant was
charged with first-degree felony sexual assault and thereafter attempted to
intimidate and influence his alleged victims and other prospective witnesses
to make statements that would result in his release. As such, this case comes
squarely under Lake, as jury was presented with facts connecting the act of
intimidation to a particular prosecution. Accordingly, Appellant’s Apprendi-
based challenge to the jury charge fails.
Our disposition of Appellant’s second issue is likewise dispositive of his
final issue directed at the legality of his sentence. “The defendant or the
Commonwealth may appeal as of right the legality of the sentence.” 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(a). “A challenge to the legality of sentence is a question of
law; our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.”
Commonwealth v. Alston, 212 A.3d 526, 528 (Pa. Super. 2019).
A claim that implicates the fundamental legal authority of
the court to impose a particular sentence constitutes a challenge
to the legality of the sentence. If no statutory authorization exists
for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to
correction. An illegal sentence must be vacated. Likewise, a
sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum is illegal. If a court
imposes a sentence outside of the legal parameters prescribed by
the applicable statute, the sentence is illegal and should be
remanded for correction.
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Commonwealth v. Infante, 63 A.3d 358, 363 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi,
supra at 490, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63, 147 L.Ed.2d at ––––.
As discussed, supra, the Commonwealth presented to the jury a factual
predicate for the first-degree felony charge under Section 4952(b)(2), and the
jury found this and every other element to the charge proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Consequently, because the Appellant’s sentence was within
statutorily prescribed legal parameters for a first-degree felony grade of
Intimidation of a Witness, Appellant’s challenge is without merit.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
DATE: 10/24/2023
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