Com. v. Perez, C. ( 2023 )


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  • J-S36044-23
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee                :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    CARLOS PEREZ                                 :
    :
    Appellant               :      No. 2237 EDA 2022
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 19, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0010665-2011
    BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and KING, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                               FILED OCTOBER 26, 2023
    Appellant, Carlos Perez, appeals from the order entered in the
    Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his first petition
    filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), upon remand from
    this Court.1 We affirm.
    The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On
    July 11, 2013, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to third-degree
    murder, conspiracy, and possessing instruments of crime. In exchange for
    the plea, the Commonwealth recommended a sentence of 20 to 40 years of
    incarceration and agreed to nolle prosse the remaining charges.
    At Appellant’s guilty plea hearing, Appellant acknowledged that his plea
    ____________________________________________
    1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
    J-S36044-23
    was based upon the following facts:
    On April 15th, 2011[,] the two defendants Angel Suarez, Jr.
    and [Appellant] went to the 3000-block of Water Street here
    in Philadelphia in search for Angel Suarez [Vargas], Sr., the
    [co-]defendant’s father.
    *      *    *
    When they arrived on the block, they did find Angel Suarez
    Vargas and engaged him in a physical altercation. During
    that altercation both defendants physically fought Angel
    Suarez Vargas. Another individual on the block by the name
    of Ian Wolbert saw the fight and jumped into the fight to
    help Angel Suarez Vargas.
    After the fight stopped, the two defendants left the same
    way they arrived, in a burgundy Honda Accord with a black
    primer door. About 10 minutes later the two defendants
    returned in the same burgundy Honda Accord. This time
    both had firearms. The two defendants saw both Ian
    Wolbert and Angel Suarez Vargas and chased them, and
    both fired their guns in the direction of Ian Wolbert and
    Angel Suarez Vargas. One of those bullets struck a 46-year-
    old female by the name of Sandra Laboy in her back. Her
    body was transported to Temple Hospital where she was
    pronounced dead. Her remains were taken to the medical
    examiner’s office where she was examined by Dr. Sam
    Gulino. The cause of death was a gunshot wound to her
    back, and he concluded to a reasonable degree of scientific
    certainty that the manner of death was homicide.
    *      *    *
    Homicide investigators interviewed a number of witnesses
    in the neighborhood who described four individuals in a
    fight, described two Hispanic males leaving in a burgundy
    Honda Accord and describe[d] those same two individuals
    as coming back and firing guns on the block. Some of those
    witnesses were able to identify Ian Wolbert and Angel
    Suarez Vargas by photo spread but were unable to identify
    the two defendants seated at the bar of the court.
    Based on this information[,] on April 17th, 2011[,] members
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    J-S36044-23
    of the Homicide Unit interviewed Ian Wolbert who provided
    a statement identifying Angel Suarez Vargas as the person
    he helped, and also telling Homicide that when the
    defendants had left the scene initially Angel Suarez Vargas
    told Ian Wolbert that one of those people was his son.
    On May 2nd, 2011[,] Angel Suarez Vargas was interviewed
    by Homicide, provided a statement detailing what [he had]
    just said, and identified both defendants as the defendants
    who were shooting guns on the 3000-block of Water Street.
    Those two defendants were placed in photo spreads and on
    May 3rd, 2011[,] both were identified by Ian Wolbert.
    On May 11th, 2011[,] affidavits and arrest warrants were
    generated for both defendants. On May 23rd, 2011[,] Angel
    Suarez was arrested on the 2000-block of North 7th Street
    and after being provided his Miranda[2] warnings did
    provide a statement to Homicide admitting to his
    participation in the offense.
    On May 31st, 2011[,] at the intersection of Kensington and
    Allegheny[,] [Appellant] was arrested during a routine
    traffic stop.  During that stop officers had recognized
    [Appellant] as wanted for murder. [Appellant] attempted to
    flee from the car but was apprehended a short distance
    away.
    (N.T. Guilty Plea Hearing, 7/1/13, at 60-63).      At the conclusion of the
    summary, Appellant agreed that it was “a fair account of what happened” and
    that he was pleading guilty because he was guilty. (Id. at 64-65). Following
    the plea, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate sentence of 20
    to 40 years of imprisonment. Appellant did not file a direct appeal.
    On June 30, 2014, Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition,
    asserting ineffective assistance of counsel and after-discovered evidence.
    ____________________________________________
    2 Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 
    86 S.Ct. 1602
    , 
    16 L.Ed.2d 694
     (1966).
