Nationstar Mortgage v. Wells, L. ( 2023 )


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  • J-S20012-23
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
    MORTGAGE ASSETS MANAGEMENT,                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    LLC                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    LEROY WELLS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS              :
    HEIR OF JESSIE WELLS, AND                    :   No. 2206 EDA 2022
    UNKNOWN HEIRS, SUCCESSORS,                   :
    ASSIGNS AND ALL PERSONS, FIRMS               :
    OR ASSOCIATIONS CLAIMING                     :
    RIGHT, TITLE OR INTEREST FROM                :
    OR UNDER JESSIE WELLS                        :
    :
    :
    APPEAL OF: LEROY WELLS, IN HIS               :
    CAPACITY AS HEIR OF JESSIE WELLS
    Appeal from the Order Entered July 25, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
    No(s): 191001142
    BEFORE:      DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                              FILED OCTOBER 27, 2023
    Appellant Leroy Wells appeals from the order entered by the Philadelphia
    Court of Common Pleas on July 25, 2022, denying Appellant’s Petition to Open
    Default Judgment in this mortgage foreclosure action. After careful review,
    we affirm the order.
    The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. In June 2012,
    Jessie Wells executed a reverse mortgage, secured by real property located
    ____________________________________________
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S20012-23
    at 128 E. Pleasant Street in Philadelphia. Jessie Wells died intestate in May
    2019.
    On October 14, 2019, Appellee filed the instant mortgage foreclosure
    action against Appellant, in his capacity as heir of Jessie Wells, and served
    Appellant personally on October 20, 2019.1        In the Complaint, Appellee
    asserted that, under the terms of the mortgage, the entire balance became
    due upon the death of Jessie Wells. Appellee stated that it sent the requisite
    foreclosure notices to Appellant.
    Although Appellant’s counsel entered his appearance on July 1, 2020,
    Appellant did not respond to the Complaint. On December 31, 2021, Appellee
    sent notices of its intention to file default judgment pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P.
    237.1. On March 29, 2022, Appellee filed its praecipe for default judgment
    against Appellant.
    Eighty days later, Appellant filed a counseled Petition to Open Default
    Judgment on June 17, 2022. The trial court denied the Petition on July 25,
    2022. Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on August 24, 2022. Subsequently,
    the trial court and Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Appellant raises the following question for our review: “Did the trial
    court err, abuse its discretion, and/or make a mistake and/or error of law
    when it denied[ Appellant’s] Petition to Open and Strike a Judgment based on
    ____________________________________________
    1 At the time of Jessie Well’s death, Nationstar Mortgage held the mortgage.
    During the instant litigation, Nationstar Mortgage assigned the mortgage to
    Appellee Mortgage Assets Management. For ease of discussion, we refer to
    both Nationstar Mortgage and Mortgage Assets Management as “Appellee.”
    -2-
    J-S20012-23
    an Answer not being filed in response to [Appellee’s] Complaint?” Appellant’s
    Br. at 2. Appellant’s phrasing of the question implies that he appeals both the
    denial of a petition to open and a petition to strike. Our review of the record,
    however, reveals that Appellant filed only a Petition to Open. 2
    “A petition to open a default judgment is an appeal to the equitable
    powers of the court.” Smith v. Morrell Beer Distributors, Inc., 
    29 A.3d 23
    , 25 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). Thus, the decision to grant or
    deny the petition “is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and
    [appellate courts] will not overturn that decision absent a manifest abuse of
    discretion or error of law.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    A court may grant a petition to open default judgment only if the moving
    party demonstrates that it “(1) promptly filed a petition to open the default
    judgment, (2) provided a reasonable excuse or explanation for failing to file a
    responsive pleading, and (3) pleaded a meritorious defense to the allegations
    contained in the complaint.” Digital Commc'ns Warehouse, Inc. v. Allen
    Invs., LLC, 