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    J-S36044-23
    Appellant attached to the petition an affidavit from co-defendant Suarez in
    which he attests that he “had done wrong by putting someone in this position
    that is innocent,” and that a friend known to him as “Pito” participated in the
    shooting. (Pro Se PCRA Petition, 6/30/14, Exhibit 2 at 2 (English Translation
    of co-defendant Suarez’s Affidavit)). Thereafter, the court appointed counsel,
    who filed an amended PCRA petition on May 30, 2017, reasserting these
    claims. The PCRA court dismissed the petition without a hearing on May 21,
    2018. Appellant timely appealed.
    On appeal, a panel of this Court concluded that the PCRA court erred in
    denying Appellant’s after-discovered evidence claim without first conducting
    an evidentiary hearing.    This Court concluded that all of Appellant’s other
    claims were meritless. Therefore, this Court vacated the PCRA court’s order
    in part and remanded for an evidentiary hearing limited to the issue of the
    after-discovered evidence claim. See Commonwealth v. Perez, 
    221 A.3d 1250
     (Pa.Super. 2019) (unpublished memorandum).
    The PCRA court detailed the subsequent procedural history as follows:
    On September 17, 2021, an evidentiary hearing was held
    with Appellant where Appellant and Co-Defendant [Suarez]
    testified. Appellant’s witness…, Co-Defendant Angel Suarez,
    Jr., testified that an individual named “Pito”, real name Alvin
    Ortiz Del Ollo, Co-Defendant [Suarez’s] brother-in-law, was
    the actual second shooter instead of Appellant. At the time
    of Co-Defendant [Suarez] testifying at the evidentiary
    hearing, Pito was dead, having allegedly been murdered in
    Puerto Rico two years earlier. (N.T. Hearing, 9/17/21, at
    49). On May 12, 2022, Appellant testified at a follow-up
    evidentiary hearing, stating that he pled guilty because he
    was scared that everyone was going to continue lying as
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    J-S36044-23
    they did in their statements and at the preliminary hearing
    and that he did not know that Co-Defendant [Suarez] was
    going to come forward and say that Appellant did not
    commit the shooting in question.
    (PCRA Court Opinion, filed 11/10/22, at 3) (citation formatting provided;
    footnote omitted).
    On August 19, 2022, the PCRA court denied relief.       Appellant filed a
    timely notice of appeal on August 29, 2022. The PCRA court subsequently
    ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
    per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant filed his concise statement on September
    27, 2022.
    Appellant presents one issue for our review:
    Did the PCRA court err by denying [Appellant’s] request for
    PCRA relief in the form of a new trial by concluding that the
    after-discovered evidence would not have compelled a
    different outcome at the stage of the plea negotiations?
    (Appellant’s Brief at 5).
    We review a PCRA court’s order denying relief to determine whether the
    court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, and whether its legal
    conclusions are free from error. Commonwealth v. Conway, 
    14 A.3d 101
    108 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 
    612 Pa. 687
    , 
    29 A.3d 795
     (2011). This
    Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if the record
    contains any support for those findings. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 
    923 A.2d 513
    , 515 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 
    593 Pa. 754
    , 
    932 A.2d 74
     (2007).
    Further, a PCRA court’s credibility determinations should be given great
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    J-S36044-23
    deference; we are bound by the credibility determinations of the PCRA court
    if those determinations are supported by the record.       Commonwealth v.
    Johnson, 
    600 Pa. 329
    , 345, 
    966 A.2d 523
    , 532 (2009).
    Appellant argues that if he had known that co-defendant Suarez would
    have testified the other shooter was not Appellant, he would not have pled
    guilty. Appellant insists that the fact that he would not have pled guilty in
    light of co-defendant Suarez’s new testimony is sufficient to satisfy the
    requirements of an after-discovered evidence claim. Appellant concludes the
    PCRA court erred by denying his claim of after-discovered evidence, and this
    Court must grant relief. We disagree.
    A petitioner asserting an after-discovered evidence claim under the
    PCRA must plead and prove that: “‘(1) the evidence has been discovered after
    trial and it could not have been obtained at or prior to trial through reasonable
    diligence; (2) the evidence is not cumulative; (3) it is not being used solely to
    impeach credibility; and (4) it would likely compel a different verdict.’”
    Commonwealth v. Cox, 
    636 Pa. 603
    , 614, 
    146 A.3d 221
    , 228 (2016)
    (quoting Commonwealth v. D’Amato, 
    579 Pa. 490
    , 519, 
    856 A.2d 806
    , 823
    (2004)).3     “At an evidentiary hearing, an appellant must show by a
    ____________________________________________
    3 Although Appellant’s conviction resulted from a guilty plea, rather than a
    trial, the analysis of his claim remains the same. Our Supreme Court has held
    that “any after-discovered evidence which would justify a new trial would also
    entitle a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.” Commonwealth v. Peoples,
    
    456 Pa. 274
    , 275, 
    319 A.2d 679
    , 681 (1974).
    -6-
    J-S36044-23
    preponderance of the evidence that each of these factors has been met in
    order for a new trial to be warranted.” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 
    939 A.2d 355
    , 359 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 
    598 Pa. 774
    , 
    958 A.2d 1047
    (2008) (internal citations omitted).
    In making the determination of whether after-discovered evidence
    would likely compel a different verdict, “a court should consider the integrity
    of the alleged after-discovered evidence, the motive of those offering the
    evidence, and the overall strength of the evidence supporting the conviction.”
    Commonwealth v. Padillas, 
    997 A.2d 356
    , 365 (Pa.Super. 2010). Where
    the alleged after-discovered evidence is recantation testimony, “the PCRA
    court must, in the first instance, assess the credibility and significance of the
    recantation in light of the evidence as a whole.” Commonwealth v. Small,
    
    647 Pa. 423
    , 450–51, 
    189 A.3d 961
    , 977 (2018) (quoting D’Amato, supra
    at 523, 856 A.2d at 825).      “Unless the [PCRA] court is satisfied that the
    recantation is true, it should deny a new trial.” Commonwealth v. Henry,
    
    550 Pa. 346
    , 363, 
    706 A.2d 313
    , 321 (1997) (citations omitted).
    Further,
    an appellate court may not interfere with the [PCRA court’s
    decision regarding] a new trial where the sole ground is the
    alleged recantation of state witnesses unless there has been
    a clear abuse of discretion. Additionally, the deference
    normally due to the findings of the PCRA court is
    accentuated where what is involved is recantation
    testimony. As such, it was within the exclusive province of
    the PCRA court to determine the credibility of [the witness’s]
    recantation. Finding no clear abuse of discretion on the part
    of the PCRA court in making its credibility determination,
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    J-S36044-23
    this Court is bound to accept it.
    Commonwealth v. Medina, 
    92 A.3d 1210
    , 1219 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal
    dismissed as improvidently granted, 
    636 Pa. 77
    , 
    140 A.3d 675
     (2016)
    (citations, internal quotation marks, and original brackets omitted).
    Instantly, in denying Appellant’s claim of after-discovered evidence, the
    PCRA court found that co-defendant Suarez’s testimony lacked the indicia of
    reliability. The court explained that the statement and testimony at the PCRA
    hearing, “by nature of being recantation, were incredibly unreliable and were
    also riddled with inconsistencies refuted by the available record.” (PCRA Court
    Opinion at 7). The PCRA court noted that both defendants pled guilty after
    hearing the factual basis for their plea. The court explained that co-defendant
    Suarez’s explanation as to why he originally said that Appellant was involved
    in the shooting was “incredibly weak.” (Id. at 11). Specifically:
    Co-Defendant Angel Suarez Jr. alleged in his affidavit that
    he went along with a story concocted by his father to blame
    Appellant as a way of helping himself out of the trouble he
    was in for shooting at his father. However, Co-Defendant
    Angel Suarez Jr. blaming Appellant for the shooting does not
    explain why Co-Defendant Angel Suarez Jr. would then still
    plead guilty.     …[T]his shows that Co-Defendant Angel
    Suarez Jr.’s justifications for lying were incredibly weak and
    this…new ‘truth’ had no indicia of reliability.
    (Id.)     Moreover, the court then explained that co-defendant Suarez’s
    statement was contradicted by the available record, stating:
    Both Co-Defendant Angel Suarez Jr.’s father and Ian
    Wolbert identified Co-Defendant Angel Suarez Jr. and
    Appellant as the shooters, undercutting the new allegation
    that “Pito” was the second shooter. Contrary to what Co-
    -8-
    J-S36044-23
    Defendant Angel Suarez Jr. stated, neighbors who
    witnessed the shooting only saw two individuals, not three.
    Those same neighbors also saw the shooters running toward
    Co-Defendant Angel Suarez Jr.’s father and Ian Wolbert
    while firing their weapons, not away from the victims as Co-
    Defendant Angel Suarez Jr. alleged in his affidavit.
    (Id.)
    Upon our review of the record, we see no clear abuse of discretion by
    the PCRA court in rejecting co-defendant Suarez’s statement as incredible.
    See Medina, supra. As the PCRA court noted, the evidence of Appellant’s
    guilt included the testimony of two eyewitnesses who identified Appellant as
    the shooter soon after the shooting.     Assessing this evidence against co-
    defendant Suarez’s incredible conflicting account, the record supports the
    court’s decision to deny relief.       See Small, 
    supra;
     Henry, 
    supra.
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    Order affirmed.
    Date: 10/26/2023
    -9-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2237 EDA 2022

Judges: King, J.

Filed Date: 10/26/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024