    223 A.3d 278
    , 285 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). “The
    timeliness of a petition to open judgment is measured from the date that
    ____________________________________________
    2 The trial court in its Rule 1925(a) Opinion addressed Appellant’s question as
    if he had filed a petition to strike. While our review indicates that Appellant
    did not file a petition to strike, we nevertheless agree with the trial court that
    Appellant failed to “identify any fatal error on the face of the record warranting
    striking default judgment.”        Tr. Ct. Op., 11/28/22, at 4; see Digital
    Commc'ns Warehouse, Inc. v. Allen Invs., LLC, 
    223 A.3d 278
    , 284 (Pa.
    Super. 2019) (observing that a petition to strike requires demonstration of “a
    fatal defect or irregularity appearing on the face of the record”) (citation
    omitted). Thus, even assuming Appellant’s Petition could be interpreted to
    include a petition to strike, we would affirm its denial.
    -3-
    J-S20012-23
    notice of the entry of the default judgment is received.” U.S. Bank N.A. v.
    Mallory, 
    982 A.2d 986
    , 995 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations omitted).
    Pennsylvania appellate courts have interpreted “prompt filing” generally as
    requiring filing within one month of the default judgment. 
    Id.
    In his Petition to Open Default Judgment, Appellant baldly asserted that
    the “petition has been promptly filed, a meritorious defense can be
    demonstrated, and the [Appellant’s] prior failures are excusable.” Petition,
    6/17/22. While identifying the three requirements in the Petition, Appellant
    did not overtly address the requirements in his counselled supporting
    memorandum. Instead, Appellant asserted that his counsel had mistakenly
    failed to withdraw his appearance in the case despite informing Appellant in
    June 2021, that he would no longer represent Appellant. Appellant further
    averred that his counsel filed the instant petition soon after receiving a “letter
    in May 2022 informing him of the default judgment and the pending sale.” 3
    Appellant asked the court to grant his petition to open so that counsel could
    then withdraw his appearance and permit Appellant to seek new counsel or
    proceed pro se. Notably, Appellant did not identify his claimed “meritorious
    defense” nor explain the delay in filing a response to the Complaint.
    Appellant’s counselled argument to this Court fails to provide any
    additional substantive analysis and instead only nominally addresses the three
    ____________________________________________
    3 Appellant’s Memorandum of Law, 6/17/22.
    -4-
    J-S20012-23
    requirements for a petition to open.4 Appellant’s Br. at 10. As such, Appellant
    fails to provide relevant legal analysis in violation of Pa.R.A.P. 2119.
    In contrast, the trial court fully supported its conclusion that Appellant
    failed to meet the three requirements for a petition to open. Addressing the
    promptness requirement, the court noted that a petition filed over a month
    after default judgment is “presumptively untimely.” Tr. Ct. Op., 11/28/22, at
    5. As Appellant filed his petition eighty days after default judgment, the court
    concluded that Appellant did not file his petition promptly. Second, the court
    opined that Appellant’s reliance on his counsel’s failure to withdraw his
    representation did “not amount to a reasonable excuse or explanation for
    failing to file a responsive pleading.” Id. at 6. Finally, the court observed
    that while Appellant claimed that he could “demonstrate a meritorious
    defense,” he did not identify the defense, nor did he attach a responsive
    pleading. Id.
    Upon careful review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did
    not abuse its discretion by denying the Petition to Open Default Judgment as
    Appellant failed to meet any of the requirements for a petition to open.
    Accordingly, we affirm the order denying Appellant’s Petition to Open Default
    Judgment.
    ____________________________________________
    4 For example, Appellant asserts that he “has a meritorious defense as he
    disputes the amount owed” on the mortgage. Id. at 6. He fails, however, to
    identify either the nature of the dispute or where he preserved this issue
    before the trial court. Id. at 6.
    -5-
    J-S20012-23
    Order affirmed.
    Date: October 27, 2023
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2206 EDA 2022

Judges: Dubow, J.

Filed Date: 10/27/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024